The defendant through its officers has shown that it considered the deceased an employe. He was on the payroll as one; he was subject to its directions at all times; his contract of employment could have been terminated at the will of the defendant. Because of the fact that the deceased was a physician and maintained an office for general practice and exercised that privilege when not actually engaged in his professional work for the defendant is urged to establish the conclusion that the relationship that existed between the defendant and himself was not one of employer and employe but rather of that professional character that excludes the idea of master and servant.

It must be borne in mind, however, that the defendant could have engaged the deceased's entire time; that its own employes were treated by him at various places in that community, and that, had he declined to answer any call of the defendant at any time of day or night to treat one of its employes, no matter where he might have been, the defendant could have exercised its power of discharge. More than that, upon the day in question, the deceased was answering a summons to go directly from his office to the defendant's place of business to examine men who were in the defendant's employ; that he adopted the most direct route to obey this command; and had he deviated in the slightest degree from the instructions of his employer he would have been subject to discharge. Therefore, it seems to the Board that under these circumstances the deceased was an employe and was in the course of his employment at the time of the accident, which caused his death.

It does not seem to us to be reasonable to hold that the deceased under these circumstances could have been held not to be in the course of employment for the defendant until he actually was engaged in his examination or treatment of the employe of the defendant upon the premises of the defendant, for it must be remembered that his engagements with the defendant necessitated treatment of its employes at their homes or at a hospital or upon the premises and that he was constantly under its direction and control, whether at his office or elsewhere.

The right of the Board under these circumstances to re

view this agreement, as raised by the claimant, is a most important question, and while having arrived at the conclusion which we have the right of the claimant to the enforcement of this agreement must necessarily follow, nevertheless this proposition of law is worthy of our most serious consideration at this particular time.

Section 411 reads:

"Whenever an agreement shall be executed between an employer and an employe, or his dependent, as provided by this Act, a certified copy of the same signed by all parties in interest shall be mailed or delivered to the Board. It shall be the duty of the Board to examine the agreement, and to determine whether it conforms to the provisions of Section 410, and, within thirty days after copy of the agreement has been mailed. or delivered to it, to notify the parties thereto as to its validity or invalidity under the aforesaid section, etc."

A reference to Section 410 will, therefore, determine the power or fix the limitations of the Board in approving or disapproving these agreements. This provides that any agreement executed within fourteen days after the accident shall be null and void. This, however, does not apply to a death case, because there is no necessity to wait fourteen days before an agreement shall be executed in such an event, but under the section it is our duty to review these agreements that come before us to determine whether or not there has been an attempt to agree upon a commutation of payments contrary to the provisions of the Act, or whether or not the provisions of the agreement vary the amount to be paid, or the period during which compensation shall be payable, as provided by our law.

Section 423 must necessarily be read in the light of our limitation in Section 410. This Section gives us the power to review an agreement at any time upon presentation of a petition alleging fraud, mistake, coercion or other proper cause. Just what the Act means by "other proper cause," is not clear, but it

must necessarily be some cause that would under the law nullify an agreement as completely as fraud, mistake or coercion.

Here we have an agreement before us properly executed alleging death of a husband, setting out that the widow is the sole. dependent; stating that the death occurred, and providing for compensation in the proper amount and for the length of time provided for in the Act. The evidence shows that the parties to this agreement were thoroughly familiar with all the facts at the time it was executed, but now the Insurance Carrier seeks to have it set aside because its representative was mistaken as to the legal consequences following these facts.

It is very doubtful in our minds whether or not the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which we have referred to, and in which we must find all our powers in this respect, gives us greater authority to set aside a written agreement, properly executed and witnessed, than now exists in a Court of Equity. We assume that it would not be seriously cortended. that this agreement could be modified or set aside in equity because of any mistake as to a legal responsibility arising out of the well understood facts, therefore, we hold that we would not have power to set aside this agreement under these circumstances even if the other contentions of the Insurance Carrier were well taken.

The petition is therefore refused.

Water Supply Commission

ACTION TAKEN AT MEETING HELD MARCH 27

Approved.

Supervisors of Albany Township, Berks County, for permission to fill in an overflow channel to a county bridge across Pine Creek, one mile from mouth of stream.

Commissioners of Bucks County, for permission to construct a reinforced concrete arch bridge across the North Branch of Neshaminy Creek, at Copes Ford, on road leading from the Ferry road to line between New Britain and Hilltown Townships, at the premises of David Bensinger, formerly that of Isaac Cope, New Britain Township.

Commissioners of Lawrence County, for permission to construct a highway bridge across Coffee Run, on Hughes Heirs Farm, on the Hillsville-New Bedford Road, in Mahoning Township.

City of Lebanon, for permission to construct the necessary channels, culverts and bridges, and to make changes in and along Quittapahilla Creek, Hazel Dyke and Brandywine Run, and across the Cornwall & Lebanon and Cornwall Railroads from the western limits of the city at Sixteenth street eastward to a point near Twelfth street, in the city of Lebanon, Lebanon County, Pa.

American Bridge Company, for permission to construct a 24-inch intake pipe line in the Ohio River, 15.6 miles below the head of the river and 4.6 miles below Lock No. 3, at Ambridge, Beaver County, Pa.

Cambria Steel Company, for permission to make a fill along the left bank of the Little Conemaugh River, from a point 2.45 miles from its confluence with Stony Creek, extending over a length of 12.945 feet, to the Pennsylvania Railroad Company bridge, in Cambria County, Pa.

Pennsylvania Coal & Coke Corporation, for permission to construct a bridge across Clearfield Creek, approximately 450 feet south of Amsbry Station on the Cresson and Irvona Division of the Pennsylvania Railroad, in Gallitzin Township, Cambria County, Pa.

Pennsylvania Railroad Company, for permission to replace the present single span opening at Bridge No. 33.09 (Old No. 54) on the Bellefonte Branch, with two spans, and changing location. of bridge to provide a more direct channel for the stream, across Buffalo Run. within a few feet of mouth, in the Borough of Bellefonte, Center County, Pa.

Philadelphia & Chester Valley Railroad Company, for permission to construct a bridge across a stream 500 feet east of Howellville, Tredyffrin Township, Chester County, Pa.

Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Railway Company, for permission to make a change in or addition to culvert No. 202.34, across Slab Run, about 300 feet from point where Slab Run empties into Sandy Lick Creek, near Falls Creek Station, in Sandy Township, Clearfield County, Pa.

Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Railway Company, for permission to make a change in the channel of Sandy Lick Creek, by widening, deepening and enlarging the same, about 1 mile easterly from the point where Sandy Lick Creek empties into Falls Creek, in Sandy Township, Clearfield County, Pa.

Popp Coal Mining Company, for permission to construct a 16-foot clear span concrete slab bridge across Spring Run, about 14 mile from mouth of stream in Smoke Run, on a private siding leading off two miles four hundred fifty-two feet northeast of Muddy Run. from junction of branch of the Tyrone Division, Pennsylvania Railroad, in Beccaria Township. Clearfield County.

Pennsylvania Railroad Company, for permission to construct a temporary trestle and new superstructure at Bridge No. 103.79. across the West Branch of the Clarion River. 0.09 mile east of Wil ox Station, on the Renovo Division. Jones Township. Eik County, Pa.