remark:-A moment, either divisible to infinity; or, composed of certain absolutely smallest parts. Both these alternatives are inconceivable. This grand principle is called "The Law of the Conditioned." The sum of what is taught by Sir W. on this matter is: The conditioned-existing between two opposite inconceivables -is, that which is alone conceivable or cogitable, i.e., thinkable in strict sense, by us. The unconditioned is that which is inconceivable, incogitable, or unthinkable by us. The CONDITIONED, or the THINKABLE, thus lies between two extremes or poles of the human universe, or creation, i.e., created universe, of thought; and these extremes or poles are each of them unconditioned, each of them is inconceivable or unthinkable, and each of them exclusive or contradictory of the other. Of these two repugnant opposites, the one is that of unconditional or absolute limitation; the other that of unconditional or Infinite illimitation. The one we may, therefore, in general call the absolutely unconditioned, the other the infinitely unconditioned; or, more simply, the absolute and the infinite; the term absolute expressing that which is finished or complete, the term infinite that which cannot be terminated or concluded. (See Lect. XXXVIII. and Appendix, 'Metaphysics.") This is regarded as a philosophical doctrine, which is specially in harmony with the orthodox doctrine of the Deity. For, we only know what we comprehend. We may imagine or believe a thousand things we cannot strictly know. We know our own self-consciousness; perhaps, we know nothing else. But we believe in a universe of things outside our own self-consciousness. Thus, we believe in the Trinity-the Godhead; but we cannot know that august, all-glorious Being, philosophically speaking. If we know a part, or parts of anything, we do not know the whole unless we fully know all the parts of it; and, as Deity cannot be divided into parts, but must be known altogether to be known at all, we do not, speaking philosophically, know God; but, we BELIEVE in Him because His existence is evidenced to be necessary by our reason, consciousness, instincts, intuitions, &c., by the proofs of external nature (the a posteriori argument), and revealed to our faith, but to our faith only, in the Bible.

We now come to one of the most momentous and perplexing problems of philosophy-causality, and the application of the law of the conditioned to it. What, then, is causality? If we analyse our thought, we shall find that the expression, this or that has a cause, simply means, that as we cannot conceive any new existence to commence, therefore all that now is seen to arise under a new appearance had previously an existence under a different form. We are unable, on the one hand, to conceive of nothing becoming something, or, on the other, of something becoming nothing.* In order to This has nothing to do with our believing the Divine Revelation of

*

Creation given by Moses.

the notion of causality, it is not necessary that we should know the particular causes of the particular effect. Brown's doctrine of causality being simply grounded on the expectation of the constancy of nature, is refuted by Sir W.* (See Lect. XXXIX.) The great defect of Brown's theory is that it excludes the idea of necessity. Before there could be any "constancy of nature" to give us "an expectation" of it, a cause was necessary both to produce nature and impress those very laws upon it which guarantee, to a certain extent, the "constancy of nature."

The application of the law of the conditioned in the question of causality is developed at length by Sir W. in the Fortieth Lecture on "Metaphysics." By a very brief account of his specific doctrine we shall close this article. Sir W. regards causality as a negative judgment, which results from mental imbecility, i.e., the impossibility of our thinking the opposite of, that every event must have a cause. But how the doctrine of the conditioned accounts for this judgment we are unable to see from what Sir W. says, except it be our simple inability to admit or believe an event or a phenomenon to be possible at all without a cause, in which cause inherently exists the potentiality of effectuating the result we denominate an effect. The effect immanently exists prior to its production and manifestation in the universe by, but outside of, the cause in which it thus resides by immanence. We confess our inability to satisfy ourselves in regard to Sir W.'s doctrine of causation. Neither from him nor all the other philosophers he reviews, and apparently refutes, can we get a clear and satisfactory notion of causality. † We wish we could; but we give Sir W.'s conclusion about the matter: "The doctrine which I propose," says he, "is not exposed to these "-the prementioned-"difficulties. It does not suppose that the judgment of causality is founded on a power of the mind to recognise as necessary in thought what is necessary in the universe of existence; it, on the contrary, founds this judgment merely on the impotence of the mind to conceive either of two contradictories; and as one or other of two contradictories must be true, though both cannot, it shows that there is no ground for inferring from the inability of the mind to conceive an alternative as possible, that such an alternative is really impossible. At the same time, if the casual judgment be not an affirmation of mind, but merely an incapacity of positively thinking the contrary, it follows that such a negative judgment cannot stand in opposition to the positive conciousness the affirmative deliverance, that we are truly the authors

And with equal success by Cousin, in the examination of Locke's Essay, pp. 127-152.

† See Cousin's "History of Philosophy," pp. 125-156, where may be seen the best account of causality we have anywhere found.

-the responsible originators, of our actions, and not merely links in the adamantine series of effects and causes. It appears to me that it is only on this doctrine that we can philosophically vindicate the liberty of the will. . How the will can possibly be free, must remain to us, under the present limitation of our faculties, wholly incomprehensible. We cannot conceive absolute commencement; we cannot, therefore, conceive a free volition. But as little can we conceive the alternative on which liberty is denied, on which necessity is affirmed. And in favour of our moral nature, the fact that we are free is given us in the consciousness of an uncompromising law of duty, in the consciousness of our moral accountability; and this fact of liberty cannot be re-argued "-reasoned against and refuted-" on the ground that it is incomprehensible, for the doctrine of the conditional proves, against the Necessitarian, that something may, nay must, be true, of which the mind is wholly unable to construe to itself the possibility;* whilst it shows the objection of incomprehensibility applies no less to the doctrine of fatalism than to the doctrine of freedom. If the deduction, therefore, of the casual judgment, which I have attempted, should speculatively prove correct, it will, I think, afford a securer and more satisfactory foundation for our practical_interests than any other which has yet been promulgated." (See Lect. XL.)

ALFRED CLAYTON.

ART. III. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CHRIST

"NEVE

AS A TEACHER.

[EVER man spake like this man!" was the exclamation of the rude officers who had been sent to seize on the person of Jesus, and who returned from their bootless mission awed and disarmed by the majesty of his words. "Abashed the devil stood, and felt how awful goodness is," is Milton's description of Satan in the presence of the archangel. Evangelist and poet have here alike touched a principle which must ever lie at the foundation of true moral power. The most potent and enduring influence over moral mind has always had its root in goodness, for goodness is in reality synonymous with the divine. It was the manifest presence of unalloyed goodness breathing in all the acts and utterances of Jesus, and sustained in its expression by appropriate intelligence and power, which awoke in his hearers the idea of his superhuman and mysterious alliance with heaven, an idea which found an imperfect expression in their declaration that he was a prophet.

As eg. absolutely bounded, or infinitely extended space.

Since the time that his wondrous words constrained the conscience of his audience into allegiance to himself, millions who have heard his teaching have seen in it such elevated beneficence, such unearthly purity, such marvellous truth, beauty, and power, that they have acknowledged it to bear the evident impress and signature of God. There have also been many who, from the theoretic difficulties the doctrine involved, have denied the proper divinity of our Lord, but who have nevertheless, confessed the superhuman purity of his teaching and the divine character of his morality; indeed, it is now matter of historic testimony that Jesus, though an unlettered and obscure Gallilean, has taken a deeper hold of the conscience and heart of man, and exercised a profounder influence over the progressive life and thought of the civilized world than any other man whatever. There is no subject which has engrossed the attention of modern thinkers more than Christ and the origin of Christianity. Vast stores of learning and unparalleled ingenuity (as in the case of Strauss, Renan, &c.) have recently been expended in rationalistic efforts to reduce Jesus and his religion within the known laws of historical development. But they have palpably failed. Jesus is unmanageable in the hands of speculative theorizers, and defies their categorization. He remains unexplained; the mysterious Man who appears from a Judean manger to dominate the mind of the world!

It is not our object in the present paper to attempt the impossible by offering any explanation of the superhuman in the person of our Lord, but to endeavour to bring into view some of the characteristic features of his teaching. Although the character, life, and work of Christ are so interwoven, and blended with his teaching as to substitute a unique and rounded unity, still, the subject must be approached on one side only at once, and be viewed in one of its several aspects. In the case of an ordinary man his teaching is often the simple expression of his thinking, and its value may not be necessarily affected by his personal character; whereas, in the case of Jesus, it would be difficult to say whether the truth he has taught us is more the result of his utterances, his work, or his character.

In the observations we shall offer on his teaching, therefore, we cannot leave entirely out of view these other matters with which our subject is connected and inter-related. We shall group our remarks under three points of enquiry:—what were the characteristic features in the object, the matter, and the method of the teaching of Christ?

The object or end which our Lord sought to realize was no less than the founding of a universal and eternal religion, which should gather a regenerated humanity within the sacred circle of an everlasting fellowship. Down to the time when Christ appeared, a

conception of such boldness, beneficence, and comprehensiveness seems never to have dawned upon the buman mind. But even supposing the idea of a universal religion to have had an existence in the world prior to his time, yet the originality of Jesus will be seen in his conception of the essential elements of such a religion. The sublime task which Jesus set himself to accomplish included, in the first place, the creation of a new moral idea. The damaging elements in the prevalent moral standard of the Jews were its hollow externality, and its spirit of proud exclusiveness. He was a good Jew who was attentive to the minute and multitudinous externalisms of the law, who loved his own people and hated all the world besides. The essential spirit of the moral law had become entombed amid the cumbrous accretions which had gathered around it, and was scarcely visible in the national morality. In opposition to the externalism of Jewish morality, Jesus declared virtue to be an inward principle. In opposition to their proud exclusiveness he declared that principle to be universal love.

The moral idea of the Gentile world may be described as the heroic; the leading qualities of which are such as courage, strength, endurance. The moral standard of Jesus is equally different from this. The heroic qualities, as they were then understood, have scarcely a place in his moral system. In his system, the gentle and self-abnegating virtues are elevated into the supreme place. In his Sermon on the Mount he strikes the key-note of his moral scheme : "Blessed are the poor in spirit ;""Blessed are the meek ;"" Blessed are the peacemakers;" "Blessed are the pure in heart; " "Love your enemies;" "Do good to them that hate you." Doubtless, a laborious research among the writings of the Platonists and Stoics might gleam a few aphorisms which may be set over against these sayings of Jesus. In their case, however, these appear only as strong gleams of light; whereas, the peculiarity of Jesus is, that he makes the principle involved in these moral precepts the centre and ground-work of his entire system.

When this spiritual ideal of moral excellence presented in the teaching of Jesus is distinctly apprehended by the conscience, the result is a perception of such inward moral discrepancy as to render the ideal practically unrealizable. The sense of inward depravity thus generated deepens into that awful feeling of moral helplessness which Paul expresses by the words, "sold unto sin." Jesus foresaw this result, and provided against it by making the second part in his grand programme the development of a new moral passion. This passion is not fully described when it is called the "enthusiasm of humanity." It is rather the enthusiasm of devotion, having its spring in the recognition of the paternal bond which unites us to the love of the heavenly Father-the mysteries deep of the human heart awoke by a voice from the deep of infinite love. The mere