seeks to redress is authorized by legislative act. That hypothesis failing, the defendant cannot be charged. Whitted v. Governor, 6 P. 335. 8. By the act of 1834, the legislature have prescribed a warrant to guide the courts in providing for a definite amenability to a judgment, and where that warrant has not been followed and to the extent to which it is departed from, the act of a court is void. Ibid.

See Scire Facias-Costs.

REGISTRATION.

1. A purchased at sheriff's sale without notice, of a slave, previously conveyed by deed of trust. The deed had not been recorded in the manner required by statute of frauds; but after the sale and before the expiration of twelve months the trustees sold the property and executed the trust-held, that the necessity of registry in such case is dispensed with, the term of twelve months allowed for registration not having expired—and that the adverse possession under sheriff's sale, did not prevent the trustees from executing the trust. Echols v. Derrick, 2 S. 144.

2. Registration not necessary to a conveyance of lands as to creditors, if made bona fide and for a valuable consideration, and such deed is also good against a purchaser at sheriff's sale, who has notice.

Avent v. Read, 2 S. 488. 3. Mere equitable title not necessary to be recorded, either as to creditors or subsequent purchasers. Morgan et al. v. Morgan et al. 3 S. 383.

4. Possession by the purchaser of land is deemed an act equivalent to registration, and should put every person upon enquiry as to the title.

Ibid.

5. The statute of 1828, requiring the recording within thirty days of all deeds and conveyances of personal property, embraces within its spirit mortgages of personal property.

McGregor & Darling v. Hill, 3 S. & P. 397. 6. And when such mortgage was left at the recording office, five days before the expiration of the time, but by the neglect of the clerk it was not recorded-held to be a compliance with the statute. Ibid.

7. The statute 1803 does not embrace deeds of trust, mortgages, or other conveyances, upon valuable consideration, so as to render their proof or acknowledgment and registration within twelve months necessary to their validity. Baker v. Washington & Washington, 5 S. & P. 142. Killough v. State, 1 S. & P. 262.

8. The acknowledgment, properly certified, of the execution of a deed, before a foreign notary, without registration here, would be sufficient to authorize its reception in evidence, under the acts 1803 and 1812.

Toulmin v. Austin, 5 S. & P. 410.

9. A sworn copy of a steam boat register, from the records of the customhouse, is not prima facie evidence of ownership even against the party making it under affidavit, without further proof of the fact.

Jones et al. v. Pitcher & Co. 3 S. & P. 135.

10. So this statute was held to include a deed of trust of personal property upon valuable consideration, executed prior to the statute 1828. lbid. 11. But in the case of such deed of trust, not embraced by the statute 1828, and required to be thus proved and recorded, the mere recording of it would not be notice to all the world of the condition of the property conveyed. 1bid.

12. The registration of a deed in another State, unless it appears that such registration was authorized by the laws of that state, implies notice to no one; and, the certificate authenticating a recorded instrument from another State, does not constitute evidence of the laws of property or of registration in such State. Tatum v. Young, 1 P. 298.

13. A deed made between parties in another State, under a contract contemplating no final execution or performance in this State, must be controlled in its effect-as to validity against the lien of strangers upon the property conveyed-in respect to its proof or acknowledgment and registration, by the laws of the State where executed.

Caldwell v. Edwards, 3 S. & P. 312. 14. Thus where slaves at the suit of a creditor had been attached in this State, and trespass was brought against the sheriff, and a bill of sale was relied on, made by the debtor to the plaintiff in the State of Tennessee, and it appeared that the bill of sale had not been proved, or acknowledged and recorded within twelve months from its date, as required by the statutes of Tennessee; it was held that the bill of sale was void and of non-effect as against the lien acquired in this state: and so no trespass lay against the sheriff, Ibid.

RELEASE.

1. Release of errors must be under seal.

Cotton v. Wilson, A. R. 118. 2. Release of interest of witness, does not legalize evidence given before release. Wynn & wife v. Williams, A. R. 136. 3. Judgment by nil dicit, does not amount to release of errors. Dinsmore v. Hand, A. R. 126.

4. To a sealed instrument an unsealed release is no defence at law nor is it in eqity, unless founded on a valuable consideration. But when a security to a sealed note has been discharged by payee by an unsealed instrument; and was induced so to believe for many years until the principle became insolvent—it would be a fraud and equity would relieve.

Tegue v. Russell & Moore, 2 S. 420. 5. Whether a parol release founded upon a valuable consideration is pleadable at law. Quere. Goodman v. Griffin, 3 S. 160.

Ibid.

6. Parol release, without consideration is unavailing. 7. By the practice in this State, a release entered upon the records would be recognized as a part of the record of the particular case to which it applied, at least in the same court where made.

Mc Causeland v. Neal, 3 S. & P. 131.

8. A release by sheriff to his deputy, who had given bond to him, in an action against sheriff, in order to make him a witness-held good-and

that a declaration of the deputy, that his principal should not suffer by his acts, and that he would secure him from injury, did not render him incompetent to testify in the suit.

Ibid.

9. A release entered on the records of the court, not signed, sealed or delivered to the witness, and implying a mere discharge as to the interest in the particular action, is not sufficient to authorize an incompetent witness to give evidence. Kennon v. McRae, 2 P. 389.

10. A verbal release of damages is not sufficient to bar an action for assault and battary. Logan v, Austin, 1 S. 476. 11. Where one becomes the indorser of a bill of exchange in trust, to secure the payments of debts due by the indorser to other persons, and afterwards executes a release under his individual signature, such release cannot be determined by the court, (without the intervention of a jury,) to be a release as to the bill so indorsed in trust.

Hazlehurst v. Pope, 2 S. & P. 259.

12. In a case where a testator bequeathed slaves to his daughter for life, remainder, in the event of her having no issue of her body, to the testator's four children-held, that the interest of the residuary legatees in the slaves, was assignable in their lives, and descendable on their decease, to their legal representatives. Hogan v. Bell et ux. 4 S. & P. 286.

13. But where slaves were bequeathed to a testator's daughter, during life, with a limitation to her sisters, and brothers, in the event of her dying without heirs of her body, and a release of the contingent estate was afterwards made by two of the residuary legatees, to the daughter; and, a third, died, during her life time, a minor-it was held, that the descent from the deceased brother, and the release of the interest of the two others, being valid, vested a sufficient possession in the husband of the daughter, to authorize a recovery by him, of that portion of her estate in the slaves, so released and claimed by descent. Ibid.

REMITTER AND RETAINER.

1. A is in possession of slaves, in which he has a life estate, the reversion to B, who dying, C, his widow, and another administer on his estate; and C, after the death of her co-administrator, intermarries with D-A and C possess themselves of the estate of B; and afterwards A dies, and D takes administration on his estate jointly with another, who afterwards dies leaving D sole administrator. D and C being husband and wife, take possession of the slaves in whom A had a life estate, and B the revision: on a bill filed by the distributees, held—

1. That the possession of the slaves should be considered as held under the administration of B's estate, and that admitting D and C to have taken possession of them as part of the estate of A, yet in equity they would be held to be remitted to the title of B, and held accountable to the distributees of B; and they could not alledge a tortious conversion to evade the distribution.

II. That as A, in his lifetime, had possessed himself of part of the estate of B-and was accountable in his life time to the administrator of B for the same: and the two administrators, after the death of A, being vest

ed in the same person, the latter would be held in equity to have retained out of the estate of A, what was due to the estate of B, and was accountable in equity to the distributees of B, on the ground that there was no remedy at law, as long as the administration of A's and B's estates were joined in the same persons; and that as the same person had possession of both estates, he would be presumed to have retained out of A's estate, what was due to the estate of B, whether it existed as a debt or unliquidated damages.

III. That while the equities of the bill might be enforced against D, administrator, in right of his wife C, of B's estate, yet, it did not follow, that D, as the administrator of A, was released or that there was no equity against him: but as the bill sought to establish the liability of the estate of A, and not alone to call on A's administrator as a trustee to distribute the effects, it was necessary to make A's administrators a party.

IV. The bill being filed to effect distribution of B's estate, and no liability being sought to be enforced against it, there was no necessity to make the administrator de bonis non of B's estate a party.

Draughon v. French, adm. 4 P. 352.

REPLEVIN.

1. The action of replevin, for property wrongfully taken, will not lie in

this State.

State v. Crockell, A. R. 279.

REVENUE AND TAX COLLECTOR.

1. That section of statute 1819, authorizing motion against delinquent taxcollector in the supreme court, is repugnant to the constitution and void. State v. Flinn, A. R. 8.

2. It is not necessary that notice to a delinquent tax-collector and securities should be given in the name of the State of Alabama, or directed to any officer to be executed. Armstrong & Packston v. State, A. R. 160. 3. A tax-collector's bond, conditioned that he shall faithfully perform all the duties of assessor and tax-collector for the county of. is sufficient, though it omits the recital of his appointment. Ibid.

4. The comptroller's notice, that he will move for judgment for a certain sum, due the State from J. W. A. as collector of taxes in the county of M. for the year 1822, is a sufficient shewing of a cause of action. Ibid. 5. The priviledge of a freeholder, as to his being sued only in the county of his residence, does not extend to a motion against a delinquent tax-collector and his securities. Ibid.

6. Judgment for the same, due as damages for the default, good, although not called "fifteen per cent damages."

Ibid.

7. Motion against delinquent tax-collector, is properly in the name of the State, although the bond is to the governor.

Wheat et al. v. State, A. R. 199. 8. The act of 1819, to raise a revenue for 1820, did not authorize the circuit court to render judgment upon motion, against the president of the Tombecbee bank, for failing to pay taxes.

Crawford v. State, A. R. 143. 9. In a summary remedy against the president of a bank for a penalty for the bank's default in paying taxes, the name of the bank must be accurately described. Judson v. State, A. R. 150.

10. The president is not liable in his private character for the penalty imposed by the act of 1820. Ibid. 11. Bank stock is liable to taxation unless the right to tax has been expressly relinquished. Ibid. 12. Motion by the State, against the president and directors of the Tombecbee bank for penalty in not paying taxes-if the defendant claim a jury they are entitled to it, although they have not plead.

Tombecbee Bank v. State, A. R. 425. 13. A motion in the name of the State will not lie against a tax-collector for failing to pay over county tax, the proceedings should be in the name of the obligee or his successor. Mayberry v. State, 1 S. 266.

Nabor v. Governor, 3 S. & P. 15.

14. In such proceedings it is incumbent for the plaintiff to set forth or describe the bond given by the tax collector and his securities, and the statute must be strictly pursued; as the ordinary legal intendments do not apply in such cases in aid of uncertainties. Nabor v. Governor, 3 S. & P. 15.

15. The notice in the proceedings must show its object, and define for what purpose judgment is claimed." Ibid. 16. Under the word "museum," in the sixth section, statute 1827, "to raise a revenue for support of government," is comprehended an exhibition of living animals. Bostwick v. Purdy et al. 5 S. & P. 105.

17. Where a judge of the county court under the act of 1829, declares the office of tax-collector vacant, such declaration is a judicial and conclusive act, and cannot while unreversed be questioned by proof that the taxcollector had his bond ready but that the judge was absent.

Peck v. Holcombe, 3 P. 329. 18. The collection of taxes by a tax-collector, after the office has been declared vacant under the act 1829 is viod. Ibid. 19. No action can be maintained by the successor of a judge of the county court upon the bond of an assessor and collector of taxes made payable to the judge-such bond by statute being required to be made payable to the Calhoun Judge v. Lunsford et al. 4 P. 345.

governor.

20. The several county courts of this State have no jurisdiction whatever of the offence created in 12th section of statute 1821, providing a penalty where a tax-collector makes a false return of taxable property, with a view to defraud the county or the State.

Patilla v. Governor, 5 P. 332.