of inferior quality, or of small cost, bear only the just proportion of the tax with those which are of superior quality or greater cost. The articles consumed by all are taxed at the same rate. A system of ad valorem revenue duties, with proper discriminations and proper guards against frauds in collecting them, it is not doubted, will afford ample incidental advantages to the manufacturers, and enable them to derive as great profits as can be derived from any other regular business. It is believed that such a system, strictly within the revenue standard, will place the manufacturing interests on a stable footing, and enure to their permanent advantage; while it will, as nearly as may be practicable, extend to all the great interests of the country the incidental protection which can be afforded by our revenue laws. Such a system, when once firmly established, would be permanent, and not be subject to the constant complaints, agitations and changes which must ever occur, when duties are not laid for revenue, but for the "protection merely" of a favored interest.

66

no money

In the deliberations of Congress on this subject, it is hoped that a spirit of mutual concession and compromise between conflicting interests may prevail, and that the result of their labors may be crowned with the happiest consequences. By the constitution of the United States it is provided, that shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law." A public treasury was undoubtedly contemplated and intended to be created, in which the public money should be kept from the period of collection until needed for public uses. In the collection and disbursement of the public money, no agencies have ever been employed by law, except such as were appointed by the government, directly responsible to it, and under its control. The safe keeping of the public money should be confided to a public treasury created by law, and under like responsibility and control. It is not to be imagined that the framers of the constitution could have intended that a treas

ury should be created as a place of deposit and safe-keeping of the public money which was irresponsible to the government. The first Congress under the constitution, by the act of the second September, 1789, "to establish the Treasury Department," provided for the appointment of a treasurer, and made it his duty" to receive and keep the moneys of the United States," and "at all times to submit to the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller, or either of them, the inspection of the moneys in his hands."

That banks, national or State, could not have been intended to be used as a substitute for the treasury spoken of in the constitution, as keepers of the public money, is manifest from the fact, that at that time there was no national bank, and but three or four State banks of limited capital existed in the country. Their employment as depositories was at first resorted to, to a limited extent, but with no avowed intention of continuing them permanently, in place of the treasury of the constitution. When they were afterwards from time to time employed, it was from motives of supposed convenience.

Our experience has shown, that when banking corporations have been the keepers of the public money, and been thereby made in effect the treasury, the government can have no guaranty that it can command the use of its own money for public purposes. The late Bank of the United States proved to be faithless. The State banks, which were afterwards employed, were faithless. But a few years ago, with millions of public money in their keeping, the government was brought almost to bankruptcy, and the public credit seriously impaired, because of their inability or indisposition to pay, on demand, to the public creditors, in the only currency recognized by the constitution. Their failure occurred in a period of peace, and great inconvenience and loss were suffered by the public from it. Had the country been involved in a foreign war, that inconvenience and loss would have been much greater, and might have resulted in extreme public calamity.

The public money should not be mingled with the private funds of banks or individuals, or be used for private purposes. When it is placed in banks for safe keeping, it is in effect loaned to them without interest, and is loaned by them upon interest to the borrowers from them. The public money is converted into banking capital, and is used and loaned out for the private profit of bank stockholders; and when called for (as was the case in 1837), it may be in the pockets of the borrowers from the banks, instead of being in the public treasury contemplated by the constitution. The framers of the constitution could never have intended that the money paid into the treasury should be thus converted to private use, and placed beyond the control of the government.

Banks which hold the public money are often tempted, by a desire to gain, to extend their loans, increase their circulation, and thus stimulate, if not produce a spirit of speculation and extravagance, which sooner or later must result in ruin to thousands. If the public money be not permitted to be thus used, but be kept in the treasury and paid out to the public creditors in gold and silver, the temptation afforded by its deposite with banks to an undue expansion of their business, would be checked, while the amount of the constitutional currency left in circulation would be enlarged, by its employment in the public collections and disbursements, and the banks themselves would, in consequence, be found in a safer and sounder condition.

At present, State banks are employed as depositories, but without adequate regulation of law, whereby the public mon ey can be secured against the casualties and excesses, revul sions, suspensions, and defalcations, to which, from over-issues over-trading, an inordinate desire for gain, or other causes they are constantly exposed. The Secretary of the Treasury has in all cases, when it was practicable, taken collateral security for the amount which they hold, by the pledge of stocks of the United States, or such of the States as were in

good credit. Some of the deposite banks have given this description of security, and others have declined to do so.

Entertaining the opinion that "the separation of the moneys of the government from banking institutions is indispensable for the safety of the funds of the government and the rights of the people," I recommend to Congress that provision be made by law for such separation, and that a constitutional treasury be created for the safe-keeping of the public money. The constitutional treasury recommended is designed as a secure depository for the public money, without any power to make loans or discounts, or to issue any paper whatever as a currency or circulation. I cannot doubt that such a treasury as was contemplated by the constitution, should be independent of all banking corporations. The money of the people should be kept in the treasury of the people created by law, and be in the custody of agents of the people chosen by themselves, according to the form of the constitution; agents who are directly responsible to the government, who are under adequate bonds and oaths, and who are subject to severe punishments for any embezzlement, private use, or misapplication of the public funds, and for any failure in other respects to perform their duties. To say that the people of their government are incompetent, or not to be trusted with the custody of their own money, in their own treasury, provided by themselves, but must rely on the presidents, cashiers, and stockholders of banking corporations, not appointed by them, nor responsible to them, would be to concede that they are incompetent for self-government.

In recommending the establishment of a constitutional treasury, in which the public money shall be kept, I desire that adequate provision be made by law for its safety, and that all executive discretion or control over it shall be removed, except such as may be necessary in directing its disbursements in pursuance of appropriations made by law.

Under our present land system, limiting the minimum price

at which the public lands can be entered to one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre, large quantities of lands of inferior quality remain unsold, because they will not command that price. From the records of the General Land Office it appears, that, of the public lands remaining unsold in the several states and territories in which they are situated, thirty-nine millions one hundred and five thousand five hundred and sev-enty-seven acres have been in the market, subject to entry, more than twenty years; forty-nine millions six hundred and thirty-eight thousand six hundred and forty-four acres for more than fifteen years; seventy-three millions seventy-four thousand and six hundred acres for more than ten years; and one hundred and six millions one hundred and seventy-six thousand nine hundred and sixty-one acres for more than five years. Much the largest portion of these lands will continue to be unsaleable at the minimum price at which they are permitted to be sold, so long as large territories of lands from which the more valuable portions have not been selected are annually brought into market by the government. With the view to the sale and settlement of these inferior lands, I recommend that the price be graduated and reduced below the present minimum rate, confining the sales at the reduced prices to settlers and cultivators in limited quantities. If graduated and reduced in price for a limited term to one dollar per acre, and after the expiration of that period, for a second and third term to lower rates, a large portion of these lands would be purchased, and many worthy citizens, who are unable to pay higher rates, could purchase homes for themselves and their families. By adopting the policy of graduation and reduction of price, these inferior lands will be sold for their real value, while the states in which they lie will be freed from the inconvenience, if not injustice to which they are subjected, in consequence of the United States continuing to own large quantities of public lands within their borders, not liable to taxation for the support of their local governments.