ence of the idea of privation. And if this idea (of privation of Being) be necessarily preceded by that of the extinction of Being, from whence this privation is denominated; the idea of privation must necessarily be excluded from entering into the production of that nonentity, from the completion of which alone, the certainty of privation can be called into existence. If the perfect nonentity of Being be not necessary to the certainty of privation, privation may exist, although the Being remain entire; and then the conclusion will be,-that privation is not necessary to its own existence. But if the perfect nonentity of Being, be necessary to the certainty of the privation of Being, the extinguishing act cannot be this priva tion. To suppose privation of Being to be the identical act of annihilation, the completion of which is necessary to the existence of the very idea of privation, is to make privation to exist antecedently to its own existence. For as the completion of the act, is necessary to the idea of the act of privatton of Being, the thing itself can never contribute towards its own existence. An action necessarily supposes the pre-existence of the actor. The supposition, therefore, that the soul can perish, either through "annihilation,”— "the privation of Being,"-"the utter loss of existence," or any term of synonymous import; conceives either or each of these ideas,-to have an action in that very ruin of the soul, upon which each idea necessarily depends for its existence. And to suppose either of these ideas thus to act, is to make It may not be unnecessary to say, that from page 201, to the conclusion of the work, I have used the word privation, as being synonymous with annihi bation. them contribute to their own Being, and to act be fore either could possibly have any kind of exist ence. And even if any substance be annihilated, to be certified of the fact, its annihilation must be ascertained. And to ascertain its annihilation, something must survive the annihilated substance, which bears some relation to it; and if any such relation survive, the existence of this relation, which is supposed to ascertain the annihilation of that substance which it is the relation of, will sufficiently demonstrate that no such annihilation has taken place. And if nothing can ascertain the fact, it can never be known, although annihilation were possible. The mere absence of Being, can never be a proof of the annihilation of Being, while the infinitude of space is too great for finite comprehension: and mere absence, is all that can possibly survive the annihilation of any substance. If any Being be admitted to be annihilated, there must be some evidence to support the mind in the belief of the certainty of that nonentity of Being which it adopts; and the only possible evidence which it can have, must be the total absence of all Being; which evidence can never be obtained by created Beings, till a finite mind can pervade an infinite expansion, which is impossible, because it is a contradiction. And if annihilation can never be known, unless the knowledge of it be supported by evidence; if the only possible evidence, be the mere absence of all Being; If the total absence of all Being can never be ascertained until a finite mind can grasp what is infinite; and if to grasp infinity be a contradiction; it necessarily follows, that the possiblity of annihilation can never be known, even admitting that it were a fact. Annihilation can never be admitted, where there is no evidence to support the mind in that belief; and the admission of evidence must necessarily contradict that fact which it is designed to prove and establish. And, therefore, from this mass of evidence, drawn purely from the fountain-head of nature, uncorrupted by literary prejudices, and unshackled by any bias of education, fully satisfied I am, that the human soul must necessarily be IMMORTAL. FINIS. CONTENTS. 1. Every thing in Nature included within the Confines of Matter and Spirit-Man con II. Nature and essential Properties of Matter, III. There may be Spiritual Substances, although we be ignorant of their Essences, IV. Volition, Judgment and Perception, having no positive Existence, demonstrates the positive 43 SECT. PAGE. -No divisible Being is capable of Consci- II. The Soul is intelligent-Can anticipate-Is not an Assemblage of independent Proper- III. Further Objections against the Soul's Immate- IV. That the Soul is immaterial, proved by the Af- fections-They inhere in the Soul-Objec- tion founded on external Excitement, answer- V. Intellectual Endowments are different-The cause of this is not physical-It is occasioned 67 VII. The subject of Instinct and Reasoncontinued, 93 VIII. Memory and Reflection-The former visible in animal Powers, the latter depends on an PART II. ILLUSTRATION OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL. CHAP. I. The Nature, Modes, and possibility of the Destruction no III. We can have no simple Idea of what has |