« السابقةمتابعة »
Mild Solitude, in veil of ruffet 'die,
And zoneless robe that trails along the ground.
Each soft indulgence nature framed to share ; Pomp, wealth, renown, dominion, all resign'd,
Ohafte to Pleasure's bower; for Love is there. , Love, the desire of Gods! the feast of heaven!
Yet to earth’s favour'd offspring not denyd!
Enllave to fame, or sacrifice to pride.
I hat cup is death, if he with-hold applause. .
And Hace that works the harrass'd soul to forin; But woo Content to breathe her foothing lay,
And charm from Fancy's view each angry form. : No savage joy th' harmonious hours profane !
Whom love refines can barbarous tumult please? Shall rage of blood pollute the sylvan reign ?
Shall keisuie wanton in the spoils of Peace?? Free let the feathery race indulge the fong,
Inhale the liberal beam and melt in love; Free let the fleet hind bound her hills along,
And in pure fireams the watery nations rove. To jcy in Nature's universal finile, i
Well suit:, O Man, thy pleasurable sphere; But why should Virtue doom thy years to toil!
Aħ, why should Virtue's law be decni'd severe! What meed, Beneficence, thy care repays ?
What, Sympathy, thy still returning pang?
Or froward wish of discontent fulfil,
But blames with keen reproach thy partial will.
Of human woes, how impotent thy !irile! , High o'er thy mounds devouring surges ride, .. Nor reck thy bafited coil:, or lavish d l.fo.
The The bower of bliss, the smile of love be thine,
Unlabour'd ease, and leisures careless dream.
And own her charms beyond compare supreme !" Mr. Beattie sometime ago publithed a volume of poems which were, or at least deserved to have been, favourably received. See Review, Vol. XXIV. p. 393. We wish this Writer would, for the future, be more attentive to his rhymes, nor suffer his ear to be milled by the northern pronunciation : Vide the inftancés printed in Italics, .
The Laws agains Ingrossing, Forestalling, Regrating, and monopo
lizing. Containing all the Statutes and adjudged Cases concerning them. Compiled by Desire of a Great Personage, for the Use of the Magistrates in Town and Country; in order to point out the Defects in the Law, as it now stands, relative to these Offences ; and, to propose such Expedients for remedying them as they shall think necessary. By Stephen Browne, Esq; Formerly Judge of his Majesty's Court of Admiralty, and one of the Justices of the Grand Court. in Jamaica, 8vo, 2 s. 6d. Withy,
THE laws against the above-mentioned offences are here,
I stated in a very full and accurate manner; and notwithstanding they may, in some particulars, be deemed defective, yet. such as they are, were they but vigorously put in force, there would not be so many grievances resulting from the pernicious practices, which have lately more than ever been the subject of
practiceai complainali well. Sadelmen, ning in
The policy of all well-governed states has eyer been directed to check the rapacity of tradesmen, whose self-interest prompts them to use every artifice for obtaining inordinate profit : and the Athenian laws were so strict in this respect, that they even made it penal in a trader to sell a commodity at a less price than was at first offered him.
With regard to our laws respecting the above offences, they labour under one disadvantage which is common to all penal laws, that is, the odium attending the character of an informer. But instead of pụnishing the breach of the law, the best policy would be, if possible, to prevent the offence : and perhaps it would contribute greatly to this end, if farmers, &c. were put under an obligation of bringing their goods to an open market: which might be done by abolishing the offices of salesinen, factors, and all intermediate agents, who only serve to enhance the price of commodities; for the greater number of hands they
pass through, the dearer they must come to the consumer, as a profit must be made by every one concerned.
We are sensible, however, that this would be a nice experiment to make, and such a one as should not be attempted per fultum.
Letters, on the Force of Imagination in Pregnant Imen. Wherein
it is proved, by inconteftible Aguments, drawn both from Reason and Experience, that it is a ridiculous Prejudice to suppose it porfible for a pregnant Woman to mark her Child with the Figure of
any Object fize has longed for. 12mo. 2s. Griffin. M H E academy of sciences at Petersburg proposed, among
their prize questions a few years ago, the following query ; . Whether the imagination of pregnant women did really affect the feetus; if so, how far, and what were the physical causes of such affection ?' Whether the letters before us were written in consequence of this academical prize, we know not; but we are much mistaken if they were penned originally in English ; the philosophy of them being evidently much fuperior to their style.
Many persons of learning, says the Writer, have endeavoured to overturn the common prejudice of the force of imagination in pregnant women, but with little success; some of them demying or concealing the facts which seem to authorize it; while others have treated the subject in too abstruse a manner, and in too technical a stile to instruct or convince those who are principally interested in its investigation. Whether our Author hath fucceeded better than his predecessors, the effect his letters may have on the fair fex will probably soon determine.
The propositions, which the Letter-writer undertakes to prove, are, that pregnant women cannot mark the infant in the womb, with the figure of those things which particularly affect them, or for which they are said to long; because the mother cannot communicate her ideas, her apprehenfiors, or fears, to the infant; and that cven if this communication were possible, and the infant fentible of the mother's passions, yet the child could not experience any other effects therefrom, than those which the mother herself experienced ; and since there never was an instance of the mother's being marked herself with the figure of what the longed for, or was particularly affected by, it is equally impossible for the child to be marked with those objects : all the external marks, which have been ridiculously ascribed ta the force of imagination, being the consequences of the mechanism, which fecundaces the egg, that incloses the first rudiments of the infant.
In regard to the communication of ideas between the mother and child ; the Writer enters into metaphysical arguments A priori, in order to disprove the supposition of Malbranche on this head. We conceive, however, that not only the principles he advances, are juftly controvertible ; but that even his reafonings are sometimes false. Not that we mean to say, they affect the main design of the Author's argument; which is rufa ficiently supported by practical reasons deduced more certainly a pofteriori. We judged it not amiís, however, to put him in mind, that the postulata he assumes respecting the foul, the animal spirits and the mechanism of thought, are by no means universally allowable; so that his deductions from such principles have not chat demonstrative force he pretends. But, be this as it may, we conceive the Writer hath undertaken a very superfluous and unnecessary task, in endeavouring to disprove the communication of ideas to the mind, or as he calls it, the soul of the fetus. It had been excusable to have disputed this point with Malbranche before the days of Mr. Locke; but the absurdity of the supposition is fufficiently obvious to all, who have learned any thing from that great philofopher, of the nature of our ideas, and the manner of acquiring them.
Admitting, however, that a child in the womb has not, nor can acquire any ideas, by communication from those of the mother, it does noi, in our opinion, necessarily follow, that it cannot be affected by her passions. Our philosopher says "every Dellion supposes an idea; fo that if the mother cannot coinmunicate her pafsions she cannot communicate her ideas.' We are afraid there is some want of accuracy in this reasoning; as there is a very wide difference betweeen paflion and intellect, nor do our affections and our ideas proceed from the same fource. But even this point is not altogether necessary to be insisted on. It may be admitted that the passions and affections of the mother have an influence on her child, without concluding that the body of an infant must be marked with the determinate figure of the object, which might excite such passion or affection. We need not go so far as to affert with our Author, that the union bea twixt the mother and child is entirely corporeal, in which the soul has not the least share ; the arguments he adduccs in fup. port of his main point, are sufficiently cogent without it. "The imagination of the mother, says he, could not mark the child with the figure of any object but through the means of the blood or animal spirits ; tri mark the child by means of the blood, the general movement of the mass of blood, and the particular motion of its component particles, must be entirely subservient to the influence of the soul. Reason and experience convince us of the contrary, the blood circulites, the particles of the blood are divided, are reunited, and distributed to different parts, the
body body receives its nourishment and growth from it: different parts of the body are deprived of it and perish, independent of our will. The imagination of the mother is equally weak with regard to the blood which passes to the body of the child, she can neither regulate the motion or quantity of it, she cannot stop those particles from passing, which occasion diseases or death to the infant. Every thing is according to the laws of circulation entirely mechanical : hence it appears that the imagination of pregnant women cannot by means of the blood mark the bodies of their infants with the figures of those things which they longed for.'
As a farther confirmation of the mere corporeal and mechanic cal connection between the mother and child, the Author en'ters into an examination of the power of the mother's imagination over the body of the infant, in regard to the addition of any new parts, or the destruction of those already formed. It hath been advanced, he says, 'that the mother's being frightened at the sight of the claw of a lobster is the reason of an infant's being born wanting some of its fingers, that the meeting a maimed person is the cause of an infant's being born without an hand; by having heard speak of a monster with many heads, the imagination of the mother has occasioned another head to grow on the neck of the child ; in short the unexpected meeting of an animal which has surprized and frighted the pregnant woman, has occasioned the child to resemble that animal. But, suppose the imagination of the mother can mark the infant with the resemblance of what particularly affected her, its power must be consequently confined to represent those objects only of which she can have an idea : I observed in the preceeding letter, that the mother can have a knowlege of the external surfaces of objects only, that she neither has nor can have any knowlege of their internal structure, their connexions, nor proportions. The parts added to the body of the infant have an internal arrangement which the mother cannot be acquainted with. Can the imagination of the mother then produce that which she is igno. rant of, which never struck her fancy, and which the cannot have any idea of? This is certainly imposible. These parts are organized, have a form and internal disposition of parts like the other parts of the infant; they must then have the same origin. :The mother who cannot by the force of her imagination create an infant, cannot by the same effort create the least part of one: but can she efface and destroy those parts which are already formed ? If the mother could by the force of imagination des Itroy a part of an infant, she could by the same effort of her imagination destroy an whole infant. Were this the case how efficacious then would remorse and shame be to preserve female honour honour . . . . . . . . .