as vice-president, and of the number of votes for each, which list they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of government of the United States, directed to the president of the senate; the president of the senate shall, in the presence of the senate and house of representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted: the person having the greatest number of votes for president shall be the president, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as president, the house of representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the president. But in choosing the president, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the St tes, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. And if the house of representatives shall not choose a president whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them before the fourth day of March next following, then the vice-president shall act as president, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the president.

The person having the greatest number of votes as vicepresident, shall be vice-president, if such number be a majority of the whole number of lectors appointed; and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the senate shall choose the vice-president: a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice.

But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of president shall be eligible to that of vice-president of the United States.

II.

(EXTRACT.)

THE UNITED STATES v. WORRALL.

In the Circuit Court of the United States for the Pennsylvania District.

APRIL SESSIONS, 1798.

Present CHASE and PETERS, Justices.

(2 Dallas, 384.)

The defendant was charged with an attempt to bribe Tench Coxe, the Commissioner of the Revenue, and the indictment, containing two counts, set forth the case as follows: (Here follows the indictment at large, with a statement of the evidence and the arguments of counsel on some incidental points which arose on the trial.)

Verdict-Guilty on both counts of the indictment.

Dallas, (who had declined speaking on the facts before the jury) now moved in arrest of judgment, alleging that the Circuit Court could not take cognisance of the crime charged in the indictment. He premised, that, independent of the general question of jurisdiction, the indictment was exceptionable, in as much as it recited the act of Congress, making it the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to form the contracts contemplated, but did not state the authority for devolving that duty on the Commissioner of the Revenue; and, consequently, it could not be inferred, that the corrupt offer was made to seduce the Commissioner from the faithful execution of an official public trust, which was the gist of the prosecution. But, he contended, that the force of the objection to the jurisdiction, superseded the necessity of attending to matters of technical form and precision, in pre

senting the accusation. It will be admitted, that all the judicial authority of the Federal Courts, must be derived, either from the Constitution of the United States, or from the Acts of Congress made in pursuance of that Constitution. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the prosecutor to shew, that an offer to bribe the Commissioner of the Revenue is a violation of some constitutional or legislative prohibition. The Constitution contains express provisions in certain cases which are designated by a definition of the crimes; by a reference to the characters of the parties offending; or by the exclusive jurisdiction of the place where the offences were perpetrated but the crime of attempting to bribe, the character of a federal officer, and the place where the present offence was committed, do not form any part of the constitutional express provisions, for the exercise of judicial authority in the Courts of the Union. The judicial power, however, extends, not only to all cases, in law and equity, arising under the Constitution, but, likewise, to all such as shall arise under the laws of the United States, (art. 3. s. 2.) and besides the authority, specially vested in Congress, to pass laws for enumerated purposes, there is a general authority given to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution all the powers vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or office thereof." (art. 1. s. 8.) Whenever then, Congress think any provision necessary to effectuate the constitutional power of the government, they may establish it by law; and whenever it is so established, a violation of its sanctions will come with the jurisdiction of this Court, under the 11th section of the Judicial Act, which declares, that the Circuit Court "shall have exclusive cognisance of all crimes and offences cognisable under the authority of the United States," &c. 1 Vol. Swift's edit. p. 55. Thus, Congress have provided by law, for the punishment of treason, misprision of treason, piracy, counterfeiting any public certificate, stealing or falsifying records, &c.; for the

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punishment of various crimes, when committed within the limits of the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States; and for the punishment of bribery itself in the case of a Judge, an officer of the Customs, or an officer of the Excise. 1 Vol. Swift's edit p. 100. Ibid. p. 236, s. 66. Ibid. p. 327. s. 47. But in the case of the Commissioner of the Revenue, the Act constituting the office does not create or declare the offence, 2 Vol. p. 112, 8. 6.; it is not recognised in the Act under which proposals for building the Light-house were invited, 3 Vol. p. 63; and there is no other Act that has the slightest relation to the subject.

Can the offence, then be said to arise under the Constitution, or the laws of the United States? And, if not, what is there to render it cognisable under the authority of the United States? A case arising under a law, must mean a case depending on the exposition of a law, in respect to something which the law prohibits, or enjoins. There is no characteristic of that kind in the present instance. But it may be suggested, that the office being established by a law of the United States, it is an incident naturally attached to the authority of the United States, to guard the officer against the approaches of corruption, in the execution of his public trust. It is true, that the person who accepts an office may be supposed to enter into a compact to be answerable to the government which he serves for any violation of his duty; and, having taken the oath of office, he would unquestionably be liable, in such case, to a prosecution for perjury in the Federal Courts. But because one man, by his own act, renders himself amenable to a particular jurisdiction, shall another man, who has not incurred a similar obligation, be implicated? If, in other words, it is sufficient to vest a jurisdiction in this Court, that a federal officer is concerned; if it is a sufficient proof of a case arising under a law of the United States to affect other persons, that such officer is bound, by law, to discharge, his duty with fidelity; -a source of jurisdiction is opened, which must inevitably overflow and destroy all the barriers between the judicial