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pass to-day in their position (which he believed to be Sahagun) they are lost.” But Moore had passed Astorga by the {gist of December, where Napoleon arrived on the rst of January 1809. Thence he turned back, with a large portion of his army towards France, leaving Soult with over 40,000 men to follow Moore.

On the “ Retreat to Corunna ” fatigue, wet and bitter cold, combined with the sense of an enforced retreat, shook the discipline of Moore’s army; but he reached Corunna on the 11th of January 1809, where he took up a position across the road from Lugo, with his left on the river Mero. On the 14th of January the transports arrived; and on the 16th Soult attacked. Bum, of In this battle the French numbered about 20,000 with Carmina, 4o guns; the British 15,000 with 9 very light guns. Jan”! '6' Soult failed to dislodge the British, and Moore was 1809' about to deliver a counter—attack when he himself fell mortally wounded. Baird was also wounded, and as night was approaching, Hope suspended the advance, and subsequently embarked the army, with scarcely any further loss. The British casualties were about 1000, the French 2000. When the troops landed in England, half clothed and half shod, their leader’s conduct of the campaign was at first blamed, but his reputation as a general rests solidly upon these facts, that when Napoleon in person, having nearly 300,000 men in Spain, had stretched forth his hand to seize Portugal and Andalusia, Moore with 30,000, forced him to withdraw it, and follow him to Corunna, escaping at the same time from his grasp. Certainly a notable achievement.

Campaign in Portugal and S pain, 1809.-—On the 22ndof April 1809 Sir Arthur Wellesley reached Lisbon. By this time, French armies, to a great extent controlled by Napoleon from a distance, had advanced—Soult from Galicia to capture Oporto and Lisbon (with General Lapisse from Salamanca moving on his left towards Abrantes) and Marshal Victor, still farther to the left, with a siege train to take Badajoz, Merida and subsequently Cadiz. Soult (over 20,000), leaving Ney in Galicia, had taken and sacked Oporto (March 29, 1809); but the Portuguese having closed upon his rear and occupied Vigo, he halted, detaching a force to Amarante to keep open the road to Braganza and asked for reinforcements. Victor had crossed the Tagus, and defeated Cuesta at Medellin (March 28, 1809); but, surrounded by insurgents, he also had halted; Lapisse had joined him, and together they were near Merida, 30,000 strong. On the allied side the British (25,000), including some German auxiliaries, were about Leiria: the Portuguese regular troops (16,000) near Thomar; and some thousands of Portuguese militia were observing Soult in the north of Portugal, a body under Silveira being at Amarante, which Soult was now approaching. Much progress had been made in the organization and training of the Portuguese levies; Major-General William Carr Beresford, with the rank of marshal, was placed at their head. Of the Spaniards, Palafox, after his defeat at Tudela had most gallantly defended Saragossa a second time (Dec. 20, 1808-Feb. 20, 1809); the Catalonians, after reverses at Molins de Rey (Dec. 21, 1808) and at Valls (Feb. 25, 1809) had taken refuge in Tarragona; and Rosas had fallen (Dec. 5, 1808) to the French general Gouvion St Cyr who, having relieved Barcelona, was besieging Gerona. Romafia’s force was now near Orense in Galicia. A supreme junta had been formed which could nominally assemble about 100,000 men, but jealousy among its members was rife, and they still declined to appoint any commander-in-chief.

On the 5th of May 1809, Wellesley moved towards the river Douro, having detached Beresford to seize Amarante, from which the French had now driven Silveira. Soult ngsnxgof expected the passage of the Douro to be attempted "18 DWI". near its mouth, with fishing craft; but Wellesley, by May '21809' a daring surprise, crossed (May 12) close above Oporto, and also by a ford higher up. After some fighting Oporto was taken, and Soult driven back. The Portuguese being in his rear, and Wellesley closing with him, the only good road of retreat available lay through Amarante, but he now learned that Beresford had taken this important point from Silveira; so he was then compelled, abandoning his guns and


much baggage, to escape, with a loss of some 5000 men, over the mountains of the Sierra Catalina to Salamende, and thence to Orense.

During the above operations, Victor, with Lapisse, had forced the passage of the Tagus at Alcantara but, on Wellesley returning to Abrantes, he retired. News having been received that Napoleon had suffered a serious check at the battle of Aspern, near Vienna (May 22, 1809), Wellesley next determined—leaving Beresford (20,000) near Ciudad Rodrigo—to move with 22,000 men, in conjunction with Cuesta’s Spanish army (40,000) towards Madrid against Victor, who, with 25,000 supported by King Joseph (50,000) covering the capital, was near Talavera. Sir Robert Wilson with 4000 Portuguese from Salamanca, and a Spanish force under Venegas (25,000) from Carolina, were to co-operate and occupy Joseph, by closing upon Madrid. Cuesta, during the advance up the valley of the Tagus, was to occupy the pass of Bafios on the left flank; the Spanish authorities were to supply provisions, and Venegas was to be at Arganda, near Madrid, by the 22nd or 23rd of July; but none of these arrangements were duly carried out, and it was on this that the remainder of the campaign turned. Writing to Soult from Austria, Napoleon had placed the corps of Ney and Mortier under his orders, and said: “ Wellesley will most likely advance by the Tagus against Madrid; in that case, pass the mountains, fall on his flank and rear, and crush him.”

By the 20th of July Cuesta had joined Wellesley at Oropesa; and both then moved forward to Talavera, Victor falling back before them: but Cuesta, irritable and jealous, Bank of would not work cordially with Wellesley; Venegas— “1",, counter-ordered it is said by the Spanish junta—did Jill-V27- 28, not go to Arganda, and Wilson, though he advanced 'm' close to Madrid, was forced to retire, so that Joseph joined Victor, and the united force attacked the Allies at Talavera de la Reina on the Tagus. The battle lasted for'two days, and ended in the defeat of the French, who fell back towards Madrid.l Owing to want of supplies, the British had fought in a half-starved condition; and Wellesley now learnt to his surprise that Soult had passed the mountains and was in his rear. Having turned about, he was on the march to attack him, when he heard (Aug. 23) that not Soult’s corps alone, but three French corps, had come through the pass of Bafios without opposition; that Soult himself was at Naval Moral, between him and the bridge of Almaraz on the Tagus, and that Cuesta was retreating from Talavera. Wellesley’s force was now in a dangerous position: but by withdrawing at once across the Tagus at Arzobispo, he reached Jaraicejo and Almaraz (by the south bank) blowing up the bridge at Almaraz, and thence moved, through Merida, northwards to the banks of the Agueda, commencing to fortify the country around Lisbon.

Elsewhere in the Peninsula during this year, Blake, now in Catalonia, after routing Suchet at Alcaniz (May 23, 1809), was defeated by him at Maria (June 15) and at Belchite_(June 18); Venegas, by King Joseph and Sébastiani, at Almonacid on the 11th of August; Del Parque (20,000), after a previous victory near Salamanca (Oct. 18), was overthrown at Alba de Tormes by General Marchand (Nov. 28) ; the old forces of Venegas and Cuesta. (50,000), new united under Areizaga, were decisively routed by King Joseph at Ocafia (Nov.19); and Gerona after a gallant defence, had surrendered to Augereau (Dec. 10).

Sir Arthur Wellesley was for this campaign created Baron Douro and Viscount Wellington. He was made captain-general by Spain, and marshal-general by Portugal. But his experience after Talavera had been akin to that of Moore; his expectations from the Spaniards had not been realized; he had been almost intercepted by the French, and he had narrowly escaped from a critical position. Henceforth be resisted all proposals for joint operations, on any large scale, with Spanish armies not under his own direct command.

1After the battle the Light Division, under Robert Craufurd, 'oined Wellesley. In the endeavour to reach the field in time it ad covered, in heavy marching order, over 50 m. in 25 hours, in hot July weather.

Campaign in Portugal, r8ro.—Napoleon, having avenged Aspern by the victory of Wagram (july 6, 1809), despatched to Spain large reinforcements destined to increase his army there to about 370,000 men. Marshal Masséna with 1 20,000, including the corps of Ney, Junot, Reynier and some of the Imperial Guard, was to operate from Salamanca against Portugal; but first Soult, appointed major-general of the army in Spain (equivalent to chief of the staff), was, with the corps of Victor, Mortier and Sébastiani (70,000), to reduce Andalusia. Soult (Jan. 31, 1810) occupied Seville and escaping thence to Cadiz, the Supreme Junta resigned its powers to a regency of five members (Feb. 2, 1810). Cadiz was invested by Victor’s oorps (Feb. 4), and then Soult halted, waiting for Masséna, who arrived at Valladolid on the 15th of May.

In England a party in parliament were urging the withdrawal of the British troops, and any reverse to the allied arms would have strengthened its hands. Wellington’s policy was thus cautious and defensive, and he had already commenced the since famous lines of Torres Vedras round Lisbon. In June 1810 his headquarters were at Celorico. With about 35,000 British, 30,000 Portuguese regular troops and 30,000 Portuguese militia, he watched the roads leading into Portugal past Ciudad Rodrigo to the north, and Badajoz to the south of the Tagus, as also the line of the Douro and the country between the Elga and the Ponsul.

Soult having been instructed to co-operate by taking Badajoz and Elvas, Masséna, early in June 1810, moved forward, and Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered to him (June 10). Next pushing back a British force under Craufurd, he invested Almeida, taking it on the 27th of August. Then calling up Reynier, who during this had moved on his left towards Alcantara, he marched down the right bank of the Mondego, and entered Viseu (Sept. 21). Wellington fell back before him down the left bank, ordering up Rowland Hill’s force from the Badajoz road, the peasantry having been previously called upon to destroy their crops and retire within the lines of Torres Vcdras. A little north of Coimbra, the road which Masséna followed crossed the Sierra de Bussaco (Busaco), a very strong position where Wellington resolved to offer him battle. Masséna, superior in numbers and over-confident, made a direct attack upon the heights on the 27th of September 1810: his an”, of strength being about 60,000, while that of the Allies

Busaco, was about 50,000, of whom nearly half were Portug'fszb” guese. After a stern conflict the French were

repulsed, the loss being five generals and nearly 5000 men, while the Allies lost about 1300. The next day Masséna turned the Sierra by the Boyalva Pass and Sardao, which latter place, owing to an error, had not been occupied by the Portuguese, and Wellington then retreated by Coimbra and Leiria to the lines, which he entered on the 11th of October, having within them fully 100,000 able-bodied men.

The celebrated “ Lines of Torres Vedras ” were defensive works designed to resist any army which Napoleon could send against them. They consisted of three great lines,

Llnes 0! Tom; strengthened by about 150 redoubts, and earthworks veins, of various descriptions, mounting some 600 cannon; 18! -u.

the outer line, nearly 30 m. long, stretching over heights north of Lisbon, from the Tagus to the sea. As Masséna advanced, the Portuguese closing upon his rear retook Coimbra (Oct. 7), and when he neared the lines, astounded at their strength, he sent General Foy to the emperor to ask for reinforcements. After an effort, defeated by Hill, to cross the Tagus, he withdrew (Nov. 15) to Santarem. This practically closed Wellington’s operations for the year 1810, his policy now being not to lose men in battle, but to reduce Masséna by hunger and distress. In other parts of Spain, Augereau had taken Hostalrich (May 10); captured Lerida (May 14); Mequinenza (June 8); and invested Tortosa (Dec. 1 5). The Spanish levies had been unable to contribute much aid to the Allies; the French having subdued almost all Spain, and being now in possession of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, On the other hand Wellington still held Lisbon with parts of Portugal, Elvas and Badajoz, for Soult had not felt disposed to attempt the capture of the last two fortresses.


Campaign of 18rr.——Napoleon, whose attention was now directed towards Russia, refused to reinforce Masséna, but enjoined Soult to aid him by moving against Badajoz. Soult, therefore, leaving Victor before Cadiz, invested Badajoz (Jan. 26, 1811) and took it from the Spaniards (March 10). With the hope of raising the blockade of Cadiz, a force under Sir Thomas Graham (afterwards Lord Lynedoch [q.v.l) left that harbour by sea, and joining with Spanish troops near Tarifa, advanced by land against Victor’s blockading force, a Spanish general, La Pena, being in chief command. As they neared Barrosa, Victor attacked them, the Allies numbering in the battle about 13,000 with 24 guns, 4000 being British; the French 9000, actually engaged, with 14 guns; but with 5000 more a few miles off and others in the French lines. Hard fighting, chiefly mm", between the French and British, now ensued, and mm", at one time the Barrosa ridge, the key of the position Mamas. left by La Per'ra’s orders, practically undefended, '8‘" fell into the French hands: but Graham by a resolute counter-attack regained it, and Victor was in the end driven back. La Pena, who had in the battle itself failed to give proper support to Graham, would not pursue, and Graham declining to carry on further operations with him, re-entered Cadiz. The French afterwards resumed the blockade, so that although Barrosa was an allied victory, its object was not attained. The British loss was about 1200; the French 2000, 6 guns and an eagle.

On the day of the above battle Masséna, having destroyed what guns he could not horse, and skilfully gained time by a feint against Abrantes, began his retreat from before the lines, through Coimbra and Espinhal. His army was in serious distress; he was in want of food and supplies; most of his horses were dead, and his men were deserting. Wellington followed, directing the Portuguese to remove all boats from the Mondego and Douro, and to break up roads north of the former river. Beresford was detached to succour Badajoz, but was soon recalled, as it had fallen to Soult. Ney, commanding Masséna’s rearguard, conducted the retreat with great ability. In the pursuit, Wellington adhered to his policy of husbanding his troops for future offensive operations, and let sickness and hunger do the work of the sword. This they effectually did. Nothing could well exceed the horrors of Masséna’s retreat. Rearguard actions were fought at Pombal (March 10), Redinha (March 1 2) and Condeixa (March 13). Here Ney was directed to make a firm stand; but, ascertaining that the Portuguese were at Coimbra and the bridge there broken, and fearing to be cut 05 also from Murcella, he burnt Condeixa, and marched to Cazal Nova. An action took place here (March 14) and at Foz d’Arouce (March 15). Wellington now sent off Beresford with a force to retake Badajoz; and Masséna, sacrificing much of his baggage and ammunition, reached Celorico and Guarda (March 21). Here he was attacked by Wellington (March 29) and, after a further engagement at Sabugal (April 3, 1811), he fell back through Ciudad to Salamanca, having lost in Portugal nearly 30,000 men, chiefly from want and disease, and 6000 in the retreat alone.

The key to the remaining operations of 181 1 lies in the importance attached by both Allies and French to the possession of the fortresses which guarded the two great roads from Portugal into Spain—Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo on the northern, and Badajoz and Elvas on the southern road; all these except Elvas were in French hands. Wellington, on the 9th of April 1811, directed General Spencer to invest Almeida; he then set 06 himself to join Beresford before Badajoz, but after reconnoitring the fortress with his lieutenant he had at once to return north on the news that Masséna was moving to relieve Almeida. On the 3rd of May Loison attacked him at Fuentes d’Onor near Almeida, and Masséna coming up himself made a more serious attack on the 5th of May. The Allies numbered Baa, 0, about 33,000, with 42 guns; the French 45,000 with Fuentes 30 guns. The battle is chiefly notable for the steadi- dOIm'» ness with which the allied right, covered by the Light M8!" ‘8'" Division in squares, changed position in presence of the French

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cavalry; and for the extraordinary feat of arms of Captain Norman Ramsay, R.Il.A., in charging through the French cavalry with his guns. Masséna failed to dislodge the Allies, and on the 8th of May withdrew to Salamanca, Almeida falling to Wellington on the 11th of May 1811. The allied loss in the fighting on both days at Fuentes d’Onor was about 1500: the French 3000.

In the meantime Soult (with 23,000 men and 50 guns), advancing to relieve Badajoz, compelled Beresford to suspend the siege, and to take up a position with about 30,000

B til I aiming, men (of whom 7000 were British) and 38 guns M8116, behind the river Albuhera (or Albuera). Here

'8'" Soult attacked him on the 16th of May. An unusually bloody battle ensued, in which the French efforts were chiefly directed against the allied right, held by the Spaniards. At one time the right appeared to be broken, and 6 guns were lost, ‘when a gallant advance of Sir Lowry Cole’s division restored the day, Soult then falling back towards Seville. The allied loss was about 7000 (including about half the British force); the French about 8000.

After this Wellington from Almeida rejoined Beresford and the siege of Badajoz was continued: but now Marshal Marmont, having succeeded Masséna, was marching southwards to join Soult, and, two allied assaults of Badajoz having failed, Wellington withdrew. Subsequently; leaving Hill in the Alemtejo, he returned towards Almeida, and with 40,000 men commenced a blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, his headquarters being at Fuente Guinaldo. Soult and Marmont now fell back, the former to Seville, the latter to the valley of the Tagus, south of the pass of Bar'ios.

In September, Marmont joined with the army of the north under General Dorsenne, coming from Salamanca—their total force being 60,000, with 100 guns—and succeeded (Sept. 25) in introducing a COHVOY of provisions into Ciudad Rodrigo. Before so superior a force, Wellington had not attempted to maintain the blockade; but on Marmont afterwards advancing towards him, he fought a rearguard action with him at El Bodon (Sept. 25), notable, as was Fuentes d’Onor, for the coolness with which the allied squares retired amidst the enemy’s horsemen; and again at F uente Guinaldo (Sept. 25 and 26) he maintained for 30 hours, with 15,000 men, a bold front against Marmont’s army of 60,000, in order to save the'Light Division from being cut off. At Aldea de Ponte there was a further sharp engagement (Sept. 27), but Wellington taking up a strong position near Sabugal, Marmont and Dorsenne withdrew once more to the valley of the Tagus and Salamanca respectively, and Wellington again blockaded Ciudad Rodrigo.

Thus terminated the main operations of this year. On the 28th of October 1811, Hill, by a. very skilful surprise, captured Arroyo de los Molinos (between Badajoz and Trujillo), almost annihilating a French corps under Gérard; and in December 1811 the French were repulsed in their efforts to capture Tarifa near Cadiz. In the east of Spain Suchet took Tortosa (Jan. 1, 1811); Tarragona (June 28); and Murviedro (Oct. 26), defeating Blake’s relieving force, which then took refuge in Valencia. Macdonald also retook Figueras which the Spaniards had taken on the 9th of April 1811 (Aug. 19). Portugal had now been freed from the French, but they still held Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, the two main gates into Spain.

Campaign in Spain, 1812.—The campaign of 1812 marks an important stage in the war. Napoleon, with the Russian War in prospect, had early in the year withdrawn 30,000 men from Spain; and Wellington had begun to carry on what he termed a. war of “ magazines.” Based on rivers (the navigation of which greatly improved) and the sea, he formed depots or magazines of provisions at many points, which enabled him always to take and keep the field. The French, on the other hand, had great difficulty in establishing any such reserves of food, owing to their practice of depending for sustenance entirely upon the country in which they were quartered. Wellington assumed the offensive, and by various movements and feints, aided the guerrilla hands by forcing the French corps to assemble in their


districts, which not only greatly harassed them but also materially hindered the combination of their corps for concerted action. Having secretly got a. battering train into Alrneida and directed Hill, as a blind, to engage Soult by threatening Badajoz, he suddenly (Jan. 8, 1812) besieged Ciudad Rodrigo.

The French, still numbering nearly 200,000, now held the following positions: the Army of the N orth—Dorsenne (48,000)— was about the Pisuerga, in the Asturias, and along the northern coast; the Army of Portugal—Marmont (50,ooo)—mainly in the valley of the Tagus, but ordered to Salamanca; the Army of the South—Soult (5 5,0oo)—in Andalusia; the Army of the Centre —Joseph (19,0oo)——about Madrid.

The siege of Ciudad Rodrigo was calculated in the ordinary course to require twenty-four days: but on it becoming known that Marmont was moving northward, the assault was 5"“ a, delivered after twelve days only (Jan. 19). The Ciudad gallantry of the troops made it successful, though with Rodrlzv. the loss of Generals Craufurd and McKinnon,and 1300 1;";‘3 8'

, . . , . men, and Marmont s battering train of 1 5o guns here fell into the allied hands. Then, after a feint of passing on into Spain, Wellington rapidly marched south and, with 22,000 men, laid siege to Badajoz (March 17, 1812), Hill with 30,000 covering the siege near Merida. Wellington was hampered by want of time, and had to assault prematurely. Soult and Marmont having begun to move to relieve the garrison, the assault was delivered on the night of the 7th of April, and 5,, 0, though the assailants failed at the breaches, the Badajoz, carnage at which was terrible, a very daring escalade Mm" '7 ‘° of one of the bastions and of the castle succeeded, AMLBB' and Badajoz fell, Soult’s pontoon train being taken in it. After the assault, some deplorable excesses were committed by the victorious troops. The allied loss was 3600 in the assault alone and 5000 in the entire siege.

The Allies had now got possession of the two great gates into Spain: and Hill, by an enterprise most skilfqu carried out, destroyed (May 19) the Tagus bridge at Almaraz, by which Soult to the south of the river chiefly communicated with Marmont to the north. Wellington then, ostentatiously making preparations to enter Spain by the Badajoz line, once more turned northward, crossed the Tormes (June 17, 1812), and advanced to the Douro, behind which the French were drawn up. Marmont had erected at Salamanca some strong forts, the reduction of which occupied Wellington teh days, and cost him 600 men. The Allies and French now faced each other along the Douro to the Pisuerga. The river was high, and Wellington hoped that want of supplies would compel Marmont to retire, but in this he was disappointed.

On the 15th of July 1812, Marmont, after a feint against Wellington’s left, suddenly, by a forced march, turned his right, and made rapidly towards the fords of Huerta and Alba on the Tormes. Some interesting manmuvres now took place, Wellington moving parallel and close to Marmont, but more to the north, making for the fords of Aldea Lengua and Santa Marta on the Tormes nearer to Salamanca, and being under the belief that the Spaniards held the castle and ford at Alba on that river. But Marmont's manoeuvring and marching power had been underestimated, and on the zrst of July while Wellington’s position covered Salamanca, and but indirectly his line of communications through Ciudad Rodrigo, Marmont had reached a point from which he hoped to interpose between Wellington and Portugal, on the Ciudad Rodrigo road. This he endeavoured to do on the 22nd of July 1812, which brought on the important battle of Salamanca (q.v.) in which sum, 0, Wellington gained a decisive victory, the French Salmanu, falling back to Valladolid and thence to Burgos. J'"! 22' Wellington entered Valladolid (July 30), and thence ' marched against Joseph, who (July 21) had reached Blasco Sancho with reinforcements for Marmont. JOseph retired before him, and Wellington entered Madrid (Aug. 12, 1812), where, in the Retiro, 1700 men, 180 cannon, two eagles, and a quantity of stores were captured. Soult now raised the siege of Cadiz (Aug. 26), and evacuating Andalusia joined Suchet

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Ram-r 2rst of October, and, directing the evacuation of from Madrid, commenced the “Retreat from Burgos.” Bums.

In this retreat, although military operations were skilftu conducted, the Allies lost 7000 men, and discipline, as in that to Corunna, became much relaxed.

By November 1812, Hill having joined him at Salamanca, Wellington once more had gone into cantonments near Ciudad Rodrigo, and the French armies had again scattered for convenience of supply. In spite of the failure before Burgos, the successes of the campaign had been brilliant. In addition to the decisive victory of Salamanca, Madrid had been occupied, the siege of Cadiz raised, Andalusia freed, and Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz stormed. Early in January also the French had abandoned the siege of Tarifa, though Valencia had surrendered to them (Jan. 9). One important result of the campaign was that the Spanish Cortes nominated Wellington (Sept. 22, 1812) to the unfettered command of the Spanish armies. For the operations of this campaign Wellington was created earl, and subsequently marquess of Wellington; duke of Ciudad Rodrigo by Spain, and marquis of Torres Vedras by Portugal.

Campaign in Spain and the South of France, 1813.—At the opening of 1813, Suchet, with 63,000 men, had been left to hold Valencia, Aragon and Catalonia; and the remainder of the French (about 137,000) occupied Leon, the central provinces and Biscay, guarding also the communications with France. Of these about 60,000 under Joseph were more immediately opposed to Wellington, and posted, in scattered detachments, from Toledo and Madrid behind the Tormes to the Douro, and along that river to the Esla. Wellington had further organized the Spanish forces—Castar'ros (40,000), with the guerrilla bands of Mina, Longa and others, was in Galicia, the Asturias and northern Spain; Copons (10,000) in Catalonia; Elio (20,000) in Murcia; Del Parque (12,000) in the Sierra Morena, and O’Donell (15,000) in Andalusia. More Portuguese troops had been raised, and reinforcements received from England, so that the Allies, without the Spaniards above alluded to, now numbered some 75,000 men, and from near the Coa watched the Douro and Tormes, their line stretching from their left near Lamego to the pass of Bar'ios, Hill being on the right. The district of the Trasos-Montes, north of the Douro, about the Tamega, Tua and Sabor, was so rugged that Wellington was convinced that Joseph would expect him to advance by the south of the river. He therefore, moving by the south bank himself with Hill, to confirm Joseph in this expectation, crossed the Tormes near and above Salamanca, having previously—which was to be the decisive movement—detached Graham, with 40,000 men, to make his way, through the diflicult district above mentioned, towards Braganza, and then, joining with the Spaniards, to turn Joseph’s right. Graham, crossing the Douro near Lamego, carried out his laborious march with great energy, and Joseph retired precipitately from the Douro, behind the Pisuerga. The allied army, raised by the junction of the Spanish troops in Galicia to 90,000, now concentrated near T010, and moved towards the Pisuerga, when Joseph, blowing up the castle of Burgos, fell back behind the Ebro. Once more Wellington turned his right, by a sweeping movement through Rocamunde and Puente Arenas near the source of the Ebro, when he retreated behind the Zadorra near the town of Vitoria.

Santander was now evacuated by the French, and the allied line of communications was changed to that port. On the 20th


of June Wellington encamped along the river Bayas, and the next day attacked Joseph. For a description of the decisive battle of Vitoria (June 21, 1813), see VITORIA. In it Bum a, King Joseph met with a crushing defeat, and, after Vltoria. it, the wreck of his army, cut off from the Vitoria- June2l. Bayonne road, escaped towards Pampeluna. Within ""3

a few days Madrid was evacuated, and all the French forces, with the exception of the garrisons of San Sebastian (3000), Pampeluna (3000), Santona (1500), and the troops under Suchet holding posts in Catalonia and Valencia, had retired across the Pyrenees into France. The Spanish peninsula was, to all intents and purposes, free from foreign domination, although the war was yet far from concluded. The French struggled gallantly to the close: but now a long succession of their leaders —-—Junot, Soult, Victor, Masséna, Marmont, Joseph—had been in turn forced to recoil before Wellington; and while their troops fought henceforward under the depressing memory of many defeats, the Allies did so under the inspiriting influence of great successes, and with that absolute confidence in their chief which doubled their fighting power.

For this decisive campaign, Wellington was made a field marshal in the British army, and created duke of Victory1 by the Portuguese government in Brazil. He now, with about 80,000 men, took up a position with his left (the Spaniards) on the Bidassoa near San Sebastian. Thence his line stretched along the Pyrenees by the passes of Vera, Echallar, Maya and Roncesvalles, to Altobiscar; his immediate object now being to reduce the fortresses of San Sebastian and Pampeluna. Not having suflicient material for two sieges, he laid siege to San Sebastian only, and blockaded Pampeluna. Sir Thomas Graham commenced the active siege of San Sebastian on the 10th of July 1813, but as Soult was approaching to its relief, the assault was ordered for daylight on the 24th. Unfortunately sun’s" a conflagration breaking out near the breaches Sebastian. caused it to be postponed until nightfall, when, the fill-"0'24, breaches in the interval having been strengthened, '8',“ it was delivered unsuccessfully and with heavy loss. Wellington then suspended the siege in order to meet Soult, who endeavoured (July 25) to turn the allied right, and reach Pampeluna. Attacking the passes of Maya and Roncesvalles, he obliged their defenders to retire, after sharp fighting, to a position 88"," of close to Sorauren, which, with 25,000 men, he [be Pym. attempted to carry (July 28). By this time W elling- nun-11W” ton had reached it from the allied left; reinforcements '1” fma' were pressing up on both sides, and about 1 2,000 allied ' troops faced the French. A struggle, described by Wellington as “ bludgeon work,” now ensued, but all efforts to dislodge the Allies having failed, Soult, withdrawing, manoeuvred to his right towards San Sebastian. Wellington now assumed the offensive, and, in a series of engagements. drove the French back (Aug. 2) beyond the Pyrenees. These included Roncesvalles and Maya (July 25); Sorauren (July 28 and 30); Yanzi (Aug. 1); and Echallar and Ivantelly (Aug. 2), the total losses in them being about—Allies under 7000, French 10,000. After this, Wellington renewing the siege of San Sebastian carried the place, excepting the castle, after a heavy expenditure of life (Aug. 31). Upon the day of its fall Soult attempted to relieve it, but Stormolsap in the combats of Vera and St Marcial was repulsed. Sebastian. The castle surrendered on the 9th of September, 4"!"“3" the lesses in the entire siege having been about— 8 Allies 4000, French 2000. Wellington next determined to throw his left across the river Bidassoa to strengthen his own position, and secure the port of Fuenterrabia.

Now commenced a series of celebrated river passages, which had to be effected prior to the further invasion of France. At daylight on the 7th of October 1813 he crossed the Bidassoa in seven columns, and attacked the entire French position, which stretched in two heavily entrenched lines from north

lDu we do Victoria, often incorrectly duke of Vitoria. The coincidqence of the title with the place-name of the battle which had not yet been fought when the title was conferred, is curious, but accidental.

of the Irun-Bayonne road, along mountain spurs to the Great Rhune, 2800 ft. high. The decisive movement was a passage in strength near Fuenterrabia, to the astonishment of the enemy, who in view of the width of the river and the shifting sands, had thought the crossing WM" 7- impossible at that point. The French right was “M then rolled back, and Soult was unable to reinforce his right in time to retrieve the day. His works fell in succession after hard fighting, and he withdrew towards the river Nivelle. The loss was about—Allies, 1600; French, 1400. The passage of the Bidassoa “ was a general‘s not a soldiers’ battle ” (Napier). '

On the 3rst of October Pampeluna surrendered, and Wellington was now anxious to drive Suchet from Catalonia before further invading France. The British government, however, in the interests of the continental powers, urged an immediate advance, so on the night of the 9th of November 1813 he brought up his right from the Pyrenean passes to the northward of Maya and towards the Nivelle. Soult’s army (about 79,000), in three entrenched lines, stretched from the sea in front of St Jean de Luz along commanding ground to Amotz and thence, behind the river, to Mont Mondarin near the Nive. Each army had with it about 100 guns; and, during a heavy cannonade, Wellington on the 10th of November 1813 attacked this extended Pam,“ of position of 16 m. in five columns, these being so the Ninth, directed that after carrying Soult’s advanced works Nov-10' a mass of about 50,000 men converged towards the “'3' French centre near Amotz, where, after hard fighting, it swept away the 18,000 of the second line there opposed to it, cutting Soult’s army in two. The French right then fell back to St Jean de Luz, the left towards points on the Nive. It was now late and the Allies, after moving a few miles down both banks of the Nivelle, bivouacked, while Soult, taking advantage of the respite, withdrew in the night to Bayonne. The allied loss was about 2700; that of the French 4000, 51 guns, and all their magazines. The next day Wellington closed in upon Bayonne from the sea to the left bank of the Nive.

After this there was a period of comparative inaction, though during it the French were driven from the bridges at Urdains and Cambo. The weather had become bad, and the Nive unfordable; but there were additional and serious causes of delay. The Portuguese and Spanish authorities were neglecting the payment and supply of their troops. Wellington had also difficulties of a similar kind with his own government, and also the Spanish soldiers, in revenge for many French outrages, had become guilty of grave excesses in France, so that Wellington took the extreme step of sending 25,000 of them back to Spain and resigning the command of their army, though his resignation was subsequently withdrawn. So great was the tension at this crisis that a. rupture with Spain seemed possible. These matters, however, having been at length adjusted, Wellington, who in his cramped position between the sea and the N ive could not use his cavalry or artillery effectively, or interfere with the French supplies coming through St Jean Pied de Port, determined to occupy the right aswell as the left bank of the Nive. He could not pass to that bank with his whole force while Soult held Bayonne, without exposing his own communications through Irun. Therefore, on the 9th of December 1813, after making a demonstration elsewhere, he effected the passage with Paul, of a portion of his force only under Hill and Beresford,

Passage of the Bldusoa,

the Nive, near Ustaritz and Cambo, his loss being slight, and Dec-9, thence pushed down. the river towards Villefranque, '8'3- where Soult barred his way across the road to Bayonne. The allied army was now divided into two portions

by the Nive; and Soult from Bayonne at once took advantage of his central position to attack it with all his available force, first on the left bank and then on the right. On the morning of the 10th of December he fell, with 60,000 men and 40 guns, upon Hope, who with 30,000 men and 24 guns held a position from the sea, 3 m. south of Biarritz on a ridge behind two lakes (or tanks) through Arcangues towards the Nive. Desperate fighting now ensued, but fortunately, owing to the intersected


ground,.Soult was compelled to advance slowly, and in the end, Wellington coming up with Beresford from the right bank, the French retired baffled. On the 11th and 12th of Battle: December there were engagements of a less severe “'0” character, and finally on the 13th of December Soult gigginzm with 35,000 men made a vehement attack up the {MM-"o, right bank of the Nive against Hill, who with about Dec. 10-13, 14,000 men occupied some heights from Villefranque 18

past St Pierre (Lostenia) to Vieux Moguerre. The conflict about St Pierre (Lostenia) was one of the most bloody of the war; but for hours Hill maintained his ground, and finally repulsed the French before Wellington, delayed by his pontoon bridge over the Nive having been swept away, arrived to his aid. The losses in the four days’ fighting in the battles before Bay one (or battles of the Nive) were—Allies about 5000, French about 7000. Both the British and Portuguese artillery, as well as infantry, greatly distinguished themselves in these battles. ' '

In eastern Spain Suchet (April 11, 1813) had defeated Elio‘s Murcians at Yecla and Villena, but was subsequently routed by Sir John Murray1 near Castalla (April 13), who then besieged Tarragona. The siege was abandoned after a time, but was later on renewed by Lord W. Bentinck. Suchet, after the battle of Vitoria, evacuated Tarragona (Aug. 17) but defeated Bentinck in the combat of Ordal (Sept. 13).

Campaign in the South of France, 1814.—When operations recommenced in February 1814 the French line extended from Bayonne up the north bank of the Adour to the Pau, thence bending south along the Bidouze to St Palais, with advanced posts on the Joyeuse and at St Jean Pied de Port. Wellington‘s left, under Hope, watched Bayonne, while Beresford, with Hill, observed the Adour and the Joyeuse, the right trending back till it reached Urcuray on the St Jean Pied de Port road. Exclusive of the garrison of Bayonne and other places, the available field force of Soult numbered about 41,000, while that of the Allies, deducting Hope’s force observing Bayonne, was of much the same strength. It had now become Wellington’s object to draw Soult away from Bayonne, in order that the allied army might, with less loss, cross the Adour and lay siege to the place on both banks of the river.

At its mouth the Adour was about 500 yds. wide, and its entrance from the sea by small vessels, except in the finest weather, was a perilous undertaking, owing to the shifting sands and a dangerous bar. On the other hand, the deep sandy soil near its banks made the transport of bridging materiel by land laborious, and almost certain of discovery. Wellington, convinced that no effort to bridge below Bayonne would be expected, decided to attempt it there, and collected at St Jean Pied de Port and Passages a large number of country vessels (termed chasse-marées). Then, leaving Hope with 30,000 men to watch Bayonne, he began an enveloping movement round Soult’s left. Hill on the 14th and 15th of February, after a combat at Garris, drove the French posts beyond the Joyeuse; and Wellington then pressed these troops back over the Bidouze and Gave'l de Mauleon to the Gave d’Oleron. Wellington’s object in this was at once attained, for Soult, leaving only 10,000 men in Bayonne, came out and concentrated at Orthes on the Pau. Then Wellington (Feb. 19) proceeded to St Jean de Luz to superintend the despatch of boats to the Adour. Unfavourable weather, however, compelled him to leave this to Sir John Hope and Admiral Penrose, so returning to the Gave d’Oleron he crossed it, and faced Soult on the Pau (Feb. 25). Hope in the meantime, after feints higher up the Adour, succeeded (Feb. 22 and 23) in passing 600 men across

. . Passage of the river 1n boats. The nature of the ground, IhcAdour, and there being no suspicion of an attempt at this beim

. s! .

point, led to the French coming out very tardily to oppose them; and when they did, some Congreve rockets (then a novelty) threw them into confusion, so that the right bank was held until, on the morning of the 24th, the flotilla of 1Cci)mmander of a British expedition from the Mediterranean islnn s. 2 “Gave " in the Pyrenees means a mountain stream or torrent.

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