tion, or decree. Morus, p. 51, note. The objects of the divine will are as many and various as the objects of the divine knowledge. Cf. s. 22, I. For God, like all rational beings, chooses only such things as are perceived by his understanding to be good. His will, therefore, as well as that of others, depends always upon his knowledge. And he chooses or rejects, as the objects which are presented to his mind appear in his judgment desirable or otherwise. Since now his knowledge is the most perfect, his will must be the best.

God is frequently represented in the Bible as favourably inclined towards all men, and as desiring their happiness. But in some passages it seems to be intimated that he does not desire the welfare of some men, but, on the contrary, their condemnation. Now, many things which we, in our philosophical style, should say took place under the divine permission, or with the distant concurrence of his will, were ascribed by the ancient world to the immediate agency and express decree of God. Traces of this common opinion appear in Homer and other ancient writers. Passages occur which exhibit the most exalted and worthy conceptions of the Deity, while other passages ascribe to him the designing and performance of such actions as are inconsistent with his perfections. Those of the latter kind, which occur in the holy scriptures, being taken by themselves, and considered by those who were unacquainted with this ancient mode of thinking and speaking, were made to contain a sense which was never intended by the original writers. This mistake gave rise to the vehement controversies respecting predestination, which continued in the Romish church from the fifth even to the eighteenth century, and which raged with great violence between the Lutheran and Reformed churches, especially during the seventeenth century. In the progress of these controversies it was found convenient, in order to remove the apparent contradiction in these texts, and to render the whole subject more intelligible, to introduce various divisions into the divine will. The following are the most

common:

1. Antecedens and consequens. Voluntas antecedens is also called prima, or primitiva; and voluntas consequens is called secunda, finalis, or decretoria. This division is very ancient, and occurs not only in John of Damascus, in the eighth century, (since whose time it has been always preserved by the schoolmen,) but even in Chrysostom, in the fourth century, who distinguishes between Séλημа лрйτоv and devTepov, Apoyoμevov and iñóμɛvov, (Homel, I., in Ephes.,) and who is said by Semler to have derived it from Plato. This division is derived from the analogy of the human mind. We possess a certain original bias, or impulse, which,

as long as it is not directed to any particular object, is called voluntas antecedens animi humani ; but as soon as it is directed to definite objects, is called voluntas consequens. Thus love and hate, while not directed to particular objects, belong to the former; when so directed, to the latter. If we apply this to God, we say that he wills the happiness and perfection of all his creatures by his voluntas antecedens; and that he makes application of this general will to particular objects, by his voluntas consequens. Now when God bestows upon any individual all the good of which he is susceptible, he is said to treat him according to his consequent or determining will. This voluntas consequens is therefore principally exhibited in the decrees of God. These two volitions thus often differ in their results, although they do not clash among themselves; although there may be succession in the objects of the divine will, there can be no succession in his will itself; for as God knows, so he wills everything instantaneously. Now, if I say God wills to make all men happy, (1 Tim. ii. 4,) this is, in the language of the schools, the voluntas antecedens Dei-the end or object of God; but if I add the distinction, that he actually bestows this happiness only on the pious, they alone being susceptible of it, (Mark, xvi. 16,) this is the voluntas consequens. God, then, ex voluntate antecedente, wills the happiness of all men, without exception; but, ex voluntate consequente, he wills the condemnation of the wicked.

With regard to the propriety of this division we would say, that so far as it helps us to understand and express many things relating to the attributes, decrees, and providence of God, it may be allowed, if what is intended by it be considered, and not the form of expression. For the language in which it is expressed is very inconvenient, and conveys the idea of succession and mutability in the divine decrees. Literally understood it involves a contradiction; for God never, in fact, willed a thing which he is said to have willed antecedenter, but which has never taken place consequenter; since he has no ends which he does not attain. This language must be understood, therefore, to represent this thing as it appears to us. Vide Töllner, Vermischte Aufsätze, Samml. II., No. I. Kann Gott Endzwecke haben, die er nicht erreicht?

2. Voluntas absoluta, and conditionata or ordinata. This division relates principally to the will of God in regard to moral beings. He is said to will absolutely when he determines anything without connecting it with a condition, or, which is the same thing, without having respect to the free actions of moral beings. Thus, for example, he frequently allots the external condition of particular men, or of whole nations, without reference to their moral worth. Vide

Since now his understanding is infallible, and he sees everything as it actually is, his choice is called necessary, and not at all because it results from any compulsion. The human understanding is subject to mistake, and our choice is frequently free only in appearance; but always to will and to do that which the understanding discerns as best is the highest degree of freedom in a moral being.

2. The doctrine of the Bible respecting the freedom of the divine will.

This rests upon the principles above stated, and is to be explained in the same way; especially as far as it relates to the freedom with which God bestows or withholds his favours. In the ancient languages, however, there were no definite terms answering to the pure idea of freedom; and if there had been such terms invented for the use of the schools of philosophy, they would have been ill adapted to popular instruction. But they had not learned, at that early period, to discriminate with sufficient accuracy between their ideas, and they therefore often employed words which indicate caprice to express the idea of freedom. We observe, however, that just conceptions on this subject are found everywhere in the Bible, although they are expressed in popular rather than in philosophical language. So, when God is said in the Bible to bestow blessings when he will, and to be severe when he will, the meaning is, not that he acts like a tyrant, in passion, or according to blind caprice, but that he does that which in his infinite wisdom he sees to be best. Thus 1 Cor. xii. 11; Isaiah, xlv. 9, 10. We regard human rulers as happy on account of the great freedom | they possess, and their independence of external control; they possess the right of pardoning, of condemning, &c. Now the popular, language of the Bible ascribes to God this unlimited use of freedom, which we consider as the prerogative of earthly princes and rulers. But this language must be interpreted in such a way as not to involve those imperfections which belong only to

men.

From this language it must not be supposed that when God pardons or condemns according to his own will, he acts, as human rulers often do, from passion or caprice; for there is no true freedom where the will is not obedient to the understanding. When God, therefore, prospers and exalts one particular individual or a whole nation, and afflicts and depresses another, in so doing he acts freely-i. e., for wise reasons, though they may be inscrutable to us, and not from wilfulness or caprice. But from the fact that we cannot see the reasons for what God does, we are sometimes disposed to think that he has none in his own mind, and that he acts in an arbitrary manner; and as we think we usually express ourselves. The popular language, therefore, which seems to affirm that God

decides and acts in an arbitrary manner, often means no more than that we are ignorant of the reasons which influence his decisions and conduct. Vide Morus, p. 51, note. And in this sense God's government, even in the intellectual and moral world, is free; to one people he gives more religious knowledge and more advantages for mental improvement, to another less; and what he bestows at one time he takes away at another. Cf. Ephes. i. 4-14. To us shortsighted beings there often appears to be something unjust, contradictory, and inexplicable in all this. At such times there is nothing more quieting than the firm conviction that God wills and acts with the most perfect freedom-i. e., according to the views of his understanding, by which he always knows infallibly what is best, The passage Rom. ix. is one of the most important in relation to this subject. Paul here contends against the error of the Jews, that God preferred their nation to all others, and looked upon them with exclusive favour. The Jews believed that God could not reject them, and could not transfer to others the blessings he had bestowed upon them. Paul undertakes to shew that, on the contrary, God proceeded freely in the dispensation of his benefits; that he did not govern himself by the supposed deserts or the personal efforts of men; and that men could not presume in this matter to prescribe to him, or to complain of his government. Verse 11, "va ἡ κατ' ἐκλογὴν πρόθεσις τοῦ Θεοῦ μένῃ—i. e., the will of God (ixλoyn, libertas in eligendo, as Josephus uses it) must be acknowledged to be free. (Cf. the phrase evdoxía Jɛλnuatos, Eph. i. 5, 11,) Ver. 7, seq., Abraham had many children, but Isaac only received the promise. Ver. 10, seq., Isaac had two sons, Jacob and Esau, born at the same time. God made the posterity of the one to be subject to that of the other. From these and other examples Paul now concludes, ver. 18, that God ov Sénec, èheeì• öv dè Jéhel, oxλypúvel, (Job, xxxix. 16.) Cf. ver. 15, ἐλεήσω ὃν ἂν ἐλεῶ, καὶ οἰκτειρήσω ὃν ἂν οἰκτείρω, quoted from Exod. xxxiii. 19, I bestow blessings at pleasure (pro lubitu), on whomsoever I will, according to my infallible wisdom. Paul afterwards, ver. 22, mentions some reasons why God frequently proceeds in this way. He does so sometimes, to deter men from wickedness, by a display of his anger, or in some manner to promote the general good; but should we in any case be unable to discover these reasons, we must humbly acquiesce in the divine will, ver. 20, 21. This passage, therefore, does not treat of the predestination of particular men to happiness or misery by an absolute decree. This predestination is not absolute, but dependent on the fulfilment of certain conditions on the part of man. In this passage Paul is speaking of the general government of the world, and of the or

s. 29.

4. We ascribe justice to God, so far as he exhibits his love of goodness and hatred of wickedness, in his dealings with his creatures; s. 30, 31.

II. Immutability of the Divine Will. The immutability of the will of God results from that of his nature; vide s. 20, ad finem. Since his will is always founded upon his perfect knowledge, and his judgment is infallible with regard to whatever it may relate, he cannot be supposed to fluctuate in his choice. The mutability of the human will is owing to the uncertainty and defectiveness of human knowledge. The Bible often speaks of the unchangeableness of the divine will. Psalm xxxiii. 10, 11, "Jehovah bringeth the counsel of the heathen to nought; but his counsel standeth for ever." Ps. cxix. 89-91, Rom. xi. 29, aueraμéanta χαρίσματα Θεοῦ. 1 Sam. xv. 29, "He is not a man, that he should repent;" coll. s. 20. When therefore we meet with texts in which God is said to repent, (as Gen. vi. 7,) or in which he is said to have done differently from his intentions, (as Isa. xxxviii. 1, seq.; Jonah, iii. 9,) we must interpret them so as to be consistent with his perfections; for Moses and the prophets well knew that God was not a man, that he should repent, Num. xxiii. 19. These representations become consistent when we consider that whenever an event occurred otherwise than had been expected, or affairs took a turn, under the divine government or permission, different from what had been common in human experience, then, in the customary dialect of antiquity, God was said to repent and alter his purpose.

III. Efficacy of the Divine Will. Whatever God wills, that he can accomplish; and his power has no limitations. And this is his omnipotence, which, as a necessary attribute of the divine nature, was considered in s. 21.

SECTION XXVII.

GENERAL REMARKS ON THE MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE DIVINE WILL.

1. WE ascribe truth or veracity to God, so far as whatever he reveals or declares, directly or indirectly, is true and certain, s. 28.

Note.-Leibnitz, in his Theodicée, (p. ii. s. 151,) considers the holiness of God as nothing else than his supreme goodness, or benevolence. In the same manner he explains the justice of God, and in this respect is followed by Wolf, Baumgarten, Eberhard, and many other modern philosophers and theologians, especially those belonging to the school of Wolf. The last-mentioned writer, following the example of Leibnitz, defines the justice of God, benignitas ad leges sapientiæ temperata; others define it still more briefly, the relative goodness of God.

These philosophers were led thus to refine upon the idea of justice, by the desire to obviate the objections to which the common idea of it appeared to be exposed. There can be no doubt of the truth which they affirm, that the goodness of God is relative; and whenever we speak of the divine holiness or justice, we must proceed on the principle, that the goodness of God is always directed by his wisdom, and is always and wholly relative, since he bestows blessings upon his creatures in exact proportion to their susceptibility for receiving them. But while this is true, the definition of divine justice given by Leibnitz is not, considered as a definition, sufficiently precise and accurate, as Kant has shewn. Without going at large into the objections which might be urged against it, it will be enough for our present purpose to observe, in the first place, that it is not sufficiently intelligible, and cannot be conveniently used, at least in popular instruction; and, in the second place, that it does not exhibit the common idea connected with this term, which is of itself proof enough that it is not just as a definition. We feel at once, on hearing this definition, that there is something wanting to complete the idea. When we are contemplating the nature of God, we consider it, after the analogy of human beings, as different according to the different objects about which it is employed. On this common mode of conception the common use of language is built, and in conformity with this usage we must make a distinction between the goodness, holiness, aud justice of God, especially as the scripture follows this common usage. Now the object of the holiness of God is, general, universal good; of his justice and benevolence, the welfare of his creatures. We here see how closely connected these ideas are, and what in

3. We ascribe holiness to God, so far as he possesses all moral perfections, and consequent

following the general usage, we make the following distinction in the employment of these terms: one is called good or benevolent who is