CONGRESS, ACTS OF. See ACTS OF CONGRESS. CONGRESS, POWERS OF. 1. To restrict hours of labor of employés engaged in interstate and foreign commerce. By virtue of its power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce Congress may enact laws for the safeguarding of persons and property in interstate transportation and may restrict the hours of labor of employés connected with such transportation. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Interstate Com. Comm., 612. 2. To regulate interstate commerce; effect of involution of intrastate commerce. The power of Congress to make regulations in regard to agencies for interstate commerce is not defeated by the fact that the agencies regulated are also connected with intrastate commerce. Ib. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 30, 31; CORPORATIONS, 4; INDIANS, 2, 4, 7, 8, 10, 11; NAVIGABLE WATERS, 1, 4; TAXES AND TAXATION, 11. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 1. Commerce; validity of act of March 4, 1907, relative to hours of labor of railroad employés. The act of March 4, 1907, 34 Stat. 145, c. 2939, regulating the hours of labor of railway employés engaged in interstate commerce and requiring carriers to make reports in regard thereto, is not unconstitutional as beyond the power of Congress because it applies to railroads and employés engaged in intrastate business. Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, distinguished. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Interstate Com. Comm., 612. See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 1, 7; NAVIGABLE WATERS, 1. 2. Contracts; existence of contract in charter of corporation within meaning of Constitution. The charter of this transportation company held not to contain any provisions giving it such contract right to use its vehicles for advertising purposes as rendered a subsequent ordinance prohibiting such use unconstitutional under the contract clause of the Constitution. Fifth Avenue Coach Co. v. New York, 467. 3. Contracts; provisions in corporate charter not within protection of contract clause. Provisions in a corporate charter which are beyond the power of the legislature to grant are not within the protection of the contract clause of the Federal Constitution. Texas & New Orleans R. R. Co. v. Miller, 408; Texas & New Orleans R. R. Co. v. Gross, 417. 4. Contracts; provision in charter of railroad exempting from liability not contract within protection of Constitution. A provision in its charter exempting a railroad company from liability for death of employés, even if caused by its own negligence, does not amount to an irrevocable contract within the protection of the Federal Constitution, but is as much subject to future legislative action as though embodied in a separate statute. Ib. 5. Contracts; protection of charter rights; to what subject. The protection of charter rights by the contract clause of the Federal Constitution is subject to the rule that a legislature cannot bargain away the police power, or withdraw from its successors the power to guard the public safety, health and morals. Ib. 6. Contracts; act of instrumentality as law of State within meaning of clause. A legislative act by an instrumentality of the State exercising delegated authority is of the same force as if made by the legislature and is a law of the State within the meaning of the contract clause of the Constitution. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. Indiana R. R. Comm., 400. 7. Contract impairment; limitation of charter rights of corporation. A contract with a corporation is subject to the limitations of the charter rights of the corporation and is not impaired within the meaning of the contract clause of the Constitution by subsequent legislation that does not extend such limitations. Fifth Avenue Coach Co. v. New York, 467. 8. Contract impairment; effect of law relating to matters beyond scope of contract. A contract cannot be impaired, within the meaning of the contract clause of the Constitution, by a law which relates to matters beyond the scope of the contract as construed according to the usual meaning of the words used. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. Indiana R. R. Comm., 400. 9. Contract impairment. Same. A contract between two railroads for maintaining the physical cost of a crossing and guarding it by good and substantial semaphores or other signals is not impaired by a subsequent act requiring an 10. Contracts; liberty of; effect of restriction as to hours of labor. 11. Due process of law; deprivation of property without; validity of act of Feb. 10, 1899, relative to assessment of property in District of Columbia. The act of February 10, 1899, 30 Stat. 834, c. 150, extending Rhode Island avenue and authorizing assessments for benefits on property within the assessment district created by the act, is not unconstitutional as depriving owners within the district of their property without due process of law either because not providing sufficient notice or as arbitrarily assessing one-half the damages upon property within the designated district. Briscoe v. District of Columbia, 547. 12. Due process of law; property rights; compensation; validity of condemnation proceeding. The Fourteenth Amendment forbids a State from taking private property for public use without compensation, C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, but where the State provides adequate machinery for ascertaining compensation on notice and hearing which were availed of and there was no ruling by the state court which prevented compensation for property actually taken, there is no lack of due process because of the amount awarded, even if only nominal. Appleby v. Buffalo, 524. 13. Due process of law; equal protection of the law; validity of Massachusetts Savings Bank Act of 1907. A statute directing that savings banks turn over to the proper state officers money in accounts inactive for thirty years and where the depositor cannot be found, with provisions for the payment over to the depositor or his heirs on establishment of right, does not deprive savings banks of their property without due process of law and is not a denial of equal protection of the law because it г applies only to savings banks, the classification not being unreasonable; and so held as to the statute of Massachusetts to that effect. Provident Savings Institution v. Malone, 660. See CRIMINAL LAW, 3; INDIANS, 9; INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 7; TAXES AND TAXATION, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9. 14. Equal protection of the law; individual and aggregate rights. Where rights exist to one they exist to all of the class to which that one belongs. Fifth Avenue Coach Co. v. New York, 467. 15. Equal protection of the law; classification for regulation; validity of New York ordinance prohibiting advertising vehicles in certain streets. Classification based on reasonable distinctions is not an unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the laws; and so held that an ordinance of the city of New York prohibiting advertising vehicles in a certain street is not unconstitutional as denying equal protection to a transportation company operating stages on such street either because signs of the owners may be displayed on business wagons, or because another transportation company may display advertising signs on its structure. There is a purpose to be achieved, as well as a distinction, which justifies the classification. Ib. 16. Equal protection of the law; validity of classification for regulation of savings from other banks. There is a special reason for protecting depositors of savings banks and there is a difference between them and deposits in other banks that affords a reasonable basis for classification in legislation. Provident Savings Institution v. Malone, 660. See Supra, 13. Extradition. See EXTRADITION, 3. 17., Freedom of speech; effect of order of court restraining publication in pursuance of boycott, as abridgment of. An order of a court of equity, restraining defendants from boycotting complainant by publishing statements that complainant was guilty of unfair trade, does not amount to an unconstitutional abridgment of free speech; the question of the validity of the order involves only the power of the court to enjoin the boycott. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 418. 18. Full faith and credit; effect of decision of court of State construing foreign statute, to violate. Where an action is commenced in the courts of one State, based on a right given by the statute of another State provided it be commenced within a specified period, which has not expired, the omission of the plaintiff to plead the statute may be cured by the defendant pleading the statute, although the answer may not be filed until after the period of limitation has expired; and the decision of the state court to that effect does not violate the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, and involves no Federal question. Texas & New Orleans R. R. Co. v. Miller, 408; Texas & New Orleans R. R. Co. v. Gross, 417. Legislative powers. See Supra, 1; CONGRESS, POWERS OF; RESTRAINT OF TRADE, 19. Property rights. See Supra, 11; NAVIGABLE WATERS, 6. 19. Self-incrimination; right does not extend to appropriation of prop erty. The right under the Fifth Amendment not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself is not a right to appropriate property that may tell one's story. Matter of Harris, 274. 20. Self-incrimination; effect of order requiring bankrupt to surrender books to receiver. A bankrupt is not deprived of his constitutional right not to testify against himself by an order requiring him to surrender his books to the duly authorized receiver. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, distinguished. Ib. 21. Self-incrimination; protection to which officer of corporation entitled. An officer of a corporation is protected by the self-incrimination provisions of the Fifth Amendment against the compulsory production of his private books and papers, but this privilege does not extend to books of the corporation in his possession. Wilson v. United States, 361. 22. Self-incrimination; protection to which officer of corporation entitled. An officer of a corporation cannot refuse to produce documents of a corporation on the ground that they would incriminate him simply because he himself wrote or signed them, and this even if indictments are pending against him. Ib. 23. Self-incrimination; right of corporation and of officer thereof to plead privilege. A corporation cannot plead a privilege against self-incrimination |