SCOTTISH AND IRISH NATIONALITY. 359 CHAP. LXI. 1648 herent of overborne nationalities. Alike in Scotland and in Ireland the distinctive national feeling had rallied to the representative of the spiritual power-in one Its incase to the Presbyterian clergy, in the other case to weakness. Rinuccini. Hamilton in Scotland and the Confederate lords in Ireland supported Charles's claims in England, because they wished to use his restored authority to support them in opposing ecclesiastical pretensions in their respective countries. Their most vigorous efforts would be heavily weighted with an ally, whose promises no man could trust, and who, when his own objects had been gained, would as readily sacrifice his supporters as his enemies. To Charles himself the varied nature of the forces Its effect in England. taking the field on his behalf was almost certain to be detrimental. Cavaliers of the old stock like Glemham and Langdale might cheerfully accept the help of the Scots, as Ormond had accepted the aid of Inchiquin and Muskerry, in confidence that when the victory had once been won their own social position, combined with the favour of the King, would suffice to secure the ascendency of their own principles in the future. Charles's new allies, the English Presbyterians, were much less confident, and but few of them were likely to believe that a victory due to the Cavaliers, aided by the less distinctively Presbyterian section of the nobility of Scotland and by the Catholic nobility of Ireland, would really conduce to the attainment of their objects. If there was a man in England capable of taking advantage of this state of feeling it was Cromwell. All his thoughts made for unity, and after pushing his designs for the conciliation of the King almost beyond the verge of safety, he at last accepted the stern teaching of facts, and betook himself to the CHAP. LXI. 1648 April 25. News from Scotland. Its effect at Westminster. conciliation of the Presbyterians. It did not need much clearness of brain to teach him the importance of succeeding here. The army, though comparatively small in numbers, had the advantage of a central position, and might fairly be expected to cope with the large forces threatening it from Scotland and Ireland, because those forces were scattered over a wide circumference, and were ill-supported even by the people of the countries which sent them forth. A successful rising in England, and especially in London, would shift the whole balance of the war. The army would, in that case, be deprived at a blow of the support of the machinery of civil government, and would degenerate into a horde of brave and welldisciplined brigands. The turning point appears to have been reached on April 25. On that day a letter written from Newcastle by Hazlerigg was read in the House of Commons, announcing that a resolution to raise an army had been taken in Scotland.1 As it happened, the House was unusually full, and in a full House there was always a Presbyterian majority. Yet the effect of this news, even on the Presbyterians, was at once exhibited. Not only did the House resolve to strengthen the fortifications of Newcastle, but to proceed with the least possible delay to the question of the settlement of the kingdom,2 which had been kept in the background since the Vote of No Addresses, during the time that the Independents had been carrying on their secret negotiation for the abdication of the King. On the 27th, before the constitutional debate was opened, a still more pressing question 1 L.J. v. 544. The letter is probably the one printed anonymously in the Perf. Diurnal, E. 522, 25. 2 C.J. v. 544, 545. 3 See p. 326. THE CITY ALARMED. 361 CHAP. 1648 April 27. feeling between the City and the army. claimed the attention of the House. The misunderstanding between the City and the army sprung from differences about money quite as much as from differences about religious and political principles. No threats of the soldiers or of Parliament could induce the citizens to pay their assessments, and without the assessments of the City the soldiers must either starve or make themselves unpopular by living at free quarter. Necessarily, therefore, the citizens were in ill odour at head-quarters, and from time to time there was a talk amongst the Agitators of taking the law into their own hands. On the 27th, the City authorities appeared at Westminster, and laid before the Houses information received from an ex- Everard's ciseman named Everard, to the effect that, being at tion." Windsor on the 20th, as he lay in his bed, he overheard some officers, of whom Colonel Ewer was one, talking in the next room of disarming the City and forcing it by threats of plunder to advance 1,000,000l. informa of the In consequence of this information the City now Demands demanded that the chains taken away from the streets City, after the late riot1 should be restored, that the army should be removed to a farther distance, and that Skippon, who possessed the confidence of both parties, should be appointed to command the trained bands of the whole district within the now demolished fortifications. Cromwell at once perceived that the granted advantage of coming to an understanding with the City would be far greater than anything that could be gained by the maintenance of irritating precautions against revolt, and, seconded by Vane,3 he moved that the petition of the City might be granted. The right at the request of and Vane. Cromwell CHAP. 1648 April 28. King, Lords, and to be main- of replacing the chains and the appointment of Skippon met with no opposition; the question of removing the army could only be decided with the concurrence of the army itself.1 On the 28th the House proceeded to consider the basis of the constitutional settlement of the kingdom. In a division, in which the Presbyterians were supported by Vane and Pierrepont and other leading Independents, it was resolved by the large majority of 165 to 99 that the House would not alter the fundamental government of the kingdom, by King, Lords, and Commons.' The question who the King should be was not openly touched, but the House proceeded to resolve that the matter of the propositions sent to the King when he was at Hampton Court pro- Court should be the ground of the debate for the settlement of the peace of the kingdom,' and that the settle. any member was to be at liberty in spite of the Vote of No Addresses to propound anything he pleased in the course of the debate.3 The Hampton positions to be the basis of ment. Result of these votes. There were some who thought that the main object of those who supported this proposal was to cut the ground from under the feet of the Scots. Cromwell, at least, could vote with a safe conscience for a Presbyterian settlement if he could be sure that Parliament would maintain the concession of religious liberty which had been made at the time of the adoption of the propositions intended to be presented at Hampton Court." Most likely, however, he troubled himself for the moment about none of these things. What he wanted now was time in which to beat the Scots, and if Parliament chose to waste 1 C.J. v. 546. 2 ? to Lanark, April 28, Hamilton Papers, 190. A MEETING OF AGITATORS. time by entering into a fresh negotiation with the King as hopeless as the first, he at least would be the gainer. 363 CHAP. LXI. 1648 Having done what he could at Westminster, April 24. Meeting of Cromwell hurried to Windsor. He had there to do Agitators. with men to whom the very idea of compromise was hateful. On the 24th a body of Agitators had met at St. Albans, where they denounced the ambition of the grandees, and drew up a petition for the immediate adoption of the Agreement of the People.1 This foolish attempt to exasperate nine-tenths of the nation against the army at a moment when the army had but little good-will to spare was summarily put down. On the 28th those who had taken part in the meeting were summoned before a Council of War at Windsor, and though they ultimately escaped with no more than a reprimand they were taught that the time was not one for sowing divisions in the army or the State. 2 distrusted. Cromwell could stamp out mutiny, but he could Cromwell not conceal from himself that his hold on the army was imperilled. Everything, it seemed, had gone wrong, and most of all his own sanguine efforts to restore peace by negotiating with the King. It was no secret that, by many in the army and out of the army, he was regarded as a traitor who had turned aside from the path in which he had engaged to walk after the suppression of the mutiny on Corkbush Field. Yet Cromwell's mind was not troubled merely by the fear of external danger. His failures always brought with them deep searchings of heart, and stern questionings of his own conscience to teach him whether he had in any way strayed from the path of 1 The Army's Petition, E. 438, I. 2 Perf. Weekly Account, E. 438, 8. |