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reach or will control. So far, then, from the will being autocratic, it is at the mercy of unknown conditions, which inay seriously affect at any moment its power or energy. Moreover, when an unwelcome idea is dismissed from the mind, it is not done by a simple despotic order of the will; but by fixing attention on some other idea which arises—by maintaining the tension of it, the latter is made consciousness; and inasmuch as two ideas cannot exist in consciousness at the same time, or at any rate cannot co-exist in equal intensity, that implies the dismissal of the former idea into the background and the initiation of a new current of reflection-a current which, however, is not uncommonly interrupted by the irruption of the old idea, which refuses to become latent or dormant. Volitional control exercised over the thoughts manifestly presupposes the existence of many ideas in the mind, and the possibility of some of these latent ones arising to influence those that may be active. Denken macht frei. What power it is by which one idea calls up another we do not know, but we do know that it is not by the will

Locke is admitted to have made a great advance in psychology when he demonstrated that there were no innate ideas in the mind, but that all its ideas were formed by observation and reflection. The necessary consequence of his demonstration plainly is, what the foregoing considerations have shown, that there is no inborn will in the human mind. It would be a very difficult matter to fix that period in the child's mental development when volition might be acknowledged to have distinctly manifested itself. Whence and when the first volition comes, would indeed be perplexing questions if the will were admitted to be a special faculty of the minil, distinct from other faculties, of constant quality, and never falling below a certain level of energy. Why is it that we are powerless to fix the time of the first volition ? Because the will is not one and constant, but infinitely variable in quantity and quality, having many nervous cntres, and not having any existence apart from the concrete act. There are in reality as many centres of volitional reaction in the brain as there are centres of iilea; and to assume one constant will is a part of that metaphysiial system of making abstraction - into entities by which also is made one understanding, one reason, and the mind is mischievouslı parcelled out into faculties that have

no existence in nature. It is utterly at variance both with psychological analysis of the nature of will, and with physiological observation of the constitution of the supreme nervous centres, to assunie a single nervous centre from which will proceeds; if we must make a definite statement on so obscure a matter, it is that every centre of idea may be a centre of voluntary reaction. For consider this : although we describe the effect as ideomotor, when an idea reacts directly outwards, yet if the energy of the idea is not instantly so expended, but persists in the mind for a moment, so as to produce a clearer consciousness of it before passing outwards, and especially if there is some feeling or desire attending it, then, when it does pass outwards, we commonly describe the effect as volitional. As consciousness may, however, exist in every degree of intensity, it is plain that we cannot definitely fix a stage at which ideational reaction may be supposed to become volitional, nor determine the nature of the change which then ensues. "The will and the intelligence are one and the same thing," is the corollary of Spinoza from his close reasoning.

Let us imagine the first appearing idea in the infant's inind to react outwards, and to leave, as it will do, a residuum in its nervous ceutre; when the idea occurs again, there will be a tendency to a similar reaction. Suppose, however, that the action causes pain to the child, and thereupon a second idea is formed in its mind, the energy of which is opposed to that of the first. When the first idea appears again, it will, instead of passing outwards at once, excite into activity the second idea, which is inhibitory or preventive. That is the simplest casc of volition : the child has voluntarily refrained from doing something, or voluntarily done something else; an l the impulse that has prompted the choice is not any abstract power, but springs from that fundamental property of organic element by which what is agreeable is sought, what is painful is shunned. Bear in mind, when weighing volition, that there is often inore power demanded for prevening or inhibiting action than for producing it. As ideas multi;ly in the mind, and groups or series of ideas are associated, « course the process becomes more and more complicated; tl. residua of volitiins, like the residua of sensations or ideas, train in the mind and render future volitions of a like kind more easy and more definite ;

contain a conception of the end desired—such a conception as has been determined by the nature of the reflection ; the conception of the result, or the design, in the act of will constituting, in fact, the essential character of the particular volition. In order that desire may become action for its gratification, a consciousness of the result of the action is necessary—that is, a conception of the aim of it. The desire, therefore, gives the special impulse which is directed or regulated by reflection, and the particular act of will is not the determining agent, but is the result determined by the impulse acting in conformity with the conception of the aim to be attained. The design, then, which a lookeron discovers in any act of will — and, be it remembered, there is no actual volition apart from the particular volition-will depend upon the nature of the individual whom he is observing, as that nature has been inherited, and subsequently developed by the experience of life. The idiocy of any one, or his congenital inability to adapt himself to external relations by correspondences of internal cerebral reaction, is a physical fact: there is no design in many of the idiot's conscious acts, because such quality or property has not been built up by cultivation as a faculty of the supreine nervous centres, a congenital defect of constitution having made such organization impossible ; in other words, the idiot is, by defect of nature, incapacitated from acquiring reflection, and cannot, therefore, have in his mind the conception of a result to be attained, cannot display conscious design. But the design manifest in any voluntary act of the best cultivated mind is likewise physical necessity: in consequence of reacting cerebral adaptations to the varieties of external impressions, reflection has, as already set forth, been organized as a development of the supreme nervous centres, or, in other words, as a faculty of the mind; and according to the extent and kind of the reflection will be the completeness of the conception of the end to be attained, or the degree of design discoverable in any act of will. The particular volition and whatever it contains, whether of folly or design, is a product of the organized residua of all former like volitions, excited into activity by the appropriate stimulus. For volitions, like sensations and ideas, leave behind then their residua which are organized in the nerve centres, and thus render future volitions of a like kind more easy.

In this sense only are we warranted in speaking of abstract volition.

It has been necessary to lay stress upon this vague and troublesome question of design, because mistaken notions with regard to it appear to have been at the bottom of much error in philosophy. The design manifest in a mental act has been supposed to evince a power which transcended or anticipated experience, instead of one that actually conforms in its genesis to experience; and the metaphysical conception of will as a fixed and undecomposable entity, in which was no variability nor the shadow of a turning, is greatly indebted for its origin to that error. The mischievous doctrine of final causes which Bacon, Comte, Spinoza, Descartes, and others scarcely less great, all agree to have done so much harm in philosophy, has sprung from erroneous views of the nature of design. Supposing that the argument from desigu as to the existence of will as a metaphysical entity were pressed to its logical consequences, what must be the result ? Nothing less than this,—that the animal, with its marvellous instinct of instant adaptation to the most complex and unfamiliar conditions, is possessed of a higher immaterial principle than the helpless child or the erring adult. We know right well, however, that the instinct of the animal is sometimes positively traceable to the acquireil power of former generations; that it has been observably built up in the constitution of the nervous centres, and transmitted to succeeding generations as an innate endows ment. It is exactly the same with the design that is formed within the term of an individual life, and which ever testifies to the previous cultivation of the individual; the more cultivateid the mind and the more varied the experience, the better des veloped is the will and the stronger its co-ordinating power over the thoughts, feelings, and artious, not otherwise, in trutlı, than as the co-ordinate reflex action of the spinal cord is developel by experience and culture. L'esign, therefore, when its natur. is fairly analysed, so far from tending to make the will a fixed metaphysical entity, goes really to prove that the will is an i:sensibly orqanized result, of varying value, quantitative an! qualitative.

llaving now adduced sufficient reasons to prove that the will is uot a self-generating, self-sutticin: fore of constant quantity

abstract or general volitions, as it were, are formed as the representatives of certain trains or groups of ideas, or as the expression of their due co-ordinate activity; and by their persistence in the mind, when not in consciousness, and their interaction there, the character of our thought, feeling, and action is modified in a way which we cannot comprehend. Every one must have felt that an act, which was at first disagreeable and demanded a painful effort of will, may become, in fact invariably does become, after several repetitions, much less disagreeable or even an easy habit. Not only, however, does that particular act lose its painful qualities, but all acts of a like kind are made easier; and our manner of feeling with regard to them, and even our judgment concerning them, are greatly modified. Though we can give no explanation of the way in which we are aided by the traces of past volitions, it is plain enough that we are so aided; conscious acquisition becomes unconscious power; and by an organic assimilation of some kind, even the will becomes automatic in certain relations.

Three conclusions are then to be distinctly established from the foregoing considerations: first, that the will is not an innate and constant faculty, but a gradual and varying organization ; secondly, that wherever an afferent nerve passes to a cell or series of cells in the cortical layers of the hemispheres, and an efferent nerve issues from the cell or series of cells, there is the possible or actual centre of a particular volition; and thirdly, that volition or will, used in its general or abstract sense, does not denote any actual entity, but simply expresses the due coordinate activity of the supreme centres of mental force, not otherwise than as the co-ordinate activity of the spinal cord or ineilulla oblongata might be said to represent its will—the faculiy in both cases being commonly an acquired one in man. When the animal acts in answer to some stimulus with direct and definite purpose, or, as we are in the habit of saying, instintively, it does so by virtue of in endowment of its nerve cen:res which is original in it; but in the formation of human volizion we observe this power of intelligent action in gradual prorss of acquirement—we witness :in illustration of design in the making; and if we only go far nough back through generations, the acquisition by the animals may sometimes be traced.

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