not get any worse.'

Further Dr. Andrews testified that in his

opinion the claimant had suffered the loss of the use of his right

eye.

We also find the following in Dr. Andrews' testimony:

Q. Do I understand you to say that Mr. Hayden has 22/100 vision with a glass?

A. Yes sir.

Q.

used?

A.

Is that the very best glass that can possibly be

Yes sir.

Q. I understand you to find that he would be practically blind if the other eye was lost?

A. He can see my hand about two feet away from him and as far as getting around is concerned he can

not.

Q.

A.

He can't use a glass at the present time?
No sir.

Q. Suppose his good eye was lost could you fit him
with a glass?

A.

Yes sir for 22/100 but no more.

Q. If his good eye was lost you could give him a glass for his injured eye?

A. Yes sir, but he would have only 22/100 vision.
Q. Then his injured eye he could use if he lost his
other eye?

A. He couldn't work and couldn't get around.
Dr. Kleinhans whose expert knowledge cannot be ques-
tioned, in answer to the Referee's question as to the
condition of the injured eye as to vision, said: "With-
out lenses, I should say his vision is about 10/200."
The Referee asked:

Q. Do you think that a person having 10/200 of
his eye sight is of any assistance to him?

A. Assistance only in that it may give protection on that side. He sees on that side and can recognize objects and the smaller the object the less would be able to use that eye.

Q. To get normal vision in the other eye, he must lose the uninjured eye.

A. Yes, sir, before he could wear correcting lenses.

The Referee had before him the physical demonstration of the claimant and the direct testimony of the attending physician that for all intents and purposes the claimant's eye is destroyed. And he also had the admissions of the experts that in order that this eye should be restored to any valuable degree of its normal condition the claimant would be compelled to lose his good eye; then by adjustment of lenses to the present injured one there probably would be a restoration of a certain percentage of vision.

The Workmen's Compensation Act never contemplated such fine distinctions. A careful reading of this testimony is absolutely convincing that this claimant has lost the use of his eye and ought to be compensated in terms of the Act. It is not within the spirit of the law that in the interpretation of this Act we should apply any unnatural meaning to its language in order to defeat its plain provisions. The Referee adopted a common sense conclusion. He is supported in it by the evidence of the claimant and his physician, together with the admission of the experts. To the claimant who finds himself without the use of an eye it is a very poor answer that vision could be restored to that member should he lose the sight of the other one.

The award of the Referee is affirmed and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.

PETITIONS FOR DETERMINATION OF COMPENSATION UPON AGREED FACTS.

SUSANNA MIKULASKO vs. CARNEGIE STEEL CO.

Dependents and dependency-Widow-What is actual dependency?

A wife who was deserted by her husband because she was afflicted with epilepsy, who is unable to earn support for herself,

and who is temporarily supported by a public charity, is actually dependent upon her husband for support.

Boone vs. P. R. R., 2 Dep. Rep. 1072 and Miller vs. Thropp. Dep. Rep. 2236, distinguished.

Petition for Determination of Compensation upon Agreed
No. 50.

Facts.

MACKEY, Chairman, Jan. 22, 1917:

The above case comes before the Board for the determination of the status of the parties hereto because of the death of the claimant's husband under such circumstances that there is a liability on the part of defendant if the claimant was either wholly or partially dependent upon the deceased at the time of the injury which caused the death.

The following is the exact language of the agreement which comes before us for interpretation in the light of our statute:

"Stephen Mikulasko deserted his wife in November, 1915, at Chicago. For a year and a half prior to the time his wife had been living in Tacoma and Mikulasko in Chicago. She returned to Chicago in October, 1915, when her husband deserted her because she was an epileptic. The last sum of money received by her was in January, 1916, at which time she received $3.00 for a period of three weeks. While in Tacoma she received on the average of $3.00 per week from her husband. Since the desertion she has been supported by the United Charities of Chicago, as she has been unable to work regularly owing to her disease."

To construe our Act of Assembly we must follow the well known rules of interpretation as well as the precedent of Courts of competent jurisdiction. Sentiment can play no part in such mental processes. There must be no confusion between the marital rights of husband and wife under either common or statutory law and the obligations and benefits created by our Legislature under the Compensation Law.

Section 307 of the Act of 1915 clearly states:

"No compensation shall be payable under this section to a widow unless she was living with her deceased husband at the time of his death or was then actually dependent upon him for support."

It is conceded in this case that the widow was not living with her husband at the time of his death, therefore, it only remains for us to interpret the words "actually dependent upon him for support" and to determine whether or not under the facts of this case there was a dependency as contemplated by our Act.

The law provides for the dependents of workmen who have met death as the result of an accident suffered in the course of employment, for then the industry in which they were engaged becomes responsible to their dependents because of the fact that they have actually lost something in that death; therefore, our Legislature wisely provides that there is an obligation on the part of the employer to pay compensation to no one who has not suffered a loss in the earnings of that deceased workman because of the fact of having received wages at the time of or immediately before the death, and not because of any right to receive any part of such wages if enforced by another tribunal.

It has always been said by every Court in Europe and America, dealing with the subject of dependency under compensation laws, that dependency is a question of fact to be established by competent evidence and is not to be determined by the ordinary legal inferences following marital relationship. We have heretofore discussed the principles involved in this case in Boone vs. P. R. R., Dept. Reports, Vol. 2, page 1072, our posi tion in that case was not at all modified in Miller vs. Thropp, 2 Dept. Reports, page 2236, where we held

"That where a widow, prior to the accidental death of her husband, has instituted proceedings for nonsupport and has secured an order for maintenance from a Court of Competent jurisdiction, the fact that the

husband was in arrears for making payments while the
wife was temporarily at work endeavoring to earn a
livelihood for herself and her children, will not bar her
right to compensation."

In the former case there was evidence of a renunciation of dependency. The wife had declined to receive and had actually returned money contributions made by the husband. She had moved out of the jurisdiction of the State and was engaged in occupation on her own account. We refused compensation.

In the second case Miller vs. Thropp supra, the claimant before the death of her husband, had complied with every provision of the law in order to have her status fixed as actually dependent. upon her husband. At the time of the death he was in arrears of these payments ordered by the Court. It was the duty of an officer of the Court to enforce such orders. Compensation law to class her as a dependent would not compel her to sit down and starve rather than to undertake to earn a mere pittance for her own support. The same law will not say that she destroyed her dependency when she endeavored to earn a few dollars each week to sustain herself. In this case we awarded compensation.

In the case under consideration we have a wife who has ac

tually asserted her dependency by following her husband from Milwaukee to Chicago, where the last desertion took place. She is an epileptic. From the standpoint of all laws previous to the adoption of compensation she represented the most dependent

of all women.

A loathsome malady rendered her helpless and pitiable. For this reason, under the statement of facts, the husband deserted her and refused to return to a common habitation. She never renounced her dependency and she was unable, because of her disease, to even try to support herself. A public charity for the time being was supporting her. The husband had recognized her dependency as well as his marital obligations by sending her some little money during January, 1916.

Inasmuch as dependency is a question of fact in each particular case, we hold that the widow is here entitled to an award.

The parties hereto may execute an agreement in accordance with this opinion.