"The Toulon fleet, in 1798, consisting of about twenty sail of line-of-battle ships and frigates, about twenty smaller vessels of war, and nearly two hundred transports, conveying the army of Egypt, slipped out of port and surprised Malta. It was followed by Nelson, who, thinking correctly that they were bound for Egypt, shaped his course direct for Alexandria. The French, steering towards Candia, took the more circuitous passage, so that Nelson arrived at Alexandria before them; and, not finding them there, returned by way of Caramania, and Candia, to Sicily, missing his adversary on both passages. Sailing again for Alexandria, he found the French fleet at anchor in Aboukir bay, and, attacking them, achieved the memorable victory of the Nile.

"When we consider the narrowness of this sea; the numerous vessels in the French fleet; the actual crossing of the two fleets on a certain night; and that Nelson, notwithstanding, could see nothing of the enemy himself, and hear nothing of them from merchant. vessels, we may judge of the probability of waylaying our adversary on the broad Atlantic.

"The escape of another Toulon fleet in 1805; the long search for them in the Mediterranean by the same able officer; the pursuit in the West Indies; the evasion of him amongst the islands; the return to Europe; his vain efforts subsequently along the coast of Portugal, in the Bay of Biscay, and off the English channel; and the meeting at last at Trafalgar-brought about only because the combined fleets, trusting to the superiority that the accession of several reinforcements had given, were willing to try the issue of a battle-these are instances of many that might be cited to show how small is the probability of encountering, on the ocean, an enemy who desires to avoid a meeting; and how little the most untiring zeal, the most restless activity, the most exalted professional skill and judgment, can do to lessen the adverse chances."

On the proposition that our ships remain at home for the purpose of guarding the coast, the report goes on to say,

that

"Instead of lying in harbor, and contenting themselves with keeping a few more of the enemy's vessels in watch over them than their own number-instead of leaving the enemy's commerce in undisturbed enjoyment of the sea, and our commerce without countenance or aid-they scattered themselves over the wide surface of the ocean, penetrated to the most remote seas, every where acting with the most brilliant success against the enemy's navigation. And we believe, moreover, that in the amount of enemy's property thus destroyed, of American property protected or discovered, and in the number of hostile ships kept in pursuit of our scattered vessels-ships, evaded, if superior, and beaten, if equalthey rendered benefits a thousand fold greater, to say nothing for

the glory they acquired for the nation, and the character they imparted to it, than any that would have resulted from a state of passiveness within the harbors.

"Confident that this is the true policy as regards the employment of the navy proper, we doubt not that it will, in the future, be acted upon as it has been in the past; and that the results, as regards both honor and advantage, will be expanded commensurately with its own enlargement.

"In order, however, that the navy may assume and maintain that active and energetic deportment in offensive operations, which is at the same time so consistent with its functions, and so consonant with its spirit, we have shown that it must not be occupied with mere coast defence."

But, it is said by some, that we could have a very proper substitute for this service in gunboats, floating batteries, and steam ships, without resorting to fortifications, which are mere relics of a barbarous age, which have altogether been left behind by the rail-road velocity with which military science is now progressing. But before implicitly putting our whole reliance upon these as a national defence, it will be well to look at the results of the trials of power that have been made between guns afloat, and guns on shore. The following are the most important ones that have taken place within the last half century.

In 1794, a Martello tower, armed with one heavy gun only, beat off one or two British ships of war, without sustaining any material injury from their fire. (Pasley's Course, vol. iii.)

On Cape Licosa, in the year 1806, a barbette battery of two guns beat off a British eighty gun ship and two frigates. The carriage of one of these land-guns failed on the second shot, so that, in fact, only one of them was available during the action.

In these two cases, one gun upon land proved more than equivalent to fifty guns afloat, and this, too, according to the estimates of the vanquished party. (Jones' Journal of Sieges.)

In 1782, the land batteries of Gibraltar, mounting eightyfive guns, were attacked by floating batteries that mounted one hundred and forty-two guns on the engaged side, with seventy in reserve to replace any that might be dismounted. Every precaution was taken to make them shell proof, by giving an additional thickness to the sides, and covering the decks with roofs of sloping timbers. Nevertheless, they

were entirely destroyed, while the works on shore received no material injury.

At the battle of Algeziras, in 1801, if we suppose the same number of English and French guns afloat to have been equivalent, (which certainly is a fair estimate for the English, considering the circumstances of the case,) we shall have one hundred and ninety-six English guns afloat, opposed by twelve French guns in battery. Nevertheless, the former were most signally and completely discomfited.

In 1836, six armed steamers, and two gunboats, attacked Fuenterabia, which was defended by only one large and two small guns. Here, a water force of more than ten to one on land, completely failed in their attack. (United Service Journal, August, 1836.)

In 1776, a fleet of two hundred and seventy guns attacked Fort Moultrie, Charleston harbor, which mounted only twenty-six guns. In this contest the British were entirely defeated, and lost, in killed and wounded, more than seventy men to every ten guns that were brought against them; while their whole two hundred and seventy guns killed and wounded only thirty-two men in the fort. (Holmes' Annals.)

In 1814, a British fleet, consisting of two ships, carrying from twenty-four to twenty-eight guns each, and two brigs, one mounting eighteen guns, the force of the other not known, attacked Fort Boyer, Mobile bay, which was a small, inefficient work, but very slightly armed. The enemy was completely repulsed; one of his ships was entirely destroyed, and eighty-five men were killed and wounded on board the other. Our loss was only nine in killed and wounded. (General Jackson's Despatches, dated the seventeenth of September, 1814.)

At Stonington, in the last war, a barbette battery of one four-pounder, and two eighteen-pounder guns, repelled a British fleet of one hundred and thirty-four guns. During the engagement the Americans exhausted their ammunition and spiked their eighteen-pounders, and only one of them was afterwards used. Two of the enemy's ships, one hundred and twelve guns, were engaged during the whole time of attack, and during much of this time bombarded the town from a position beyond reach of the land battery. They were entirely too far off for the four-pounder to be of any use. Supposing the two eighteen-pounders to have been employed during the whole action, and also all the guns of

the fleet, one eighteen-pounder on land must have been more than equivalent to sixty-seven guns afloat, for the ships were so much injured as to render it necessary for them to withdraw. The British loss was twenty killed, and more than fifty wounded. Ours was only two killed and six wounded. (Perkins' War.)

M. Thiroux, in his Instruction Théorique et Pratique d'Artillerie, gives it as the opinion of artillerists generally, that one gun on shore is equal to twenty-five afloat; in other words, he says, that a land-battery of four twenty-four or sixteen-pounder guns, ought to beat off any vessel of one hundred guns. In some of the examples we have here adduced, the ratio has been more than double this, and still, with this striking inequality of more than fifty to one, the land guns have most successfully repelled the attacks that have been made on them.

Indeed we know of only two instances in history where a floating force, however superior in numbers, has been able to cope with a land battery. These are, the capture of the castle of San Juan d'Ulloa, by the French, in 1838, and the reduction of the fortress of Acre, in 1840. Ignorant and superficial persons, hearing merely that these forts had yielded to a naval force, and taking no trouble to inform themselves of the facts of the cases, have paraded them before the public as proofs positive of the superiority of guns afloat over those on shore, and as the first indications of a new era in military science. This conclusion, however groundless and absurd, has received much credit in this country. The American people are easily attracted by whatever is new and plausible. No other nation was ever more easily carried away with novelty. Old theories and established principles are regarded so much the less from their antiquity, and the proofs and arguments which time has thrown around them. Hence the favor which plans and theories of national defence have received by us, merely from their novelty, without once stopping to inquire into the efficacy or propriety of them. If it were true that the results of these two sieges gave a decided superiority to guns afloat over those on shore, would they justify us in changing the whole system of modern defensive warfare, while the results of all history have been just the opposite? Should we not distrust them from the very fact of their being exceptions to rules so well established by a long train of historical proofs? But we are

not required to draw this conclusion. The sieges above alluded to are no exceptions to the general rules. When rightly understood it will be seen that they have no tendency to change the estimated value of the two kinds of force.

The following facts relative to the attack upon the castle of San Juan d'Ulloa, are drawn principally from the report of a French engineer officer who was one of the expedition. When the plan of attack was formed, all the French vessels were towed into their position by two armed steamboats belonging to the squadron. "It was lucky for us," says the reporter," that the Mexicans did not disturb this operation, which lasted nearly two hours, and that they permitted us to commence the fire." "We were exposed to the fire of one twenty-four-pounder, five sixteen-pounders, seven twelvepounders, one eight-pounder, and five eighteen-pounder carronades; in all nineteen pieces only." If these be converted into twenty-four-pounders, in proportion to the weight of balls, the whole nineteen guns will be less than twelve twentyfour-pounders. And this estimate is too great by full one third, as it allows three eight-pounders to be equal to one twenty-four pounder, and each of the eighteen-pounder carronades to be three-fourths the power of a long twentyfour-pounder, whereas, at the distance at which the parties were engaged, these small pieces were nearly harmless. The French force consisted of four frigates, one hundred and eighty-eight guns, and two bomb-ketches, each carrying two heavy sea-mortars. During the action two of the powder magazines were blown up, by which three of the nineteen guns on the water front of the castle were dismounted, thus reducing the land force to less than an equivalent of ten twenty-four-pounders. If we estimate for only one broadside of each ship, we have opposed to this number, a floating force of ninety-four guns and four sea-mortars. principal damage in the castle was, in all probability, occasioned by these mortars. Not one of the magazines were bomb-proof.

The

From the above-mentioned report we learn, that the French were opposed by an equivalent of only about one gun to nine; that the Mexican guns were generally so inefficient that their balls did not pass through the sides of the attacking frigates; that the principal injury sustained by the castle was produced by the explosion of powder magazines, which were injudiciously placed, and improperly secured;