isting of himself: nor does he apprehend the force of πì wartwv, or what Athanasius is talking of in that place. When he understands the maxim of Irenæus, (invisibile Filii Pater, p. 234.) and considers how God the Son was supposed to be let down, as it were, to the creatures, while the Father remained in excelsis, and, as it were, within himself; he will then know how to construe that passage. III. Page 19th of the Observations, we meet with another misrepresentation, a very great one. 66 "It was further alleged, that Dr. Waterland most ab"surdly so interprets this phrase, (èxagíoaro,) given him a name; as if it could signify extolling and magnifying "in such a sense as men extol and magnify God; as if "men could (xapio ao dai) graciously grant any thing to "God." I had interpreted exalting to signify praising, (in such a sense as men exalt God,) in opposition to the other sense of exalting, which is raising up to a higher place or dignity. This is all the objector has to ground his weak suggestion upon. As to xagíoaodai, giving, gratifying with, or the like, as it may be done by equals to equals, or even by inferiors to superiors, as well as by superiors to inferiors; where is the inference that the Father must be superior to the Son, because of his giving him a name? My answer therefore was in these words: "I see no absurdity in interpreting giving a name to be 'giving a name. But it is absurd to imagine that God "may not glorify his Son, as well as his Son may glorify "him; by spreading and extolling his name over the "whole creation1:" which this writer transcribes, and leaves as he found; not being able to answer it. Nor indeed is there any just objection against an equal doing thus to an equal: nor does xapioada intimate any thing more than its being a free and voluntary act. But it is trifling in this case to strain the words (used in the other case) in such a sense as men exalt God; which were in 1 Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 211. tended only in opposition to another quite different sense of exaltation: and are still to be understood with allowance for the different circumstances. " is not. 66 IV. Page 34th, this writer cites some words of my Second Defence, (vol. iii. p. 169.) which are these: "If you "ask why that Person called the Son might not have "been Father, I have nothing to say, but that in fact he So it is written, and so we believe: the Father “is Father, and the Son is Son." Upon which he is pleased to remark as follows: " By the Doctor's hypo"thesis therefore, there was no impossibility in the na"ture of things, but unoriginate might have been originate, and originate unoriginate; underived might have "been derived, and derived underived; the Father might "have been begotten, and the Son unbegotten." Such is his malicious or thoughtless misconstruction of very plain and very innocent words. In the same paragraph, from which he cited my words, I assert the priority of order (that is, the originateness of one, and unoriginateness of the other) to be natural, that is, necessary or unalterable, and eternally so: so that one could never have been the other; which is my constant doctrine. But if you ask why they could not, which is asking a reason a priori in a case which admits of none, I pretend not to it; being content to prove the fact a posteriori, which is all that can be done. Will any man give me a reason a priori, why there must have been a God, or why it could not have been otherwise? It is impossible. It is sufficient to prove a posteriori, that in fact there is a God, and that he could not but be, because we find that he exists necessarily, and without a cause. But we shall have more of this in the sequel. V. Page 35. Observat. " Instead of eternal generation, "the Doctor, if he was at liberty, had much rather say "eternal existence of a real and living Word, &c.-And "for this reason, I suppose, it is, that instead of the Ni"cene words, begotten of the Father, and from the sub"stance of the Father, the Doctor, by a new and unheard "of expression, affirms the Son to be the substance of the "Father." First Defence, vol. i. p. 269. Answ. As to what he is here imagining of what the Doctor had rather say, and if he was at liberty, it deserves no answer my sentiments in that article are sufficiently known, and fully laid down in my writings. His other remark about a new and unheard of expression, betrays his ignorance in antiquity, or something worse. Ever since the terms substance and person came into this controversy, Father and Son have been always believed and professed to be one substance: as high as Tertullian, all the three have been called one substance. Una substantia in tribus cohærentibus. What is this but saying, that both the Son and Holy Ghost are the Father's substance, since all are one substance, which one substance is the Father's, as well as theirs? This is all that I say in the place referred to, "that the Son might be justly called the Father's sub66 stance, both being one." VI. "Tertullian presumes to add, speaking of one of "Dr. Waterland's principal assertions, if the Scripture "itself had taught it, it could not have been true." Observ. p. 52. comp. p. 47. This is misrepresentation both of Tertullian and me. The assertion of which Tertullian speaks is, that "the Father was actually incarnate, suf"fered," &c. the tenet of the Praxeans. And he does not say, it could not have been true, but could not have been believed, and that with a perhaps (fortasse non credenda de Patre licet scripta) to show that it was rather a rhetorical figure of speech, than to be taken strictly, and with utmost rigour: and his chief reason why he said so much, was because such a tenet could hardly, if at all, be reconciled with other Scriptures and their description of the Father, and the standing economy of the three Persons therein revealed. How does this at all affect my as sertion that, antecedent to the economy, "there was no "impossibility in the nature of the thing itself, but the "Father himself might have done the same that the Son "did?" This is not the assertion which Tertullian strikes 66 at: nor did he say of the other, that it could not be true, nor positively, that it could not be believed. Three false reports this gentleman has here crowded into one short sentence. And I must remind him of what I before told himm, (though he is pleased to forget it,) that the same Tertullian, in the same treatise, when, in the course of the dispute, he was brought closer up to the pinch of the question; had nothing to say about the natural impossibility of the supposition: but he resolves the case entirely into this, that Scripture had warranted the assertion in regard to God the Son, and had not done so, but the contrary, in regard to God the Father. So little reason had this writer to appeal, twice, to Tertullian upon this article. VII. "The three Persons in the Trinity are (with Dr. "Waterland) real Persons, each of them an individual intelligent agent, undivided in substance, but still dis"tinct Persons: so distinct, that were they all unori"ginated, he himself allows they would be three Gods." [Good reason why, when upon that supposition they would be more distinct than they now are: but this is one of our author's shrewd remarks.] "Yet at the same time, "in a most unintelligible manner, and with the utmost "inconsistency, he professes them to be all but one living "Person." Where do I profess any such thing? This hasty gentleman might better have stayed a while to prove what he pretends, instead of fixing upon me a consequence of his own, and in such a manner as must make an ignorant reader think he had quoted my own words. He brings some passages of mine to prove his charge, which yet prove nothing like it. If the reader pleases to turn to my definition of person", he will easily perceive that the same life may be common to three Persons, and that identical life no more infers singularity of Person, than identity of essence. When this writer pleases to give us another m Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 124. definition of person, or to confute mine, we may give him a farther hearing. VIII. In the next page, (p. 90.) I meet with a misrepresentation of so odd a kind, that I could never have suspected it, and can scarce think he was well awake when he made it. He pitches upon a passage of my Second Defence, vol. iii. p. 188. which runs thus. "You have taken a great deal of fruitless pains to show, "that the particular glories belonging to the Son, on ac"count of his offices, are distinct from the glories belong"ing to the Father. You might in the same way have "shown that the particular glories due to the Father "under this or that consideration, are distinct from the "glories of the Father considered under another capa"city." Now let us come to the remark of this acute gentleman upon it. It is thus: "What is this, but saying, "that the Persons of the Father and Son differ no other"wise than as capacities of the same Person?" I am content to put it off, and to refer the reader to my book, which fully explains the whole thing; hinting only, that the writer might as well have said offices, (as capacities,) when his hand was in; and that nothing is more evident than that, if distinct offices in different persons are a foundation for distinct worships, then distinct offices in the same person will make as many distinct worships as there are offices. IX. One noted misrepresentation must not be neglected: the author insults mightily upon it. I shall cite part of what he says. "A coordination or subordination of mere order, with"out relation to time, place, power, dominion, authority, or the like, is exactly the same manner of speaking and thinking, as if a man should say, a coequality or in"equality of equality. Dr. Waterland therefore was really "much weaker than he imagines, when he wantonly de"clared, he was so weak as to think, that the words coordi"nation and subordination strictly and properly respected |