PREFACE

To the FOURTH EDITION.

HE author of the following letters is too

THE

well acquainted with human nature, to bet in the leaft furprised at the reception they have met with; that is, that they have been much liked, much cenfured, and little affented to: Truth, he knows, has at all times been so received; -for, tho' by her native beauty the is fure to charm, yet from her repugnancy to moft men's interefts, fhe is feldom welcome: politicians are afraid of her, parties deteft her, and all profeffions agree, that he is mad, and very dangerous if fuffered to go about in public: he knows, that mankind live all in masquerade, and that whoever presumes to come amongst them barefaced must expect to be abused by the whole affembly: he could therefore have no motive for thus imparting his free fentiments to the public, except the dictates of his own heart, which tell him, that it is every man's duty, who comes into the world, to ufe his best endea

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endeavours, however infignificant, to leave it as much wiser, and as much better as he can. Induced by this motive alone, he at first undertook this Inquiry; and now, actuated by the fame principle, and unprovoked by all the fenfeless misapprehenfions, and malicious mifconstructions, with which it has been tortured, he will here, with all poffible conciseness, endeavour to explain thofe parts of it, which have been fo mifunderstood, or misrepresented, and give fatisfaction to all, who are either able or willing to understand it.

THE first letter treats of Evils in general, and endeavours to prove, that they all owe their exiftence, not to any voluntary admiffion of a benevolent Creator, but to the neceffity of their own natures, that is, to the impoffibility of excluding them from any fyftem of created Beings whatever; and that in all fuch fyftems, however wifely contrived, they must have, and muft at all times have had a place. Against this, but one mateArial objection has been urged; which is this, that, in order to make room for this neceffity of Evil, the real exiftence of a paradifiacal state is reprefented as at all times impoffible; and confequently, the Mofaic Account of that ftate is utterly exaploded, on which the whole fabric of the Chrif tian Religion is erected. How far the literal belief of that account is effential to the true faith of a Christian, need not be here decided; because

caufe not the leaft mention of it is made in this letter and therefore this objection is intirely founded on a mistake. The argument there made ufe of, is only this, that fome have endeavoured to justify the goodness of God from the introduction of Evil, by afferting, that at the beginning there was no fuch thing, but that, at first, all creation came out of his omnipotent hand, endued with abfolute perfection, and free from all Evil, both natural and moral: to fhew, that this was an ancient opinion, fome lines are quoted from Ovid's Metamorphofis, defcribing the Golden Age, in fuch a state of perfect happiness and innocence; on which the Author, thinking them to be no part of any one's creed, imagined himself at liberty to observe, that from the nature of man, and the nature of this terreftrial globe, which he inhabits, the real existence of fuch a fate feemed impoffible; and therefore, that these descriptions. of it could be nothing more, than amufing dreams, and inchanting fables. This bears not the leaft reference to the Mofaic account of Paradife, in which fuch a state of abfolute perfection, void of all Evil, is fo far from being defcribed, that the Serpent, or the Devil, the parent of all Evil, is one of the principal characters of that Hiftory; which therefore by no means contradicts the propofition here afferted.

THE fecond Letter undertakes to fhew, that Evils of Imperfection are in truth no Evils at all; but only the abfence of comparative good, refulting folely from the neceffary inferiority of fome Beings with regard to others, which cannot be prevented in a system of creation, whose very effence confifts in a chain of subordination, defcending from infinite perfection to abfolute nothing. To this likewife one objection only has been made; which is, that no fuch chain of fubordinate Beings, reaching from infinite perfection to abfolute nothing, can, in fact, exift; for this notable reafon: because no being can approach next to infinite perfection; nor any be contiguous to nothing. But this argument being no more than a quibble on metaphysical terms, to which no precife ideas are affixed, neither deserves, nor is capable of an answer.

The third Letter treats of Natural Evils; and attempts to fhew that most of these, which we complain of, are derived likewife from the fame fource; that is, from the imperfection of our natures, and our ftation in the univerfat system: to this are added three conjectures; first, that many of our miseries may be owing to fome fecret, but invincible difpofition in the nature of things, that renders it impracticable to produce pleasure exclusive of pain; a certain degree of

which must therefore be endured by individuals, for the happiness and well-being of the whole: fecondly, that many other of our miseries may be inflicted on us by the agency of fuperior Beings, to whose benefit they may poffibly be as conducive as the deaths and fufferings of inferior animals are to ours, and, laftly, that by the ancient doctrine of Transmigration, the miferies, which for the fake of general utility we are obliged to fuffer in one life, may be recompenced in another, and fo the divine goodness be fufficiently juftified from the admiffion of them all. To every one of these fome objections have been made: against the first, it has been alledged, that this impracticability to produce pleasure, without pain, whence arifes this utility of the sufferings of individuals for the good of the whole, is merely a production of the Author's own daring imagination, founded on no reason, and fupported by no proof. To which he answers, that he propofes it as a conjecture only; but cannot think it ill-founded, fince it is confirmed by the appearance of every thing around us, and fince it is reasonable to believe, that a benevolent Creator would not have permitted his creatures to have fuffered on any other terms. In ridicule of the fecond conjecture, it has been asked, with an air of humour, whether we can think it credible, that fuperior beings fhould ride, or hunt, or roaft, or eat us, as we make use of inferior animals? Which question