in relation to the unfortunate Florida war, produced by some reflections General Clinch, then of the army, had made on Mr. Cass, in his testimony before the court of inquiry, assembled at Frederick, Maryland, in 1837, to investigate the difficulties between Generals Scott and Gaines. The following indignant reply written at Paris, best explains itself and the conduct of Mr. Cass while Secretary at War.

66 A friend has sent me a short extract from the evidence, recently given before the military court at Frederick, by General Clinch, together with copies of some letters presented by him. In his testimony, General Clinch charges me with neglecting to make adequate preparations for the defence of Florida, upon his representations, during the progress of the difficulties with the Seminole Indians, and for some time after the commencement of hostilities.

"The failure of a campaign is an old subject for crimination and recrimination. In all ages and nations it has been fertile in disputes, sometimes confined to the officers themselves, and sometimes extending to the administration of the government. Knowing that while in the department of war, I anxiously endeavoured to fulfil the duty which the troubles with the Seminoles imposed upon the government, and satisfied, on as dispassionate a review as a person can be expected to take in a matter which so nearly concerns him, that that duty was faithfully performed, I am not willing to be subject to the imputation which General Clinch has so cavalierly cast upon me. If the course of events in Florida, whether attributable to imbecility, to misfortune, or to circumstances beyond control, may seem to the military commanders to require a propitiatory sacrifice, I shall most assuredly not submit to receive upon my head their maledictions without an appeal to the justice of my countrymen. That appeal I am now led to make; but, in the performance of this task, it is not my object to assail

any one. I carry on no Carthaginian warfare, and shall confine myself to repelling a serious imputation laid upon me. I beg that it may be recollected that I am far from home, and that I am destitute of many documents essential to a full investigation of the statement of General Clinch. I have no papers upon the subject excepting those already alluded to -the two pamphlets of documents published by order of congress in the session of 1835 and 1836, and for which I am indebted to the same friend, and the defence of General Scott, published in the National Intelligencer. For all else, I must rely upon my memory; but I trust I shall commit no importI am sure I shall commit no intentional

ant error.

one.

"An examination of the general course of operations in Florida does not come within the scope of inquiry which I propose to myself. It is enough, upon this point, to say that each of the commanding generals serving in that country after the commencement of hostilities, had carte blanche as to men, and means, and plans. Their measures were left to their own discretion; and they were authorized to call from the neighbouring states such force as they might judge adequate to the attainment of the objects committed to them; and the various military departments were directed to provide and furnish all the supplies demanded. It follows, of course, that the government was not responsible for results. They did what every wise government should do in such a juncture. They sanctioned the full employment of all the means judged necessary by those upon whom was to devolve the conduct of the war. The main reliance was necessarily upon the militia. The small amount of our regular army, its dispersed condition, and the numerous points it is called upon to maintain, rendered it impracticable to carry on operations by its means alone; and, added to these considerations, there were, during a

part of the Seminole campaign, strong reasons, which all will appreciate, having reference to our foreign relations, which rendered it inexpedient to withdraw all the troops from the Atlantic and the south-western frontiers.

"After the incipient measures, the actual and only responsibility of the government was in the selection of the officers to command. Upon this point I have nothing to say. I would not utter a word of reproach against any of the gallant men who have served in Florida. I would not, if I could, tarnish a single laurel gathered in other and happier fields. The difficulties they had to encounter were great, and in some points unexpected. And I believe that the general conduct of our officers and soldiers, during this trying warfare, was worthy of the best period in our military annals. Of the military service and claims of General Scott, few have a higher estimate than I have, and no person has heard me utter a sentiment of disrespect towards him. Nor shall I reproach myself for any part which I took in his selection for the command. Success is not always a true test of merit, nor the want of it of incapacity. When General Scott took the command the season of operations was short. Every thing was to collect, to combine, to organize. I saw his difficulties then, and I can still better appreciate them now.

"I may be permitted to say, however, that his plan of operations did not seem to me well adapted to the nature of the country and the habits of the enemy; and this fact is known to some of the persons officially connected with me in the war department. The opinion of the president upon this subject was still stronger, and is, of course, entitled to much more weight than mine. I recollect perfectly his views, when the letter of General Scott, disclosing his plan, was read to him. But any change by the authority of the government, would have been a

66

hazardous experiment. General Scott was upon the spot, with the best means of information, and with all the intelligence and experience necessary to devise and to execute. To have overruled him would have been to assume a most fearful responsibility, and to direct the details of a campaign in an Indian country at the distance of a thousand miles. I observe in General Scott's defence a quotation from the testimony of Captain Thruston, a most intelligent officer, by which it appears that the first impression upon his mind was unfavourable to the contemplated plan, but that subsequent experience had corrected this opinion. Not having had the advantage enjoyed by Captain Thruston, of a personal knowledge of the course of operations in Florida, it will not, I trust, be imputed to any unjust prejudice, that I participated in the opinion of an officer who is held in high esteem by General Scott, and that I retained that opinion, not having seen any sufficient reason for changing it. I did not see how a combined operation against such an enemy as the Indians, here to-day and gone to-morrow, and whose presence is seldom known but by their assaults, could be carried on simultaneously from three points so distant as Volusia, Fort Drane and Tampa Bay, with any reasonable hope of a cooperation, which would bring the enemy to action, and at the same time prevent his escape. I did not think that when these masses were brought to a point when the net was drawn that the game

would be caught. I am free, however, to confess that I have now doubts whether any other plan would have succeeded better at that time, and within the short space remaining for the service of the militia, and for the season of operations; and as neither of the columns was attacked, no positive injury resulted from the division. The enemy was sought and could not be found.

"But to the main point of this appeal. General

Clinch was asked by the court, What in your opinion prevented the subjection of the Seminole Indians in the campaign conducted by General Scott, in Florida, in 1836?'

"To this General Clinch answers in substance, that it was owing to the neglect of the head of the war department in not having made more adequate preparations in 1835, and early in 1836. In other words, because there were not troops enough in Florida to prevent the Indians from commencing hostilities, therefore the campaign to reduce them was unsuccessful. I leave to the court itself and to General Clinch the task of reconciling this answer with the question itself, and the objects of the inquiry. The causes of the Indian hostilities, or the measures taken by the government to prevent them previously to the assumption of the command by General Scott, were not subjects before the court. They were questions of public policy, properly cognizable by congress alone, and which had more than once engaged the attention of that body. But between them and the nature of the military operations there was no just connection; and whether there were in the country, before the war, ten men or ten thousand, was a question having no relation to the duties of the court or the conduct of General Scott.

"But General Clinch goes still further; quite far enough indeed to disclose that his feelings were so much excited, as to weaken very much his perceptions of what he owed to the court, to himself, and to me. He says, 'when at last the honourable secretary awoke from his dreams of political preferment, and turned his attention,' &c. And this General Clinch says, as a witness, under the sanction of an oath. He undertakes to dive into the recesses of the human heart, not as a matter of speculation, but of assertion; and to pronounce on the witness' stand, not only that I neglected my duty,