claiming an arrear of pay as officers, or making some other demand upon the public, made it necessary for the House to put some restriction upon these applications; which, their being often promoted by members who were friends to the parties, and carrying with them the appearance of justice or of charity, induced the rest of the House to wish well to, or at most to be indifferent to their success; and by this means large sums were granted to private persons, improvidently, and sometimes without sufficient grounds. Very early, therefore, in the next session, on the 11th of December, 1706, before any petitions of this sort could be again offered, the House came to a resolution 'that they would receive no petition for any sum of money relating to public service, but what is recommended from the Crown.' This resolution not being at that time made a standing order, had no effect beyond the session in which it was passed, so that soon after the same practice returned again; and (the same mischiefs resulting from it) the House, upon the 11th of June, 1713, ordered the resolution of the 11th of December to be read, and declared it to be a standing order of the House. From this time, whenever any petition which desires relief by public money is offered, or any motion is made to this purpose, before the Speaker puts the question for bringing up the petition, it has been the practice, in conformity to this order, that the recommendation of the Crown should be signified by some member authorized so to do; and if the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or person usually authorized by the Crown, declines to signify this recommendation, the House cannot properly receive the petition. It has sometimes happened that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has, from motives of humanity, and in order not to preclude the House from taking a petition under their consideration, given the recommendation of the Crown, in cases of which, even at the time, he acknowledged his disapprobation. This conduct, from whatever motives it may proceed, is not to be approved of. It destroys the meaning and spirit of the order, and reduces it to a mere form. The resolution of the 11th of December has no other intention than to transfer the responsibility of receiving or refusing the petition from the House to the Ministers of the Crown. Unless, therefore, the Ministers will do their duty, by examining into the nature of the claim, and the propriety of granting any relief; and if they find the application unfounded, will have the courage to inform the House of the result of their opinion-it would be better that the standing order should be repealed, and the House should be left to act in these, as in other circumstances, without restraint or control."

It will be perceived, Sir, from these passages, that neither of these rules of the British Parliament go the length of the rule of this House. Neither of them provides that petitions of a certain class shall not be received at any time, or under any circumstances, or be entertained in any way whatever. The first declares only that petitions against a tax bill shall not be received while that bill is actually pending; and this, on the ground that the nation might be undone for want of an immediate supply for the public service, while Parliament was occupied in hearing petitions against some particular mode of raising

This rule has been discontinued by the House of Commons within a few years past.

that supply. And it is expressly admitted that petitions for the repeal or alteration of these same taxes may subsequently be received. The second of these rules stops equally short of an entire exclusion of a certain class of petitions. Its whole intention and operation is to throw upon the ministry the responsi bility of all appropriations of public money. It substantially refers all the petitions to which it relates to the advisers of the Crown, (themselves members of Parliament,) and makes them a committee to receive and consider them. And it expressly provides that, with their indorsement, these very petitions shall be received and considered by the House. What sort of analogy is there between rules like these and a rule which declares that petitions on certain enumerated topics shall not be received at any time, or under any circumstances, or be entertained in any way whatever?

But what does Mr. Hatsell say further on the subject of these rules? "The House," he says, in commenting on one of them, "ought to be particularly cautious not to be over rigid in extending this rule beyond what the practice of their ancestors in former times can justify them in. To receive, and hear, and consider the petitions of their fellow-subjects, when presented decently, and containing no matter intentionally offensive to the House, is a duty incumbent upon them, antecedent to all rules and orders that may have been instituted for their own conven. ience. Justice and the laws of their country demand it from them."

Here, Mr. Speaker, is laid down, in the clearest and noblest phraseology,-in words which, after the principles that have so often been advanced, and the practice which has so long prevailed here, ought to be emblazoned in letters of gold upon every column in this hall, and to be suspended on a scroll of silver from the very beak of the eagle above your head, -the true parliamentary and constitutional doctrine on the subject of petitions.

But, before enlarging upon this idea, I must say a few words in defence of the fourth proposition which I promised to prove, namely, that there is abundant reason for believing that the framers of our Constitution would have been the last persons to acquiesce in the exceptions to this doctrine which are contained in the two special rules which have just been cited. Why, Sir,

is it forgotten that our fathers had some experience of their own on this subject of the reception of petitions? Is it forgotten that the Declaration of Independence itself, after reciting the various oppressions to which the American Colonies had been subjected, goes on to state, that "in every stage of these oppressions, we have petitioned for redress in the most humble terms; our repeated petitions have been answered by repeated injury?" Is it forgotten that Patrick Henry, of Virginia, in that celebrated speech, which is at the tongue's end of every schoolboy in the Union, and in which he comes to the stern and startling conclusion, "we must fight," presents it as the very climax of his description of the unbearable grievances of that day, "we have petitioned, we have remonstrated, we have supplicated: our petitions have been slighted, our remonstrances disregarded, and we have been spurned with contempt from the foot of the throne?" It is an historical fact that the petitions of our fathers were refused a reception in the British Parliament. And on what ground were they refused? Upon what principle were they denied a hearing, or any entertainment whatever? Sir, it was in conformity with these very precedents which have been cited here so triumphantly! It was under these very rules which are appealed to so confidently in justification of our rule! Here is the record of the fact:

"On the 15th of February, 1765, a petition of Mr. Montague, agent for Virginia, and a petition from Connecticut, and another from the inhabitants of Carolina, against the bill then depending, for imposing a stamp duty in America, being offered, upon the question for bringing them up, it passed in the negative.”

And now will any gentleman undertake to maintain that the framers of the Constitution intended to give their assent to principles, under which their own petitions against the Stamp Act were refused a reception? Will any gentleman rely on these precedents, while the words of Patrick Henry and the language of the Declaration are still fresh in his memory? No, Sir, I am sure I need not urge this point further.

Let me recur, then, for a moment, to the admirable exposition of Mr. Hatsell: "To receive, and hear, and consider the petitions of their fellow-subjects, when presented decently, and containing no matter intentionally offensive to the House, is a

duty incumbent upon them, antecedent to all rules and orders that may have been instituted for their own convenience. Justice and the laws of our country demand it of them." This sentence, I repeat, contains, in the noblest terms, the true constitutional and parliamentary principle. It embraces the whole rule and the only rule; the whole exception and the only exception to the rule;- the rule being that petitions shall be received, heard, and considered; and the exception relating exclusively to such as are not decently presented, or such as contain matter intentionally offensive to the House.

[Mr. Winthrop was here interrupted by the expiration of the morning hour, and the subject was laid over until the following day.]

January 24, 1844.

The orders of the day having been called for by Mr. Adams, Mr. Winthrop proceeded with his remarks:

When I was interrupted yesterday, I was proceeding to make some comments on the golden rule which has been laid down on the subject of petitions by Mr. Hatsell, who, by all acknow ledgment, is the highest authority on the subject of parliamentary principles and parliamentary precedents; and who has been styled by Mr. Jefferson "the preeminent authority" on all such matters. It will be observed that this rule contains no sanction for the doctrine which has so often been advanced here, that petitions are not to be received, because there may seem to be no authority to grant the prayer of them. And where, let me ask, where would such a doctrine lead us in these days and in this country? Where would it lead us in this House, and at this very moment? Why, sir, there is an undoubted majority of this body, who hold that Congress have no constitutional authority to establish a national bank; no constitutional authority to carry on a system of internal improvements; no constitutional authority to distribute among the States the proceeds of the public lands. I am by no means sure that there is a majority here who would dare to assert, in positive terms, the power of Congress to protect American labor. We all know that, in the changes of parties and of party opinions in this country, this Constitution of ours is one thing to-day and another thing to-morrow; a strait

jacket-as an honorable member from Virginia has termed itto one set of men, and a charter wide withal as the wind to another set of men. Some of us maintain that the power of Congress over slavery in the District of Columbia is as clear and as unqualified as its power to regulate commerce or to support a navy. Others hold, on the contrary, that an exclusive jurisdiction in all cases whatsoever does not extend to the case of slavery. In the mean time, some are of opinion that there is a power in this Government to annex Texas to the Union; while others, (and myself among the number,) maintain, that such an annexation would be a plain and palpable violation of the Constitution, and an utter annihilation of what little there is left, on our side at least, of the old, original compromises, on which that Constitution was adopted. Where, I repeat, would the doctrine end, that petitions are not to be received, if they ask for any thing which an existing majority here may deem it unconstitutional to grant? It is plain that the power to grant the prayer of a petition is a question to be considered, and the petition must be received and heard in order that this question may be considered. It is always, let me add, in the power of Congress to propose amendments to the Constitution. Perhaps the consideration of a petition may lead to such propositions. Perhaps this may be the very design and object of the petitioners. This idea alone is an ample answer to the suggestion, that a supposed or even a real want of power to grant them, is ground enough for a summary refusal to receive petitions.

But this golden rule of Mr. Hatsell's, it will be perceived, does not stop short at the reception of petitions. It declares it to be a duty incumbent on us, antecedent to all rules and orders for our own convenience, to hear and consider them. And, for myself, I do not desire to have the rule of this House changed at all, if it be not so changed as to meet and embrace this whole principle. As to receiving petitions for the purpose of laying them instantly on the table, it is a mere evasion of the principle, and a mere mockery of the parties. The original excitement on this subject sprung up under such a rule as that would be; and a return to it would do nothing, nothing whatever, to allay that excitement. In this one point, therefore, I agree with the honor