troops, and in the neighbourhood of Montreal they had been indifferent and lukewarm even when service was accepted by them. The general feeling may be described, that, for the most part, they looked on to see which was the stronger side. This was the more remarkable since there was a traditional hatred of the "Bastonnois," as the congress troops were called, and there was little doubt that every institution of the past was threatened by their success.

The fact is a curious commentary on the political cry so long the shibboleth of French Canadian political orthodoxy, “notre langue, nos institutions, et nos lois." It is not heard so much nowadays, except from young and ambitious politicians desirous of flattering the prejudices of their countrymen, by the cant of extolling to the verge of folly what to-day would be found to be insupportable. Three quarters of a century back it was the accepted key-note of political fidelity. In 1775, it was the very dread of reverting to those institutions, of having again to submit to the arrogance and power of the seigneurs, and the exacting authority of a dominant church, which led so many French Canadians to accept the promises made by the invaders, of a future assured condition of liberty and freedom; the two words constantly prominent in the speech and writings of the advocates of the, revolution. It may, however, be safely affirmed that there was never greater tyranny than that exercised by the majority who advocated. independence. At no time, was mercy shewn to any one attached to the connection with the mother country. The number of those professing these opinions in the old provinces was still large, and earnest in feeling; but overpowered by the outrages of the mob, paralyzed from want of leaders, with no rallying point, without organized means of resistance, without strength to vindicate their opinions, they were subjected to unceasing persecution. There was no one to call out this latent strength, and no effort was made by the imperial government to aggregate and direct it. On the other side all was vigour and effort, while intimidation was incessantly exercised, and the political agitation was unremittingly persevered

1775]

THE FRENCH CANADIANS.

485

in. There was a constant appeal to the glaring wrong and injustice which the people were told they suffered, and artifice and violence were constantly practised to advance the cause of the revolution.

The French Canadians became dupes to this pretension. They had enjoyed British liberty for sixteen years, and had learned to treasure the political rights, which, for the first time in their history, they had possessed. There was no grievance of which they complained; they had become prosperous and comparatively rich. It was not resentment of any past injustice, but the fear of coming wrong which had arrayed them against the flag to which they owed allegiance. They had been made to believe that the government would revert to the ancient system they had groaned under before the conquest. What was stranger still in the character of their hostility was, that the agitators who had called forth this disloyal feeling, by their constant misrepresentation as to the influence of the Quebec act, were those who were prepared to sacrifice the French Canadians in every relation of life. It must never be forgotten, that they had demanded the legislature should be formed from the few hundred protestants bent on destroying the language, laws and religion of the new subjects, while the British government had unflinchingly acted on the principle, that it would be a gross injustice to consider the question in any other light than as one on which the great majority of the Canadians should themselves adjudicate This paternal care of the new subject was primarily the wrong complained of by the English speaking inhabitants, and was the cause that many of them. acted in open hostility. Nothwithstanding this assumed grievance on their side, by cunning and misrepresentation they succeeded in leading many of the French Canadians to accept their view, that a wrong had been done to the province by the Quebec act, of which the effect would be to throw the government, as of old, into the hands of the seigneurs, and that the habitants would themselves drift back to the oppressive times of corvées, compulsory service, and the harsh features

of former days. Had the English speaking minority been suffered to act as oppressors, as far as they were capable, they would have been loyal defenders of the government which conceded the right of persecution.

That the few men who accompanied Montgomery were enabled to conquer Canada, with the exception of Quebec, and hold the country for six months, would be inexplicable, but for the facts that I have given. There were only nine. hundred regular troops, for the defence of the whole province. Among the English speaking population, there was a feeling of active sympathy with the cause of congress. The Canadian habitants generally were neutral, or favoured the invaders. There was a strong party among them loyal to British institutions as they had been established; especially the ecclesiastics, and the higher and professional classes. They possessed, however, but little influence.

It is simply a duty to record that this feeling passed rapidly away, and never again obtained activity. During the period of the whole struggle, the French Canadians remained attached to the British government, and no encouragement was given for a second invasion of the province. It is true that the weight of the contest in the colonies called forth all the efforts of the troops of congress in New York and in the south; but the probability is, that had the opportunity again presented itself to have detached Canada from its connection with Great Britain, the attempt would have been made.

Carleton saw all the difficulty of the situation in which he was placed. He wrote to Dartmouth, that he found during his absence everything possible had been done for the defence of Quebec. If the people in the town and the seamen could be depended upon, the place could hold out; but there were so many traitors within, that it was doubtful, to say nothing

worse.

A vessel left Quebec carrying the news to England, with the resolution that it had been determined to defend the place to the utmost. One line of conduct was followed by Carleton

Can. Arch., Q., 11, p. 318.

1775] CAUSES OF THE SUCCESS OF CONGRESS.

487 which Cramahé had hesitated to take, notwithstanding that repeated representations had been made to him of the disloyalty of certain men. Such as these were ordered by Carleton immediately to leave the town. On their departure the cabals ceased, and there was a common desire of all who remained, to do their duty regardless of any personal privation or exposure to hardship. *

The narrative of the months of humiliation which Canada endured from the conquest of the province by a few hundred of the troops of congress, the wrong the province suffered by forced requisitions of provisions paid for in worthless paper money, the outraged pride of a people treated as an inferior race by those who had marched into it as conquerors, will be incomplete unless an endeavour be made to penetrate the causes owing to which Canada underwent this degradation.

Three independent causes may be mentioned. The first, the imbecile policy followed by the ministry of lord North, putting out of view the necessity of garrisoning the province. While Boston was filled with troops, to remain cooped up in the town to fail in all they undertook, to remain idle and without account in the convulsions of the continent, Canada was left perfectly exposed to invasion. Nevertheless, such was the ignorance of the condition of the province that it was proposed to raise 6000 recruits from a population, of whom but a few score would pull a trigger in the defence of their own homes.

This deplorable mistake might have been rectified if an admiral other than Graves had been at Boston. His refusal to furnish transports for the force asked for by Carleton was a scandalous disregard of duty not to be explained away. We have only to conceive that if the schooner "Success," in October, instead of bringing Howe's indignant explanation

* Colonel Caldwell says on this point in his letter of 15th June, 1776, supposed to be addressed to general Murray (Hist. Soc., Quebec, p. 6)': "The Bonfields left the town on that occasion, Wells, Zachary McCauley, Murdoch Stewart, John McCord and several others, amongst whom were four or five of the militia officers appointed by Cramahé."

of his inability to furnish the troops, had been accompanied by transports carrying two British regiments, how different would have been the result at Saint John's. As fast as boats could have been propelled by oars, they would have ascended to Sorel, and by the river Richelieu to Saint John's. In a few hours Montgomery's force would have been driven into lake Champlain, or would have surrendered as prisoners of war. It must ever remain the epitaph of Graves that his timidity, and want of proper conception of what he owed to his country, led to the misfortunes of Canada in the winter that ensued; conduct on his part never to be forgotten or forgiven. But, even with this shortcoming, a chance remained that Montgomery would have failed in his enterprise, and on the approach of winter have abandoned the siege. That he remained to effect the surrender of the fort was through the cowardice of major Stopford at Chambly, who by his surrender placed in Montgomery's possession powder and provisions, by which the offensive operations could be continued.

It was, indeed, fortunate for Canada, that a man of Carleton's genius was at the head of affairs. He saw the true key of the situation was the possession of Quebec. So long as there was hope that the then western part of Canada could be held, he remained at his post. It was only with difficulty he arrived at Quebec, to inspire with fortitude and decision the few who remained within its walls. It was the fourth siege which Quebec underwent; Phips, Wolfe and de Lévis had at the several periods led an array against it. In no one instance were the operations of less importance. The possession of Quebec during the winter of 1775-1776, was to determine who was to be the future master of Canada. Held by the congress troops during the winter, under a soldier so distinguished and experienced as Montgomery, it is hard to tell what would have been the fate of the fortress, if attacked in the ensuing spring, by the reinforcements which arrived from England.

It is mere speculation to consider what the result would