The word "compromise" so far as it implies a concession has practically no application to workmen's compensation Acts. The amount of compensation due is subject to computation when the facts are properly established, in most cases, and very little is left for dispute or negotiation. Compromise settlements, therefore, are scarcely recognized at all under such statutes. Some of the acts, however, permit the parties to agree as to the amount due, but most of them provide in one form or another that a settlement must either be approved by some public officer in the first instance or that it is subject to re-examination thereafter before it become conclusive. In New Jersey, for example, while the

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parties may agree as to the amount due, if the employé or the beneficiary subsequently brings proceedings in court the settlement is binding only so far as it is in compliance with the Statute. This chapter points out specifically in what instances settlements may be made by the parties and the effect of such settlements.

The British Act "authorizes employers and injured workmen (or the dependents of workmen who have been killed) to enter into agreements as to the compensation to be paid. In order that such agreements when entered into may be binding the Act requires them to be registered in the County Court, or in Scotland in the Sheriff Court. Either the workman or the employer may apply to the Registrar of the County Court (or in Scotland to the Sheriff Clerk) to register the agreement, and once the agreement is registered it has the same force as a County Court judgment, or in Scotland as a decree-arbitral. It is not necessary that the agreement should be in writing. A written agreement is, of course, more satisfactory in every way, but an oral agreement can be registered. All that is necessary is that the person asking for registration of an oral agreement shall write down in his own words the substance of the agreement; the Registrar or Sheriff Clerk will register it if he considers it to be genuine. An implied agreement even may be registered. An implied agreement is one that has neither been written nor spoken, but may be inferred from the conduct of the parties concerned. Thus, if an employer, without making any promise, pays compensation weekly to an injured workman the court will, under certain circumstances, say that there is an implied agreement which can be registered. It must not, however, be assumed that in every case where an employer voluntarily pays compensation an agreement can be implied. There may be other facts to be taken into account. Either the employer or the workman may register the agreement, but by Section 11 (1) (c) of the National Insurance Act a special duty is laid upon the employer when the agreement

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is for the payment of a lump sum in lieu of weekly payments or for the payment of less than 10s. a week. In either of such cases the employer is bound under the act to give notice of the agreement either to the Insurance Commissioners or to the workman's approved society or (if the workman is a deposit contributor) to the Local Insurance Committee. This notice must be given within seven days from the making of the agreement."

Both employer and workman are entitled to be present when the agreement is registered.

A workman employed by contractors was knocked down and injured by the defendants' tramcar. He received several weekly payments from his employers and gave them receipts therefor. Subsequently he repaid to the employers the amount he has received from them, and sued the defendants for damages. At the trial the workman stated that he did not understand the nature and terms of the receipts he had signed. The County Court judge dismissed the case, holding, as a matter of law, that he had recovered compensation within the meaning of § 6 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and that his action was therefore barred. The Court of Appeal held that it was a question for the jury whether the plaintiff understood the nature and effect of the receipts he had signed. Huckle v. The London County Council (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 113.

An illiterate and ignorant workman gave a cumulative receipt for all payments of compensation received by him. This sum included one week in advance, but no other additional payment. It was found, as a fact, that the workman was not recovered at this date, nor at the date of the hearing of the arbitration. The employer applied to record a memorandum of agreement of final discharge, and the workman at the same time applied to record one to pay him compensa

From an Article by John H. Greenwood in the Fifty-fifth Quarterly Report of the General Federation of Trade Unions of Great Britain (March, 1913).

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tion. It was held that the "final discharge " was not a genuine agreement, and should not be recorded, but that the workman's memorandum should be recorded. Macandrew v. Gilhooley (1911), 48 Scotch L. R. 511; 4 B. W. C. C. 370.

A judge refused to record a memorandum of agreement for a lump sum settlement on the ground of inadequacy. The workman then applied for compensation, and the judge, finding that his incapacity was no longer due to the accident and that the amount in fact paid under the settlement was enough to cover all compensation due for the short period during which the incapacity had been due to the accident, decided in favor of the employers. The Court of Appeal held that the judge was entitled to decide the application for compensation freely on the evidence and was not bound by his previous decision to award compensation. Beech v. Bradford Corporation (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 236.

A workman entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906 signed a discharge which purported to be in full satisfaction of all claims, past and future, in the belief that he was merely signing a receipt for compensation past due. The employer's cashier took the discharge in the belief that the workman had fully recovered, whereas he was still totally incapacitated. Compensation was awarded, it being held that the workman was not barred from recovering compensation by the discharge. Ellis v. The Lochgelly Iron and Coal Co. (1909), 46 Scotch L. R. 960; 2 B. W. C. C. 136.

Where a claimant signed a release expressing a consideration of £35 and it appeared only the sum of £17, 10s. was paid, and the balance was paid as wages, it was held that there was accord but no satisfaction, and that the receipt did not contain a genuine agreement under the Act. Hawkes v. Richard Coles and Sons (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 163.

A compensation agreement between the workman and his employers stated that the workman should receive a

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lump sum of money and be given regular employment, as foreman in the works, at specified wages. The employers paid the sum of money and kept the workman in their employment on the terms arranged for nearly three years, when they dismissed him owing to a dispute. The workman thereupon brought an action against them for damages for breach of contract, and it was held that the action could not be maintained as there was no breach of contract, the employers having given the workman regular employment for a considerable period. Lawrie v. James Brown & Co. (1908), 45 Scotch L. R. 477; 1 B. W. C. C. 137.

A seaman sustained serious injuries. He was conveyed to a hospital while unconscious and remained there after his discharge from the ship for fifteen weeks. The shipowners made payments for his maintenance during that period equal to the full weekly compensation for which they were liable. They were not legally liable to make these payments under the Merchant Shipping Act. It was held that such payments were a benefit which the workman received from the employers during the period of his incapacity, and that they must be taken into account in fixing the amount of compensation. Kempson v. Owners of Schooner "Moss Rose" (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 101.

On an application for compensation account must be taken of a lump sum paid by the employer in full settlement. Horsman v. Glasgow Navigation Co. (1909), 3 B. W. C. C. 27.

A workman met with an accident to his head in 1909. Apparently he got perfectly well and returned to his work. Two years later he died from the effects of an operation for abscess on the brain. Upon the dependents claiming compensation the employers offered £.10 in settlement. The sum was accepted and the money paid into Court. The Registrar refused to record the memorandum of agreement inasmuch as two of the children were minors, and on appeal to the Court of Appeal it was held that the sum offered was inadequate and the memorandum was properly refused.