volume, paradoxical as it may appear, is not unconfirmed by observation. I had, somewhat to my own surprise, arrived at these results, by an application of well-established principles to the facts of the case; but my attention has since been directed, by Mr. Campbell, to several instances mentioned by the Italian engineer, Frisi, of such effects being actually produced from such causes.

The division of the Rhine into several branches, near its mouth-said to have been commenced by the Romans-is said to have caused a constant rising in the beds of these diminished branches. A waste wier, proposed to relieve the lock from its surplus waters, was opposed by the engineer, Gennete, on the ground that it could have no good effect.

Two relieving sluices, made in the Celone, are said to have caused the filling up and loss of the principal trunk of that river; and it is likewise said, that the lateral discharges, made in the Adige, have only produced a heightening of the bed, and thereby rendered the floods more dangerous.

The results I have given being, as they are, rigid deductions from wellestablished principles governing the phenomena of rivers, and confirmed by experience, we cannot be too cautious about throwing off the waters of the Mississippi, through lateral outlets, or tampering with it in any way. That a certain amount of water might be thrown off, in extreme stages, with safety and beneficial results, appears probable; but it is extremely doubtful whether a waste wier, into lake Pontchartrain, could be kept open. As the river commences falling, the velocity in the outlet will be checked and a deposit will form. This, during the summer and autumn, will become covered with a dense growth of reeds, grass, &c., which would still further obstruct the discharge of the next year; so that, in a few years, there would be no other result of the heavy expenditure of making this outlet, than a strip of high land from the river to the lake.

I have but few words to say on the subject of levees. If the results I have given in this paper are correct, then the levee system, instead of favoring, as is alleged, the tendency of the bed of the river to rise, has precisely the reverse effect. By confining the waters within their limits, they increase the velocity and abrading power of the current, causing a deepening, rather than an elevation, of the bed. This velocity may become too great for convenience, causing a rapid destruction of the banks; but the It may tendency to prevent the elevation of the bed is not the less true. safely be affirmed, therefore, that the bed of the river is now lower than it would have been, had no levees been made.

If, as is probable, all schemes for relieving the river from its surplus waters, by lateral discharges, fail, then levees must remain, as they are now, our only safeguard. The great difficulty now is, that the levees are entirely inadequate to their object. A study of the levee system in Holland, where much greater heights of water, and even the waves of the ocean, are to be contended with, would give Louisianians some light as to what a safe levee should be.

The

The levees should be much wider and higher than they now are. carriage road, instead of being along side, might be on their tops, which

would keep them always compact and the road itself dry. When the baik is curving, the levee should be so far removed from the river as to be beyond all possibility of danger.

An efficiert system of control and management should be established, so that the welfare of a whole community should not be hazarded by the negligence of an individual. With such a levee system, I think the crevasses we hear of in almost every day's paper-so destructive to property, and likely to be so permenently injurious to Louisiana, should they not be hereafter prevented-need not occur. I am yours, very respectfully, &c.,

J. G. BARNARD, Brev. Maj. Engineers.

ART. IX.-SLAVERY.

MR. CALHOUN'S LETTER TO MR. KING.

BRITISH MOVEMENTS IN TEXAS; HER EMANCIPATION SCHEMES AND THEIR FAILURE; HER POLICY IN REGARD TO SLAVERY.

[THIS celebrated letter of the great American statesman, now passed from the scene of action, has been universally admired, as presenting one of the most powerful and irresistible arguments against the emancipation and abolition movements of the age. Its publication, six years ago, produced a sensation in Europe, as well as in our own country, which can never be forgotten. Yielding to the solicitations of many of our subscribers, and in the conviction we could do better service to the cause of the South, we publish in our pages this letter, copies of which having become very rare among us.—Ed. ]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, August 12, 1844. SIR-I have laid your dispatch, No. 1, before the President, who instructs me to make known to you that he has read it with pleasure, espe cially the portion which relates to your cordial reception by the king, and his assurance of friendly feelings toward the United States. The Presi dent, in particular, highly appreciates the declaration of the king, that, in no event, would any steps be taken by his government in the slightest degree hostile, or which would give to the United States just cause of complaint. It was the more gratifying from the fact, that our previous information was calculated to make the impression, that the government of France was prepared to unite with Great Britain in a joint protest against the annexation of Texas, and a joint effort to induce her government to withdraw her proposition to annex, on condition that Mexico should be made to acknowledge her independence. He is happy to infer from your dispatch, that the information, as far as it relates to France, is, in all probability, without foundation. You did not go further than you ought in assuring the king, that the object of annexation would be pursued with unabated vigor, and in giving your opinion, that a decided majority of the American people were in its favor, and that it would certainly be annexed at no distant day. I feel confident that your anticipation will be fully realized at no distant period. Every day will tend to weaken that combination of political causes which led to the opposition of the measure, and to strengthen the conviction that it was not only expedient, but just and necessary.

You were right in making the distinction between the interest of France and England, in reference to Texas-or rather, I would say, the apparent interests of the two countries. France cannot possibly have any other than commercial interest in desiring to see her preserve her separate independence; while it is certain that England looks beyond to political interests, to which she apparently attaches much importance. But, in our opinion, the enterest of both against the measure is more apparent than real; and that neither France, England, nor even Mexico herself, has any in opposition to it, when the subject is fairly viewed and considered in its whole extent and in all its bearings. Thus viewed and considered, and assuming that peace, the extension of commerce, and security, are objects of primary policy with them, it may, as it seems to me, be readily shown, that the policy on the part of those powers which would acquiesce in a measure so strongly desired by both the United States and Texas, for their mutual welfare and safety, as the annexation of the latter to the former, would be far more promotive of these great objects than that which would attempt to resist it.

It is impossible to cast a look at the map of the United States and Texas, and to note the long, artificial, and inconvenient line which divides them, and then to take into consideration the extraordinary increase of population and growth of the former, and the source from which the latter must derive its inhabitants, institutions and laws, without coming to the conclusion that it is their destiny to be united, and, of course, that annexation is merely a question of time and mode. Thus regarded, the question to be decided would seem to be, whether it would not be better to permit it to be done now, with the mutual consent of both parties, and the acquiescence of these powers, than to attempt to resist and defeat it. If the former course be adopted, the certain fruits would be the preservation of peace, great extension of commerce by the rapid settlement and improvement of Texas, and increased security, especially to Mexico. The last, in reference to Mexico, may be doubted; but I hold it not less clear than the other two.

It would be a great mistake to suppose that this government has any hostile feelings toward Mexico, or any disposition to aggrandize itself at her expense. The fact is the very reverse.

It wishes her well, and desires to see her settled down in peace and security; and is prepared, in the event of the annexation of Texas, if not forced into conflict with her, to propose to settle with her the question of boundary, and all others growing out of the annexation, on the most liberal terms. Nature herself has clearly marked the boundary between her and Texas by natural limits too strong to be mistaken. There are few countries whose limits are so distinctly marked; and it would be our desire, if Texas should be united to us, to see them firmly established, as the most certain means of establishing permanent peace between the two countries, and strengthening and cementing their friendship. Such would be the certain consequence of permitting the annexation to take place now, with the acquiescence of Mexico; but very different would be the case if it should be attempted to resist and defeat it, whether the attempt should be successful for the present or not. Any attempt of the kind would, not improbably, lead to a conflict between us and Mexico, and involve consequences, in reference to her and the general peace, long to be deplored on all sides, and difficult to be repaired." But should that not be the case, and the interference of another power defeat the annexation for the present, without the interruption of peace, it would but postpone the conflict, and render it more fierce and bloody whenever it might occur. Its defeat would be attributed to enmity and ambition on the part of that power by whose interference it was occasioned, and excite deep jealousy and resentment on the part of our people, who would be ready to seize the first favorable opportunity to effect by force, what was prevented from being done peaceably by mutual con

sent. It is not difficult to see how greatly such a conflict, come when it might, would endanger the general peace, and how much Mexico might be the loser by it.

In the mean time, the condition of Texas would be rendered uncertain, her settlement and prosperity in consequence retarded, and her commerce crippled, while the general peace would be rendered much more insecure. It could not but greatly affect us. If the annexation of Texas should be permitted to take place peaceably now (as it would, without the interference of other powers), the energies of our people would, for a long time to come, be directed to the peaceable pursuits of redeeming, and bringing within the pale of cultivation, improvements and civilization, that large portion of the continent lying between Mexico on one side, and the British possessions on the other, which is now, with little exception, a wilderness with a sparse population, consisting, for the most part, of wandering Indian

tribes.

It is our destiny to occupy that vast region; to intersect it with roads and canals; to fill it with cities, towns, villages and farms; to extend over it our religion, customs, constitution and laws; and to present it as a' peaceful and splendid addition to the domains of commerce and civilization. It is our policy to increase, by growing and spreading out into unoccupied regions, assimilating all we incorporate: in a word, to increase by accretion, and not, through conquest, by the addition of masses held together by the cohesion of force. No system can be more unsuited to the latter process, or better adapted to the former, than our admirable federal system. If it should not be resisted in its course, it will probably fulfill its destiny without disturbing our neighbors, or putting in jeopardy the general peace; but if it be opposed by foreign interference, a new direction would be given to our energy, much less favorable to harmony with our neighbors, and to the general peace of the world.

The change would be undesirable to us, and much less in accordance with what I have assumed to be primary objects of policy on the part of France, England and Mexico.

But, to descend to particulars: it is certain that while England, like France, desires the independence of Texas, with the view to commercial connections; it is not less so, that one of the leading motives of England for desiring it, is the hope that, through her diplomacy and influence, negro slavery may be abolished there, and ultimately, by consequence, in the United States, and throughout the whole of this continent. That its ultimate abolition throughout the entire continent is an object ardently desired by her, we have decisive proof in the declaration of the Earl of Aberdeen delivered to this department, and of which you will find a copy among the documents transmitted to Congress with the Texan treaty. That she desires its abolition in Texas, and has used her influence and diplomacy to effect it there, the same document, with the correspondence of this department with Mr. Pakenham, also to be found among the documents, furnishes proof not less conclusive. That one of the objects of abolishing it there, is to facilitate its abolition in the United States, and throughout the continent, is manifest from the declaration of the abolition party and societies, both in this country and in England. In fact, there is good reason to believe that the scheme of abolishing it in Texas, with the view to its abolition in the United States and over the continent, originated with the prominent members of the party in the United States; and was first broached by them in the (so called) World's Convention, held in London in the year 1840, and through its agency brought to the notice of the British govern

ment.

Now, I hold, not only that France can have no interest in the consummation of this grand scheme, which England hopes to accomplish through Texas, if she can defeat the annexation; but that her interest, and those

of all the continental powers of Europe, are directly and deeply opposed

to it.

It is too late in the day to contend that humanity or philanthropy is the great object of the policy of England in attempting to abolish African slavery on this continent. I do not question but humanity may have been one of her leading motives for the abolition of the African slave trade, and that it may have had a considerable influence in abolishing slavery in her West India possessions-aided, indeed, by the falacious calculation that the labor of the negroes would be at least as profitable, if not more so, in consequence of the measure. She acted on the principle that tropical products can be produced cheaper by free African labor and East India labor, than by slave labor. She knew full well the value of such products to her commerce, navigation, navy, manufactures, revenue and power. She was not ignorant that the support and the maintenance of her political preponderance depended on her tropical possessions, and had no intention of diminishing their productiveness, nor any anticipation that such would be the effect when the scheme of abolishing slavery in her colonial possessions was adopted. On the contrary, she calculated to combine philanthropy with profit and power, as is not unusual with fanaticism. Experience has convinced her of the fallacy of her calculations. She has failed in all her objects. The labor of her negroes has proved far less productive, without affording the consolation of having improved their condition.

The experiment has turned out to be a costly one. She expended nearly one hundred millions of dollars in indemnifying the owners of the emancipated slaves. It is estimated that the increased price paid since, by the people of Great Britain, for sugar and other tropical productions, in consequence of the measure, is equal to half that sum; and that twice that amount has been expended in the suppression of the slave trade; making, together, two hundred and fifty millions of dollars as the cost of the experiment. Instead of realizing her hope, the result has been a sad disappointment. Her tropical products have fallen off to a vast amount. Instead of supplying her own wants and those of nearly all Europe with them, as formerly, she has now, in some of the most important articles, scarcely enough to supply her own. What is worse, her own colonies are actually consuming sugar produced by slave labor, brought direct to England, or refined in bond, and exported and sold in her colonies as cheap or cheaper than they can be produced there: while the slave trade, instead of diminishing, has been in fact carried on to a greater extent than ever. So disastrous has been the result, that her fixed capital vested in tropical possessions, estimated at the value of nearly five hundred millions of dollars, is said to stand on the brink of ruin.

But this is not the worst. While this costly scheme has had such ruinous effects on the tropical productions of Great Britain, it has given a powerful stimulus, followed by a corresponding increase of products, to those countries which have had the good sense to shun her example. There has been vested, it is estimated by them, in the production of tropical products, since 1808, in fixed capital, nearly $4,000,000,000, wholly dependent on slave labor. In the same period, the value of their products has been estimated to have risen from about $72,000,000 annually, to nearly $220,000,000; while the whole of the fixed capital of Great Britain, vested in cultivating tropical products, both in the East and West Indies, is estimated at only about $830,000,000, and the value of the products annually at about $50,000,000. To present a still more striking view of three articles of tropical products (sugar, coffee, and cotton), the British possessions, including the West and East Indies, and Mauritius, produced, in 1842, of sugar, only 3,993,771 pounds: while Cuba, Brazil and the United States, excluding other countries having tropical possessions, produced 9,600,000 pounds; of coffee, the British possessions produced only 27,393,003, while Cuba and