themselves, are so incomplete and inapplicable to the formations to be discussed in the book as to be misleading. These faults lie within the range of common elementary knowledge, and may be verified by any student. Many like faults, of positive error, of statements so imperfect as to amount to errors, and of confusion and inconsistency of thought, characterize the whole book, and are the more harmful in proportion as they are the less readily detected by the non-professional reader.

As the book is entitled "Man and the Glacial Period," we are naturally led to expect special care and accuracy in determining the age and relations of the deposits that contain supposed implements and other relics of man. The deposits on the Delaware river are the most noted of these in eastern America, and are among the most easily determinable. It will not, therefore, be unfair to examine the discussion of these somewhat critically, because the value of the book hangs largely upon them. There are on the Delaware two deposits in which chipped fragments of rock, designated in the book "paleolithic implements," are reported to have been found. Both of these are river deposits at the points where the relics occur, and both connect at the north with driftsheets in such a way that their relative ages can be made out without difficulty by a competent glacial geologist. The earlier deposit is known as the "Philadelphia red gravel and brick clay," and the later as the "Trenton gravel." Relics are reported to have been found in the former at Claymont, in the latter at Trenton. After the earlier deposit was laid down, the land was elevated and a deep valley cut in it by the Delaware. Afterwards, this valley was partly filled up with the later deposit

the Trenton gravel. The interval between the two was great. In the opinion of several experienced glacialists, it was much greater than all the time which has elapsed since the deposit of the Trenton gravel. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance to a correct view of the antiquity of man to place these two deposits in their correct relations to glacial history, and also to correctly interpret the supposed relics.

The chief questions of popular interest are three (1) Are these chipped or flaked stones really "paleolithic implements," or "imple"imple ments" of any kind? (2) Were they deposited at the same time as the formations in which they occur, or were they introduced at a later time? (3) Are the formations correctly in

terpreted, and properly placed in the glacial series?

Professor Holmes, of the United States Bureau of Ethnology, has practically demonstrated that these flaked stones are neither "implements" nor "paleolithic," but are only the chips, flakings, failures and rejects thrown aside in the making of stone implements of the more modern or neolithic type. He has found many of the quarries at which the flaking process was carried on, and has worked out the main features of the process and imitated it with ease and dexterity. Last year he conducted a party of geologists from different parts of the world, who were in attendance upon the International Geological Congress and the American Association for the Advancement of Science at Washington, to one of these quarries in a gravel deposit near that city, and showed them tons of these pseudo-paleolithic "implements and flaked stones," and demonstrated the method by which they were made. The later and more complete results of Professor Holmes's epoch-marking investigations have only very recently been given to the public, and Professor Wright could not have used them in the correction of his manuscript; but a notable part of his results have been for some time in print, and, as above indicated, brought directly to the attention of scientists. generally. All these most radical investigations our author ignores, while professing to tell the public "the present state of progress.' If the reader will look for himself at the cuts of the so-called "implements," implements," we think he will find an entire absence of any marks of use upon them; and if he were to examine wagon-loads of them, it would be only in the rarest instances that any signs of use would be found. He might probably as frequently find marks of use on the cobble-stones about a farmhouse, and for a like reason.

Some of the most careful and discriminating geologists in this country doubt whether these chipped stones were deposited at the time the formations with which they are now connected were laid down. There are many ways in which they might be introduced later, and many reasons for thinking they were so introduced. No geological expert of unquestioned competence has ever yet, so far as we can learn, found a single implement or stone flaked by man, in a glacial formation in America, which was clearly deposited contemporaneously with it. Not a single find rests on expert geological testimony. The finds may be genuine none

the less, for common testimony is worth something when it is conscientious, as it is, doubtless, in the most of these cases; but when an author assumes to teach the people on behalf of science, he ought to tell them what is science, as distinguished from what rests merely on inexpert testimony.

When we come to inquire whether the formations are correctly interpreted and their relations to the glacial period properly set forth, we find a singular confusion and inconsistency of ideas. Professor Wright says (p. 261): "The age of these deposits in which implements have been found at Claymont and at Trenton will be referred to again when we come to the specific discussion of the glacial period. It is sufficient here to bring before our minds clearly, first, the fact that this at Claymont is connected with the river floods accompanying the ice at its time of maximum extension, and when there was a gradually increasing or differential depression of the country to an unknown extent to the northward." By this "differential depression" he means the Champlain depression. If it were possible under his views to suppose that anything else was referred to, he makes his meaning clear in his "Ice Age in North America," where (p. 524), in discussing the same question, he cites the marine deposits at Montreal and in Vermont as proof of this depression, and uses the term Champlain. Now these Champlain deposits occurred after the icesheet had retreated beyond the St. Lawrence, and the sea had come in and occupied the site of Montreal and the Champlain Valley, and, according to De Geer, extended as far as Lake Ontario, Ottawa, and probably Lake Huron. Professor Wright thus makes the Claymont deposit contemporaneous with the "maximum extension" of the ice, and at the same time with the depression that accompanied the disappearance of the ice-sheet from the United States. Either, therefore, the author has confounded two widely separated times of depression, and referred the Claymont deposits to both, or else he holds that the depression which accompanied the "maximum extension" was the same as the Champlain depression, or at least continuous with it. But the later implement-bearing deposit, the Trenton gravel, comes in between the maximum extension and the Champlain deposits, and was formed at a time of elevation. Professor Wright says, on the same page: "The deposit of Trenton gravel occurred much later [than the Claymont deposit], at a time when the ice had melted far back towards the

"

"

А

head-waters of the Delaware and after the land had nearly resumed its present relations of level; if indeed it had not risen northward to a still greater height." The author is evidently unconscious of this confusion and inconsistency of ideas. He is wrong in his placing of both the "implement-bearing" deposits, as has been clearly shown by the glacialists of the New Jersey and United States Geological Surveys. The earlier deposit is contemporaneous with one of the old drift-sheets which are chiefly buried by the later drift in this region. A part of the attenuated edge of the old drift, however, extends some miles south of the terminal moraine a much later formation that crosses the Delaware near Belvidere. The later deposit, the Trenton gravel, was strictly contemporaneous with this Belvidere moraine. It has been traced up the river by careful and competent geologists and found to be connected directly with the moraine. Professor Wright makes the singular mistake of connecting the Trenton gravel terrace with a terrace about onethird its height and of much later formation.

On this central ground, therefore, where, above all others, there should be clearness, consistency, and accuracy, there is confusion of thought, error in tracing simple deposits, and fundamental misconception in interpretation. The correct correlations have been pointed out by at least three of the most experienced of American glacialists. If Professor Wright saw fit to differ from these, as of course it was his privilege to do, he should at least, out of fairness to his readers and especially to his clerical brethren, who are liable to be led into embarrassing positions by quoting erroneous views, have given the opinions of these experts accurately and clearly on a point so vital to the subject. He does make quotations on some phases of the subject, and does this in such a way as to give the impression of considerateness in this respect, but these quotations relate to side questions, and tend the more to disarm his readers of any thought of differences on the vital points. He entirely ignores the most critical and careful work that has been done on the correlation of these deposits that of Professor Salisbury and his associates under the joint auspices of the New Jersey and United States Surveys, though this bears in the most direct way on the main question and stands opposed to his views.

The book is characterized by frequent instances of this kind. Instead of pointing out clearly and fairly differences of opinion on vital

points, it is quite the habit of the author to turn aside to discuss some unessential difference, and at length to leave this with a "however this may be," and an illusive impression of candor, while the real issue is untouched. The reader is thereby led to assume that the main point is undisputed.

66

The author's discussion of the other "implement-bearing" deposits in the glacial regions is scarcely more satisfactory. They are referred, rather vaguely, to a stage of the retreat of the ice; but even this will have to be forced to make it cover the correct reference. The author says (p. 249): "The expectation of finding evidence of pre-glacial man in Ohio was justified," etc. Five pages later, he says: Probably it is incorrect to speak of these as pre-glacial, for the portion of the period at which the deposits incorporating human relics were made is well on toward the close of the great Ice age, since these terraces were, in some cases, and may have been in all cases, deposited after the ice front had withdrawn nearly, if not quite, to the water-shed of the St. Lawrence basin." The author thus seeks to justify a prediction respecting evidence of "pre-glacial man" by relics deposited "well on toward the close of the glacial period." If the Ice age were but a short single period, this might be overlooked, if precision were of no consequence; but it has been demonstrated that the Ice age was prolonged and complex, and the impression that these statements give is misleading. The ages of some, if not all, of these deposits in if not all, of these deposits in Ohio and Indiana have been carefully worked out by Mr. Leverett, of the United States Geological Survey, and definitely connected with specific stages of the invasion of the ice, not a single vague stage of its withdrawal. But Mr. Leverett's work is ignored.

The finds near Little Falls, Minnesota, will probably drop entirely out of the discussion when the results of recent critical examination are published and duly considered.

66

We feel justified, from the foregoing, in making the summary statement that no one of the alleged "implements" is referred to its proper place in glacial history. The author, instead of giving the public " Man's entire relation to the glacial period," has given no integral part of it with accuracy and trustworthiness so far as America is concerned. As he spent "a summer in Europe," he may do better there.

The remainder of the book is of like nature; but a review of all its errors, or even its chief ones, is quite out of the question. We have

touched those that relate to its central theme and are of the most general interest.

Not the least of the misleading features of the book is found on its title-page. The author entitles himself "Assistant on the United States Geological Survey." The inference of the public naturally is that the work has the sanction or at least the acquiescence of the National Survey. The facts are due to the public and to the survey, and are briefly these: In 1884, on his own application, Professor Wright was employed to trace the border of the drift across Illinois. To this he gave the month of July. Later in the season, and during a part of the following season, he reviewed some of the border phenomena to the east which he had previously studied, chiefly in Ohio and Pennsylvania. This work was done with industry and enthusiasm, but was felt to be seriously defective in discrimination, breadth, and correctness of interpretation, and he was not assigned further work beyond that incidental to the completion of his report. (Bulletin 58, U. S. Geol. Surv.) Geol. Surv.) When he announced his intention of publishing his former work ("The Ice Age in North America ") he was strongly advised against it by the head of the Glacial Division, on the ground of the immaturity of the investigations at that time, and the liability of teaching the public erroneous views. He was explicitly advised that in case he published the work the Survey did not wish to be made in any way responsible, and a termination of relations, then only nominal, was suggested to free himself and the Survey from embarrassment. This wish of the Survey respecting its own relations was disregarded. The title and phraseology of the book convey the impression of approval rather than disapproval. When it was learned that the present volume was in preparation, and that further misuse of former brief relationship was possible, a formal notification that he had been dropped from the Survey was sent by the Secretary of the Interior to Professor Wright. This should have been received in July. Whether received in time for changing the title or not does not greatly alter the case, as the author has had no real connection with the Survey for the past seven years. The case is aggravated by the fact that, while claiming relations to the Survey, the author ignores its most recent and critical work on the formations most involved in his subject. This is a very disagreeable statement to make, but justice to the Survey and the public demand it. T. C. CHAMBERLIN.

Two NOTABLE BOOKS ON ETHICS.*

There have recently appeared in the depart ment of ethics two works of marked ability,namely, Dr. Newman Smyth's "Christian Ethics" and Professor Borden P. Bowne's "The Principles of Ethics." With little similarity in the method of treatment, they are not unlike, either in general plan or in the primary principles which underlie them. Though the title of the first work, "Christian Ethics," might lead to an expectation of a treatment narrower than the full field which belongs to Ethics, and one limited by a single phase of faith, there is little in the book open to this criticism. The principles discussed are termed Christian Ethics rather as assuming their fullest form; and touching their highest point, in Christian life, than as in any way opposed to any The temper of other species of ethical truth.

the author is at once spiritual and liberal, earnest and comprehensive. The work is in no way narrow or dogmatic. With a little shifting of phraseology, it would have the appearance of being a large rendering of our universal experience. The energy of hope and depth of conviction are such as to make the presentation stimulating and instructive to almost all readers. The work is full and complete, covering well both the theoretical and practical sides of the subject.

The author accepts freely both of the two elements, so essential in conduct, the interior power which discerns and enjoins excellence, and the exterior discipline by which alone this power is unfolded and directed.

"The natural history of conscience has been itself determined by conscience." (P. 34.)

"Life, so far as we have any positive science of it, always presupposes life." (P. 35.)

66

Psychologically it is not true that all objects of desire are pleasures,- that pleasure is the only thing desired or chosen. For an object or end of activity may be itself desired, and the pleasure accompanying the choice may be a sign or justification of the choice of it as reasonable, but not necessarily the object of the choice,

the thing immediately desired and willed." (P. 36.) The force of Christian faith in the ethical life of the race is identified with the slow historical development of spiritual truth, itself the leading phase in the unfolding of human history and the divine mind. What evolution is to the natural sciences that is the historic growth of truth in Christian belief.

* CHRISTIAN ETHICS. By Newman Smyth. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS. By Borden P. Bowne. New York: Harper & Brothers.

"The Old Testament marks the period of its imperfect, yet real and growing, vitality and power. The morality of the Old Testament was incomplete, in many respects defective, and neither in its outward sanctions nor its inward motives a final morality for man; yet it was real morality, striving towards better things, growing from a genuine ethical root into the light and fruitfulness of the coming season of divine grace." (P. 60.)

It does not detract, therefore, from the proper authority of the New Testament as the immediate reflection and especially prepared and attested witness to Christ, when we discern in it, as we have already discovered in the Old Testament, signs of a growth in knowledge of Christ, and a progressive Christianization of thought and life by the spirit of Christ. (P. 62.)

"These sacred writings, it is evident from what has just been said, are to be taken as a whole and in the moral and spiritual teaching which issues finally from them, in order that they may constitute a normative authority of faith and practice." (P. 63.)

"Whatever special or unique authority Scripture may have, it cannot have it apart from the Church to which the Holy Ghost has been given. . . We reject, therefore, as one-sided and perilous alike to faith in the Scriptures and to the Christian law of conduct, any view of inspiration which either puts the Bible in absolute supremacy above conscience, or, on the other hand, subordinates entirely the Scriptures to the Christian consciousness of men." (P. 72.)

"The Scripture is law to the Christian consciousness, -to it, not independently of it. The Christian consciousness, all the knowledge and experience, that is, which Christianity has gained of its Christ,- becomes also in its turn law to the Scriptures; — law of their interpretation, of their criticism, of their verification, of the selection and completion of their canon." (P. 73.)

These are most pregnant assertions. Nor is it easy to see how they can be set aside. The divine revelation and those who receive it are in active interplay. They are mutually causes and effects. We cannot give an absolute external authority to the Scriptures aside from this unfolding process without profoundly mistaking their office and restraining their force. This is the leading idea of the book, and a most significant one.

"History in its profoundest significance is a moral and spiritual movement towards the ideal or the highest good." (P. 144.)

"In the Christian moral motive power we discover, therefore, as its deepest and exhaustless source of power, the working of the spirit of Christ. This is not a miraculous grace, instantaneously changing sinful character into all perfection. It is a spiritual Power which works according to moral laws, and through the natural processes of human life. It is the personal influence of the holy spirit with the spirit of man. It is a divine co-working with the human according to the nature of man and the love of God in Christ. It is like the energy of the sunshine in the fruit; it is the life of the vine in the branches." (P. 492.)

We wish to pass but one very secondary criticism on the book. A writer, by virtue of his very vigor, is sometimes obscure. Almost any

words serve with him to carry forward the teeming thought as swollen waters float stones. The constant use by Dr. Smyth of the word "consciousness" for almost any degree or form of conviction, seems to us an example in point. "The Christian consciousness of life," "the Christian consciousness of man,' "the moral consciousness of our age," "the ethical religious consciousness," "the results of analysis of man's moral consciousness,' these are the phrases we meet with constantly. Nothing, on the one hand, can be a more vague, variable, undefined quantity than the Christian consciousness of life. It must stand for all subtle, evanescent ideals floating through a thousand minds gathered up in a coherent expression. But we need, supremely need, and must have, this word "consciousness" to express each man's knowledge of his own mental states, or the sum of these mental states. The author so uses it in the phrase, "the results of analysis of man's moral consciousness." It seems to be a very vicious habit to allow the word "consciousness" to range over the entire field of personal and social experiences even in their most indeterminate forms. We often need to make a very precise appeal to consciousness, and we should restrain the meaning of the word that the appeal may be intelligible.

The second work, by Professor Bowne, does not contain as full a discussion as the volume by Dr. Smyth, but it covers in about the same proportion theoretical and practical morals. Both works attach something like their true importance to existing social problems. Professor Bowne his purpose very conexpresses cisely in the preface:

"Apart from this critical discussion, the work has two leading thoughts. One is the necessity of uniting the intuitive and the experience school of ethics in order to reach any working system. The other is that the aim of conduct is not abstract virtue, but fulness and richness of life." (P. iv.)

With him, as with Dr. Smyth, the mind's ideal, its inner growing grasp of the nature and glory of life, is the supreme thing. There is no more significant assertion in this field than that of the present and eternal inapplicability of dogmatism—exact and final statement,

to it, whether it be religious or scientific dogmatism.

Professor Bowne justly lays great emphasis on the continuous unfolding of moral truth.

"The actual order of graded development in the mental life cannot be understood as a modification of its earliest phases, but only as the successive manifes

tations of a law imminent in the whole development." (P. 10.)

"The ideal does not admit of exhaustive definition; and it exists in any given circumstances chiefly in a perception of the direction in which human worth and dignity lie. Hence its actual contents vary with mental and moral development, but the sense of direction is fairly constant." (P. 117.)

The manner in which intuitive and empirical morals are united is indicated in the following passage:

"Schleiermacher has shown that there are three Each leading moral ideas, the good, duty, and virtue. of these is essential in a system which is to express the complete moral consciousness of the race. Where there is no good to be reached by action, there can be no rational duty, and with the notion of duty vanishes also that of virtue. Again, where there is no sense of duty, but only a calculation of consequences, we have merely a system of prudence. This may be good enough in its way, but it lacks moral quality. Such conduct may be natural and allowable, but it is not regarded as virtuous. For in such conduct we miss all reference to the moral agent. It is a matter of wit and shrewdness only, and is not a manifestation of virtuous character." (P. 20.) The pleasures of life, very various, and recognized more or less distinctly in their variable value, constitute the only field in which moral quality could be devoloped; but their moral, rational rule is not, therefore, identical with these enjoyments or subject to them. Out of this material it constructs an ideal excellence, more, far more, than the simple sum of its parts.

"The ideal good is conscious life in the full development of all its normal possibilities; and the actual good is greater or less as this ideal is more or less approximated." (P. 69.)

"We must now inquire into the form and contents of this inner law. This may be called subjective ethics, as being the law founded, not in a consideration of objective consequences, but in the nature and insight of the moral subject himself, or as being the law which the moral subject imposes upon himself." (P. 98.)

The relation of ethics and religion is this: "Our moral nature has not been transformed, but the conditions of its best unfolding have been furnished. It is the same life but very different. The relations and meanings of things have changed. Rights grow more sacred; duties enlarge, and the sense of obligation deepens." (P. 202.)

These passages sufficiently indicate the trend of the work. The discussion is penetrative and quickening throughout, making the perusal of the book worth while, I was about to say, even though the theme is so familiar; perhaps it would be better to say, because a theme so familiar has new light shot into it. Professor Bowne has a very vigorous and analytical mind. He takes to philosophy as a duck to water. He is occasionally open to the criticism that, with his ready strokes, he gives