Misc.] Supreme Court, Appellate Term, March, 1899. court below was justified in resorting to oral evidence upon these subjects for the purpose of ascertaining and explaining the intention of the parties. The plaintiff insists that it was not competent for the defendant to show a failure to supply steam power or heat during December, 1892, January, 1893, and February, 1893, as a justification for her removal from the demised premises in the latter part of April, 1893. We think, however, such testimony was clearly admissible under the authorities. Thalheimer v. Lempert, 17 N. Y. St. Repr. 346; Tallman v. Murphy, 120 N. Y. 345; Tallman v. Earle, 3 Misc. Rep. 76. There was ample evidence adduced to sustain the finding that the plaintiff failed to furnish, as required by the terms of the covenant on his part, "so much heat as shall at all times be required" in her drying-room, and this considered in connection with the fact, as found, that plaintiff also failed to supply a uniform power, the defendant was justified in removing from the demised premises before the expiration of the said term. Koehler v. Scheider, 15 Daly, 198; Lawrence v. Mycenian Marble Co., 1 Misc. Rep. 105, 106, and citations; 2 McAdam L. & T. Supp. (2d ed.), § 212. Frederick C. Henderson, upon being recalled, as a witness, on behalf of the defendant, testified: "Q. Did you testify in the last trial as follows: 'It sometimes happened that Mrs. Schneider's belts slipped off the pulleys, and that Mrs. Schneider or Mr. Schneider called upon Mr. Trenkmann to shut down because the belts had slipped off, and when Mr. Trenkmann was thus called upon he did shut down. One cause of the slipping of the belts off the pulley was the slackness of Mrs. Schneider's belt.' Did you so testify? A. I don't remember. Q. If you did so testify, was your testimony true? A. It was not. Plaintiff's counsel: I now offer in evidence that part of his testimony at fol. 145, which I have read." This was objected to by the defendant; the objection was sustained and the plaintiff noted an exception. While the plaintiff had a legal right, as claimed, to show that the testimony of the witness on the former trial was inconsistent with his testimony given upon the last trial, yet he could do so only by competent proof. The case on appeal, to which the offer is assumed to have referred, was not evidence of the facts therein. contained. These could only be shown by a transcript of the Supreme Court, Appellate Term, March, 1899. [Vol. 26. minutes of the stenographer, supported by his oath upon the stand. As the objection was a general one, and a ground in fact existed for the exclusion, the ruling is to be upheld. Tooley v. Bacon, 70 N. Y. 34, 37; Quinby v. Strauss, 90 id. 664; McIlhargy v. Chambers, 117 id. 532, 542; Baylies Tr. Pr. 202. With respect to the plaintiff's exceptions to the charge and refusals at his request, we are of the opinion that none of them present sufficient ground for reversal. The error which, it is claimed, the court committed in declining to charge plaintiff's first request, was corrected by the charge which was made immediately thereafter of plaintiff's second request. Several other exceptions are referred to in the appellant's brief, to which we have given attention, but in our opinion, none of them are of sufficient importance to call for a reversal, and consequently the judgment should be affirmed, with costs. BEEKMAN, P. J., and GILDERSLEEVE, J., concur. Judgment affirmed, with costs. CLINTON S. HARRIS, as Assignee, Etc., of JOHN W. O'CONNELL, Respondent, v. HENRY BATJER et al., Appellants. (Supreme Court, Appellate Term, March, 1899.) Assignee for creditors May attack a chattel mortgage of his assignor which is void because not filed in time - Conversion. A general assignee has power to maintain an action of conversion to recover the value of chattels sold, against his protest, by chattel mortgagees of his assignor whose mortgage was concededly void, as against the creditors of the assignor, because it had not been filed in proper time as required by section 90 et seq. of chapter 418 of the Laws of 1897. APPEAL from a judgment rendered in the Municipal Court of the city of New York, borough of Manhattan, first district, in favor of the plaintiff. Charles G. F. Wahle, for appellants. Gwillim & Meyers, for respondent. Misc.] Supreme Court, Appellate Term, March, 1899. BEEKMAN, P. J. On April 30, 1898, one O'Connell executed and delivered to the defendants a chattel mortgage upon certain property, retaining, as is usual, possession of the chattels. On the 23d day of May following he made a general assignment for the benefit of creditors to the plaintiff, which was duly filed on the same day, and the assignee immediately took possession of the assigned estate, including the chattels in question. On the following day the defendants filed their chattel mortgage for the first time, and, against the protest of the assignee, took possession of the mortgaged property and caused it to be sold under the mortgage; whereupon this action was brought to recover its value, on the ground of conversion, resulting in a judgment against the defendants, from which they have appealed to this court. The mortgage was concededly void as against the creditors of O'Connell, because of the failure to file it in proper time, and the only question presented for review is whether an assignee for the benefit of creditors can take advantage of the fact. The statutory provision is familiar, which declares that where the mortgage is not accompanied by an immediate delivery of the chattels, followed by an actual and continued change of possession, it is "absolutely void as against the creditors of the mortgagor," unless the mortgage or a true copy thereof is filed as therein directed. Laws of 1897, chap. 418, § 90. It has been repeatedly declared by the courts that the word "creditors," as thus used, is to be taken in its most comprehensive sense. Southard v. Benner, 72 N. Y. 424; Karst v. Gane, 136 id. 316, 323. It is true that where the individual creditor intends to pursue the mortgaged property, he must, as a rule, reduce his claim to judgment, and by subsequent proceedings thereunder acquire a lien upon such property before his right to disregard the mortgage under the statute becomes of any practical value. But the right is not conditioned upon the pursuit of any particular remedy for its enforcement. It always existed potentially, but it became operative to his advantage only when the creditor, having as such acquired an interest in or lien upon the property, was confronted with the mortgage as an obstacle to the satisfaction of his debt out of it. Because as to him the mortgage was always nonexistent, by statute, he could deal with the property when it came within his grasp without reference to it. The essence of the thing, then, is the acquisition of such an interest. in the property as to entitle the creditor to its appropriation for the Supreme Court, Appellate Term, March, 1899. [Vol. 26. discharge of his debt, through methods not, necessarily or on principle, confined to the reduction of his claim to judgment and a levy under an execution. But in the case of a general assignment for the benefit of creditors is there not such a distinct and specific appropriation of the property which passes under it to the discharge of the assignor's debts? Such an assignee, as Judge Danforth observed in the case of Wheeler v. Lawson, 103 N. Y. 40, is "not a mere representative of the debtor, but of the rights of creditors, and may impeach the assignor's conveyances, although the debtor could not do so. Laws of 1858, chap. 314." It is true that the assignee derives his title to the assigned estate through the voluntary act of the insolvent and by his deed and not through the intervention of the court by the employment of its process or through its receiver; but why, in reason, should the difference in method call for a distinction in principle? In both cases the same purpose is sought to be accomplished, and one which the law favors, namely, the application, as far as may be, of an insolvent estate to the discharge of the insolvent's debts. Indeed, except in the first instance, the action of the court is in both cases constantly and necessarily invoked in the administration of the estate and its final distribution; and in both cases, whether the functionary be a receiver or an assignee, he represents the creditors, and although deriving title through the insolvent, may in their interests attack transfers previously made by the latter in fraud of their rights. The power to do this, in part at least, exists by virtue of chapter 314 of the Laws of 1858, as amended by chapter 740 of the Laws of 1894, which provides "That any executor, administ: ator, receiver, assignee or trustee of an estate, or the property and effects of an insolvent estate, corporation, association, partnership or individual, may for the benefit of creditors or others interested in the estate or property so held in trust, disaffirm, treat as void, and resist all acts done, transfers and agreements made, in fraud of the rights of any creditor, including themselves and others, interested in any estate or property held by or of right belonging to any such trustee or estate." The result of this legislation was to give to receivers and assignces for the benefit of creditors, rights which the insolvent himself did not possess, but which the creditors might have individually exercised, a broadening of power which is logically and indeed. in terms founded upon the existing right of the creditors them Misc.] Supreme Court, Appellate Term, March, 1899. selves to attack that which was fraudulent as against them. The exclusive appropriation of the property affected by the fraudulent transfer for the payment of the claims of creditors is thus accomplished through the devolution of their rights in that regard upon their trustee. No question can be made as to the right of an assignee to attack any such transfer where actual fraud can be shown, but it is contended that this is as far as the Act of 1858 goes, and the argument is that as the mere nonfiling of a chattel mortgage, unaccompanied by evidence of an associated purpose to defraud, is not fraudulent in fact, it does not, therefore, come within the purview of the statute. The question is one which has received considerable discussion, where the rights of receivers are concerned, and the authorities bearing upon the point have been reviewed at some length by the writer in the case of Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Baker, 20 Misc. Rep. 387. The case of Stephens v. Perrine, 143 N. Y. 476, is quite in point. There the plaintiff, a receiver appointed in proceedings supplementary to execution, brought an action to set aside a chattel mortgage, and to recover the property covered by it or its value, the mortgagee having omitted to file the mortgage. The question was raised as to the right of the receiver to maintain. such an action. At page 483 of the report, Judge Peckham, who delivered the opinion of the court, says: "It has been decided by this court that such a receiver can maintain an action of this nature where the assignment or mortgage is void on the ground that it was executed for the purpose of defrauding creditors, and we think the same principle reaches the case where the mortgage is void because it was not filed and there was no change of possession. Cases above cited. We see no distinction between the two cases so far as this question is concerned. The mortgage, as already stated, is equally void in both cases, and a receiver in supplementary proceedings represents the creditors, or in other words, is trustee for them just as much when the mortgage is void on the ground of the failure to file it as when it is void because executed with a fraudulent purpose. The case of Underwood v. Sutcliffe, 77 N. Y. 58, has, plainly, no bearing upon this point." In the case of Stephens v. Meriden Britannia Co., 13 App. Div. 268, the plaintiff, who was also a receiver appointed in proceedings supplementary to execution, sued for damages for the conversion of certain chattels by the chattel mortgagee, whose mortgage had not been filed. It was held that the action was |