The grant of an office, like the charter of a public corpora-
tion, is a mere delegation of authority, and revocable at pleas-
ure by the State. The law creating the office may therefore
be repealed, or the salary of the incumbent reduced during
his tenure without impairing the obligation of a contract.1
The rule was so held in Connor v. The City of New York,2
where Ruggles, J., said that in this country public offices are
not incorporeal hereditaments, nor have they the character or
quality of grants; they are agencies created for the benefit
of the public, which may at any time be controlled or abol-
ished by the legislature. So in Knoup v. The Piqua Bank,3
a public agent was described as being simply a servant or
trustee having no ownership in the duties which he has been
appointed to perform, or the compensation which he is to re-
ceive for his services. An ordinance of the City Councils
reducing the salary of the mayor of Philadelphia after the
commencement of his term of office, was accordingly held valid
in the Commonwealth v. Bacon. Duncan, J., said: "The
broad ground taken on the part of the mayor was, that his sal-
ary could not legally be diminished after his duties had begun.
It had been endeavored to support this position both on the
general principles applicable to contracts, and because the
change was forbidden by the Constitution. Neither argu-
ment was good. The case was not that of a hiring for a
year, because it was not obligatory on the mayor to serve out
the year. The services rendered by public officers do not
partake of the nature of contracts. The salary of the gov-
ernor and judges of the Supreme Court and of the presidents
of the courts of Common Pleas could not, agreeably to the
Constitution of Pennsylvania, be diminished while they re-
mained in office. The compensation of all other officers was
left to the discretion of the legislature." 5

1 Koontz v. Franklin Co., 76 Pa. 154; The State v. Horman, 11 Mo.
App. 43; Donahue v. Rolls County, 100 Ill. 94; Commonwealth v.
Bailey, 81 Ky. 395; Farwell v. Rockland, 62 Me. 296; Warner v. The
People, 7 Hill, 81.

2 1 Selden, 285.

8 1 Ohio St. 603, 616.

4 6 S. & R. 322.
5 See 4 Wheaton, 418, 593; 6 Howard, 507, 548; Butler v. Pennsylvania,

10 Id. 402.

OR SALARY REDUCED.

651

A State is nevertheless as much bound by its contracts as an individual, and cannot engage a servant for a definite period and then rely on a repeal of the statute under which the agreement was made, as a justification for dismissing him before the appointed time.1 An office is an employment; but it does not follow that every one whom the State employs is a bare mandatary who may be turned adrift at pleasure.2 In Hall v. Wisconsin the legislature provided for a geological survey of the State, and authorized the governor to carry it into effect by engaging the services of three commissioners, who were to serve for two years at the rate of four thousand dollars per annum, and not to be removable except for incompetency or neglect. The plaintiff was employed under this statute, and it was held that there was a contract that bound both parties, and could not be rescinded without mutual consent. As the State could not have dismissed the plaintiff while the statute was in force, so they could not attain the same end by repealing the statute, and thus putting an end to the business for which he had been engaged.

Although the grant of a license for a valuable consideration is presumably irrevocable, or, in other words, a contract that the grantor will not recall the power which he has conferred, the circumstances may nevertheless exclude this inference and show that the grant is subject to an implied condition which may render it inoperative. The grant of a pew in perpetuity, or of a burial-lot in a cemetery attached to a church, is within this principle, and simply entitles the grantee to a usufructuary right so long as the church is employed as a place for religious worship, or the cemetery can properly be used for interments. If the edifice becomes useless by dilapidation, or is destroyed by fire or other casualty, the right of the pew-owner is gone; and it has been declared that a "pew right" is not of such a character as to preclude a sale of the church edifice either by private contract or by

1 United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wallace, 385; Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U. S. 5; see King v. Hunter, 65 N. C. 603; Van v. Pepkin, 77 Id. 408.

2 United States v. Maurice, 2 Brock, 96.

judicial process.1 So the purchase of a church vault, or of the right of sepulture belonging to a religious society, does not, agreeably to many authorities, give a title to the heirs or executors of the buyer, or preclude the sale of the premises and the removal of the remains with the decency and respect for the feelings of the survivors which humanity and the common law require.2

Whatever the rule may be between a cemetery company and the persons to whom they have sold burial-lots, there can be no doubt that the State may, by virtue of the police power, forbid interment within the limits of a city or in any place where it will be injurious to the public health, and that a law passed for that end will be obligatory both on the company and its grantees. In The Brick Church v. New York,3 the city of New York conveyed a piece of ground to a religious society for burial purposes, with a covenant for quiet enjoyment; and an act prohibiting future interments was held to be a defence to a suit for the breach of the covenant. The act rescinded without impairing the obligation of the contract, because it was a legitimate exercise of the police power, and the covenantor could not be bound to do what the law prohibited. The case of Coates v. The Mayor of New York is to the same effect; and it has been held to follow that the legislature may proceed a step further, and not only vacate the burying ground as such, and order the removal of the bodies, but authorize a sale of the premises, and direct that the proceeds shall, after compensating the holders of the lots, be distributed among the stockholders or other persons owning or entitled to the fee. 5

1 The Church v. Wells, 24 Pa. 249; Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Pa. 411. 2 See Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Pa. 411; Richards v. The Church, 32 Barb. 42; Windt v. The Reformed Church, 4 Sauford Ch. 471; The King v. Lind, 2 Term, 733.

85 Cowen, 538.

47 Cowen, 585.

5 Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Pa. 411.