way. One man is either little, or not at all in- | cause he is ashamed of his sickness, and partly clined to those things for which another has a because he is reluctant to adopt the severe regreat propensity. All, however, are inclined medies necessary to his cure. Thus it is with to perform many actions which they themselves the carnal man who refuses to undertake the acknowledge to be sinful and injurious. There radical cure of the disorders of his soul, because is in men a general anomaly, or a general dispo- he would feign conceal his sickness from his sition to transgress the moral law, which does own view, and dreads to make the bitter sacrinot determine to any one particular vice, but fices which his moral recovery and holiness rewhich is differently modified in different per- quire. He would rather, therefore, persuade sons. Since this disposition seeks out so himself and others that he is good, or at least many and so different deviations, it has a differ- that his case is not so bad as might seem. Now ent aspect in different individuals; but in all if any one does not believe that he is sick, neialike, it appears as a strong disinclination to ther does he believe that he is in any need of a certain duties, and a vehement propensity to remedy or of a physician; or if he thinks he is certain actions which are morally bad. What only slightly sick, he hopes he shall be able to is common to this depravity, as it appears in all help himself, or to recover without the aid of men, is the preponderance of that which is re- medicine. And so any one who thinks in the presented to us as good or evil by our lower ap- same way with regard to his moral state will petites, over that which we perceive in the use infallibly be cold and indifferent in the use of of reason to be good. From this depravity no all the means which the Christian doctrine preage is free, nor can it in this life be ever wholly scribes for the sanctification of the heart; he eradicated. The faults of youth, such as levity will even scorn them as idle and superfluous, and prodigality, do, indeed, often disappear in because he sees no necessity for them; yea, he later periods of life, but their place is supplied will even feel aversion and hatred towards them, by others, such as ambition and jealousy; and as a sick man is accustomed to do towards a many of the excellences which belong to the pe- bitter and disagreeable medicine. It is thereriod of youth-e. g., innocence, openness, and vi- fore very intelligible, and may be psychologivacity, often gradually decay in the years of man- cally explained, why the opinion, that man is hood; and although a more advanced age seems not so depraved as is sometimes represented, to have the advantage in point of experience and and the delusion that the Christian means of exercise, yet still it cannot be affirmed as a ge- cure are inappropriate, superfluous, and may be neral fact, that this higher age is on the whole easily dispensed with, should gain currency in morally better than youth. It is therefore a an age and among men distinguished above well-known proverb, founded in experience, to others in egotism, self-sufficiency, and the love say respecting old men who only seem exter- of worldly enjoyment. nally to have reformed, that they have not forsaken sin, but sin has forsaken them. II. On Teaching this Doctrine. The questions relating to this subject are, Whether the doctrine of man's native depravity ought to be exhibited in popular instruction? and if so, in what way? On this general subject, cf. Knapp's Essay in Ewald's Christlicher Monatsschrift; Jahrg. 2, 1802; bd. 2, st. 1, s. 3, f. (1) The doctrine of native depravity, as we are taught it both by scripture and experience, is very disturbing, depressing, and humbling in its tendency, The light in which man is here taught to regard himself is not at all favourable or pleasant, and is calculated to lead him to tremble for himself. But feelings of this kind, although highly salutary, are yet unpleasant to the natural man (capxix, Juzıxò̟), and for the very reason that he is of such a character, he is opposed to everything which awakens feelings of this kind; he prefers to keep this subject out of sight, and is unwilling to hear anything respecting it. It is with him as with a sick man, who is unwilling to acknowledge, either to himself or others, that he is sick, partly be (2) We may hence explain the fact why the doctrine of human depravity is repugnant to so many in our age, and why it is almost wholly set aside in the instruction of the common people and of the young. The pretext by which the omission of this doctrine is commonly justified is, that it inspires men with aversion to God, that it makes them irresolute and spiritless in the pursuit of virtue, and that it leads to an unworthy depreciation of oneself, and even to despair, which prevents all improvement. These effects, however, can never be feared when this doctrine is taught as it is in the holy scriptures. Who can bring an example to shew that the scriptural doctrine ever produced such an effect? On the contrary, experience shews that this doctrine, rightly exhibited, produces just the opposit effects, and animates man in the pursuit of holiness, and leads him to the highest exertions of all his powers for the attainment of it. Vide s. 77, II., ad finem. The true ground why so many forbear to preach this doctrine is, that, for the reasons just now suggested, it is displeasing to many of their hearers, whose favour they would gladly conciliate. It is with them as with those respecting whom John speaks, ch. xii. 43. Others have never clearly considered the reasons why they forbear to preach this doctrine, but follow blindly the example set them by some of the eminent and lauded preachers of the day. For the great majority of men, and even of teachers, never think for themselves, but depend upon authority. Again: there are, alas! many religious teachers who are themselves unrenewed men, who even while at home were sunk deep in moral corruption, who become still more depraved at the schools and universities, and who, when they assume the sacerdotal robe, alter only their outward deportment, without experiencing a radical change of heart. Such are blind leaders of the blind. (3) The teachers who adopt the principles just mentioned are accustomed to descant largely upon the worth, the nobleness, and the dignity of man, since discourse like this is heard with pleasure, and it is far more agreeable to be praised than blamed. In this strain, therefore, preachers of such a character often indulge, and even in their instruction of the young dwell on nothing but the dignity of man. In this way many of them suppose they shall elevate man, inspire him with a zeal for virtue, and by means of this feeling of honour raise him to nobleness of character. And it is, indeed, right to point man to the noble faculties which he possesses, &c. This is often done in the Bible. This, however, we should do, and not leave the other undone. In the Bible this is always done in connexion with the doctrine of the moral apostasy of man. If this doctrine be not brought into connexion with it, the doctrine of the dignity of man is injurious; it nourishes pride and selfrighteousness, and prevents that self-knowledge which is so essential, and thus leads aside from the way of true reformation, such as God will accept. It leads men to think that they are perfect, and have no need of reformation; that they are in no danger, and at most need only to be ennobled and perfected, and not to be radically renewed. What must be the effect of a doctrine like this in an age in which self-confidence and selfish blindness are the prevailing fault, and have so deeply imbued the minds even of children and youth, that at the age when they are just beginning to learn, they think themselves wiser than their teachers, and from the height to which they suppose themselves to have attained, seem to look down with compassion upon the aged. (4) From these observations it follows, that it is the duty of a Christian teacher to exhibit the doctrine of moral depravity without regard to the fear or the favour of man, after the example which the inspired teachers have set himthe ancient prophets, Jesus, and the apostles. The times have changed nothing belonging to this doctrine, nor can they. Human nature is the same now that it has been in every preceding age; and the inculcation of this doctrine is not less important in an enlightened than in an unenlightened period. It is by this doctrine alone that the necessity of an entire moral renovation of the human heart can be placed in a strong light; here man learns to understand himself aright, and to think humbly with regard to himself; here he learns to see clearly the difficulties and mighty hindrances which lie in the way of conversion, and attains to the conviction that he needs help, and that without divine assistance he can do nothing. Truly and beautifully has Seneca said, Initium est salutis, notitia peccati. Nam qui peccare se nescit, corrigi non vult. Deprehendas te oportet antequam cmendes, Ep. 28. This is the great principle upon which the inspired teachers proceeded in all their instructions. Christ, for example, took this course in his conversation with Nicodemus, however strange the doctrine might have appeared to the latter. And there is no better way, none which is more capable of vindication on psychological grounds. (5) But in order that the teaching of this doctrine may attain its end, it is not enough to set forth the mere dogma, and to prove it connectedly from the holy scriptures, and then to speak of it in the abstract; for in that case the wholesome and necessary application is easily neglected by the hearer. On the contrary, it ought rather to be spoken of in the concrete; at least, the abstract statement should always be applied to particular concrete cases, and especially to ourselves. This is the wise mode of teaching exhibited in the Bible. Vide s. 77, III. 2. In the popular exhibition of this doctrine, therefore, the teacher should begin with making his hearer observant of himself, and endeavour to convince him of his own depravity, or of the preponderance of appetite over reason in himself, as learned from his own experience. This is the easiest way to bring the contemner of this doctrine to silence. For example, let the teacher in his instructions go over all the points which Paul has cited Rom. vii. 7-23, as proof of the moral corruption of man, without at first remarking that this is taught in the Bible. The hearer must confess that he finds it in himself exactly as described-that he is not what he ought to be, and what his own moral feeling teaches him that he must be, in order to please God. When he is brought to this conviction, then let him be shewn that the doctrine of scripture corresponds with his own experience. In this way he will acquire regard for the Bible, as he will see that it gives no ideal description of man, but represents him as he actually is. Then he will be constrained to acknowledge: "Yes! I too am actually so; it is as if I myself were here described." Has any one come to this point, there is hope that he may be inclined to employ the means of recovery prescribed in the scriptures, and especially in the Christian doctrine; particularly if he is shewn how and wherefore they have so beneficial an effect; and if is made to consider, that our own good intentions and all the means by which we attempt to help ourselves are inefficacious. In this way is the feeling of the need of help and of a Redeemer to be excited in man; and thus does the knowledge of our moral depravity and inability lead to Christ, as to him through whom alone it can be removed. But all this instruction will be in danger of failing of its effect, unless the hearer perceives that the teacher himself has a personal interest in the matter, that he speaks from his own internal conviction, and that he has experienced on his own heart the efficacy of the means prescribed, and shews their effect in his life and walk. (6) None of the profound and learned investigations of philosophers and theologians, respecting the nature of human depravity, the mode of its propagation, &c., should have any place in the practical and popular exhibition of this doctrine. It is enough for the teacher to stop with the simple doctrine of the Bible, and merely teach, (a) that all men have been actually so, ever since our first parents transgressed the divine command; and (b) that, according to the Bible, the ground why all their posterity are such lies in our first parents; but that (c) we owe the improvement of our condition, and the restoration of our lost holiness and happiness to Jesus Christ, since he redeems or frees us from sin and its evil consequences, and turns this evil to our good; Rom. vii. 25. For more on this point, vide the article on Christ. SECTION LXXXI. EXPLANATION OF THE IDEA WHICH IS COMMONLY CONNECTED IN THEOLOGY WITH THE EXPRESSION "ACTUAL SINS;" AND OF THE DIFFERENT DEGREES OF SIN. We have thus far treated of the moral corruption of human nature, and its causes; we have also given a history of this doctrine; s. 74-80. We now proceed to consider particular sinful actions, whose source is found in this same moral depravity. Vide s. 73, ad finem. We shall treat this subject under the two following divisions-viz., (1) The nature of particular sinful actions, and their different kinds and divisions, s. 81-84; (2) The different state which arises in man on the commission of sin, s. 85-87. I. Additional Explanation of the idea of Sin. We have before shewn, under s. 73, I., what is meant by the terms sin and law; and this will be presupposed in the remarks which follow. Since now we must regard this natural depravity as a sinful state, and since we must regard particular sinful actions as the consequence and result of this state, theologians, since the time of Cassianus, have adopted the division of sin into peccatum originale and peccatum actuale. Vide s. 79, No. 4, ad finem, and Morus, p. 118, supra. Morus has, indeed, omitted the special consideration of the doctrine de peccato actuali in his Dogmatik, and assigned the discussion of it wholly to the department of Morals. But the general theory of actual sins belongs to the province of Dogmatical theology, and is commonly introduced by theologians into this department. Actual sins are, moreover, commonly denominated peccata sensu strictiori. By actions, however, theologians do not mean, in treating of this subject, those merely which are external—i. e., which are committed by means of the body and its organs; but also those which are internali. e., those which take place merely in the soul, and are performed in thoughts, desires, &c. Hence it has been common to subdivide actual sins into external and internal, of which we shall say more hereafter. Actualis is a term which belongs to the later Latin, and was first used by Macrobius; it answers to the older term actuosus, active, consisting in action; or to activus, which is sometimes employed in the same sense. Hence Cicero says, vita actuosa, virtus actuosa, Nat. Deor. i. 40; instead of which Macrobius writes, virtutes actuales. Seneca has, activa philosophia, Ep. 95, and Quinctilian opposes activum (the practical) to speculativum, (the theoretical.) But sinful actions are denominated peccata actualia in opposition to native depravity, because they involve an actus transitorius, such as exists in all human actions; they have a beginning and an end. But original sin has in this life no end, but continues as long as man remains upon the earth. It is not an act, but a state. The application of the term sin to this state is indeed inconvenient, because, according to the definition given of sin, native depravity cannot be literally so called; a more appropriate name would be, hereditary evil. But since the former term is now common among theologians, and the thing denoted by it is accordant both with reason and scripture, it must be understood, and its ground must be known. In explanation of the subjective definition of sin given s. 73, I.—viz., a free action which is not conformed to the law of God, or which deviates from this law, let the following additional remarks be considered. When we would judge respecting any action, internal or external, whether it is sinful or not, our decision must depend upon the three following conditions-viz., (1) That the man who commits the action had sufficient knowledge of the law, (notitia legis.) And this presupposes (a) that the law | such a state, they ought to be set at rest. In was actually given to man; (b) that it was known by this individual, or at least, that it should have been known by him, and that so it is his own fault if he remained unacquainted with it; and (c) that he understood the sense of the law, or might have understood it. Is any one of these conditions wanting, the act contravening the law is, indeed, an evil, (foolish, hurtful in its tendency, &c.,) but not sin. Vide s. 73, I. Cf. Rom. iv. 15; v. 13, ȧμapría oix 220yeira μὴ ὄντος νόμου. order that a man's action may be free, (b) his power to act must not be hindered by external circumstances. If, therefore, in any case a man is compelled by some external necessity to act wholly against his will, or if he is barely restrained in acting, so that he cannot proceed wholly according to his own will and intent, then his action is not free, or at least not perfectly free, and so is not imputable, or is not wholly so. Everything depends here upon the intention. A man designs to do an evil deed, but is prevented from accomplishing his purpose by external circumstances, and so does not sin indeed externally, but he does in his heart, and in the judgment of God and of his own conscience is deserving of punishment. The case is the same as to the imputation of a good act, the execution of which has been prevented by external circumstances. Vide Matt. v. 28, coll. s. 82. II. The different degrees of Sin. (2) That the action does not, in fact, agree with the law. The determination of this matter has often in particular cases more difficulty than one would think. The over-anxious and scrupulous man often regards certain actions, both internal and external, as sinful, while they are not forbidden in the divine law; and in this way he needlessly disquiets himself. Another man mistakes on this subject through indifference and carelessness. But a far more common fault is, to allow self-love to pronounce too light and partial a sentence upon our own actions, while, on the other hand, we judge the actions of others too severely. Vide Matt. vii. 3—5. Nor is the obligation of the law the same for all. Some laws are not universally obligatory, but binding only on certain individuals, and in particular cases. The same action may be sin in one man, and not in another. One does it with a conviction that it is not wrong, and so sins not; the other is doubtful, or convinced in his heart that it is wrong, and yet does it, and sins. This may be applied to the so-called adtápopa, indifferent things, fastings, amusements, cardplaying, dancing, &c. Vide 1 Cor. viii. and ix., and Rom. xiv. 23. The further discussion of the subject of sin ex conscientia errante sive erronea belongs to the department of theological Morals. (3) That in the commission of the action, man had the use of his free-will, (tò aȧTEŽOVSIòv, or inɛvdéρa яроaípess.) An action which we have been compelled to do against our will, or which we have done without consciousness, cannot be regarded as our own action. This is true not only of evil, but of good actions. In order, now, that the action of a man may be free and so imputable, he must in doing it (a) be in a state in which he can exercise his understanding, and determine his will according to that which his understanding approves; for this is essential to freedom. Therefore no infant, no idiot, no insane person, no sleeper or dreamer, can commit sin, because he has not the use of his understanding. The shameful words and deeds, the blasphemy, &c., which we often see and hear in delirious persons, are not sins, be-urišov ȧμapria; Luke, xii. 47, 48; Matthew, cause they are not free actions; and if they are afterwards disposed to trouble themselves on account of what they may have said or done in In common life sins are distinguished into gross and great sins, and light and trifling sins, and the latter are judged deserving of less punishment than the former. This difference is founded in the nature of the thing itself. For whoever sins, acts against the obligation which rests upon him to fulfil certain duties; but this obligation has different degrees, according to the difference of the powers of the acting subject, and of his motives to action. Hence it follows that one commits greater sins who has more power and stronger motives for doing right than one with whom these powers and motives were weaker. Again: the less the motives and inducements to sin, and the more the reasons which were calculated to deter from the commission of it, so much the worse is the sin, and so much the more deserving of punishment. The motives tending to withhold from sin are to be judged of from the peculiar situation, the circumstances, the mode of thinking, and the knowledge of each individual; also, according to the nature of the person or thing with respect to which the sin is committed, (e. g., sins against parents, to whom we are under greater obligations than to others;) and also according to the consequences which flow from the sin. The consideration of this matter, however, properly falls into the department of theological morals. In entire conformity with these principles does the holy scripture decide respecting the different degrees of sin, and their desert of punishment. Vide Matt. v. 22; John, xix. 11, xi. 22-24; 1 Tim. i. 15; 2 Peter, ii. 20, 21. But since this difference of degree in sin depends upon so many things, which are not Note 2.-Some theologians have maintained that sin, or rather the guilt of sin, is infinite in the philosophical sense, (culpam sive reatum peccatorum esse infinitum.) They resort to this statement in order to explain more easily the infiniteness of the satisfaction made by Christ, and also the eternity of the punishments of hell. Whoever, they say, breaks the laws of the Infinite Being, brings upon himself infinite guilt. But this statement, taken in the strict philosophic sense, is incorrect. For (a) it would follow from this that there was no difference of objects; for the infinite is always like to itself, and cannot be increased or diminished. (b) An action which is directed against a particular object, does not, of necessity, partake of the nature of this object. Whether the object is finite or infinite is a matter of indifference with regard to the nature of the action, and makes no alteration in its character. A finite action cannot become infinite, or involve infinite guilt, merely because it relates to an infinite object. If it could, then every good action agreeing with the divine law must be infinite, and have an infinite worthiness; and so the knowledge which man has of God must be infinite because it relates to an infinite being. (e) This whole opinion rests upon a comparison of divine and human things carried too far, so as to give rise, as in innumerable other cases, to mistake. We look upon the crimes committed against rulers and magistrates as greater than those committed against others, and we punish them more severely; and this with justice. But the reason of this lies not so much in the personal character or worth of the injured object, as in care for the public welfare or security, which is more endangered by any indignity done to the magistracy than to a private person. Hence this crime, in order to deter others from com always obvious, and cannot be duly estimated by others; upon the dispositions and intentions concealed in the heart of him who acts; upon his knowledge, his temptations, his powers and capacities; it is often impossible for us in particular cases to form a correct judgment. God only, who knows the heart of man, and the circumstances in which he acts, can judge truly and decisively respecting his actions. To him, therefore, should this decision be left. Vide Rom. xiv. 4, où ris ei ô xpívwv ȧ2λótpcov oixérny; James, iv. 12; Matt. vii. 1, seq. On this account, it is our wisdom, as well as our duty, although contrary to the common disposition of men, to judge ourselves with all possible strictness, but the faults of others with forbearance and toleration. This, too, is according to the direction of Christ, Matt. vii. 1-5, coll. Luke, xiii. 2-5. Baumgarten has discussed this subject minutely in his "Diss. de gradibus peccatorum ;" Halæ, 1744. Note 1.-The philosophers both of ancient and modern times have been almost entirely agreed that there is a difference of degree in sins; with the exception only of the stoics, who maintained the paradoxical opinion, that all sins are alike. Vide Cicero, Parad. iii.; Seneca, Ep. 66; Cicero, De finibus bonor. et malor. iv. 27, seq. They assumed that all virtues were equal; and hence it followed, by way of contrast, that all vices were equal; and hence, that all the virtuous and all the vicious were, in their view, on the same level-e. g., one who killed a slave without a cause committed, in their view, an equal sin with one who abused his father. In this doctrine they were opposed chiefly by the peripatetics. But although they maintained this equality of virtues and of vices, they yet ascribed to them a different extent and limitation, so that some were capable of palliation, others unpardonable; because some deviated more than others from the law; and so with re-mitting it, must be punished more severely gard to the virtues, which were judged of by them according to their different utility. Hence we see that in substance they agreed with others, and only differed from them by this striking proposition, which they selected on account of its strangeness. All which they mean to affirm is, that one transgression is as much a transgression as another; and all, in respect to their internal nature, are alike, because they are all violations of the rule, and so are opposite to the virtues. And the same is taught by the text, James, ii. 10, 11. But this internal nature of virtues and vices cannot be made the standard by which their greatness is determined, but the consequences which result from them, the purpose and intention of the soul from which they flow, and sometimes even the mere "so it seems good" of the lawgiver. Vide Tiedemann, System der Stoischen Philosophie, th. iii. s. 151-156. than others. But this principle cannot be applied in its whole extent to God; although such human representations are often applied to him. For, properly speaking, God cannot be injured by men; they cannot frustrate any of his plans, nor set aside, disturb, or throw effectual hindrances in the way of any of his counsels. Vide Eberhard, Apologie des Sokrates, th. i. s. 374, f. SECTION LXXXII. DIVISIONS OF SIN IN RESPECT TO THE LAW, TO I. In respect to the Law. As the law contains both precepts and prohibitions, it follows that actions deviating from it may be of two kinds―viz., (a) actions forbidden by the law, sins of commission, (peccata |