FERRIES. 1. The owner of a ferry rented to another, not liable in action for damages for loss in crossing the ferry-statute 1820. Ladd v. Chotard, A. R. 366. 2. The lessee of a ferry is the person liable to the penalty of $10, imposed by statute of 1820, for neglect. Taylor v. Rushing, 2 S. 160. 3. But when a person is employed on shares, and for an indefinite time, though he has the exclusive control and management during his employment, is to be considered as a servant and not a lessee, and the owner is liable. Ibid. 4. G, having a public ferry established by law, M & S built a bridge near it without authority from the County Court, and suffered all persons to pass free of toll, whereby the profits of the ferry were lost: held that it was a violation of the rights of G, and that Chancery would restrain the use of it, except for their own families. Gates v. McDaniel & Spurlin, 2 S. 211. 5. Declaration against keeper of a ferry, in an action on his bond to the judge of the County Court, setting out the bond and assigning as a breach —that the keeper had not provided good and sufficient boats, nor done and performed generally what was required by law-is uncertain and insufficient. Judge of Wilcox County Court v. Pharr, 4 S. & P. 333. Ibid. 6, Whether an action can be maintained on the bond-quere. 7. The keeper or owner of a public ferry, is bound to transport goods across the stream after night, and a failure so to do, will subject him to an action under the statute, without a suit upon the bond. Pate v. Henry, 5 S, & P. 101. 8. But it seems, that in such actions, defendant may show the prevalence of high winds rendering it dangerous; or, that the application was after usual bed time, and that the residence was at some distance from the ferry. Ibid. 9. The authority granted to the Court of Commissioners of Roads, &c. to establish ferries, must be exercised with reference to public benefit and private injury. The court has no authority to decide that the title to the land on which the ferry is sought to be established is illegal. Cox v. Easter, 1 P. 130. 10. One who crosses a river at a ferry, in a boat not belonging to the owner of the ferry, and who lands by stepping from the ferryman's boat, is not liable in an action to recover the rate of ferriage allowed by law; however he would be responsible for the invasion of plaintiff's franchise. Henry v. Turner, 2 P. 23. 11. The establishment, by the Legislature, of a bridge near a town for public convenience, is no invasion of the vested rights of a ferry-keeper, under license from the County Court, though within two miles; and, a loss thus sustained by him, does not entitle him to compensation, as property subjected to public use. Dyer v. Tuscaloosa Bridge Company, 2 P. 296. 12. No appeal or writ of error lies on the decision of the Commissioners of Roads and Revenue, establishing a ferry. Ricks v. Hall, 4 P. 179. 13. It is no objection to the bond of a ferry owner, (given under the statute) that he is required to keep good and sufficient boat or boats-instead of a good and sufficient boat or boats, the legal effect being the same: nor does the following increase his duties or enlarge his statutory liabilities, "to do and perform generally all matters and things required by the laws of the State in such case made and provided to be done and performed by keeper of public ferries—for and during the time he may keep a public ferry." Botts et al. v. Bridges, Judge, 4 P. 274. 14. Negligence whereby a loss has accrued, is a proper assignment of breach, under that part of the statute bond, which requires the ferry to be well attended. Ibid. 15. Debt against keeper of ferry upon his bond, judgment for damages only-is good. Ibid. FIXTURES. and 1. A gin house, the running gear thereof and a packing screw are fixtures, pass with the freehold. McDaniel v. Moody 3 S. 314. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER. 1. Tenant at will, may maintain the action. McDonald v. Gayle, A. R. 98. 2. The trial in the Circuit Court is not de novo, but on the record sent up by the justice. Aldridge v. Hightower, 4 P. 418. Dunham v. Carter & Carroll, 2 S. 496. 3. To sustain forcible entry and detainer, it must be shewn that the party complaining had actual possession, Childress v. McGehee, A. R. 131. 4. On certiorari, it is matter of discretion, to require bond and security, and court may order new bond to be taken. Ibid. Ward v. Lewis, 1 S, 26. ( 5. The justice is not required to record the whole of the evidence. Ward v. Lewis, 1 S. 26. } Payne v. Martin, 1 S. 407. 6. Averment of the boundaries of the premises which plaintiff claims in fee simple, and that he was in possession and forcibly turned out by defendant-sufficient, without averring that he was seized of the premises. Ward v. Lewis, 1 S. 26. 7. Since the act of 1823, the venire and other process, may be served by a constable. Ibid. 8. It is not necessary that the jury should sign the verdict, or that it should appear that the complaint was read to them. Ibid. 9. Jurisdiction of justices of the peace in forcible entry and detainer, is constitutional, Ibid. 10. The complaint was for an unlawful entry and for a forcible and unlawful detainer. The summons is to answer for a forcible entry and detainer -variance cured by plea to merits. Grice v. Ferguson, 1 S. 36. 11. In proceedings for forcible entry and detainer, notice for delivery of possession not necessary. Ibid. 12. By the statute an unlawful detainer, and a forcible detainer, are distinct, and therefore upon complaint of a forcible entry and detainer, verdict guilty of "unlawful detainer" does not respond to the issue. Ibid. 13. In a record of unlawful detainer, the justice is not required to state all the evidence given, but only such as is objected to, and the proper proof will be presumed to have been made to support the verdict unless the contrary be shewn. Payne v. Martin, 1 S. 407. Lecatt v. Stewart, 2 S. 474.} 14. The complaint was for unlawful detainer-verdict guilty. The magistrate enters judgment for a forcible and unlawful detainer;-the word forcible, will be regarded merely as surplusage. Ibid. 15. In an action for "forcible detainer," it is not necessary to alledge in the complaint that defendant "entered" the premises. Lecatt v. Stewart. 2 S. 474. 16. To charge that the plaintiff has a "freehold in fee simple," is a sufficient statement of his "estate" in the premises. Ibid. 17. To establish possession the plaintiff may prove a tenancy under him, and possession by his tenant. Ibid. 18. In such actions title cannot be investigated, and need not be proved, the question is as to possession only. Ibid. 19. The county court has no jurisdiction by certiorari or appeal in cases of forcible entry and detainer. Dunham v. Carter & Carrol, 2 S. 496. 20. In cases of forcible entry and detainer brought up by certiorari, the trial must be on the errors assigned, and not on a re-investigation of matters of fact. 1bid. Perryman v. Burgster, 6 P.99. 21. The complaint of a party for forcible entry and detainer must show that the plaintiff had been in possession-this mode of redress is favored by the courts. Wright v. Mullen, 2 S. & P. 219. 22. The word occupancy, does not necessarily embrace possession. 1bid. 23. Mere right of possession, arising from the right of property, is not sufficient to authorize a recovery under the summary remedy, for forcible entry and detainer, or for forcible and unlawful detainer. Singleton v. Finley, 1 P. 144. 24. The claim of a party in this proceeding must show that he has by himself or tenant enjoyed the actual possession of the premises within three years, mentioned by the statute. Ibid. 25. Complainant need not specify the land by statutory demarkations, of section, township, and range: any description by metes and bounds and objects of neighborhood notoriety, is sufficient. Mead v. Daniel, et al. 2 P. 86. 26. It is not necessary for the justice to record and certify all the evidence before him, but only such as is admitted after objection, or rejected when offered. Ibid. 27. An unexpired term of years is a sufficient estate to support this proceeding. Ibid. 28. In proceedings before justice of the peace, in forcible entry and detainer, a party is entitled to the peremptory challange of a juror, as in civil cases, Johnson & Wash v. Christian & Goyne, 2 P. 201. 29. In a proceeding for an unlawful detainer by A, for the use of B; a demand by B in his own name, is not evidence of the demand required by the jury. Kennedy v. Hitchcock, 4 P. 230. 30. The justice, before whom such proceedings are had, has no right to enter upon his minutes, other evidence than such as is made the ground of exceptions. Aldrige v. Hightower, 4 P. 418. 31. Such proceedings when removed to an Appellate Court, must be tried upon an assignment of error; and, when there is none, the judgment will be affirmed. Such proceedings are to be tried upon transcript, and not by an investigation of matter of fact. Ibid. Perryman v. Burgster, 6. P, 99. 32. So, if proceedings commenced before justice of the peace, are removed to the Circuit Court, and from thence, into the Supreme Court, and the record shows no assignment of error in the circuit court, and only such are assigned here as arise upon the record of proceeding before the justice-the judgment will be affirmed. Ibid. 33. It is no available objection in a case of forcible entry and detainer, brought up from a justice by certiorari, that the process was issued by one justice and the case tried by another their powers are coextensive. Perryman v. Burgster, 6 P. 99. 34. Transcripts in such cases cannot be amended in the circuit court upon motion sustained by affidavits, shewing the neglect of the justice to record fully the matters accruing on the trial;—but when the justice has omitted to perfect the record, the correct practice is to move for a rule against him to show cause; and if cause be insufficient, a mandamus should be awarded. 1bid. 35. A paper purporting to be a transcript as a return to a certiorari, should not be received unless it be certified by the the justice and returned with the writ. Ibid. 36. The complaint describes the boundaries of the premises, that plaintiff claims by virtue of a fee simple, and says he was in possession-that defendant entered with force and turned him out of possession. This sufficiently specifies the lands, plaintiff's estate therein, and the injury. Ward v. Lewis, 1 S. 26. 37. Whether in such proceeding justice has the discretionary power of granting new trial on merits-quere. Barr v. White 2 P. 342. 38. When after judgment for defendant on unlawful detainer, a justice after three days consideration, granted a new trial to plaintiff, and gave a new judgment; without notice to defendant-held to be error. See Indians and Indian Lands-New Trial. Ibid. FOREIGN LAWS, JUDGMENTS OF A SISTER STATE AND JUDICIAL PROceedings. 1. In debt on record of judgment from another State-payment and accord and satisfaction are good pleas. Hardwick v. King, 1 S. 312. 2. Under the issue of "nul tiel record," if a duly certified exemplification is produced of a judgment, valid in the State where rendered, though not founded on personal service-judgment must be given for plaintiff. Hunt & Condry v. Mayfield, 2 S. 124. 3. In such action, nul tiel record is the only general issue, but not the only plea. Ibid. 4. A plea that the judgment was entered fraudulently, by a combination of the clerk with the plaintiff-bad on demurrer, Ibid. 5. Judgment obtained in a sister State, where the court there had no jurisdiction over the person, is not binding here and affords a good plea at law, and therefore equity will not relieve against a recovery at law. Lucas v. Bank, Darien, 2 S. 280. 6. A judgment on original attachment in a sister State is prima facie evidence of debt here, though without personal service. Miller v. Pennington, 2 S. 399. Bigger adm'tx. v. Hutchings & Smith, adm'rs. 2 S. 445. ) } 7. But such judgment may be impeached by plea, shewing that defendant constantly resided here, and had no notice of the suit. Ibid. 8. Decrees in chancery from other States are embraced within the spirit and meaning of the constitutional provisions, giving the same effect to a judgment of a sister State, in other States, which it had in its own. Green v. Foley, 2 S. & P. 441. 9. A plea to an action of debt on a judgment of a justice of the peace in another State, "that the plaintiff and defendant were citizens of this State when the judgment was rendered by the justice," (the cause of action being ex contractu) is bad. McGee & Richardson v. Sheffield, 3 S. & P. 351. 10. In a suit upon such a judgment, parol evidence is admissible to show that the individual purporting to have rendered the judgment was a justice of the peace.-semble. Ibid. 11. This court will not presume that justices courts are courts of record in sister States, and will admit in evidence sworn copies of the proceedings in a suit before them, in the absence of proof that such State has provided by law any particular mode of proof. Ibid. 12. When the record of a judgment rendered in another State was in the ́ following words, "for the sum of two hundred and twenty dollars which may be discharged by the payment of one hundred anefraud Creit was held that debt was the proper action for thur, Statute. and that in an action to recover the amount on th to declare for the conditional sum of one h still liable for fraudulent 13. A judgment of a sister State of defence. It is on the same. repre Harton v. Watt, adm. A. R. 166. , he cannot under plea of fraud, avoid the The matters determined for the purchase money. is the judgment liable t Christian v. Scott, A. R. 353. |