indeed, propitiate his favor, but we cannot calculate upon it. We can have no certain knowledge whether the wind will blow or not. If, on the other hand, it is subject to laws, like every thing else, once discover these laws, and men will predict concerning it as they predict concerning other matters. "Even the wind and rain," to use the language of one of our clearest writers, "which in common speech are the types of uncertainty and change, obey laws as fixed as those of the sun and moon; and already, as regards many parts of the earth, man can foretell them without fear of being deceived. He plans his voyages to suit the coming monsoons, and prepares against the floods of the rainy season.' If one other argument be needed, we would simply refer to the gradual and progressive improvement which has always taken place in every department of inquiry conducted upon the positive Method-and with a success in exact proportion to its rigorous employment of that Method-contrasted with the circular movement of Philosophy, which is just as far from a solution of any one of its problems as it was five thousand years ago; the only truths that it can be said to have acquired are a few psychological truths, and these it owes to the positive Method. So little has the Philosophy of Science been studied, that Comte's admirable classification of the fundamental sciences has not only been regarded as a merely ingenious speculation, but many writers have said that it was not different from other classifications which had been proposed, among which Hegel's has been mentioned. But the resemblance is only superficial. ふ A few sentences must suffice here to indicate the principle on' 27 which it is based :-The problem to be solved is the dependence of the sciences upon each other. This dependence can only result from that of the corresponding phenomena. In considering these, it is easy to class them in a small number of natural categories, so disposed that the rational study of each successive category should be founded on the knowledge of the principal

* Dr. Arnott's Elements of Physics, fifth edition, vol. i. p. 13.

laws of the preceding category. The order of their dependence is determined by the degree of simplicity or generality of the phenomena. It is evident that the most simple phenomena— those which are least mixed up with others-are the most general; for that which is observed in the greatest number of circumstances is the most independent of the various particulars of those circumstances. The principle therefore to be adopted is this we must commence with the study of the most simple or general phenomena, and proceed successively to the most complex and particular.

A distinction is to be made between the two classes of phenomena which are manifested by inorganized bodies and by organized bodies. The phenomena of the latter are obviously more complex than those of the former: they greatly depend upon inorganized bodies, while these in no way depend upon organized bodies. Organized bodies manifest all the phenomena of the inorganized, whether chemical or mechanical; but they also manifest the phenomena named vital, which are never manifested by と inorganized bodies.

In the study of inorganic Physics we commence by separating the general phenomena of the universe from the less general terrestrial phenomena. Thus we have, first, celestial Physics, or Astronomy, whether geometrical or mechanical; secondly, terrestrial Physics. The phenomena of Astronomy being the most general, the most simple, and the most abstract of all, we must begin our study with them. Their laws influence all other terrestrial phenomena, of which they are essentially independent. In all terrestrial Physics universal gravitation is a condition; and so the simple movement of the body, if we would consider all the determining conditions, is a subject of greater complexity than any astronomical question.

Terrestrial Physics is also divided into two classes: Physics and Chemistry. Chemistry, rightly conceived, presupposes a knowledge of Physics: for all chemical phenomena are more complex than those of Physics, and depend on them in great part:

whereas they have no influence on physical phenomena. All chemical action is subject to the influence of weight, heat, etc., and must therefore be treated after them.

Organic Physics requires a similar division into Biology and Sociology. The phenomena relating to mankind are obviously more complex than those relating to the individual man, and depend upon them. In all social questions we see in operation. the physiological laws of man; and we see also something peculiar, not physiological, which modifies the effects of these laws, and which results from the action of individuals on each other, curiously complicated by the action of each generation on its successor. It would be manifestly as impossible to treat the study of the collective species as a pure deduction from the study of the individual, as it would be to treat Physiology as a pure deduction from Chemistry.

The Positive Philosophy therefore resolves itself into five fundamental sciences, of which the succession is determined by at necessary and invariable subordination founded on a comparison of corresponding phenomena. The first (Astronomy) considers the most general, simple, and abstract phenomena-those farthest removed from humanity: they influence all others, but are not influenced by them. The last (Sociology) considers the most particular, complex, and concrete phenomena-those most directly interesting to man: they depend more or less upon all the preceding classes, without exercising on the latter the slightest influence. Between these two extremes the degrees of speciality and of complication of phenomena gradually augment according to their successive independence.

The foundation of a comprehensive Method is the great achievement of Comte, as it was of Bacon, and the influence he has exercised, and must continue to exercise, will be almost exclusively in that direction. Over his subsequent efforts to found a social doctrine, and to become the founder of a new religion, let us draw the veil. They are unfortunate attempts which remind us of Bacon's scientific investigations; and, in the minds of

7

Begin

many, these unfortunate attempts will create a prejudice against what is truly grand in his philosophic career. In the Cours de Philosophie Positive we have the grandest, because on the whole the truest, system which Philosophy has yet produced; nor should any differences, which must inevitably arise on points of detail, make us forget the greatness of the achievement and the debt we owe to the lonely thinker who wrought out this system.

CONCLUSION.

MODERN Philosophy opens with a Method; and ends with a Method; and in each case this method leads to positive Science, and sets Metaphysics aside. Within these limits we have witnessed various efforts to solve the problems of Philosophy; and all those efforts have ended in skepticism.

There are two characteristics of Modern Philosophy which may here be briefly touched on. The first is the progressive development of Science, which in ancient speculations occupied the subordinate rank, and which now occupies the highest. The second is the reproduction in Philosophy of all the questions which agitated the Greeks, which also pass through a similar course of development: not only are the questions similar, but their evolutions are so.

After the Eleatics had vexed the problems of Existence to no purpose, there came Democritus, Anaxagoras, Plato, and Aristotle, who endeavored to settle the problems of the nature and origin of human knowledge. So, in modern times, after Descartes and Spinoza, came Hobbes, Locke, Leibnitz, Reid, and Kant. The ancient researches into the origin of knowledge ended in the Skeptics, the Stoics, and the New Academy: that is to say, in Skepticism, Common Sense, and Skepticism again. The modern researches ended in Berkeley, Hume, Reid, and Kant: that is, in Idealism, Skepticism, Common Sense, and

Skepticism again. These inquiries terminating thus fruitlessly, a new and desperate spring was made in Alexandria: reason was given up for ecstasy; Philosophy merged itself in Religion. In Germany a similar spectacle presents itself: Schelling identified Philosophy with Religion. Thus has Philosophy completed its circle, and we are left in this nineteenth century precisely at the same point at which we were in the fifth.

Observe, however-and the fact is full of significance-how, in the course of speculation, those questions which were susceptible of positive treatment, gradually acquired strength and development. If we are as far removed from a solution of any ontological problem as we were in the days of Proclus, we are not nearly so ignorant of the laws of mental operation. Psychology is not a mature science yet; but it boasts of some indisputable truths. Although much remains to do, much also has been done; and whatever be the ultimate results of the new Method, it is satisfactory to feel that we have at least escaped from the vicious circle of verbal quibbling and logomachy, and are advancing on a straight road, every step bringing us nearer to positive knowledge, every addition being that of inalienable truth.

Modern philosophy staked its pretensions on the one question: Have we any ideas independent of experience? This was asking, in other words, Have we any organon of Philosophy?

The answer always ends in a negative. If any one, therefore, remain unshaken by the accumulated proofs this History affords of the impossibility of Philosophy, let him distinctly bear in mind that the first problem he must solve is, Have we ideas independent of experience? Let him solve that ere he begins to speculate.

THE END.