sible for a human or other intelligent mind, to arrive at a clear and distinct perception of truth by intuition. On the contrary, the supposition of the possibility of a faculty of intelligence necessarily infers the possibility of the exist ence of truth, as the object of intelligence, and of truth's being in the universe capable of understanding truth, there must be truth for that being to understand; and that truth must be within the reach of his understanding. But as it is self-evident, that there are an infinite number of ideal, or conceivable truths, it is likewise evident, there must be an infinitely comprehensive understanding, which perceives this infinity of truths. To talk of a truth perceivable by no mind, or that never has been the object of any perceptive faculty, would be a self-contradiction. Mind is the very substratum of truth. An infinite mind of infinite truth. That a finite understanding may attain a finite perception of truth, is necessary to be admitted, unless we deny the possibility of the existence of any finite understanding. For an understanding capable of attaining no degree of knowledge of truth, or an understanding which neither did nor could understand or preceive any one truth, is a contradiction in words. Proceeding in this train of reasoning, we say, Either there is no such thing as intuition possible, or it must be possible by intuition to perceive truth; there is no such thing as sensation possible, or it must be possible for the mind to perceive real objects. That what we actually and really apprehend by intuition and sensation, must be somewhat real, as far as actually and really apprehended; it being impossible to apprehend that which is not. Now, the evidence of the reality of any existence, or the truth of any proposition, let it be conveyed to the mind by deduction, by testimony, by revelation, or if there were a thousand other methods of information, would still be reducible at last to direct intuition; excepting what arises from sensation. The mind, in judging of any proposition, through whatever channel communicated to it, or on whatever argument established, judges of the strength of the evidence; it makes allowance for the objections; it balances the arguments, or considerations of whatever kind, against one another, it sees which preponderates. And supposing this to be done properly, it sees the true state of the case, and determines accordingly;

nor can it possibly determine contrary to what it sees to be the true state of the case.

When, for example, I consider in my own mind, on one hand, the various evidence from authors and remains of antiquity, that there was formerly such a state as the Roman, which conquered great part of this side of the globe; and on the other, find no reason for doubting of the existence of such a state in former times, I find it as reasonable to believe it, and as impossible to doubt it, as to doubt the solution of a question in numbers or quantity, which I had proved by arithmetic, vulgar and decimal, and by Algebra. And so of other instances. So that, though it would not be proper to say, I see, by intuition, the truth of this proposition, "There was once such a city as Rome;" yet I may with the utmost propriety say, I see such a superabundance of evidence for the truth of the proposition, and at the same time see no reason to think that any valid objections can be brought against it, that I intuitively see the evidence for it to be such as puts it beyond all possibility of being doubted by me, and feel that, though I should labour ever so much to bring myself to question it, I absolutely cannot; nor can I conceive it possible that it should appear questionable to any person, who has fairly considered it.

Suppose, in the same manner, (in a point which has been disputed) a man, of a clear head, to have thoroughly examined all the various evidences for the christian religion, allowing to every one its due weight, and no more; suppose him to have attentively considered every objection against it, allowing, likewise, to every one impartially its full force; suppose the result of the whole inquiry to be his finding such a preponderancy of evidence for the truth of christianity, as should beyond all comparison overbalance the whole weight of the objections against it; I say, that such a person would then intuitively see the evidence for ohristianity to be unsurmountable; and could no more bring himself to doubt it, than to doubt whether all the angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones; nor to conceive the possibility of any other person's doubting it, who had fairly considered both sides of the question.

In the same maner a person, who should carefully examine the arguments in a system of ethics, and should

clearly and convincingly perceive the strength of each, the connexion of one with another, and the result of the whole; might in the strictest propriety of speech be said to see intuitively the truth and justness of that system of ethics.

If so, then it is plain, that certainty is, in the nature of things, equally attainable upon all subjects, though beings of no limited capacity may not, in our present imperfect state, be capable of attaining it. In the same manner as the truth of the most obvious axiom in arithmetic or geometry, may lie out of the reach of an infant, or an idiot; which appears self-evident to the first glance of any mind that is capable of putting two thoughts together. How comes it to pass, that the truth of such an axiom as the following appears immediately incontestable: That if from equal quantities equal quantities be subtracted, equal quantities will remain? How comes, I say, the truth of this axiom to appear at once, while moral doctrines furnish endless dispute? The obvious answer is, from the simplicity of the terms of the proposition, and of what is affirmed of them, which leaves no room for ambiguity or uncertainty; and from the narrowness of the subject to be considered, or the smallness of the number of ideas to be taken in, which prevents all danger of puzzling, or distracting the understanding, and rendering the result or conclusion doubtful. Suppose the arguments for christianity to be exactly one thousand, and the objections against it exactly one hundred: Suppose an angelic, or other superior understanding, to perceive intuitively the exact state of each; and to see distinctly the hundred objections to be surmountable, or not valid, and the arguments to every one solid and conclusive; I say, that such a being would intuitively see the truth of christianity in the same manner as a human mind sees the truth of any complex demonstration in Euclid.

It is therefore certain, that all evidence whatever is to be finally tried by, and reduced to intuition, except that which we have from sensation: That truth of all kinds is equally capable of being intuitively perceived, and of being ascertained to minds fitted for receiving and examining it: That moral truth is in no respect naturally more vague or precarious than mathematical; but equally fixed, and equally clear, to superior minds; and probably

will be so hereafter to those of the human make, who shall attain to higher improvements in future states: And that in the mean time our duty is to examine carefully, and to act upon the result of candid inquiry.

That we are, in some instances of inconsiderable importance to our final happiness, liable to error, is no more than a natural consequence of the imperfection of our present state, and the number of particulars necessary to be taken in, in order to find out the true state of things upon the whole. But this, so far from proving the impossibility of coming at truth, or that we are exposed to irre midable error, shows, that truth is certainly to be attained by such intelligent beings as shall with proper advantages of capacity and means, set themselves to the finding it out with sincerity and diligence.

The amount of what has been said on moral certainty is briefly as follows, viz.

That it is self-contradictory to talk of doubting the perceptions of our faculties, it being impossible to perceive a truth clearly, and yet to doubt it.

That our simple ideas being the immediate objects of our understandings, and being level to direct intuition, are capable of being with the greatest exactness examined and compared, in order to finding the truth or falsehood, of any proposition, whose terms are not too complex, or otherwise out of the reach of our faculties. And that whatever the understanding clearly determines, after mature examination, to be truth, it is impossible to doubt.

That whatever any mind really perceives must be real, as far as perceived. That therefore, there must be real truth perceivable, else there could be no perceptive faculty in the universe; since falsehoods and impossibilities are not in the nature of things perceivable, being nonentities.

That all kinds of truths appear equally certain to minds capable of investigating them. That moral truth is in its own nature no more vague or precarious, than mathematical; though in some instances more difficultly investigated by our narrow and defective faculties.

That there must be in the nature of things, (the basis of which is the Divine Nature) an eternal, essential, and unchangeable difference in morals; that there is a real,

not a factitious, or arbitrary, good and evil, a greater and less preferableness in different characters and actions. That, accordingly, if it had been in the nature of things no way better that an universe should be created, than not; it is evident, God, who sees all things as they are, would not have seen any reason for creating an universe, and therefore would not have exerted his power in the production of it.

That the divine attribute of benevolence, is in its own nature, really and essentially, and without all regard to the notions of created beings, and exclusive of all consequences, a perfection; not an indifferent property, as some pretend. For that nothing either evil or indifferent can be conceived of as existing necessarily; but the divine benevolence and all the other attributes of his nature exist necessarily.

That if it was proper or good, to create an universe of beings capable of happiness, it must on the contrary be improper, or morally wicked, to endeavour to oppose the divine scheme of benevolence, or to wish innocent beings condemned to misery. There is therefore an eternal and essential, not a factitious, or arbitrary, good and evil in morals; and the foundation of moral good is in the necessary and unchangeable attributes of the Divine Nature.

That certainty is in the nature of things attainable by sensation. That reality must be the object of sensation, it being impossible to feel what has no existence. That it is impossible to doubt what we perceive by sensation.

That certainty is in the nature of things attainable by intuition. That the existence of intelligence necessarily supposes that of truth, as the object of understanding. That truth is a Divine Attribute; therefore must exist necessarily. That every intelligent mind must be supposed capable of intuitively perceiving truth. And that we find by experience, we cannot even force ourselves to doubt the truths we intuitively perceive.

That such certainty is in the nature of things attainable in subjects of which we receive information by deduction, testimony, and revelation, as renders it impossible for the mind to hesitate or doubt. For that the sum, or result, of all kinds of evidence, however complex and