house," says Basil Montagu, "where, in the society of his philosophical friends, he devoted himself to study and meditation." Aubrey tells us that he had the aid of Hobbes in writing down his thoughts. Lord Bacon appears to have possessed the happy gift of using other men's faculties in his service. Ben Jonson, who had been a thorough student of chemistry, alchemy, and science in all the forms then known, aided Bacon in his observations of nature. Hobbes aided him in giving clearness to his thoughts and his language. And from Shakespeare he may have derived the radical and central ideas of his philosophy. He used the help of Dr. Playfer to translate his philosophy into Latin. Tobie Matthew gives him the last argument of Galileo for the Copernican system. He sends his works to others, begging them to correct the thoughts and the style. It is evident, then, that he would have been glad of the concurrence of Shakespeare, and that could easily be had, through their common friend, Ben Jonson.

If Bacon wrote the plays of Shakespeare, it is exceedingly difficult to give any satisfactory reason for his concealment of that authorship. He had much pride, not to say vanity, in being known as an author. He had his name attached to all his other works, and sent them as presents to the universities, and to individuals, with letters calling their attention to these books. Would he have been willing permanently to conceal the fact of his being the author of the best poetry of his time? The reasons assigned by Judge Holmes for this are not satisfactory. They are: his desire to rise in the profession of the law, the low reputation of a play-writer, his wish to write more freely under an incognito, and his wish to rest his reputation on his philosophical works. But if he were reluctant to be regarded as the author of "Lear" and "Hamlet," he was willing to be known as the writer of "Masques," and a play about "Arthur," exhibited by the students of Gray's Inn. It is an error to say that the reputation of a play-writer was low. Judge Holmes, himself, tells us that there was nothing remarkable in a barrister of the inns of court writing for the stage. Ford and Beaumont were both lawyers as well as eminent play-writers. Lord Backhurst, Lord Brooke, Sir Henry Wotton, all wrote plays. And we find nothing in the Shakespeare dramas which Bacon need have feared to say under his own name. It would have been ruin to Sir Philip Francis to have avowed himself the author of "Junius.”

But the Shakespeare plays satirized no one, and made no enemies. If there were any reasons for concealment, they certainly do not apply to the year 1623, when the first folio appeared, which was after the death of Shakespeare and the fall of Bacon. The acknowledgment of their authorship at that time could no longer interfere with Bacon's rise. And it would be very little to the credit of his intelligence to assume that he was not then aware of the value of such works, or that he did not desire the reputation of being their author. It would have been contrary to his very nature not to have wished for the credit of that authorship.

On the other hand, there would be nothing surprising in the fact of Shakespeare's laying no claim to credit for having assisted in the composition of the "Advancement of Learning." Shakespeare was by nature as reticent and modest as Bacon was egotistical and ostentatious. What a veil is drawn over the poet's personality in his sonnets! We read in them his inmost sentiments, but they tell us absolutely nothing of the events of his life, or the facts of his position. And if, as we assume, he was one among several who helped Lord Bacon, though he might have done the most, there was no special reason why he should proclaim that fact.

Gervinus has shown, in three striking pages, the fundamental harmony between the ideas and mental tendencies of Shakespeare and Bacon. Their philosophy of man and of life was the same. If, then, Bacon needed to be helped in thinking out his system, there was no one alive who would have given him such stimulus and encouragement as Shakespeare. This also may explain his not mentioning the name of Shakespeare in his works; for that might have called too much attention to the source from which he received this important aid.

Nevertheless, I regard the monistic theory as in the last degree improbable. We have two great authors, and not one only. But if we are compelled to accept the view which ascribes a common source to the Shakespeare drama and the Baconian philosophy, I think there are good reasons for preferring Shakespeare to Bacon as the author of both. When the plays appeared, Bacon was absorbed in pursuits and ambitions foreign to such work; his accepted writings show no sign of such creative power; he was the last man in the world not to take the credit of such a success, and had no motive to conceal his authorship. On the

other hand, there was a period in Shakespeare's life when he had abundant leisure to coöperate in the literary plans of Bacon; his ample intellect was full of the ideas which took form in those works; and he was just the person neither to claim any credit for lending such assistance nor to desire it.

There is, certainly, every reason to believe that among his other ambitions, Bacon desired that of striking out a new path of discovery, and initiating a better method in the study of nature. But we know that, in doing this, he sought aid in all quarters, and especially among Shakespeare's friends and companions. It is highly probable, therefore, that he became acquainted with the great dramatist, and that Shakespeare knew of Bacon's designs and became interested in them. And if so, who could offer better suggestions than he; and who would more willingly accept them than the overworked statesman and lawyer, who wished to be also a philosopher?

Finally, we may refer those who believe that the shape of the brow and head indicates the quality of mental power, to the portraits of the two men. The head of Shakespeare, according to all the busts and pictures which remain to us, belongs to the type which antiquity has transmitted to us in the portraits of Homer and Plato. In this vast dome of thought there was room for everything. The head of Bacon is also a grand one, but less ample, less complete-less

"Teres, totus atque rotundus."

These portraits therefore agree with all we know of the writings, in showing us which, and which only, of the two minds was capable of containing the other.

JAMES FREEMAN CLARKE.

PARTISANSHIP IN THE SUPREME COURT.

MR. WHYTE, of Maryland, has drawn the attention of the country to a subject that has been too long neglected, by a joint resolution, read in the Senate, to amend the Constitution of the United States so as to fix permanently the number of judges of the Supreme Court.

The number of the judges of that court is not prescribed in the Constitution. Indeed, no reference is made to the question whether the court is to be composed of one or more judges, except in the sixth section of the third article, in which the "Chief Justice" is required to preside on the trial of an impeachment of the President of the United States. If it had been intended that the Supreme Court might be composed of a single judge, the office of Chief Justice would not have been mentioned es nomine.

The framers of the Constitution were very trustful of the patriotism and political integrity of the future generations of the American people. More so, indeed, than their conduct has justified. In leaving this great department to be supplied with such officers as the President should appoint, "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate," there was a most forcible declaration that the officers and department are not representatives of the people, in the common acceptation of the word. The courts do not represent the people as legislators: they judge between them. The life tenure of the judicial office removes them from all direct responsibility to popular will. The only power over the judges that is reserved, in any form, is the power of impeachment, which is conferred by the Constitution upon the House of Representatives, and the jurisdiction to try the impeachment, which is conferred upon the Senate. Two-thirds of the members of the Senate present must concur in a judgment of

conviction before the impeached judge can be removed and disqualified from holding office. This is as far as the people have any control of the conduct of the judges, either directly or indirectly, except to provide, through their representatives, laws for the further punishment of their offenses; but these are to be tried by the judiciary. It is needless to argue that the purpose of this strictly guarded sanctity and immunity of the judiciary is to secure its independence of the people.

The independence of the judiciary, when coupled with the supremacy of their power, and the inviolability of their decrees in the field of jurisdiction assigned to them, seems almost to lift them to a height of authority that is too autocratic for harmonious companionship with the other departments of a republican government. But these high powers conferred upon the judiciary are of the very essence of free government, because they are necessary to give practical force and effect to the laws which they themselves establish. It behooves a free people that their judges should be above the "influence of fear, favor, affection, reward, or the hope thereof," so that justice shall not be denied to the poor or the humble man, or sold to the rich; and that it be not biased by the hope of favor, or the fear of giving offense to popular sentiment, or political power.

Having, of necessity, placed our judicial department on this high plane, and being powerless to control it, as we can control the other departments of the government, by the direct influence of popular will expressed in elections, we have no effectual means of preserving its purity, or of restraining it from the exercise of an arbitrary power within its own limits of jurisdiction. The almost ineffectual power of impeachment is a poor remedy for judicial abuses. In Judge Peck's case, the House of Representatives impeached him of a high misdemeanor in office, without one dissenting voice, but the Senate refused to convict him. Without intimating that either of the Houses was at fault in the matter, this precedent is a very clear proof of the weakness, the nothingness, of the strongest current of popular opinion, when it is directed to the removal of a judge from office.

Being compelled to give to the judiciary the highest powers, and to retain the least possible control over the judges and the courts, for the sake of having a supreme and independent arbiter of justice in our free system of government, we cannot be too watchful of the moral forces that we may employ in guarding