shown by M. Perrot's collaborator, the architect Charles Chippiez, whose name has been associated with Perrot's throughout the course of his researches, and has an equal place on the title page of each published volume. Without the Without the help of the exquisite drawings of M. Chippiez, it would be impossible to gain a full conception of the vast extent and rich detail of the special creations of the art peculiar to Persia. It was imposing, it had various original features, and yet M. Perrot tells us it was imitative, taken as a whole. He even questions if foreign artists were not employed at the bidding of the king, to construct works which illustrated his greatness but could not have sprung from the genius of a people enslaved from generation to generation. He finds in the monotony of design and treatment characterizing the monuments of every sort, in the absence of spontaneity and natural vigor, abundant proof that they who planned, as they who wrought, in the various departments of Persian art, toiled to gratify the pleasure of a sovereign master, and not to give expression to ideas that were the heritage and outgrowth of the popular mind.

The history of art in Phrygia, Lydia, Caria, and Lycia, is treated by M. Perrot with his unvarying knowledge and fidelity. Less important than that of Persia, it is less inviting; nevertheless, it could not be spared from the general connection. It supplies links in the chain the author has been slowly welding to unite the art products of the oldest historical nations in one unbroken series with those which in ancient Greece became the crowning glory of the classical world. The two volumes are prodigally illustrated with full-page and minor engravings of the best workmanship. That dealing with Persia contains, in addition, twelve steel and colored plates of extreme beauty. SARA A. HUBBARD.

ENGLAND'S INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL

HISTORY.*

As the later methods of economic study have tended to lead investigators away from abstract theories to the analysis and interpretation of industrial facts, it is very desirable that competent authors select and arrange the leading facts of economic life, statistically and

*THE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND. By the late James E. Thorold Rogers. Edited by his son, Arthur G. L. Rogers. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

historically. For the preparation of books of this kind, probably no man of the present generation has been better equipped than was the late Professor Thorold Rogers. In his great work on the "History of Prices in England," and in his "Six Centuries of Work and Wages, he laid a basis of fact for the testing of many of our economic theories and for the working out of new ones. His posthumous work on The Industrial and Commercial History of England," consisting of two courses of lectures delivered at Oxford, is not to be considered as of so much importance as either of the two preceding works; but nevertheless, written by a man so competent to discuss the question in hand, it is one that is very valuable and interesting. I say interesting, for two reasons. The details of the development of industrial skill in England, of the making of new inventions, of progress in population, of the development of credit agencies and of means of transit, of chartered trade companies, joint stock companies, etc., cannot fail to interest anyone who has any taste for the study of economics or for business. business. When to this is added the author's love for a good hit at one of his contemporaries of whose economic doctrines he disapproves, or for an entertaining story, the interest is increased.

Rogers's lecture writing is not of the dignified dry style that some consider essential for the statement of scientific doctrines or scientific facts. A new story of Arkwright, in telling which he trusts that he is not anticipating "the excellent Mr. Smiles," not merely illustrates, as he says, "how active the minds of English inventors in the North were during the period which followed on the peace of Paris, when a new world was opened to the energy of the British shop-keeper and merchant," but it illustrates his manner as well. When Arkwright had almost perfected his first power-loom, "he found that the yarn as it was delivered from the rollers had a queer and fatal trick of curling back." Calling in a local blacksmith to his aid, the latter told him that he thought he could cure the trouble; but his terms for the service were "ten years' partnership and equal profits."

"This was too much for Arkwright, who, like Naaman of old, turned and went away in a rage; but still the yarn curled and dashed his hopes. At last, he reluctantly yielded to the blacksmith. Then occurred another scene. The blacksmith thought the deed of partnership should be executed and enrolled. Arkwright stormed, and, I regret to say, swore violently; but the local Vulcan was firm. When the deed was signed, the blacksmith went behind the rollers and apparently rubbed one of them with his hand. Instantly the yarn

was delivered as was wished, and the astonished and enraged Arkwright found that his new partner had only rubbed one of the rollers with a piece of chalk; in other words, proved that one of them should have a different surface from the other. The execrations of the enraged manufacturer were unspeakable; but the compact held, and in the end the blacksmith became Lord Belper."

The second course of lectures gives us more economic doctrine, treating the subjects of Waste, Rent, Bimetallism, Trade and Competition, etc., closing with a brief review, in two chapters, of English Economic Legislation from 1815 up to the present time.

Though the book is devoted to the industrial history of England, the author gives us much valuable information with reference to the development of industry in other countries of Europe-Holland, Belgium, France, Germany,

their experience being cited wherever it can throw light upon the causes of English development or add pith to the matter by comparison. This book shows, as do the other works of Professor Rogers, his remarkable learning in facts, his intolerance toward those who differ from him in method, his sense of humor, and his sound judgment on many important questions of the time. The lectures on Waste, Contracts for the Use of Land, Competition, etc., contain much excellent material for every-day political and family life.

A few sentences from the close of his first lecture give us a specimen of his habit of wholesale praise or blame usually blame,with a touch of his political wisdom and a hint of his opinion of our wisdom.

"Even though Europe has profited by peace during two-thirds of a generation, I see no reason to think that British industry and invention are losing their hold on the world's progress, or that, as was the case some centuries ago, our people have to be taught by foreign

ers.

On the contrary, the German has not got beyond the position of an imitator, and not an over-honest one either. The United States have made no great discoveries. And so with the rest of the nations. Nor is the cause far to seek. These political communities had deliberately adopted protection. Governments have been too weak or too dishonest to be sensible, and are consequently crippling the intelligence of those whose affairs they administer, by pandering to the foolish, dangerous, and wholly unjust dictum, that private interests are public benefits."

The last sentence of the book adds to this a sample of his humor, and shows that he thinks as little of English political methods as of our own. Speaking of the income tax and of his own efforts to have the tax system of England modified, he says:

"I am not conscious of any bias in what I have said or say, when I allege that the extraordinary expendi

ture of government seems likely to be provided, as it has been in recent years, from the most unfair, indefensible, and nearly the most mischievous tax that can be devised. But as the Patriarch said, Issachar is a strong ass, and if, as some say, we are descended from the lost tribes, I make a shrewd guess at the particular tribe to which we must assign our origin."

The work is a valuable one, and will be used, doubtless, in many of our colleges as a work of reference for students of history and economics. Indeed, for a special course in our largest institutions, it will by many be considered the best text-book obtainable on the subject. JEREMIAH W. JENKS.

SOME RECENT DISCUSSIONS OF RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY.*

The liberal movement in religious thought represents the vital religious impulse of the time. time. It is not a movement away from religion, it is a movement towards religion-a searching of the true religious spirit for a more adequate expression of itself. This movement is, of course, but a part of the larger movement towards freedom, which shows itself also in politics and philosophy. It is everywhere the attempt to bring the spirit and vital truth in the place of forms and formulæ. Men want the reality, as never before; and they want it as little as possible encumbered with outer wrappings. Whatever be the "breadth" of our individual opinions, it is important that all should recognize that the liberal demand for a re-statement of religious truth is serious, sober, determined, and an expression of the religious spirit. One of the evidences of this may be found in the number of strong books of a liberal tendency that issue in these days from the press. A few of them are grouped together here.

A frequent criticism of the "New Theology" is that it does not define its position. Men say that they cannot tell whether to accept it or not, as they do not clearly know what it is. Ex-President Bascom's book, "The New Theology," makes a good point right at the outset

*THE NEW THEOLOGY. By John Bascom. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

ANTHROPOLOGICAL RELIGION. The Gifford Lectures for 1891. By F. Max Müller. New York: Longmans, Green & Co. WHAT IS REALITY? By Francis Howe Johnson. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

EVOLUTION AND ITS RELATION TO RELIGIOUS THOUGHT. By Joseph Le Conte. (New edition.) New York: Appleton & Co.

THE SPIRIT OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. By Josiah Royce. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

by insisting that the New Theology is not a creed but a tendency. It consists, indeed, "largely in breaking old bonds and in refusing to accept new ones" (p. 1). It cannot, therefore, fairly be asked to define its position. Movements in thought, like the Kingdom of God, come not with observation; their character is discernible only by those who feel and know them within themselves. Still, some expression can be given of its general spirit. By the New Theology, Dr. Bascom understands "An awakening in religious thought which leads it to seek for more flexible, less rigid; more productive, less barren; more living, less dead forms of expression and action, and by means of them to come fully under the progressive movement which belongs to our time as one of enlarged knowledge and renewed social life" (p. 2).

He sees

A corollary of the inwardness of new movements of thought is the fact that accounts of them are necessarily somewhat subjective. No one man can hope to make entirely his own a great contemporaneous movement. only phases of it, and most clearly those that have affected him, or that he shares. We must not be surprised, therefore, to find that Dr. Bascom's conception of the New Theology his criticisms of the old ways of thinking, and especially his ideas as to what considerations will best help us over our present theological difficulties is strongly colored by his personal philosophy, and by what has been transpiring within his own inner consciousness.

The book consists of an Introduction and five Essays, entitled respectively, "Naturalism," "The Supernatural," "Dogmatism," "Pietism," and "Spiritualism." The Introduction shows a wide-awake appreciation of many of the religious characteristics of the present time the alienation of the masses from the churches, the diminished importance of dogmas and creeds, the moralization of religion, etc. The main thought running through the essays seems to be that the situation brought about by the advancement of science calls especially for a new definition of the spheres of the natural and supernatural, and that from a just settlement of their relation religious thought should go on, after appropriating the good and rejecting the evil in Dogmatism and Pietism, to the form of a true Spiritualism. Were it possible, it would be a pleasure to follow through the argument of these chapters. They each contain very much that is excellent and that is well said. Only a few points can be noted. The author contends for the extension of the sphere of law to the spiritual world. The

truths of revelation would then no longer be understood as received contrary to reason. In the natural and necessary formation of dogmas, it is essential to allow for change under the advancement of knowledge. The mistake of dogma is to claim absolute certainty and finality. Putting thoughts in formulæ, in finally fixed forms, is the death-blow of progress. Dogmas are necessary and very helpful, but only when held loosely and susceptible of modification with increasing experience. The fault of Pietism is its narrowness. It is a heated centre. It misses the breadth of life. It is other-worldly. It fails to see that salvation consists in a dutiful life. It thinks to remedy the loss of the church's power, because of its dogmatic inflexibility, by mere lung-power expended upon the few most important doctrines. The Spiritualism of a higher life is the condition of progress and true salvation. It is a "subjection of the entire life to the higher laws which spring up in apprehension of the true, the beautiful, and the good" (p. 196). This is the life of the Spirit. It gives us, by true penetrative insight, the thoughts and principles of Christ, without a dogmatic theology. Somewhat after the manner of "Ecce Homo," the author then lets the chief teachings of Christ speak for themselves.

Perhaps the book as a whole wants strong and clear outlines. It shows much vigor of statement and skilful argument, but still hardly coherent presentation. And, together with much freshness in his way of putting things, it is to be feared that the author retains enough of the old phraseology to prejudice at times his reader's chance of getting his thought.

There are few more striking evidences of the progress made in the free discussion of religious questions than are to be found in the terms of the munificent bequest of the late Lord Gifford, of Scotland, which established lectureships in Natural Theology at the four Scottish Universities. tish Universities. As an expression of religious toleration, the entire trust-deed is a highly interesting document: perhaps the provision respecting the qualifications of the lecturers is sufficiently noteworthy to warrant being quoted in full. It reads:

"The lecturers appointed shall be subjected to no test of any kind, and shall not be required to take any oath, or to emit or subscribe any declaration of belief, or to make any promise of any kind: they may be of any denomination whatever, or of no denomination at all (and many earnest and high-minded men prefer to belong to no ecclesiastical denomination); they may be of any religion or way of thinking, or, as is sometimes said, they

may be of no religion, or they may be so-called sceptics, or agnostics, or free-thinkers, provided only that the 'patrons' will use diligence to secure that they be able, reverent men, true thinkers, sincere lovers of and earnest inquirers after truth."

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66

Professor Max Müller was appointed, in 1888, to the lectureship at Glasgow, and delivered, in that year and the following, two courses of lectures upon "Natural Religion" and "Physical Religion" respectively. Being reappointed for another two years, he has now followed with the lectures upon "Anthropological Religion," and promises to conclude with a series upon "Psychological Religion." These series of lectures are of course continuous, each in turn unfolding some important part of the general subject of Natural Religion. They ought, accordingly, to be taken together. Their connection may be briefly indicated as follows: The volume on "Natural Religion" lays the foundation for the rest by a full discussion of (1) the definition of Natural Religion, (2) the proper method of its treatment, and (3) the materials available for its study. The lectures on Physical Religion" undertake to show that from the contemplation of nature man inevitably comes to believe in an invisible cause of nature; and, similarly, those on Anthropological Religion" seek to show that from the contemplation of himself man as inevitably comes to believe in the existence of his own soul, and in its immortality. The author declares that the purpose of the whole series is to show that religion is natural to man by historical investigation rather than by à priori reasoning. The question whether he has succeeded in all the details of the attempt must be left to specialists in the fields of philological and ethnological research. Certainly no one who believes that all revelation has really been through the human consciousness elevated, to be sure, at the time by so rare and supreme an insight as to be properly called "divine" would have any à priori difficulty with the author's general thesis. Some allowance must of course be made for the circumstances of a public lectureship; but none the less it seems a misfortune that so much of the space of a serious scientific book should have to be given up to controversy and mere recapitulation. On the whole, "Anthropological Religion presents very little of philosophical interest, and, in the opinion of a layman, not much that is new. The concluding course on "Psychological Religion," may perhaps be expected to offer more that is suggestive to the philosophical student.

son.

A book of far greater philosophical ambition is "What is Reality?" by Francis Howe JohnThe sub-title more nearly indicates its purpose "An Inquiry as to the Reasonableness of Natural Religion, and the Naturalness. of Revealed Religion." The Preface declares that the object of the book is "to show that the premises of religion are as real as any part of man's knowledge; and that the method by which its vital truths are deduced from these premises are no less legitimate than those employed by science." If it shall prove that Mr. Johnson had carried out this important undertaking to the satisfaction of large numbers of thinking men, the present generation will certainly owe him a very large intellectual debt. The present writer, however, cannot think that he has been altogether successful. The introductory chapter is progressive, courageous, clear-sighted, and intellectually honest; and, especially by its swift and apparently masterful movement, fills one with high and confident expectation. But the subsequent handling of the argument hardly justifies this expectation.

The first point to make clear is the relation of the problem of reality to the author's special thesis. Stated in a word, it is this: If the faith of religion is to be able to claim an equally verifiable basis with the "truths" of science, it must be shown that spirit is a reality. What, therefore, is Reality? Mr. Johnson at once answers this question, and develops the principles which he wishes to apply to timely theological matters, somewhat as follows: The ego as active immediately knows itself as real. This is the "complex ego of experience; the ego, plus all the relation that it sustains to all other forms of being." This human ego, "the largest, most comprehensive reality of experimental synthesis," is the "reality from which all man's knowledge takes its start," the basis, therefore, of all safe philosophizing (pp. 138, 227, 241). This fundamental reality, the concrete human ego, is a dual reality. It exhibits a two-fold aspect. It is both one and many. First, it is the chief unit in the physical organism, "the intelligent and supreme head of a great and diverse multitude of organically connected living agents" (p. 241), the centre and even creator of its own world of manifold activities (pp. 137, 138). Yet, on the other hand, it is an aggregate of individuals, it "embraces within itself an untold multitude of beings." We may find a symbol of its being as a many in a "combination of atoms"

(p. 195). Hence the ego is a "unity in multiplicity." We must conceive of it as "embracing a diversity of beings, that are distinct yet inter-related, and comprehended in the higher personal unity" (Contents, p. xiv.). The ego is at once transcendent a distinct, separate, overruling being; and immanent the very life of the subordinate beings themselves. But this fact of "being within being," of life within life," is wholly unintelligible. How it is that one being can consist of many, will forever remain a mystery. We are accordingly obliged to employ these principles in turn, to look first on one side of this "doublefaced fact," and then on the other. The two cannot be united in thought (pp. 222-4, 243). If asked whether the principles of transcendency and immanency are not contradictory of each other, the answer is that we cannot prove that they are not; we can only point to the fact that they are combined in experience (p. 252).

Now the conception of the human ego, as a mysterious unity in complexity, becomes in Mr. Johnson's hands a master-key for unlocking all problems. Extending it by analogy to the Divine Being, God may be thought of as the ego of the universe, at once immanent and transcendent (p. 251); and our relations to Him and to each other are therein to find their explanation. Moreover, by this conception of combined immanence and transcendence the author finds it possible to assimilate evolution, and progressive views of revelation, miracles, etc., to one religious faith.

With the author's main conclusions, so far as they are positive, we have no quarrel. Our complaint is rather with their incompleteness

with that unsolved, mysterious, perhaps selfcontradictory"double-faced fact," "these two realities, coëxistent, but not harmonized in our experience" (p. 224), and with the method by which they have been reached. Mr. Johnson frequently uses the term organic unity, but plainly has in mind a half-mechanical, halfchemical unity. Had he been fortunate enough to study the great Idealists without the assistance of Lotze, and especially of Mr. Seth, he might have got a clear grasp of this conception, which he seems always on the point of getting, but never fairly gets, and which would have enabled him to conclude without supposed mystery and contradiction in his fundamental principle. He might then have learned that the ego as unity, as transcendent, is not distinct and separate, not a chief unit, or master monad,

among the others, but the ideal whole, the law of the whole. The unity of transcendency and immanency means that the law of the whole is at once indwelling in the members and dominant over their life, and yet the law is nothing but the working together of the members themselves. And, moreover, it would then have ceased to be a matter of difficulty that the "how of this combination" can never be conceived. "How" is an empirical problem. It has to do with spatial and temporal order. There is no "how" of spiritual activity (but this does not imply that it does not follow law). The "how connected with spiritual activity can refer only to the order of the physical aspect correlated with the spiritual. To ask the question, then, shows that the mind is set on a mechanical problem is thinking in terms of space and mechanical causation. must be admitted, however, that organic unity as conceived by Mr. Johnson is mysterious and unintelligible, because it implies a direct

contradiction.

It

This failure to grasp the real nature of organic unity is fundamental, and leaves a logical blemish upon nearly all of the author's work. Thorough minds, moreover, will probably not be satisfied with his appeal to man's immediate consciousness in determining the prime reality which is to furnish the startingpoint, with the fact that he does not tell us definitely and fully what the characteristics of reality are, and most of all with his reliance upon an analogy for the nerve of his whole argument as to the nature of the Divine Being and the reality of the world. Why rely on an analogy, when a necessary conclusion from given facts yields the result with certainty? Human self-consciousness implies the Absolute Spirit with a necessity that can be demonstated. But this criticism ought not to be allowed to obscure the fact that Mr. Johnson has produced a well-written, strong book, which will be suggestive and helpful to many minds, even though it fails, as we think, in method, and in leaving a residual mystery.

Perhaps no hypothesis in the whole history of thought has been of a more profoundly revolutionary character, as regards religious belief, than the modern doctrine of Evolution. If it has not disturbed thought so violently as other innovations, that is because the rapid succession of great scientific discoveries in modern times has accustomed the world to receive new and startling truths with more composure. Of its emphatically revolutionary