preference or conviction,) at the poll the profession is equally false, being a profession against the judgment, and the action is contrary to the line of public duty, for it is opposed to the voter's secret conviction or preferences. Thus the person is equally false in pretences in either case; yet, in the Ballot, the public extracts that which it needs, namely, the sincere judgment, and in the other instance of open voting the desired object is not secured. There is no reason to suppose that, on the first establishment of the Ballot, there would be more hypocrisy than is now created by open voting under sinister and undue influences; but the Ballot, be it observed, would, in a very short time, strike at the root of hypocrisy by destroying the foul influences, which would cease to be exerted when the opportunity of ascertaining their success should be denied and their power defeated. But it is asked, would you destroy the influence of property? It were as sensible to ask whether we would destroy the influence of the sword, or any other sort of power available to beneficial or to mischievous purposes. The influence of property is of two kinds, good and bad, and it is the admirable function of the Ballot to annul the bad and leave free scope for the good. The beneficial employment of property wins upon the affections and engages the respect of men, as is excellently explained by the author of the masterly essay on the Ballot in the Westminster Review. "Riches, to the purpose we are now contemplating, mean a certain quantity of power, power of bestowing-good more or less extensively-and also of inflicting evil on our fellow-creatures. It is possible, we all know, for a man who is possessed of this power, to exercise it in such a manner as to become the object of the affection and reverence, not only of all those who come within the sphere of his virtues, but, by sympathy with them, of all those to whom the knowledge of his character is diffused. The opinions, the wishes, of such a man, become a motive to his fellow-creatures. We desire to be able to concur with him in his opinions, we desire to be able to forward the objects of his wishes. If such a man expresses a decided preference of one or two candidates; the opinion of his virtue, that he would not recommend the man whom he did not inwardly prefer; and of his wisdom, that he would not be deceived, together with the unavoidable pleasure of giving him pleasure, would always go far to determine the choice of those who live under the influence of his virtues. This is the legitimate influence of property, in the sense in which it is moral. This is an influence which is as safe under the Ballot as without the Ballot. The man who proceeds to the scene of election with that reverence in his heart which the moral influence of property implies, will not be deserted of that moral impulse, when he places his vote in secrecy. The effect of it is as sure as if it were delivered before an assembled world; because it is the mind of the man that acts. The will, the choice, are his own. Thus, where property is worthily employed, its influence would be as strong in the balloting-box as in the hearts of men; but where it is used for vice, oppression, debauchery, bribery, and corruption, there its power would cease with the secret delivery of the suffrage. The next objection is, that lying and venality would be caused by the Ballot. Nothing short of the wit of Sir Robert Wilson could have strung together these two antagonist propositions, for it should be clear to the understanding of a child of eight years of age, that the renality could not co-exist with the lying, or the lying with the venality. No person, who walks abroad without a keeper, buys without the opportunity of knowing whether the terms of the bargain are performed by the seller; and no one can sell whose word is not to be believed, and whose performance of the required services is not to be seen. When lying has shaken faith, there must clearly be an end of the traffic of corruption. But the prevalence of falsehood would not be necessary to this result. Open voting abolished, every one would feel the absurdity of relying on the engagement of a man to vote for a bribe who was base enough to receive a bribe. The desperate experiment might occasionally be made, but it would be too costly and doubtful for common or general practice, and too often disappointed for encouragement to a repetition. There is yet another objection proceeding from the same author, the Southwark knight, which is so absurd that it is hardly worth mention, except, indeed, for its egregious folly. Sir Robert Wilson seems, of all men, the most happy in self-confutation, and the teemings of his brain destroy each other like the children of Cadmus. It is said that secret voting would be bad because its secrecy would be attended with the demoralizing effects whose probability we have considered; and it is also alleged that secret voting would be worthless because secret voting would not be secret. The votes could only be known by defect in the arrangement for taking them, and the apprehension does not, therefore, apply to the principle of the measure proposed, but to the means of carrying it into effect. Electors may of course declare how they have voted, but observation assures us that men are not apt to make declarations which are sceptically received by friends, and angrily resented by enemies. The bavard, who says, "I voted in the Ballot for A against B," has scarcely a hold on the favour of A, who has his doubts of the service; but he is certain of the anger of B, who firmly believes the boasted act of hostility, as it is in human nature, or rather experience, to be more credulous of injuries than benefits. The effect of declarations to prejudice, and not to profit, would soon be felt, as the avowals would only be implicitly credited by those interested in resenting them. We now come to the last objection, and the only one involving a serious consideration, and supported with any show of reason-the impolicy of withdrawing the elector from the influence of public opinion. It is curious, that upon this ground has been founded the only plausible argument against the Ballot, and yet it is the only argument that has not been urged by the opponents of the Ballot in Parliament and at public meetings. The Standard newspaper put it forth, but the arms thus tendered have probably proved too heavy for the persons who have fluttered the flimsiest fallacies against secret voting. In order to understand the unsoundness of the objection to which we have referred, it is first to be considered that the constituency is itself part and parcel of public opinion, and unable to escape in the Ballot from its own convictions. To borrow the felicitous bull of the late Lord Londonderry, the people cannot "turn their backs upon themselves." In open voting there is a mode by which the venal or influenced escape the working of public opinion, and the shame of acting in defiance of the general sentiment of society. The biassed and influenced profess preferences which they do not feel, and the consequent display of a mass of fictitious opinion serves to sanction the course of the venal and the subservient, and to shelter them under the imposing show of numbers. The false appearances, at many an election, produced by bribery or intimidation, pass for a demonstration of opinion, respectable from its earnest ness and extent. Substitute secret voting for the open poll, and this pseudo-opinion ceases to act, and the true opinion dictates the course of conduct in place of it. For the comprehension of the value of publicity, in respect of the delivery of the suffrage, the following explanatory passage from Mr. Mill's History of British India" should be constantly borne in mind as a guiding principle. "There are occasions on which the use of the Ballot is advantageous; there are occasions on which it is hurtful. If we look steadily to the end to which all institutions profess to be directed, we shall not find it very difficult to draw the line of demarcation. A voter may be considered as subject to the operation of two sets of interests: the one, interests arising out of the good or evil for which he is dependent upon the will of other men; the other, interests in respect to which he cannot be considered as dependent upon any determinate man or men. There are cases in which the interests for which he is not dependent upon other men might impel him in the right direction. If not acted upon by other interests, he will, in such cases, vote in that direction. If, however, he is acted upon by interests dependent upon other men, which latter interests are more powerful than the former, and act in the opposite direction, he will vote in the opposite direction. What is necessary, therefore, is, to save him from the opposition of those interests. This is accomplished by enabling him to vote in secret; for in that case the man who would otherwise compel his vote, is ignorant in what direction it has been given. In all cases, therefore, in which the independent interests of the voter, those which in propriety of language may be called his own interests, would dictate the good and useful vote; but in which cases, at the same time, he is liable to be acted upon in the way either of good or evil, by men whose interests would dictate a base and mischievous vote, the Ballot is a great and invaluable security. In this set of cases is included the important instance of the votes of the people for representatives in the legislative assembly of a nation. It is, therefore, of the highest importance that they should be protected from that influence. There is, however, another set of cases in which those interests of the voter, which have their origin primarily in himself, and not in other men, draw in the hurtful direction; and in which he is not liable to be operated upon by any other interests of other men, than those which he possesses in common with the rest of the community. If allowed in this set of cases to vote in secret, he will be sure to vote as the sinister interest impels. If forced to vote in public, he will be subject to all the restraint, which the eye of the community fixed upon his virtue or knavery, is calculated to produce; and in such cases the Ballot is only an encouragement to evil."-Mill's British India, b. 4, c. 9. In disposing of the objections to the Ballot, we have forborne from citing examples, and from references to the experience of other nations. Were such examples and experience as adverse to our argument as they are favourable to it, we should deny force to them with reference to our case, because it is our firm conviction that Great Britain is the country of the world whose peculiar state of society most especially requires the redress of the Ballot. There is no other country in which the dependences are so many, so various, and so close; in which the influences have been so long exercised, and the black art of employing them so wickedly well understood. There is no expedient but the Ballot to prevent such scandals to society and cruelty to individuals, as have been exhibited in the late oppressions of Stamford and Newark. Other places are groaning under the same system, but resistance has not provoked the open manifestation of tyranny and made its workings known. There is no expedient but the Ballot to check such disgraceful exhibitions as that of the last Liverpool election, when every species of depravity was indulged in without disguise or stint; and wretches who had prostituted their votes by day, actually destroyed themselves with drink at night, perishing with the filthy poison they had betrayed their social trusts to riot in. Against corruption and intimidation there is no security but the Ballot-against the former it will generally prove sufficient, against the latter always. What are, then, the objections to be balanced against these advantages? We declare, we know not one that will bear a moment's consideration. Phantoms of the imagination are suggested to scare us from recourse to the crypt of political liberty, but the mischief that would result from the use of it is yet to be stated. MY SINECURE PLACE. How's this, my Lord Grey, can you mean what you say? My mansion in town has been lately rebuilt, My castle must also be kept in repair, My lady, the beauty-you'll own 'twould be hard- Economy may be discreet, I dare say, You must, my Lord Grey, (it is time to be frank,) If beggarly vagabonds will make a row, Be firm, and intimidate, no matter how— I'll stipulate always to give you my vote- Your notions-whate'er they may be -I'll embrace, T. H. B. VICISSITUDES IN A LAWYER'S LIfe. SOME years ago, a friend of mine was called up to London, as being the representative of a person that had lately died intestate. The deceased had been a barrister of some reputation with his class, but in small practice; and, not having during his life been very communicative respecting his affairs, it was thought necessary that my friend (who was his cousin and next of kin) should personally superintend the opening of his desk and papers, and endeavour to ascertain the amount of property to which he had become heir. Being myself somewhat of a man of business, although no lawyer, I accompanied him on these occasions, and assisted him on all others with my friendship and advice. After long and careful investigation, however, we could discover nothing in the shape of money, beyond a sum of 1207. stock in the Three per Cents., together with a few sovereigns and some loose silver, in his chambers. He had evidently lived, from day to day, on what his profession brought him. There was, indeed, an indifferent law library, which we disposed of for forty or fifty pounds, and a few precedents, (of conveyances, bills and answers in Chancery, and such like things,) which we charitably presented to the clerk; but nothing farther worthy of mention,-excepting only the manuscript, of which a copy is given below. This was found lying, with other unimportant papers, in the drawer of his table, and having been tied up with red tape, and written on what the lawyers call draft paper, was at first mistaken by us for a matter of business. Just, however, as my friend was handing over the bundle to the clerk, a few letters which were on the back caught my attention, and, on looking closer, I perceived the words, "Some account of my life." Being curious in my reading, (for which, however, I have but little time to spare from my business,) I begged the manuscript from my friend, who was delighted at an opportunity of making some return for my exertions. I had no thoughts of rendering the matter public, as will easily be believed; but a literary acquaintance having run his eye over it, recommended me to print it. He offered, moreover, to "polish it up," and "make it fit for the press;" but (though I listened to his recommendation as to publishing) I determined that it should appear in its natural dress, if it appeared at all. I am one of those who think that the feelings of an individual can be best expressed in his own unstudied language. Independently of this, I was desirous of exhibiting to the world what Mr. Coleridge calls "a psychological curiosity," or, in other words, the autobiography of a lawyer, who, after having dwelt in the midst of forms and tautologies for twenty years, had courage to write like a rational being, and to put down his thoughts in common language. The parallel of " the dyer's hand" (which the great poet, Shakspeare, adverts to) does not, as it appears to me, hold good upon all occasions. But I will not detain the reader any longer from the counsellor's manuscript. The following is a verbatim copy of it, made by my own hand, and carefully examined with the original. THE LAWYER'S STORY. ... Had I followed the example of my fathers, I should now be a farmer of thirty acres, on the banks of a little stream that runs into |