The House then again went into Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, Mr. CAMBRELENG in the chair, and took up the bill to alter and extend the Judiciary system.

Mr. STRONG rose, and concluded his argument in support of his amendment.

[The remarks of Mr. STRONG were to the following effect:]

[JAN. 20, 183

any more judges, and without trying any new experiment, it is difficult to conceive any good reason why it should not be done.

Should the opinion prevail, that separate, independer: circuit courts ought not to be adopted, it will seem to fol low that we must take the plan proposed by the bill, with the certainty that the number of the justices of the Supreme Court will be increased beyond what convenience and efficiency require in performing their original and ap pellate duties; and with the further certainty that the desired equality will not be attained, or that we must take Mr. STRONG said, that, on most occasions, he was con- the plan proposed by the amendment, with the certainty tent to give a silent vote; but, on the present subject, so that it will be simple, cheap, uniform, and efficient in its important in its character and consequences, and holding operation, and with the further certainty that it will prothe opinions he did in regard to it, he hoped a departure duce exact equality in the order and administration of from his accustomed rule would not be deemed improper. justice throughout the Union. The amendment which I have submitted, [said Mr. S.] The alleged incompetency of some of the district court the committee will recollect, proposes to transfer all the judges is no argument against the plan. Were the fact powers and duties of the circuit courts to the several so, the fault would not be in the system. But there is no district courts of the United States, and to require the evidence of the fact. And the fair inference is, that they justices of the Supreme Court, being thus relieved from are able men, competent judges, and worthy of the high their circuit duties, to hold annually two or more terms of stations they occupy. And why should they not be? Their that court. To avoid embarrassment in discussing the jurisdiction embraces more matters, and covers a larger principle upon which the plan depends, I have purposely field of property and of human life, than that of the cit omitted some necessary provisions. These, however, cuit courts.

should the plan be adopted, may be readily supplied, The honorable chairman, [Mr. BUCHANAN] after having either here, or by sending the subject back to the Com-described, in fresh colors, the deprivations and wants of mittee on the Judiciary. This amendment opens the Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louwhole field of debate. It does more. Contrasted with isiana, contended that the circuit court system ought to the bill, it presents plainly the two great alternatives, be extended to those new States, in order that they might either to go on increasing the number of the justices of be put upon an equal footing with the older States of the the Supreme Court, for the performance solely of mere Union. I have admitted that the benefits of the federal incidental and subordinate duties, or to require, in another judiciary ought to be distributed equally among the form, and of others, the performance of those duties. It twenty-four States. But, sir, does the bill do this? It seems clear to me that the federal judiciary must be or- clearly does not. It makes no provision for having one ganized upon the one or the other of these cardinal principles.

of the justices of the Supreme Court hold a circuit court in the northern districts of New York and of Alabama,

I suppose it will not be denied that the benefits of the or in the western districts of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and federal judiciary ought to be extended equally to all the Louisiana. These are left with district courts only; and States, and to all the people. Any plan which falls short this is certainly the more remarkable, as two of these dis of this will be partial and unjust, because it will give to tricts are in the States for whose benefit and relief we are some, and deny to others, privileges which are common to urged to pass the present bill. Without stopping, there all, and which all have an equal right to possess. fore, to inquire into the practical operation of the plan Nor do I think it will be denied, as a general rule, that which the honorable gentleman proposes, it is apparent, the number of judges should be fixed with a sole view on the face of it, that it does not do equal justice. to the performance of those duties which cannot be performed by others, and the court so organized as to secure independence, soundness, and efficiency in its members. Any deviation from this rule ought to be sustained by clear and conclusive reasons.

gentleman [Mr. B.] to pass this bill, because the decisions But we are again earnestly entreated by the honorable of the district courts, in the districts to which the circuit court system has not been extended, are, in certain cases, final and conclusive upon the property and life of the citi The existing inequality in the distribution and character zen. of the federal courts among the several States, may be the remedy is easy, and should be applied without delay. If there be any thing hard or unmerciful in this, remedied, either by adding to the number of justices on We should at once give an appeal in those cases, directly the bench of the Supreme Court, or by separating them to the Supreme Court of the United States. This from their circuit court duties. Now, sir, if the remedy would obviate the evil, and is one answer to the argument. be by addition, the first idea that forces itself upon the The bill, however, is exceedingly objectionable for another mind is, that we must add to the number until we get up reason; it is partial and unequal. It withholds the cir to twenty-four, thus making the number of the justices of cuit court system from five large districts, and thus leaves the Supreme Court equal to the whole number of States the property and lives of the citizens in these districts at in the Union. Any less number will approach towards the mercy of district court judges-thereby entailing up. equality, but can hardly attain it. But if the remedy be on a large portion of our fellow-citizens the very evils by separation, perfect equality may be produced by the which the gentleman so eloquently deprecated. No such institution of independent circuit courts and judges, or objection exists against the plan I have proposed. It re by adopting the plan which I have proposed; that is, by moves all these evils; it presents an equal and uniform transferring the jurisdiction, powers, and duties of the system; it carries this equality and uniformity into every circuit courts to the existing district courts, part of the Union.

As several of the Western States do not enjoy the bene- If I did not misapprehend the honorable gentleman, he fit of circuit courts, which are common to the others, I shall seemed to take it for granted that the bill involved no new take it for granted, without inquiring into the wants or principle, that it merely extended the present circuit court desires of these new States, that this inequality ought to system, which he told us had been sanctioned by long ex be remedied; because, when each State, in this respect, perience. Sir, plans may appear the same on paper, and can be put upon a footing of perfect equality with every yet widely differ in principle and practical results. Had other, without any additional expense, without appointing he proposed to increase the number of the justices of the

JAN. 20, 1830.]

The Judiciary.

[H. of R.

security remains for the independence, or soundness, or safety of the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court to one hundred, instead of nine, and to create a new circuit for each, would not the committee have instantly perceived that the plan, though the same to the But, in order to weaken the force of these objections, eye, was founded upon a new principle, and for the attain- the honorable gentleman insisted, with much apparent ment of purposes different from those which the framers zeal, that there ought to be a judicial representation upon of the present circuit court system designed? It appears the bench of the Supreme Court! A representative court! to me that the bill contains a new principle. I may be And for what purpose? Is it to be of State courts, of wrong. And should the committee think I am wrong, State rights, or of State laws? Then ought not each State still I hope they will bear with me, while I state some of to have her own separate representative on the bench? the reasons which have led me to the conclusion, that, by Sir, to me this doctine is alarming. I have hitherto heard passing the bill, we shall not only depart from the old, but it suggested; but this is the first time I remember to have shall adopt a new system, highly dangerous in its charac-heard it seriously urged. Is it not fallacious, and full of ter and consequences. mischief? What is it? Is it not this-that a judge, havThe duties of the justices of the Supreme Court are of ing acquired at a circuit court all the knowledge he can two distinct kinds. One kind consists of those duties which of the local law, first decides what the law of the particugrow out of the original and appellate jurisdiction of the lar State is, and then represents his own decision to his court, and which they must, and they only can, perform. brethren on the bench as the law of the State? Will any These, therefore, are their principal duties. The other great good be likely to result from this sort of judicial rekind consists of those duties which Congress has, from presentation? think not. But I ask the committee, time to time, imposed upon them, by requiring them to whether, in a court organized upon these principles, there hold circuit courts. These duties are performed by them, may not necessarily be another sort of representation? not as justices of the Supreme Court, but as judges, of Will not such a court too often and too faithfully reprean anomalous character. These duties can and may be sent the prejudices, and passions, and partisan spirit of performed by others. They are, in fact, now performed the day? by some one or other of the district court judges. It seems, therefore, too plain to be controverted, that these duties are merely and wholly incidental and subordinate to their principal duties.

I agree with the honorable chairman, that we ought not to resort to independent circuit courts and judges, if a better plan can be devised. Still, I think the circuit court system less objectionable than the plan proposed by the Now, sir, the honorable gentleman having relieved me bill; and the plan I have submitted less objectionable than from the trouble of proving that the justices of the Su- either, because it is simple, cheaper, more efficient, and preme Court are sufficiently numerous, by distinctly ad more uniform. But I cannot agree with him, that the premitting that seven, the present number, are enough, and judices of the people against the old system of 1801 still that nine would be too many for the convenient and effi-exist. Sir, I know nothing of the men, or the motives, cient performance of their original and appellate duties, or the measures of that day, except from history. I am does it not follow that this new court, of nine, is to be no advocate of that system; it will not do for the present created for the purpose avowedly of performing those day; it lived but a year, and I will not open its grave, nor duties which, we have seen, are merely and wholly inci- disturb its ashes. By recurring, however, to the history dental and subordinate, and which may be performed of that stormy period, the committee, I think, will find by others? The present court is admitted to be large that that system was abolished, not because it proved to enough for the business of the bench. Wherefore in-be intrinsically or practically wrong, but because the peocrease the number of the justices? If you do increase ple thought such a number of judges unnecessary and the number, do you not depart from the old, and adopt a burdensome. So in the present case. Is not the honornew system, resting upon a new principle? What is this able gentleman in danger of falling into the same difficulbut changing the principle into the incident-thereby ty? Is not his plan obnoxious to the same objections? Are making the secondary duties of the old court the main object nine justices of the Supreme Court necessary? They are and excuse for creating the new court? Ought we not to not for the security of the constitutions, or laws, or liberpause before we adopt a plan which, while it fails to pro- ty of the country. As their numbers are increased, their duce the desired equality among the States, may prove fa- individual responsibility will be less felt, and their high tal to the soundness and efficiency of the court itself? And powers will be exercised with less and less consideration if we increase the number beyond what is wanted on the and care. Nor are nine necessary for the prompt and disbench, where shall we stop what is the limit? The hon-creet administration of justice. But all the purposes of orable chairman admitted that soon another must be added justice will be readily and equally attained by adopting to the number; but contended that ten would answer the the plan which the amendment proposes. Should expeexigencies of the country for some hundred years to come. rience prove that intermediate courts are convenient and Sir, if we add two now, for the purpose of doing circuit desirable, they may be easily formed of the district court duties, and for that purpose only, what shall we say when, judges, without at all disturbing the harmony or uniforat short intervals of time, two more, and two more, and mity of the system. There are now twenty-seven district so on, (until the court comes to consist of twenty or thirty judges, and thirty-two or three districts. Courts may be justices,) are demanded at our hands for the like purpose? organized, composed of three of these judges. Take Shall we say that the duties of the bench require no addition? But if this objection be of no avail now, when we have not passed the safe boundary, of what avail will it be then, when we have passed that boundary? Again, sir, the number of circuits must always depend more upon the extent of territory to be traversed, than upon the quan tity of business to be done. Look over the vast territories of the United States! When these come to be divided and admitted into the Union, must they not be provided for? What assurance have we that the States, if we sanction the principle of this bill, will not successively claim the right of having a justice of the Supreme Court? Think you that such claims would or could be rejected? If, then, we pass this bill, and incur these dangers, what

New York and New Jersey, for example. They are divided into three districts, and have three judges. It is so also with Pennsylvania and Delaware. In this way, nine courts may be organized, with appellate jurisdiction, or with the jurisdiction which the present circuit courts possess, with the merit of embracing all the States, and of producing entire equality among all, without the appointment of a single new judge.

Against the separation of the justices of the Supreme Court from the circuit courts, the honorable chairman strongly objected, because, in that event, the justices might become idle, rusty, and corrupt. These are not the terms he used; but if I did not mistake the design of his remarks, these were, in his judgment, the probable conse

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The Judiciary.

[JAN. 20, 1800, quences which might flow from withdrawing the justices governed. But when the justices of our Supreme Court from the circuits. are in consultation, is it so with them? It is not--because I freely admit that I feel great difficulty on this point. the local constitutions and laws and practice are not the This difficulty, however, does not arise from a conviction same in any two of their circuits. Now, according to the of the soundness of the objections; for, on the contrary, argument, the justice allotted to one circuit is supposed I am convinced that they are unsound. But it arises from to rely upon his brother justice for information as to L the strong prejudices, which, I am aware, are entertained the law, or the practice, in each particular case, is in t by many against separating the two courts--from the fact, other circuit. But, if each justice possesses a thorond that we are quick to perceive present good, and slow to knowledge of the whole law of the case, then such in apprehend future evil; and from the known propensity mation will not be sought or required, and the decision of men have, of being thought economical and prudent to- the case will be the judgment of the court. Whereas, i day, at whatever expense to-morrow; and of contenting this sort of information be material and necessary, then themselves with partial remedies for growing and invete the decision of the case is no longer the judgment of the rate evils; which, being thus tolerated, sometimes end in court, but of a single member of the court. the destruction of property and liberty and life.

But permit me to give another view of the matter The existing prejudices upon this subject cannot be the Take this new court of nine, as it is proposed to be or fruits of experience. This plan, in regard to the Supreme ganized. After it has been in operation a sufficient length Court of the United States, has never been fairly tried. of time, suppose the justices to be assembled in consulta And the experience of State courts, in this respect, will tion. Nine causes, one from each circuit, are before them be found to have little application to the case before us. I for examination and decision. The cause from the ninth readily admit that the justices of the Supreme Court circuit (of which Louisiana is a part) is taken up, and is will derive some advantages from attending the circuits. to be decided according to the civil law of Louisiana. But I cannot admit that those advantages, be they what Now, if the whole nine have acquired a full knowledge of they may, will countervail the evils of increasing the num-so much of the civil law as is applicable to the cause, then ber of justices on the bench, or that they will be such as it cannot be necessary for one of the number to go into the honorable gentleman supposed. It is true, that riding that circuit to acquire and impart to his brethren on the the circuits will keep them from idleness. So will travel-bench a knowledge of the law which they already pos ling for any other purpose. So the time thus employed, sess. If, however, they do not possess this knowledge, if applied in examining the laws of the country, will not but eight of them are obliged to rely upon the ninth for only keep them from growing idle and rusty, but will information respecting any portion of the law or the prac make thein abler lawyers and better judges.

tice material to a correct decision of the cause, then it is The same advantages, moreover, will result from at- plain that the judgment in the cause is that of a single tending the different terms of the Supreme Court, if my judge, and not the judgment of an intelligent court. The amendment be adopted. But they are to learn the laws same may be said respecting each circuit. And is this and practice of the States, by holding the circuit courts! among the advantages contended for? Sir, it seems to me How is this to be done? Is it by traversing the States in that the argument, which proves that the plan proposed stage coaches or steamboats? Or is this knowledge to be by the bill may be a very good one for a State, is a strong acquired from the contradictions of lawyers during the argument to prove that it is a very bad one for the United trial of a cause? To what extent? Is the circuit judge to States. And will not increasing the justices of the Su attain a profound knowledge of all the laws, customs, and preme Court rather aggravate than lessen the mischief I practice of the States in which he holds, and while he is do not mean to intimate that the learned justices of that holding his court? This will not be pretended. It appears high tribunal do not understand fully the law applicable to me, therefore, that, to sustain this argument, it must be to every case that comes before them. Far be it from me shown that the knowledge of the law or the practice thus to impute such wrong to them. But it is said, that, if they acquired at the circuits, be it much or little, cannot be ob- are detached from their circuit duties, they will not have tained in any other way, and that, without it, the Supreme the means of obtaining all the necessary books of law and Court cannot come to a just decision upon causes brought practice, from which to acquire a competent knowledge up from the circuit courts. The honorable gentleman, of the laws of the several States. Then let Congress furin support of his argument, referred to the Supreme nish a library at each place where a term of the court is to Court of England, and seemed to conclude that, as the be holden-for it cannot be more necessary for the United justices of that court were benefited by performing nisi States to provide courts, than to provide able judges, prius duties, so ours would be alike benefited by perform- And if the necessary knowledge be beyond the reach of ing circuit court duties. Sir, to judge of this matter individual means, the Government should furnish the rightly, we must attend to the facts in the two cases. means, that the laws may be executed, and justice be What are they? The Supreme Court of England has no done.

come to

jurisdiction of equity or of admiralty causes. The Su- The honorable chairman apprehended that the justices, preme Court of the United States has jurisdiction of mat-if withdrawn from the circuits, would probably ters at law and in equity, and of admiralty and maritime the city of Washington to reside, where they might possi causes. In England, there is but one constitution of Go- bly, in future time, become corrupt. Sir, if I thought the vernment. In the United States, there are twenty-five dis-political influences of the day would act more strongly tinct constitutions of Government. There, one code of upon them, than upon other men here, I should agree statute law prevails. Here, there are twenty-five differ- with him. But is there danger that corruption will insi ent codes of statute law. There, we find, with trifling ex-nuate its way into the bosom of the court? If so, where is ceptions, but one system of common law. Here, we find it most likely to effect its purpose? Is it here, when the twenty-four systems of the common law, each varying eye of the nation is continually upon them, and where the from the other. There, the rules of practice and the law concurrence of three or four, at least, is necessary to deof evidence are the same in all her courts of nisi prius. cide a cause; or at the circuits, where they may be taken Here, the rules of practice and the law of evidence are in detail, one by one, and where, too, both the property different in every circuit court in the Union. What next and the life of the citizen may depend upon the decision Why, the justices of the Supreme Court of England, of a single circuit judge?

when in consultation, compare the knowledge which each I very much regretted one remark which fell from the has acquired, of the same constitution and laws and prac-honorable gentleman. I was sorry to hear him invoke, in tice, and by which each has been always and every where advance, the public indignation upon the court, by cha

JAN. 20, 1830.]

The Judiciary.

[H. of R.

racterizing it as fulminating its decrees from a dark and any one place. They would naturally reside at different vaulted chamber, declaring State laws unconstitutional. places about the country, as they now do. It would preWherefore utter a doubt as to the exercise of powers vent delay, and make justice more prompt, by the fre which are clearly constitutional? Wherefore seem to im-quency of the terms. It would be a great accommodation pugn the members of a court justly distinguished, as well to suitors, by the great saving of time and expense to r their learning and integrity, as for their republican them. It would carry the court home to the people, and Leckness and simplicity? And wherefore cast the dark among the people. Sir, I agree that judges, to be good shades of suspicion over this high tribunal? It is the only judges, should be employed, and constantly employed. strong barrier between armed power and the unarmed ci- But it is the employment of the mind that makes the judge. tizen. It should be cautiously touched. Sir, much hand-It is the time spent in the study, in the acquisition of ling soils the whiteness of the ermine, as it dims the lustre legal science, and not in stages, in traversing the country, of fine gold. And though it do not destroy, it deeply in-that makes the profound jurist. I have not been able to jures. ascertain the quantity of business the court now has to do. The honorable gentleman seemed to think it might all be done in six weeks or two months. This appears to me to be too low an estimate. But, whatever the fact may be,

it is very easy to give the court enough to do. By simply extending the right of appeal, there would soon be enough for the court to do.

The honorable gentleman gives me to understand that he did not deny this high power to the court, of deciding upon the constitutionality of laws. I know, sir, he did not. But his language implied that the exercise of it was odious. It is of that I complain. What is doubted, soon comes to be denied. Is not this great power indispensable to our safety? And if so, ought it to be impaired? Suppose Con- There is another evil, of no small magnitude, growing gress should suspend the writ of habeas corpus, when there out of this circuit court system; and which the plan prowas no war, nor insurrection, nor rebellion--in a time of posed by the bill will, in my judgment, go very far to perprofound peace, and when every man would admit the petuate. The law requires the judge of the seventh cirsuspension to be unconstitutional? An innocent citizen is cuit to reside within that circuit. The practice is, in fillarbitrarily seized and imprisoned; what redress has he? ing a vacancy upon the bench of the Supreme Court, to Will he come to Congress for it? Congress is his oppres-make the selection within the particular circuit in which sor. Where then must he go? He must go to this same the vacancy happened. Pass this bill, and the law and “dark and vaulted chamber." There is no other power the practice will soon come to be, that each justice must that can open his prison doors and set him free. Again-reside within the circuit allotted to him; and when he dies suppose a State Legislature should revive the old law of or resigns, some one must be selected within the same cirattainder, or make bank bills, for example, a legal tender, cuit, and not elsewhere, to supply his place. Does any instead of "gold or silver?" Where else than to this one doubt that none but the ablest and fittest men and court can the citizen go, for the protection of his proper- best jurists should be put upon the bench of the Supreme ty and his blood? But if the war be carried further, as it Court? And ought not the whole field to be left open for might be, and a State Government should wantonly attaint the selection of such men? Will not this system often prefederal officers--and the Federal Government should ar- scribe the fittest men for that high trust? Does it not bitrarily imprison State officers, who could stay the strife, make the chances of getting the fittest men as one to the and redress the wrong, but the Supreme Court? It is the whole number of circuits? Thus its practical effect constitutional judge, and there is none else. The court will be to limit the discretion, and control the constitumay sometimes err. But what then? Shall we destroy tional power of the Executive. It may do more. Sir, all respect for it, by direct or implied charges of usurpa- suppose, hereafter, great questions should arise, deeply tion? Sir, it appears to me that the fear which leads affecting the property and industry of the country. Supsome to think that the court may wantonly abuse or usurp pose one of these questions should respect the constitupower, rests upon no good foundation. The justices are tional powers of the Federal Government to protect this liable to impeachment. If they wantonly abuse their high property and industry. Opposite opinions will be entertrust, they may be impeached, and turned out of office. tained by the people among the different circuits. Some This is a strong security. But there is still a stronger. of the circuits will be for the power-others against it. If Congress can at any time diminish, or wholly take away, need be, the circuits may be multiplied. Parties will arise. their appellate jurisdiction; and thus leave them nearly If one judge can be secured here, and another there, a powerless. Suppose, however, that we had not this secu- majority of the court may be procured, who will deny or rity. Will adding to their number increase their respon-affirm the power, according to the prevalence of their sibility, or diminish their power, or prevent error in judg- local feelings. To this end may not partisan influence and ment? Directly the contrary. power be exerted? And will not the court be moulded Should my amendment be adopted, the permanent re- of bad materials, and for sinister purposes? And may not sidence of the justices of the Supreme Court at the city it become a great political regency? What, then, are the of Washington would not be a thing of course. There real benefits which this system of a political court will would be no necessity for it. But suppose they should produce, compared with its real evils? Are they not as come to this city to reside, could they not acquire as the gentle breeze to the fierce tempest that uproots the much valuable information from the lawyers, and judges, forest, and prostrates men and temples in its progress? and other citizens, who resort to this place, from the se- There is no safety in this troubled sea. Why then urge veral States, as they could obtain while on their circuits? this young, and healthful, and vigorous republic to plunge Besides, if it requires any eye to watch over them, would into the angry flood, and vainly buffet the surge? Is it they not be subjected here to the severe scrutiny of the that she may founder and perish upon the breakers? President, the Senate, and the immediate representatives Sir, if the people want what is simple, cheap, and uniof the people? If, however, the residence of the justices form, the amendment which I have offered gives a simple, at Washington be objectionable, it affords an additional and cheap, and uniform system for the administration of reason for having two or three terms a year of the Supreme justice throughout the Union. I have before referred to Court, instead of one. If one term of the court be held the five large districts which are not embraced by the bill. at the city of Washington, and one or two other terms be These are told to be content with their district courts. held at one or two of the following places, namely, Cin- And yet, sir, the northern district of New York contains cinnati, Philadelphia, or New York, some of the advanta- nearly one million of inhabitants; and I suppose the other ges would be obvious. It would remove the objection, if four districts as many more. Thus it will be found that there be any thing in it, against the justices residing at the five districts which are left without the benefits, real VOL. VI.-69

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[JAN. 20, 1860.

or imaginary, of circuit courts, contain as great a popula-point of dignity and of rights. The principles of this bill tion as that portion of the six new States to which the bill I prefer to the amendment, though I am not entirely satis extends the circuit court system. My amendment does fled with either. The bill proposes no new system, but no such injustice. It puts all upon the same footing. an extension of the old one, long enjoyed by the Atlantic The members of the Supreme Court should not be too States, to the Western country. I could have wished that few for the requisite efficiency and weight of character, its provisions had not only extended the system, but have nor too many for convenience and promptness in the de-made it the same in all the States. The West asks this: spatch of business. Perhaps the court is now too large. and is her request unreasonable? In the Atlantic States In my opinion it is not. Five would inspire less confidence, there is no complaint. There should be none in the nine and more than seven probably still less. I have always Western States. Your judiciary ought to expand itself looked, and still look, to this court as the guardian of the with the growth and population of the country. The sys oppressed, as the bulwark of freedom. I can do nothing tem which has been tested by the experience of forty which, in my judgment, will impair its independence or years in the Atlantic States, and which was adapted to our stability, its virtue or intelligence. When and in what condition in our infancy, has not been enlarged so as to country was the law triumphant, or liberty or life safe, suit us in our manhood. We have outgrown the garment where there was not an intelligent, sound, independent ju- that then fitted us, and it is now too small. Six of the diciary? The Old World furnishes but few examples. Western States are wholly without the benefit of the preEngland furnishes some, both for evil and for good. Her sent circuit court system, (having only district courts,) star chamber court was the offspring of oppression, and and it has been but imperfectly extended to the seventh cr soon degenerated into a regency of tyrants. The days cuit, composed of Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, as of Jefferies exhibit, in strong colors, the bloodshed and shall presently endeavor to show. ruin which flow from a dependant, servile court. In order to show more distinctly the inequality of the the days of Coke. Then the sword and sceptre were present system as regards the Western States, compared forced to yield to an intelligent, sound, independent ju- with those east of the Alleghany mountains, it may be well diciary, and the innocent and oppressed were protected. to look, for a moment, to the judicial history of the United But there is an example nearer home. The old supreme States, and to ask of gentlemen here representing the court of New York existed at a time when party spirit East, why this inequality should have been permitted so ran high, was most embittered and unrelenting, dividing long to remain, and what sensible reason there can be now neighborhoods and families. It was composed of men to refuse the remedy.

Not so

equal to the perils of the hour. It interposed its shiekl When the judiciary act of September, 1789, was pass between martial and municipal law, and rescued and saved ed, there were but ten States in the Union: North Caroli the citizen. The angry passions of the time have subsid-na, Rhode Island, and Vermont came into the Union subed. The value of such a court, in a time like this, is rea- sequently to the passing of that act; and the system which dily appreciated; and the memory of the distinguished men it provided was extended to the former in June, 1790, and composing it will be revered as long as the science of law to the latter in March, 1791. At the date of that act, with or the principles of civil liberty shall have an advocate. only ten States in the Union, and with a population not My conviction is thorough, that the justices of the Su- exceeding one-third of the present population of the twen preme Court ought to be withdrawn from the circuits. Ity-four States, it was deemed necessary to appoint si see no other way to maintain the integrity of the court, judges of the Supreme Court. The States were divided which I deem not more essential to its safety than to its into three circuits, the Eastern, Middle, and Southern. usefulness. Think of it as we may, still this high tribunal North Carolina was attached to the Southern, and Rhode occupies the neutral ground between the twenty-five go- Island and Vermont to the Eastern circuits, as they respec vernments and the people. No matter whether the op-tively came into the Union. Two judges of the Supreme pression or the wrong proceed from the federal or from Court were required to preside in each circuit with the re a State government. Uncontrolled power is the enemy of liberty, and the people's tyrant. It is, therefore, between the governments and the governed, between the powers and duties of the people's agents, and the rights and privileges of the people themselves, that this court is the constitutional judge, and the sole judge. And he assumes a fearful responsibility who impairs this last and strongest citadel, to which man can flee for the protection of liberty or life.

spective district judges, and constituted the circuit court, until the act of March, 1793, when one judge of the S preme Court and the district judge composed the circuit court, who were required to alternate or interchange cit cuits with each other. It is not my purpose to detain the committee by a minute account of the judicial history, further than to show the inequality of the system as it ope rates in the different States. The chairman of the Jude ciary Committee, in his opening argument, has relieved Mr. POLK next rose. He said that, in consider-me from the necessity of doing so. Thus the system coning the bill now before the committee, and the amend-tinued until the famous act of the 13th February, 1801, fament offered as a substitute for it by the gentleman from miliarly know to the country as the midnight system. By New York, who had just resumed his seat, he perfectly that act, the Supreme Court judges were relieved from agreed both with the chairman of the Committee on the circuit court duties, and were to constitute an appellate Judiciary and with the gentleman from New York, that, court alone. Many additional circuit judges were created whatever the judicial system of the United States be, it and commissioned, two of whom, with the district judge, should be uniform; that the inferior judicial tribunals, how-constituted a court termed a circuit court. ever organized, and with whatever jurisdiction and pow- not precisely the same with that proposed by the gentle ers it was deemed wise to invest them, as well as the mode man from New York, but differs from it only in this, that of administering justice, should be the same in every por- the gentleman's amendment does not propose the appoint tion of the Union. If [said Mr. P.] "the citizens of each ment of circuit judges, but to invest the district judges State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of with circuit court powers. At the first session of Cocitizens in the several States," and if the States are enti-gress after Mr. Jefferson came into office, the system of tled to be governed (as far as this Government can legiti-1801 was repealed, and the new judges legislated out of mately extend its authority) by equal and uniform laws, office; and, at the same session, the former system was re operating alike upon every portion of the country, it is organized, with slight and immaterial alterations from difficult to perceive upon what principle it is that the ju- that of 1793, not important here to mention, and the sys dicial system extended to one portion of the Union should tem which we now have was established. At the re-of be withheld from another. All the States are equal in ganization of the system in 1802, Kentucky and Tennes

This system is

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