SECT. VI.

Animal Vitality.-Instinct and Reason:

mate nature.

THAT there is diffused through all animated nature, a certain principle of vitality, is one of those truths which supercedes the necessity of all proof. It is a principle, every human being feels diffused through every part, and forms that insuperable line, which divides all animate from inaniNor is this principle confined to man alone; every animated being is made an equal possessor of it, though with different degrees of acuteness, from the "unwieldly elephant," down "to the green myriads of the peopled grass." To separate this vital principle from any animated being, without destroying its present state of existence, is utterly impossible; but whether this principle of vitality belong to an immaterial substance or not, is a totally distinct question.

Passing beyond that surface of things, where the mind floats in a shoreless ocean of uncertainties, we enter a region which popular observation cannot explore. In this intellectual region, where apparent reason operates in all its gradations, there, however, must be some line of demarkation, that distinguishes the animal from the man: but where this line can be drawn, or where the boundaries can be fixed, is to me a point of almost inexplicable difficulty; and yet to fix on some discriminating criterion, is a point which must first be ascertained, before any conclusions can be deduced therefrom. Among those faculties that present themselves to the mind, there are none which I can discover, so appropriate as instinct and reason; but the shades which divide them from each other, are so minute, and so nearly allied, that they lose themselves in one another, by tints which are almost imperceptible; and we pass their boundaries, without disco

vering our situation, till we find ourselves on the confines of an opposite extreme.

It is foreign to my present design, to inquire into the various active operations, either of instinct or reason. I only wish to discriminate between them, to mark their respective relations to their original causes, and their necessary connections therewith: and in this view, I conceive the former to be founded upon sensation, and the latter upon reflection. To suppose the former to exist where there is no sensation is a contradiction; and to suppose the latter to exist where there is no reflection, is an absurdity too gross to be admitted. If instinct can exist where there is no sensation, it can include neither energy nor action; and if instinct exist abstracted from all energy and action, it must exist without having any existence. And in supposing reason to operate without, or to exist abstracted from, all reflection, we must suppose it to act without either perception or judgment; and to decide upon the certainty of that, which is avow. edly unknown, and without the knowledge of which, no rational decision can ever be obtained.-Instinct, therefore, must be founded upon sensation, and reason upon reflection.

But if sensation be necessary to the existence of instinct, and reflection to that of reason, neither instinct nor reason can have any positive existence, and therefore can only be relative terms. If instinct have a real being, it must exist abstracted from all action; for whatsoever exists positively, must have a being before it can possibly act; and what has a positive existence, must be independent of all action. But if instinct exist abstracted from action, it can have no connection with sensation, for sensa tion itself must be the result of action: and to suppose any thing to have a necessary connection with sensation, from which it is possible to exclude the idea of action, is a contradiction.

If all instinct be limited in the nature of its existence, and confined wholly to those objects which are capable of exciting sensation, corporeal existence must form those lines, beyond the boundaries of which it cannot pass. To admit any thing to have a positive existence, which is not independent, is a contradiction in terms; and to suppose the independence of that which cannot pass the boundaries of corporeal existence, while nothing physical obstructs such an action, is to suppose it to be independent, and not independent at the same time.

As a contradiction must ever be inadmissible, it follows, that instinct, whatever it may be, can have but a relative existence ;- -a relative existence must always be dependant on that object to which it is indebted for its being, and can no longer exist, than it is excited by foreign action. If instinct be in all animals the central point, where all the lines of organization meet, through which external objects are capable of communicating their impulses; instinct can only be the medium through which the creature is directed to its intended end, but of itself it can have no self-determining power.

If instinct have a self-determining power, it can be no longer dependant on the impulses of sensation; but to abstract the idea of sensation from that of instinct, and to suppose instinct to exist after this abstraction, is to attribute to it, a power which is precluded by the very nature of its existence. An idea of instinct, which does not include the idea of action, is a contradiction; and therefore, wherever instinct be supposed to have an existence, the idea of action cannot be excluded; which action must be either from itself, or excited by the impressions of foreign impulses. If it be from itself, it is at once raised into a state of independence, which, excluding all external impulses, annihilates its very nature. It must therefore follow-that as action is necessary to the idea of instinct, and as this action I

cannot be from itself, it must be impressed by that foreign power which communicates its impulses ; and instinct can only be the medium or censorium, through which this foreign power acts, to produce those effects which we discover in animal life.

If this reasoning be admitted, it will follow also -that the instinctive properties which are perceived, must not only have a relative and dependant existence, but they can continue no longer than those causes conspire to operate; which instinct is the medium of, and on which it must entirely depend. A relative idea can exist no longer than it is in contact with the influencing power; and when that contact ceases, all relations must evaporate and expire. Animal action can only be excited by sensation; and the action must ever be in proportion to the impulse. And whether the cause be physieal or moral, there must be a contact previous to any operation; and when the capacity becomes inaccessible to impulsion, the ideas of instinct and action must be precluded through necessity.

If instinct were supposed to have the power of election, where opposite sensations excite, and where no previous preponderation had given it a bias, it could be no longer excited by sensation.— An elective power supposes in that Being which possesses it, a principle of judgment, with which instinct can have no kind of connexion. Instinct must, therefore, be dependant upon sensation, and where the exciting powers are hostile to each other, it must necessarily follow the strongest impulse.

But while we behold a principle of animation diffused through all animal nature, distinguishing such portions of matter which are animated, from those that lie in a state of passiveness; and while we behold the inferior orders of animal creation, acting under those impulses which preclude the ideas of judgment, and election, we discern a supe

rior principle in man. This superior principle the Almighty has stamped upon us at our primary formation; and under its guidance and direction, has placed the whole economy of human actions.Whether we have acted conformably to the influences of this polar star, or deviated from its direc tions, is rather foreign to my present design. It is to the sacred writings we are indebted for this information; and in those sacred books it is, that we must find the perfect standard of right and wrong.

If this superior principle, to which we have uniformly given the name of reason, were nothing different from instinct, the brutal and human natures must have been physically the same. We might have differed from them, it is true, as one animal differs from another; but if there were nothing in either nature, which the other did not, and could not, possess, their physical identity must have been the same.

It may, however, not be difficult to ascertain, that reason is different from instinct, in its source, in its nature, in its operations, and in its end. Ánd if it can be thus ascertained, it must produce conviction, in opposition to the indications of appear

ances,

Whatever affections reason may possess, or howsoever it may be diversified in the manner of its operations, it is certain that it can have no positive independent existence. For if reason have an independent existence, it can have no necessary connexion with any positive Being. But the instant we suppose reason to exist, while we exclude from it the idea of a reasonable substance, to support its existence; we admit reason to exist, without admitting the existence of any thing reasonable, which is a contradiction. If, therefore, reason cannot have any independent existence, (which must be admitted) it must rely on something capable of