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“pretends to accomplish the discovery of the laws of the human mind by contemplating it in itself; that is, by separating it from causes and effects.” (Miss Martineau's Translation, 'p. 11.) Again, he says: “In order to observe, your intellect must pause from activity; yet it is this very activity that you want to observe. If you cannot effect the pause, you cannot observe; if you do effect it, there is nothing to observe. The results of such a method are in proportion to its absurdity." (Ibid. p. 11.)
(p. 12).—“ But the truth is, that they are not the highest instances which give the best or securest information, as is expressed, not inelegantly, in the common story of the philosopher, who, while he gazed upon the stars, fell into the water; for if he had looked down, he might have seen the stars in the water, but, looking aloft, he could not see the water in the stars.”—De Augment. Scient. B. ii.
• (p. 14).- Individual Psychology Bacon set down as wanting; he enforces its study, “so that we may have a scientific and accurate dissection of mind and characters, and the secret dispositions of particular men may be revealed, and that from the knowledge thereof better rales may be framed for the treatment of the mind.”—De Augment. Scient. B. vii.
(p. 23).—“It is to be regretted that he (Dugald Stewart) had not studied (he even treats it as inconceivable) the Leibnitzian doctrine of what has not been well denominated obscure perceptions or ideas—that is, acts and affections of mind, which, manifestiny their existence in their effects, are then selves out of consciousness or apperception. The fact of such latent modifications is now established beyond all rational doubt; and on the supposition of their reality, we are able to solve various psychological phenomena otherwise inexplicable. Among these are many of those attributed to habit.” (Sir W. Hamilton, in his edition of Reid, p. 551.)
"Ich sehe nicht," says Leibnitz, “dass die Cartesianer jemals beweisen haben oder beweisen können, dass jede Vorstellung von Rowusstsein begleitet ist." And again :-“ Darin nämlich haben die Cartesianer sehr gefehlt, dass sie die Vorstellungen, deren man sich nicht bewusst ist, für nichts rechneten. Das war auch der Grund, warum sie glaubten, dass nur die Geiste Monaden waren, und dass es keine Seelen der Thiem oder andere Entelschien gebe.”- Leibnitz als Denker. Auswahl seiner kleinern Arjätze. By G. Schelling. Pp. los and 115.
Fichto, in his Bestimmung des Menschen—“In jedem Momente ihrer Dauer ist die Natur ein zusammenhängendes Ganze; in jedem Momente
muss jeder einzelne Theil derselbe so sein wie er ist, weil alle übrigen sind wie sie sind ; und du könntest kein Sandkörnchen von seiner Stelle verrücken, ohne dadurch vielleicht alle Theile des unermesslichen Ganzen hindurch etwas zu verändern. Aber jaler Moment dicser Dauer ist bestimmt durch alle abgelaufenen Momente, und wird bestimmen alle künftigen Momente, und du kannst in dem gegenwärtigen keines Sandkörne Lage anders denken als sie ist, ohne dass du genöthigt würdest die ganze Vergangenheit ins Unbestimmte hinauf, und die ganze Zukunft ins Unbestimmte herab dir anders zu denken."-Sämmtliche Werke, ïi. 178.
It is only right to add, that the fullest exposition of unconscious / mental action is to be found in Beneke's works. A summary of his views is contained in his Lehrbuch der Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft.
. (p. 37).-Since this chapter was written, and, indeed, separately published, Mr. J. S. Mill has made a powerful defence of the so-called Psychological Method. In his criticism of Comte in the Westminster Reries for April 1865, and in his “ Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy," he has said all that can be said in favour of the Psychological Method, and has done what could be done to disparago the Physiological Method. This he had already done many years ago in the second volume of his “System of Logic,” and he is now only consistent in returning to the charge. Nevertheless, the admirers of Mr. Mill may well experience regret to sue him serving with so much zeal on what is a so desperately forlorn hope. Physiology seems Bever to have been a favourite sturly with Mr. Mill-in none of his writings does he exhibit any indications of being really acquainted with it; for it is hardly possible to conceive that any one having a knowledge of the present state of this science, would disparage it as be bas done, and exalt so highly the psychological method of investiEuting mental phenomena. The wonder is, however, that lie who has dine so much to expound the system of Comte, and to strengthen anel complete it, should on this question take leave of it entirely, and follow and laud a method of research which is so directly opposed to tl method of positive science. Of course, I speak now strictly of the fthod, not of Comte's application of it in his unfounded plireno1 _ical speculations, which are scarce less wild and absurd than his Ilgious delirium appears to be. I wever, though one may suspect 1:. Will to be unfortunate in his igrance, or entirely mistaken in 1. estimate, of the piysiological niet!.., one cannot fail to profit by 1 study of his arguments on behuis of the psycholoviral method, a l by his expositie of its merits. By parailing the whole force
of the reasons in favour of it, he has exhibited, not so much its strength as its weakness, and has undesignedly given important assistance to the physiological method. For the reasons why he has not been convincing, and why this chapter has been left unmodified, I
may refer to the arguments set forth in a review of his “Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy” in the Journal of Mental Science for January 1866. “Mr. Mill," it is there said, “has a high opinion of the psychological method of inquiry into mental phenomena, and thinks Conte to have committed a great error in discarding it. Whether that be true or not is not the question now; we may admit it to be true, and still ask whether it is a sufficient reason for ignoring those important results of the physiological method of research which bear vitally on psychology ; whether, in fact, because a certain method has some worth, it can therefore afford to dispense entirely with the aid furnished by other methods."
And again :-“ The present complaint against Mr. Mill is that he takes no notice of the effects of recent scientific conceptions on the questions referred to philosophy; that he goes on exactly as he might have gone on if he had lived in the days of Aristotle; that at a time when a new method, highly fertile in fact and of more fruitful promise, was available, he persists in trying to do, by the old method, what Plato, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and a host of others have not done. Now, we have not the slightest faith that ten thousand Mills will, following the same method, do what these great men bave not done ; but there can be no question that had Dr. Mill chosen to avail himself of the new material and the new method, which his great predecessors had not in their day, he would have done what no other living man could have done,”
THE MIND AND THE NERVOUS SYSTEM.
“That which perccives is a part of nature as truly as the objects of perception which act on it, and, as a part of nature, is itself an object of investigation purely physical. It is known to us only in the successive changes which constitute the variety of our feelings : but the regular sequence of these changes admits of being traced, like the regularity which we are capable of discovering in the successive changes of our bodily fraine. There is a Physiology of the Mind, then, as there is a Physiology of the Body—a science which examines the phenomena of our spiritual part simply as phenomena, and from the order of their succession, or other circumstances of analogy, arranges them in classes, under certain general names; as, in the physiology of our corporcal part, we consider the phenomena of a different kind which the body exhibits, and reluce all the diversities of these under the names of a few general functions.”-Skelch of a Syslern of l'hilosophy of the fluman Mind, by T. Brown, M.D.
MHE crude proposition of Cabanis,* that the brain secretes
thought as the liver secretes bile, has been a subject of duch ridicule to those who have not received it with outeries of disapprobation and disgust. Assuredly it is not an exact expression of the facts; one may rightly adınit the brain to be the priucipal organ of the mind, without accepting the fallacious comparison of mental action with biliary secretion. llere as elsewhere, confusion is bred by the common use of the word “secretiou" to express, not only the functional process but the secreted product, loth the insensible vital changes and the tangible results of them 11 is of great importance to try to fix, with as much precision is possible, what we mean by mind.
In the first place, mind, viewed in its scientific sense as a natural tree, caunot be observed and handled and dealt with as a pal; eble object; like electricity, or Tavity, or any viher
• "Not incluous avec la même certitudo que le cerveau ddigare en quelque port les ini sessions; qu'il fait organiquement la séchetion de la pensée."-Ruport de Physiqui a du Mural de l' Uomine, par P. J. G. Cuanis.
of the natural forces, it is appreciable only in the changes of matter which are the conditions of its manifestation. Few, if any, will now be found to deny that with each display of mental power there are correlative changes in the material substratum; that every phenomenon of mind is the result, as manifest energy, of some change, molecular, chemical, or vital, in the nervous elements of the brain. Chemical analysis of the so-called extractives of nerve testifies to definite change or "waste" through functional activity; for there are found, as products of a retrograde metamorphosis, lactic acid, kreatin, uric acid, probably also hypoxanthin, and, representing the fatty acids, formic and acetic acids. These products are very like those which are found in muscle after its functional activity: in the performance of an idea, as in the performance of a movement, there is a retrograde metamorphosis of organic element; the display of energy is at the cost of the highly-organized matter, which undergoes degeneration or passes from a higher to a lower grade of being; and the retrograde products are, so far as is at present kuown, very similar in muscle and nerve. While the contents of nerves, again, are neutral during rest in the living state, they become acid after death, and after great activity during life: the same is the case also with regard to muscle. Furthermore, after prolonged mental exercise, the products of the metamorphosis of nerve element, into the composition of which phosphorus enters largely, are recognised in an increase of phosphates in the urine; while it is only by supposing an idea to be accompanied by a correlative change in the nerve-cells that we can explain the exhaustion following excessive mental work and the breaking down of the brain in extreme cases. These things being so, what is it which in a physiological sense we designate mind ? Not the material products of cerebral activity, but the marvellous energy which cannot be grasped and handled. Here, then, is made manifest a fallacy of the axiom propounded by Cabanis: it is plain that the tangilileo results of the brain's activity, the waste matters which pass into the blood for assimilation by tissues of a lower kind, and for ultimate excretion from the body, might not less rightly be called the secretion of the brain, an i be compared to the bile, than the intangible energy revealed in the mental phenomena