Callisen, Beytrag die Lehre von der Allwissen- said by the schoolmen to know immediaté, sine heit Gottes, und die Lehre von der menschlichen discursu, uno actu. Vide Castner, Wie die allgeFreiheit in Harmonie zu bringen, in Schmidt's meinen Begriffe im göttlichen Verstande sind; Bibliothek der theologischen Literatur, b. viii. Altenburg, 1768. s. 247; Giessen, 1805, 8vo.

We can therefore bring no objection against the Bible, when it ascribes to God this scientia futurorum contingentium. Vide Psalm cxxxix. 16, “ Thou knewest the whole course of my life, when thou sawest me in the first stages of existence." Cf. v. 2, Thou understandest my thought afar off,”—i. e., before I myself think it. Isaiah adduces it as a proof of the greatness of God, that he foresees and announces to his prophets those future contingent things which are beyond the reach of the human understanding, ch. xli. 26; xliv. 8; xlviii. 4-8.

II. The Mode of the Divine Knowledge. The faculties which we possess for the acquisition of knowledge are very limited, and the knowledge which we acquire in the use of them is very imperfect. In forming conceptions, therefore, of the divine intelligence, we must abstract all those limitations which relate to time and space; and in this way we obtain, for the most part, merely negative ideas. The difference between our understanding and that of God may be rendered evident by the following particulars:

1. Our knowledge is mostly derived from sensation, from which we obtain, either directly or indirectly, all our ideas. This is a limit beyond which we cannot pass; and being such, it is wholly inapplicable to the mind of God. Our souls, in the present life, act and feel through the body and its senses. But as these do not belong to God, he cannot be supposed to have either sensation or passions. Vide Morus, p. 54, s. 15, not. extr.

When every imperfection is abstracted from the divine understanding, it appears, from what has been said, to surpass human understanding in the following respects:-(a) It is simultaneous,—God knows by one act; (b) most true, without error or mistake; (c) most clear,-without darkness or confusion; (d) most certain,— without doubt or ambiguity.

But those who live in the sphere of sense, and are limited by time and space, are unable to form distinct conceptions of the perfection and immeasurableness of the divine understanding. There is, therefore, in all the languages of men, especially the more ancient, an entire destitution of terms which literally express these ideas; and even had such terms existed in former times, they would have been unintelligible. There is no way, therefore, when this subject is mentioned, but to take language borrowed from the objects of sense, and to employ it with a purer and more refined meaning. This is the method of the Bible. It speaks of God as remembering either in a good sense, meaning that he bestows favours after he has for a long time inflicted punishments, (e. g., Gen. viii. 1; Acts, x. 4;) or in a bad sense, meaning that he calls to mind—i. e., punishes, the sins of men, (e. g., Psalm xxv. 7; ciii. 9.) In the same manner it speaks of God as forgetting-i. e., leaving men without help, or suffering their sins to pass unpunished. It speaks too of his hoping and expecting, and finding his hope and expectation, as it seems to us, disappointed. On the same principle, the terms taken from the bodily organs, through which we obtain all our knowledge, are applied to God-e. g., 87, pov, ideiv, ȧxove, which are synonymous with μα, γινώσ κειν, τῆς ἐρευνῶν, &c. Morus, p. 46, s. 10.

SECTION XXIII.

OF THE OMNIPRESENCE OF GOD.

2. Our knowledge is obtained gradually. We first receive our notions from sensation; we then treasure them in our memory; and afterwards compare them with one another, and form judgments concerning them. We then proceed gradually, by means of the conclusions to which we have arrived, from one truth to another, attaining sometimes to a probability in our knowledge, but remaining often uncertain and wholly uninformed. But this process of acquisition is in various ways imperfect, and cannot, therefore, be attributed to God. He does not recollect what is past, nor form images or symbols in his mind, nor come to the conclusions of reason. He does not form abstract ideas; for to his minded by Morus. We justly conclude, that he who each particular thing is equally present; he regards all things with immediate intuition; and is independent of the aid of memory. Everything like succession in knowledge must be absolutely excluded from the knowledge of God. This is called scientia simultanea; and God is

I. Statement of the Doctrine. THE omnipresence of God is that power by which he is able to act everywhere. This attribute, when correctly viewed, cannot be distinguished from the divine omnipotence and omniscience taken in connexion; and so it is exhibit

knows all things (s. 22), and whose power is so unlimited, that he does whatsoever he will (s. 21), must be present in all things, and cannot be separated from them by time or space.

In thinking on this subject, we have need to guard against gross conceptions, and especially

against the danger of predicating of God what | various opinions which have prevailed respect

ing the omnipresence of God, it appears that most of the errors have arisen from confounding the ideas of body and substance. In doing this, our author has followed the example of Reinhard, Morus, Doederlein, and others, who adopted the philosophy of Leibnitz and

can only be said of the presence of body. This caution is particularly necessary here, since we are apt to transfer the forms of time and space, which are applicable only to the sphere of sense, into the world of spirits; and in so doing, to come to conclusions which are false and contradictory, and dishonourable to the purely spi-Wolf. In denying to God a body, and thus ritual nature of God. Vide s. 20, I. The following points should be considered in reference to this subject:

avoiding the errors of pantheism, they seemed at the same time unconsciously to deny him substance, and to transmute him into an unessential thought, and then to locate him somewhere beyond the limits of the universe, from whence he looks forth, and exerts his power upon all his works; in which, therefore, he is no other

1. Extension is not predicable of God, who is a Spirit. To say, therefore, that he is in infinite space, or, with Philo, the Cabbalists, and many modern writers, that he is himself infinite space, is altogether erroneous. Such expres-wise present than by his knowledge and agency.] sions necessarily involve a material and limited nature. Space is a mode of thought, in which, as in a frame, we must range everything which belongs to the sphere of sense, but within which nothing relating to the spiritual or moral world can be brought. The omnipresence of God was often mentioned by the ancient philosophers who ascribed to him a corporeal nature, or who regarded him and the world as composing one whole. He was called by Novatianus and other Grecian writers, τόπος τῶν όλων, or του ökov, locus omnium rerum; and by the Rabbins, op, spatium universale. But this is an incorrect notion of the divine omnipresence. Baier and many of our older theologians spoke of the omnipresence of God as substantialis, or essentialis, in opposition to that which was merely operativa, or actualis. This substantial presence of God they called àdiastasía, or in Latin, indistantia, or adessentia substantiæ divinæ. These expressions, however, convey no distinct idea, and often lead to erroneous conceptions.

[Note. Some of the older theologians entertained the more scriptural opinion, that both the substantial and efficient presence of God were involved in his omnipresence. Thus Calovius defines the omnipresence of God to be that attribute, "vi cujus ille, non tantum substantiæ propinquitate, sed etiam efficacia ac operatione, adest creaturis omnibus." System. tom. ii. p. 612. He adds, p. 613, "Omnipræsentia Dei est attributum ἐνεργητικόν, nec solum ἀδιαστασίαν, indistantiam adessentia, sed etiam ἐνέργειαν, operationem præsentis Dei, subinfert." In this view of the subject Calovius was followed by Quenstedt, who writes that this attribute, non solum essentiæ divinæ propinquitatem, sive adessentiam Dei ad creaturas, sed etiam operationem quandam, importet." He therefore distinguishes between the immensity and the omnipresence of God, the former of which he supposes to be absolute and eternal, the latter relative, and coeval only with the creation.

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2. By the presence of a spiritual being with us, we mean, that he thinks of us, and in this way acts upon us. But in order to this, we need not suppose his local presence, or the approximation of the spiritual substance. We are present in spirit with an absent friend, when we think of him, and thus act upon him. Paul says, 1 Cor. v. 3, ἀπὼν τῷ σώματι, παρὼν δὲ τῷ πνεύματι, cf. v. 4. We see thus that our minds have an agency, and an agency different from that of matter, though we are ignorant of the mode of their operation. How, then, can we hope to understand the manner in which God acts? From what we observe of the operation of our own minds, we may, however, reason with respect to God, if we are on our guard against transferring to him the imperfection and limitations which we perceive in ourselves. He sees and knows all things; nor is he removed from objects extrinsic to himself in respect either of time or space, as we are, the operation even of whose minds is limited by the sphere of sense, to which we are chained by our connexion with our bodies. The power of his Spirit, or rather, the power of him, as the most perfect Spirit, is infinite; that of our spirits, finite. He therefore understands and controls all things; which is the same as to say, he is present in all things. If we attempt to go beyond this, we fall at once into fruitless subtilties. We should be content to say with Morus, Deus rebus præsens, est Deus in res agens.

II. The Scriptural Representations.

These are accordant with the views which we have here expressed. The Bible exhibits this attribute of God in such a manner as to lead us to reverence his character, to place our confidence in him, and to walk circumspectly before him. And it accomplishes this practical end without the aid of metaphysical subtilties. In Psalm cxxxix. 7-10, the knowledge and power of God are mentioned in close and inseparable Hahn remarks, that from the history of the connexion with his presence-" Whither shall

I go from thy spirit? If I ascend up into hea- | pressed after the example which is given even ven, thou art there; if I dwell in the uttermost in the scriptures, by the phrase, God is exalted parts of the sea, even there shall thy hand lead over all. We sometimes find the phrase, he dwells me, and thy right hand shall hold me." The on high, instead of the phrase, he dwells in heaomniscience and omnipresence of God are con- ven. Vide Psalm cxv. 3; Job, xvi. 19. nected in the same manner in Jer. xxiii. 23, 24, "Am I a God who is near, and far from no one; and can any hide himself in secret places that I shall not see him?" For other passages, cf. Morus, p. 52, and Hahn, S. 188, s. 43.

(a) He dwells IN HEAVEN. There he gives the most awful displays of his power, in the lightnings and flying tempests, and thence he sends down the most visible marks of his favour in the light and vital warmth of the sun. The heavens are therefore called the palace, throne, or temple of God; and the earth, in contradistinction, his footstool. For this reason, the face and hands were directed heavenwards in prayer, and the temples and altars of God were built upon mountains and hills. What is intended by these figurative representations may be literary ex-seq. s. 14.

SECTION XXIV.

THE WISDOM OF GOD.

I. Statement of the Doctrine.

2. He chooses the best means (media, instrumenta) for the attainment of these ends. He not only knows, as omniscient, what the best means are, but is able, as omnipotent, to employ them. In the choice of means he cannot be de

infallible. Hence he will never choose unsuitable, ineffective, or injurious means; nor will he employ means which are superfluous, or more than are necessary for the attainment of his object in the shortest way. To suppose this would be to impeach his omniscience. This is sometimes expressed as follows: God acts by the rule of economy, (ex lege æconomiæ;) Deum ire viâ brevissimâ; according to the axiom: Quod fieri potest per pauca, non debet fieri per plura. That God acts upon this maxim, both in the material and moral world, we see from innumerable observations. But since we are unable to survey the whole system of things we cannot and should not presume to decide in given cases what might be the shortest way and what might be the best means for attaining the divine ends. Many things appear to us useless, unsuitable, or superfluous. The observation of Paul, (1 Corinthians, i. 25,) that even those actions and works of God which appear to us foolish and unwise far surpass all human wisdom is abundantly confirmed both in the physical and moral world. Vide Reimarus, Abhandlungen über die Wahrheiten der natürlichen Religion, s. 206; and Jacobi, Betrachtungen über die weisen Absichten Gottes, 4 thle. Hanover, 1765, 8vo. The science in which the ends and objects of God are investigated is called teleology. Vide s. 15, 68, ad finem.

THIS attribute of God, as well as his omni-ceived, since he is omniscient, and consequently presence, stands in the closet connexion with his omniscience, and can be directly derived from it. The omniscience of God implies that he possesses the clearest knowledge of the connexion of all things, and therefore of their relations as means and ends, and this knowledge is commonly called wisdom. And because God possesses the most perfect knowledge of this kind he is said to possess supreme wisdom. He is accordingly styled by Paul, (1 Tim. i. 17), uóvos oopós, the all-wise, sapientissimus; cf. Jude, v. 25. The wisdom of God implies two things:1. God proposes to himself the best ends (fines, consilia.) The question is here asked, what is the end of God in the creation and preservation of the world? The earlier theologians generally assign the glory and majesty of God as the final cause of the creation, and refer to the texts which speak of him as doing everything for his own glory-i. e., that it might be seen and acknowledged. And we may say, indeed, that in relation to men and other rational beings, who are bound to acknowledge the glory of God, this is one end of the creation. But glory, in itself considered, cannot be looked upon as the sole, universal end, for which the world exists. For God himself can be in nothing dependent on the glory which others ascribe to him, nor can he receive any increase of honour from their praises. Other theologians, therefore, say that the welfare of men was the object of God in the creation of the world. This may be true, if it is not understood to mean that God created everything solely for this object. It were judg-high degree practical. It is calculated to inspire ing very proudly concerning ourselves and very poorly concerning God to suppose that he proposed to himself no other object than this, and had created everything for our sake who constitute so small a part of the boundless universe. We prefer the following answer to this question: The end of God in the creation of the world was to impart to all his creatures that degree of perfection of which they are severally susceptible; in accomplishing this end he employs the most suitable means, and thus displays before our eyes his wisdom, power, and goodness. This is what is meant when it is said in the scriptures, he made everything for his own glory.fied, and in which Solomon bestows upon it all We should learn the majesty and glorious attributes of the Creator from the creatures of his hand. But this can be done only by moral beings like ourselves. Vide Psalm xix., et alibi. Cf. s. 18, I. Note. Also s. 48, IV. Hahn, Lehrbuch, s. 271. Bretschneider, Handbuch, band. i. s. 584.

II. Scriptural Representations.

The doctrine of the wisdom of God is in a

our hearts with pious, thankful, and reverential feelings towards God. It offers to us an unfailing source of consolation and peace in the midst of our cares and sufferings, and is therefore frequently exhibited by the sacred writers. The most important texts relating to this attribute may be divided into two classes.

1. The texts which treat of our knowledge of the wisdom of God derived from the creation and preservation of the physical world. These are, Psalm civ., especially ver. 24; Prov. iii. 19, seq.; Is. xl. 13, seq.; also Prov. viii. 22-30, where the wisdom of God is personi

possible praises, and shews that it is that attribute by which God so especially glorifies himself in the creation and preservation of the world. In the preceding and succeeding context he describes folly and ignorance by way of contrast.

2. The texts which treat of the wisdom of

rejecting here, as before, all imperfection. This is the only way in which we can come to a knowledge of God. Vide s. 18, ad finem. Now we ascribe to the human soul two powers, or rather, a twofold modification and exercise of its power-viz., thinking and choosing, or intelligence and will. And we call the attributes of God which are analogous to these by the same name. Of the understanding of God, and of the attributes in which it is principally developed, we have before treated. We now come to speak of the divine will, and the attributes which belong to it. The will with us is dependent upon the understanding. We are said to will, when we feel an inclination for anything which appears agreeable, and disinclination for anything which appears disagreeable. And it is the same with God. What the will either of men or of God is, must be learned from its effects, or by the actions.

God as displayed in the various institutions of the moral world, especially those which he has established to promote the moral perfection and happiness of the human race. For moral perfection, and the happiness which stands in an immediate connexion with it, are the ultimate destination of men and of all moral creatures. The writers of the New Testament especially love to dwell upon these great plans of God. Christ says, (Matt. xi. 19,) ǹ oopía (Oɛoù) ¿dizaiện ảnò Tùy téxvwv avtys—i. e., the wisdom of God (as displayed in the calling and preparation of teachers, and in the publication of their doctrines) is approved by all the wise. Paul says the same respecting the wisdom of God as displayed in the Christian doctrine so generally condemned at that time, 1 Cor. i. ii. Those very doctrines which appeared the most revolting to Jews and heathen contained, in his view, the greatest proof of the divine wisdom. He calls the doctrine of redemption copía, by The following words are used in the Bible to way of eminence, (1 Cor. 1. 25, seq. coll. Rom. designate the will of God. Yen and the subxi. 33;) although it appeared foolishness to men. stantive son; also 3, and the substantive 7. Morus, p. 47, note 7. A taste for these moral The former words are translated in the Septuasubjects, and a perception of the wisdom of God gint by Saw, Bovλoμai, Séanμa, Bovan, and the in the provisions he has made for the moral latter by evdoziv and evdoxia. The last word improvement and for the recovery of our race, often denotes the sovereignty, or rather, the is, as it were, the test by which we can judge freedom of the divine will (1) These of the degree of moral improvement to which are the senses, therefore, in which these words any one has attained. He who has no taste for are used by the Hellenistic Jews, and the these objects has made as yet but little pro- writers of the New Testament. Cf. Ephes. i. gress; for the Bible assures us that the most 11; Ps. cxv. 3. These words, moreover, often pure and perfect of the moral creatures of God designate the thing itself which God reveals as -the angels in heaven, admire the wisdom dis- his will, or which he commands by his preplayed in his plan for the redemption of men, cepts; as, yevndńtw tò Séanμá oov, Luke, xi. 2. and ponder them with delight, and inquire into Cf. Ephes. v. 17; Romans, xii. 2. Bovaǹ Oεov them with earnestness, Ephes. iii. 10; 1 Pet. ( ven, Is. liii. 10,) means the decree of God, i. 12. In Col. ii. 3, Paul says that in this plan or his plan for the good of men; and so denotes, lie concealed all the treasures of the wisdom of by way of eminence, the dispensation of grace God. through Christ, Acts, xx. 27, coll. ver. 20. Connected with this, there is one more signification of these words, which deserves to be noticed. When the verbs volendi and eligendi are construed, in Hebrew with 2, or in Greek with iv or eis, (as D 2 son or, and doxɛiv iv tívi,) they signify, to be well-disposed towards any one, to love him, to shew him favour; i. q., bene cupere, velle, to wish well; also, to like to do anything; in short, i. q., piλɛiv. Indeed, the latter word is used in Luke, xx. 46, instead of Séhɛw, which occurs in the parallel text, Mark, xii. 38. The same meaning, to love, to have pleasure in a thing, belongs also to See with the accusative, Matt. xxvii. 43. Hence θέλημα, βουλή, εὐδοκία, often

Note.-The Hebrew on, and the Greek copos, signified originally, skilful, expert, and were applied especially to artificers; cf. Ex. xxxi. 3; Homer. Il. xv. 412. They signified, secondarily, able and knowing in any way. Thus pare docti, Eccl. i. 18; Is. xix. 11; 1 Cor. i. 20, (xov sopòs; nov ypaμμarɛús.) They came gradually to have that more general signification which belongs to them in all the ancient languages. The same is true of the corresponding substantives on, and sopía.

SECTION XXV.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS RESPECTING THE NA- signify the GRACIOUS will of God, his benevolence,

TURE AND PERFECTIONS OF THE DIVINE WILL.

I. What is meant by the Will of God. WE derive our notions and expressions respecting this divine attribute, as well as the others, from what we know of the human soul;

the proofs which he gives us of his friendship.

II. Divisions of the Will of God, and Divine
Decrees.

The will of God that anything exterior to himself should take place, is called his determina

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