surpass them in their composition. Not only were their views far less enlarged, which was the necessary consequence of their more confined knowledge, but they gave much less information to their audience in point of fact, and they applied themselves less strenuously to argument. The assemblies of modern times are eminently places of business; the hearers are met to consider of certain practical questions, and not to have their fancy charmed with choice figures, or their taste gratified with exquisite diction, or their ears tickled with harmonious numbers. They must, therefore, be convinced; their reason must be addressed by statements which shall prove that the thing propounded is just or expedient, or that it is iniquitous or impolitic. No far-fetched allusions, or vague talk, or pretty conceits, will supply the place of the one thing needful, argument and information. Whatever is beside the question, how gracefully soever it may be said, will only weary the hearer and provoke his impatience; nay, if it be very fine and very far-fetched, will excite his merriment and cover the speaker with ridicule. Ornament of every kind, all manner of embellishment, must be kept within its subordinate bounds, and made subservient merely to the main business. It is certain that no perfection of execution, no beauty of workmanship, can make up for the cardinal defect of the material being out of its place, that is, indifferent to the question; and one of the most exquisitely composed of Cicero's orations, the one for Archias, could clearly never have been delivered in any English court of justice, where the party was upon his defence against an attempt to treat him as an alien; though, perhaps, some of it might have been urged in favor of a relaxation of the law, after his alienage had been proved, and the whole of it might have been relished by a meeting assembled to do him honor."

Now, as far as Cicero is concerned, and especially the speech for Archias, there is some truth in the objection -though it is but fair to remind the reader that the Roman orator begins by advertising his audience that he intends to deviate for once from the beaten forensic track. But did Lord Brougham never hear Sheridan speak? and would he have us believe that he was not listened to with pleasure by the House? or that he was a man to sacrifice style, and point, and imagery, to dry reasoning and solid information? We have it on excellent authority, for Lord Brougham at least, on his present utilitarian tack, that Sheridan's famous speech on the impeachment of Hastings was excessively rhetorical and declamatory, as might be expected from the character of his mind, and that he showed more wisdom in suppressing than in making it. Yet it had its merits, no doubt, for the occasion, for it succeeded better, perhaps, than the best harangue of Mr. Fox, who himself, though a debater

and nothing but a debater, was so little intent on informing his audience that he professed not to be able to comprehend the problems of political economy! As to Lord Brougham's description of the sort of speech necessary to please a modern assembly, (by which he must be always understood to mean the House of Commons, for it is evident that very different things have had influence with other assemblies, as for instance the French Convention,) it is not an adequate, to be sure, but it is, as far as it goes, a very accurate description of a Greek business speech, as we shall see. And if Demosthenes is the Prince of orators, as he unquestionably is, it is because coming up to that description in everything required by the most severe taste, he adds to it everything necessary to raise the language of truth and reason into that of eloquence and inspiration. Lord Brougham's so-called modern eloquence is no eloquence at all, but only sensible speaking: Demosthenes' speaking was not a jot less sensible than that of Sir Robert Peel or Lord Lyndhurst, but at the same time infinitely more powerful, persuasive, and sublime. But this Lord Brougham denies.

His second objectionable proposition is, that it is all a mistake to speak of the great orator as a reasoner, for that although he did something marvellously like it, and seemed bent on doing nothing else, yet that in fact, when passed through his lordship's crucible, it is found to be just no reasoning at all.

"It is a common thing with those who, because Cicero is more ornate, suffers the artifice of his composition to appear more plainly, and indulges more in amplification, imagine that he is less argumentative than the Greek orators, to represent the latter, and especially Demosthenes, as distinguished by great closeness of reasoning. If by this is only meant that he never wanders from the subject, that each remark tells upon the matter in hand, that all his illustrations are brought to bear upon the point, and that he is never found making any step in any direction which does not advance his main object, and lead towards the conclusion to which he is striving to bring his hearers-the observation is perfectly just; for this is a distinguishing feature in the character of his eloquence. It is not, indeed, his grand excellence, because everything depends upon the manner in which he pursues this course, the course itself being one quite as open to the humblest mediocrity as to the highest genius. But if it is meant to be said, that those Attic orators, and especially their great chief, made speeches in which long chains of elaborate reasoning are to be found—nothing can be less like the truth. A variety

of topics are handled in succession, all calculated to strike the audience.

-

"Passions, which predominated in their minds, are appealed to feelings, easily excited among them, are aroused by skilful allusions glaring inconsistencies are shown in the advice given to others—sometimes by exhibiting the repugnance of those counsels among themselves, sometimes by contrasting them with other counsels proceeding from the same quarters. The pernicious tendency of certain measures is displayed by referring, sometimes to the general principles of human action, and the course which human affairs usually take; more frequently, by a reference to the history of past, and generally of very recent events. Much invective is mixed with these topics, and both the enemy without, and the evil counsellor within the walls, are very unsparingly dealt with. The orator was addressing hearers who were, for the most part, as intimately acquainted as himself with all the facts of the case, and these lay within a sufficiently narrow compass, being the actual state of public affairs, and the victories or the defeats which had, within the memory of all, attended their arms, or the transactions which had taken place among them in very recent times. No detailed statements were, therefore, wanted for their information. He was really speaking to them respecting their own affairs, or rather, respecting what they had just been doing or witnessing themselves. Hence, a very short allusion alone was generally required to raise the idea which he desired to present before the audience. Sometimes a word was enough for his purpose; the naming of a man or a town; the calling to their recollection what had been done by the one, or had happened to the other. The effect produced by such a rapid interchange of ideas and impressions, must have struck every one who has been present at public meetings. He will have remarked, that some such apt allusion has a power-produces an electrical effectnot to be reached by any chain of reasoning, however close; and that even the most highly-wrought passages, and the most exquisite composition, fall far short of it in rousing or controlling the minds of a large assembly. Chains of reasoning, examples of fine argumentation, are calculated to produce their effect upon a far nicer, a more confined, and a more select audience. But such apposite allusions-such appropriate topics such happy hits, (to use a homely, but expressive phrase,) have a sure, an irresistible, a magical effect upon a popular assembly. In these the Greek oratory abounds, and above all, its greatest master abounds in them more than all the lesser rhetoricians. They would have been highly successful without the charms of composition, but he also clothes them in the most choice language, arranges them in the most perfect order, and captivates the ear with a music which is fitted at his will to provoke or to soothe, but ever to charm the sense, even were it possible for it to be addressed apart, without the mind, too, being moved.

"Let any one examine the kind of topics upon which those orators dwell, and he will be convinced that close reasoning was not their object that they were adapting their discourse to the nature of their audience- and that, indeed, not a few of their topics were such as they would hardly have thought of using, had they been arguing the matter stringently with an antagonist, 'hand to hand, and foot to foot;' or, which is the same thing, preparing a demonstration to meet the eye of an unexcited reader. It is certain that some of Demosthenes' chief topics are exactly those which he would use to convince the calm reason of the most undisturbed listener or reader-such as the dangers of inaction- the formidable, because able and venturous, enemy they had to contend with the certainty of the peril which is met by procrastination becoming greater after the unprofitable delay. These, however, are the most obvious considerations, and on these he dwells the less, because of their being so obvious. But the more striking allusions and illustrations by which he enforces them, are not always such as would bear close examination, if considered as arguments, although they are always such as must, in the popular assembly to which he addressed them, have wrought a wondrous effect."

- pp. 431-433.

Now, as to a speech being good in form or execution, which is good for nothing in substance, we profess ourselves unable to comprehend such a thing. It smells of the rhetorician's art which is mere pedantry, and never did and never will contribute in the slightest degree to make any man really eloquent. We do not think this language of his lordship a jot less absurd, though somewhat less ludicrous, than an idea quoted, we think, by Blair, from the Père Rapin, that Cicero must needs be a better speaker than Demosthenes, because he had seen and studied Aristotle's Rhetoric, whereas the Greek orator had actually delivered and published his master-pieces before that work saw the light! We are firm believers in matter, or, which is the same thing here, in mind. Our experience-and it has been, we suspect, on this point, very much more extensive and diversified than Lord Brougham's-is conclusive that in any assembly met to discuss and do business, the speaker who really knows more about the matter in hand than anybody else, and is at all in earnest about it, will be sure to lead, in spite of every disadvantage in style and delivery. We know it is so in the House of Representatives at Washington, for example-a body, of which, for many reasons, it is so difficult to command the attention, that we have heard intelligent foreigners inquire whether it ever listened at all. Yes, it

does listen; and it listens to any one who has information to communicate on a subject interesting to it, and will do so with anything approaching to brevity. It listens always to gentlemen who have established a reputation for speaking only to inform others, and to illustrate the question before the House. And so it is, we repeat, and so it has been, and so it ever will be with every assembly, rude or cultivated; in every country, barbarous or civilized, convened for such purposes as war and peace, legislation and judicature. It is only under very peculiar circumstances, in moments, for example, of intense revolutionary excitement, when all argument is out of the question, that a mere declaimer can aspire to any decided influence. Here, as in the sister art,

"get wisdom

"Sapere est et principium et fons,"

-get understanding" —

"Verbaque provisam rem non invita sequentur;"

or, as Milton quaintly but forcibly expresses it: "Whose mind soever is fully possessed with a fervent desire to know good things, and with the dearest charity to infuse the knowledge of them into others; when such a man would speak, his words, (by what I can express,) like so many nimble and airy servitors trip about him at command, and in wellordered files, as he would wish, fall aptly into their places."* And not only does he command language, but he infallibly

commands attention.

The idea that all this, though perfectly true in modern times, is inapplicable to antiquity, is preposterous. If Lord Brougham really thinks so, he is the first person of any note we have ever heard of, who would profit by that learned dissertation mentioned in Gil Blas, to prove that at Athens, little boys cried when they were flogged by their schoolmasters, just as they do at Oviedo or Salamanca. Let any one read the life of Demosthenes, and consider under what circumstances, and in the face of what an opposition it was that he maintained for a generation together, such a decided ascendant in that fierce democracy, and he will see at once the absurdity of ascribing his wonderful success to the art

* An Apology for Smectymnus.