should be empowered to put forth authoritative expositions of Scripture, that some such appointment is absolutely necessary, to compensate for the obscure nature of the inspired writings themselves. Without such provision, it is asserted that few persons could arrive at any definite knowledge of the truths of revelation; that the obscurities of Scripture are so great, and the ignorance and prejudice of man so insurmountable, that no uniformity of belief could by any possibility be looked for; so that the whole purpose of the revelation itself must fail, and the world continue in little better than heathen darkness. Truth is one, it is justly urged, and not that which a man troweth; since, therefore, the human mind is so much influenced by folly and self-will, it is supposed that but few of those who study the Bible for themselves, can gain any satisfactory acquaintance with its contents. may be sure, therefore, (it is said,) that God who sent the revelation, would provide for its being understood; and not frustrate his own ends by leaving it to the charge of intellects so weak, and inclinations so wayward, as are those of men when left to themselves.

We

Now this argument is wholly built upon the supposition, that we are acquainted with the

counsels of the Almighty, with the laws by which He would guide Himself, in making any revelalation to his creatures, and with the object which in so doing He would seek to attain. It assumes, in short, that we possess, without the assistance of divine teaching, that very knowledge which it is one of the purposes of revelation to communicate. Whereas, in truth, our ignorance of the nature of God is so great, that it is impossible to form any sure judgment, either of the description of truths which He would be likely to make known, of the means which He might employ for announcing them, or of the extent to which He might spread them among mankind. We know no more of God, than that He could not command our belief in an absurdity, or enjoin the performance of an impossibility. We are so ignorant of our own real wants and capabilities, that we can be confident of nothing more than that He would not first create us with senses and reasoning powers which should compel us to form certain conclusions, and then require us to renounce these conclusions as false; and that He would never exact from us any course of action, which from the nature of the case, and not from any want of will in ourselves, is really impossible. When we are speculating upon the

probable character of a divine revelation, our only safe course is to observe carefully the system upon which we know that God has already acted in his dealings with man, to mark the mode in which He tries and governs us in the affairs of our daily life; and from our conclusions thus formed to decide upon the probable truth of any doctrine which professes to be a manifestation of His will. The testimony of others, or of our own personal experience, as to what God has already done, is our only source of information concerning what He is likely to do; and therefore it is the highest presumption to suppose, that in making a revelation to man He must aim at some one object, and employ some one system of means, which happen to harmonize with the notions which our fancies may have led us to entertain concerning Him.

2. Let us observe, then, whether we can discern in God's government of the world about us, any traces of that line of conduct which the advocates of the authority of a divinely-commissioned interpreter of Scripture suppose that he must pursue. Let us observe whether or not we are placed in such a state of things, as that after some one voluntary act of our own, our

intellectual probation entirely ceases, and we are enabled to trust implicitly to the guidance of another. That such is God's method of ruling mankind, no one will be so bold as to assert. On the contrary, we know that from the moment when we are first enabled to decide for ourselves on the truth or falsehood of any assertion, even to our dying day, we are compelled to shape our conduct according to the decisions of our individual judgment. Neither in our search after speculative or practical truth, do we ever obtain any one general maxim or criterion, any authoritative standard, by a reference to which we may be secured from a possibility of error. As long as we live, we are compelled to go on balancing conflicting arguments; our candour and fairness are daily put to the test; the whole course of our conduct is guided by convictions which we embrace as being probably founded in truth.

Can it, then, be supposed, that there exists any presumption in favour of a system, which asserts that God has appointed an institution which compels us to act in a manner altogether opposite to that which in the course of his Providence He has determined that we should follow? Is it likely that in his search after revealed

truth, man should be enabled to arrive, at the very outset of his enquiries, at some one infallible test, which should spare him all further doubt and difficulty? From what we know of God's method of dealing with us, can we find any one reason for concluding that He would place us in such a state as should put an end to all intellectual probation, a state in which by the repetition of one single act of obedience, we should be enabled to learn all truth without risk of error? Surely it is rather probable that He would in all his appointments, make our knowledge of what is true depend upon our freedom from prejudice, and our diligent use of every available means for satisfying our doubts.

Let it be observed, also, that the Ruler of the universe bestows all present blessings in the most unequal manner; that his government of the world is not in the least such as we should have looked for; that however great and glorious be the ends which He appears to have had in view in conferring his gifts upon mankind, and in putting into our hands means and instruments by a just use of which the greatest enjoyments may be attained; He yet has, as it were, bound Himself by one general law, namely, that all his gifts shall be liable to abase, and