bottom of 517 fathoms. It was subsequently proved by repeated soundings that this curious result obtained in the first instance was typical of the Mediterranean Sea in general. There is a shallow stratum of super-heated water extending from the surface to a depth of ten or fifteen fathoms, in which the fall of temperature is very rapid; from this point the descent is more gradual down to 100 fathoms, when it is uniformally about 55 deg. F, and this temperature is invariably maintained to the bottom irrespective of depth, whether it be 100 or 2,000 fathoms. This curious fact is well illustrated in the following serial soundings copied from Dr. Carpenter and Mr. Jeffrey's "Report on the Deep Sea Researches" as presented to the Royal Society. It is the sounding of Station 47, off the southern coast of Spain, near to Cartagena :

The dredge was used in most of the twenty-seven stations occupied within the Mediterranean, but with very disappointing results. In the shallow water fringing either coast life was found to be moderately abundant, but here the unequal and rocky bottom rendered dredging very difficult; and after losing two dredges and a considerable quantity of rope, it became necessary to dispense with the dredge altogether whilst working over this rocky ground, and depend simply upon the tangles. Useful as these tangles proved in sweeping up such objects as are armed with asperites, they could only tell a one-sided tale of the life below, failing as they did to catch the smoother forms, particularly the Mollusca, which were rarely obtained by such means. The bottom of the deeper portions of the Mediterranean was found to consist of a very fine yellowish sand, mixed with a blueish clay, and was so persistent as to be characteristic of the deep-sea area, as far as investigated. This tenaceous mud was repeatedly sifted and searched in large quantities, but it proved almost destitute of organic forms, often containing nothing except a few fragments of shells or a small number of Foraminifera, and in no instance did it yield considerable numbers of living animals of any description. Although not absolutely azoic, yet the deeper portions of the Mediterranean are evidently unfavourable to the existence of marine life.

Along the Coast of Africa proved the most productive region for dredging purposes, and perhaps the best hauls secured within the limits of the Mediterranean were obtained on the Adventure Bank,

between Tunis and Sicily, in depths varying from 30 to 250 fathoms, where several Sicilian and Coralline Crag, fossil Testacea, were taken in the living state. Following the South Coast of Sicily, touching at Malta, and making a few final hauls at the entrance to the Straits of Messina, the investigations of the Mediterranean basin closed-the same distinctive features of temperature and distribution of life characterising the Eastern portion as were found in the Western.

We have hitherto followed the track of the little vessels, the Lightning and Porcupine, in their several cruisings-a narrative that will ever be of classic interest in relation to deep-sea questions —and have attempted to bring into prominence the salient points of those important discoveries which from time to time rewarded the investigators. It now remains to ascertain the place which these new facts are to take in Natural Philosophy--modifying our previous conceptions-explaining what was formerly enigmatical, and opening new fields for scientific speculation and research. It is too much to suppose that all the questions that have grown out of these researches can be demonstrably settled at once; light has fallen upon the mysteries of the great deepprovisional theories can be launched, but we must patiently wait for a more thorough and exhaustive investigation in this novel region of enquiry before transferring many of these theories to the shelf of undisputed facts. Great things are anticipated from the Challenger Expedition, which is to embrace the whole maritime world within the scope of its mission. With a splendid vessel, elaborately furnished with all necessary scientific appliances, and an efficient staff under the control of Professor Wyville Thompson, the three or four years work to which she has been commissioned must be productive of important results, and may, possibly, settle for ever such questions as have been the cause of protracted discussion in scientific circles from the commencement of these researches. A consideration of these scientific bearings of our subject must be left for a future article. W. H.

ART. IV. THE FOUNDATION OF AUTHORITY IN
MATTERS OF RELIGION.

BY matters of religion we may understand either religious doc

trines, or the facts from which such doctrines are inferred, and upon which they must ultimately rest. The term may also include matters of duty or religious conduct, and matters of ritual or religious ceremony. We desire, however, to limit our attention to the first class the matters of religious doctrine, with their essential basis of historic fact.

The question which now presents itself is pregnant with interest. Men desire to know what is to be understood by authority in such matters. That there is an authority in them is felt by many men, though not by all, and not with equal binding force among those who allow it. Let us take, for instance, the fact of the Incarnation and the inferred doctrines of the Pre-existence and Divinity of Jesus Christ. One man denies the fact or the doctrines deduced. He may deny the whole. Another neither affirms nor denies them; he is indifferent to them; while a third regards them as claiming the full assent of his understanding and will. It is not a mere "notional assent, but a real assent." It is the assent of the entire man, and not simply that of his intellect. The fact and the inferred dogmas exert a power over him; they possess an authority which insists on his accepting them. Other facts and doctrines of Scripture produce similar effects among men, and the authority of such may be defined as "their right to be believed and obeyed."

But if, in religious matter, such a right exist, as we think it unquestionably does, how is this sense of authority generated? On what does it rest? Where is its foundation? In solving this problem two courses open themselves out. Either the facts and dogmas are authoritative because of something essentially inherent, that is, because of what they are in themselves; or their authority is acquired from something external to them and separable from them. Their authority must either be internal or external; in other words, either subjective or objective.

The theory of subjective authority has had no lack of expounders. In early Reformation times it formed the ground generally taken by the Reformers in pressing truth home upon men. The "Testimonium Spiritus Sancti," though ever fruitful in debate, was yet in some form or other, almost universally held. They maintained that it was a faulty method to establish the truth of Christianity without regard to its specific matter; that Holy Scripture had the power of self-authentication; that it could give to man an experience of its peculiar power to comfort him and to amend what was wrong. The truth did not do this, however, by its own subjective quality as truth. An objective influence, which was separable from the truth, was considered as acting upon the mind of man, in the person of the Holy Spirit. Thus we find the Reformers in their confessions of faith setting forth," that we believe the Holy Scriptures, not so much because the Church receives them, but particularly because the Holy Spirit has testified in our hearts that they are of God."

This subjective theory has not lacked supporters since the Reformation era; but no one in modern times has reproduced it more powerfully, or more beautifully, than Coleridge in his "Inquiring Spirit." With him, the proof of the Divine authority of religious

"The Bible,

truth is "in its fitness to our nature and needs." considered in reference to its declared ends and purposes, is true and holy, and for all who seek truth with humble spirits, an unquestionable guide, and, THEREFORE, it is the Word of God." He, in common with the early Reformers, seeks to maintain the influence of the Holy Spirit in connection with truth; but we doubt whether he retains the strong personal objectivity of the Holy Ghost as they held it. For instance, "whatever finds me bears witness for itself that it has proceeded from a Holy Spirit." It is just as the truth lays hold of him in the deepest yearnings of his nature that he becomes aware of its spiritual origin; but the indefiniteness of that origin is expressed by his use of the indefinite article.

This theory should be regarded with considerable favour. It has a place to fill in the evidences of Christian truth, and a work to accomplish when everything else fails. It was owing, in no slight degree, to the harmony which the teachings of Jesus were ever felt to have with the needs of men, that "the common people heard Him gladly," And now, in this age of intense activity, when men cannot pause to study Christian evidences in the immense tomes of literature which have been written on the subject, they may be led to realise from the testimony of consciousness, the divinity of Christianity. The evidence which shows that there has never been a book like the Bible, which on every page speaks to the moral sense in men, and wakes up echoes there so that earth takes up the good news with a glad shout, and the mountains tell it to each other, this is evidence which will assert itself over the most ordinary men when unprejudiced against the truth.

Thus, the opinion that this subjective theory furnishes a powerful moral basis for authority, we fully and freely endorse; but, that it furnishes a logical and demonstrative basis, we do not admit. We invite our readers to consider the following thoughts against the assumption that subjective fitness is the sole or sufficient foundation of authority in matters of religion.

If we take this theory in its clear Reformation sense, to whom is it adapted? Only to those who believe in the action of the Holy Spirit. In relation to those who reject that doctrine it has no logical force. It is only for friends, not foes.

Our second objection is, that it makes our reason the arbiter of truth. The testimony of the Holy Spirit reaches us through our own consciousness, and it cannot reach us any other way. Coming through our own consciousness, it becomes the expression of our own human nature. Out of this point two questions may arise. First, Is it true that consciousness is so very open to the recognition of religious truth? We are afraid that facts are against it. The constitution of man, depraved as we find it, is not so in

flamable to the truth, that the least spark kindles it into a flame. Further, it may be asked, Is it unknown in history that reason has imparted the authority of truth to that which has afterwards been pronounced false? And what guarantee have we, in this case, that it may not be so, and that we shall not set off in quest of still more goodly pearls? We have no assurance, nor can we have any. Reason is the sole arbiter, and the purest rationalism results from the subjective theory.

We object to this basis of authority since authority is not given by it to the historic facts on which religious truths must rest. Those religious truths have some fitness to our nature and needs; or that fitness may be seen in the facts when associated with the truths, but not in the facts merely, and when unclothed with doctrines. For instance, Jesus died on the cross. That is a matter of history, but it has no authority in the view of the subjectivist until certain dogmas are attached to it. Now, one of the first questionings of doubt may be whether Christ ever lived and died; and, if so, was the cross the mode of his death? We want authority for the reception of mere facts, and the subjectivist has no provision to meet the requirement.

We now turn to the external or objective theory. If intrinsic excellence is not the source of authority, surely it must arise from something external.

They who maintain the theory just canvassed, hold that some religious truth, though not all, is revealed truth.* By the latter term we mean truth supernaturally revealed. Religious truth is not necessarily revealed truth. Religious truth, as a term, is wider than revealed truth, for it includes the truth in such religious systems as Buddhism, to which we ascribe not the higher term -revealed truth. Now, the Christian religion claims that its religious truths are revealed truths. "The works, which the Father hath given me to finish, the same works that I do, bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me. We are thus required to assent to Christian beliefs because Revelation, in Jesus Christ and the accompanying events, has really transpired.

Let it, then, be understood that revealed truth is the highest form of religious truth, and then the question becomes, not merely one of its mere fitness to our requirements, but rather of evidence of the fact of revelation. And if Christianity is a revelation, the primary question is not, what purpose does it serve in relation to me? does it meet the necessities of my nature? For we are far from being infallible judges either of the purpose of truth or of our own necessities. But these questions arise, and are of paramount importance. Is it what it claims to be a revelation? And, if so, are its facts what they purport to be? For if God has spoken to some man, at some time, in some place, and under some parti