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who demonstrated by reason what is confirmed by the evidence of our senses, in our experience of perceptible objects.'
1. The success of experiments, continues our philosopher, serves to confirm the suggestions or conclusions of reason; even as the methods of proving the truth of arithmetical operations serve to detect and prevent error, when the calculations are tedious and intricate. It is this circumstance also which includes the difference between the knowlege of men and brutes. The knowlege of the latter is purely empirical, and is founded on mere experience; for, as far as we are able to judge of their intellects, they seem incapable of forming necessary or abstract propositions. Whereas the human understanding is, on the contrary, qualified to invent hypotheses and forni fyftematical plans of abstracted science. The inferences deduced by the brutes, are like those of mere empirics, who presume that whatever hath fometimes happened, must happen again in circumstances that appear to them the same, without knowing whether the same causes subsist. Hence it is that mankind find it so easy to deceive the brutes, and that empirics are so liable to commit blunders. And hence it is, also, that persons, whose knowlege depends merely on age and experience, are not exempt from the like fallibility ; especially when they depend too much on paft experience, as if what hath once happened in civil and military affairs, must necessarily happen again. Whereas they should consider how much the world is subject to change ; and that mankind, every day growing wiser, or at least more knowing and artificial, discover numerous methods of counter-action and prevention, which were unknown to their ancestors. In the mean time, it is certain that the brutes of the present times are no more artful or preventive than those of antiquity *. The logic of the brutes, is but the mere fhadow of reasoning; it is the simple connection of ideas, or the transition from the perception of one image to that of another : for, in any new situation, bearing resemblance to a preceding one, they expect of course the former event to follow, as if things in themselves were thus actually connected, because the ideas of them are so connected in their memory. It is certain that reason directs us, in the common course of things, to model our future expectations from the outlines of past experience; but we are not thence to conclude that such experience involves a necessary and infallible truth. On the contrary, it is possible that our most
* It is our business here fimply to exhibit, and not to controvert, the arguments of the Author. We cannot help obferving, however, that this sentiment is by no means applicable to particular animals, especially those of the domestic kind; no:withstanding it be true with regard to the comparative knowlege of men and brutes in general.
rational rational expectations, when founded merely on past experience, may be suddenly disappointed, from a change of circumstances. It is for this reason that philosophers never depend very firmly on mere matters of fact ; but endeavour to penetrate into the motives or efficient causes of such fact; in order to qualify themselves to judge where they are to make exceptions to general rules. For it is from reason only that we are capable of laying down sure and certain general sules, and of supplying those which are not such, with proper exceptions; by which means, and by which only, we may hope at length to arrive at those absolute connections, which subfift between the causes of things and their necessary consequences. It is the knowlege of these connections that oftentimes enables us to forelee che consequences of things merely hypothetical; that is, without the necessity of having recourse to experience, or to the perceptible connections of palpable objects ; to which the brures are constantly reduced. And hence we see, that the doctrine of innate ideas, or the internal principles of necessary truths, includes the effential distinction that subsists between man and the brute creation.'
• Perhaps, continues Mr. Leibnitz, the very ingenious erfayist, [Mr. Locke] does not diffent from us altogether in this particular; for, after having taken up his whole first book in combating the doctrine of innate ideas, taken in a certain sense, he admits, notwithstanding, at the beginning of the second, that those ideas which do not immediately arise from sensation deduce their origin from reflection. Now, reflektion is nothing more than our attention to what is already innate; which is not communicated from without by means of the senses. This being the case ; can it be denied that there is a great deal innare in the mind ? Since we are innate, if I may lo say, to ourselves, and possess being, unity, substance, duration, change, action, perception, pleasure, and a thousand other objects of ideas purely intellectual? Instead of making use of the comparison of the philosopher's tabula rasa, or a plain piece of marble, I Mould prefer therefore a piece of marble that is originally veined: for if the soul resemble a tablet perfectly clear and plain, the truths impressed on it are like the figure of an Hercules, for instance, that is sculptured on it; to which figure it was totally as indifferent as to any other. But if the piece of marble be already veined, and the configuration of its veins present the figure of an Hercules, in preference to all others; that figure may be justly said to be innate, notwith. ftanding it may require considerable labour to cut and polish the surface of such marble, in order to render the figure apparent. Ic is in this manner that there are certain ideas and propofitions, which may be denominated inpaté; and that with as much propriety, as our inclinations, dispositions, and natural propensities.' . L14
The metaphysical Reader will see that this celebrated Writer gives a different turn to the doctrine of innate ideas, as laid down by Mr. Locke, and maintained by his followers. It is not for us, however, to say how far the sentiments of these two great philosophers are reconcileable, or how far those of either are consistent with truth. But we must not dismiss chis subject, without observing that the doctrine of a moral instinct, on which Hutchin'on, Hume, and other late moralifts, have so largely expatiated, is here suggested in the plainest terms by Mr. Leibnitz: although he does by no means impute so great an influence to it as the author of De la Nature, and some other writers, who have adopted it.
The next important point, on which the author of the system of the pre established harmony differs from Mr. Locke, relates 10 the nature and in materiality of the soul; which the former maintains to be constantly thinking, and to be a simple substance totally distinct and different from matter. It is to the durat on and presence of this substance, also, that he imputes the personality or identity of the individual. Mir. Locke, it is true, difiers from our Author in a great degree with regard to these particulars; we do not think, however, that the Leibnitzians do ftiiet justice to our English philosopher, in imputing to him the retion that matter is capable of thinking. Mr. Locke indeed hath faid, that he saw no reason why the omnipotence of the deity might not fuperadd a capacity of thinking to matter : but this is not saying that he conceived matter could think. And indeed the whole dispute is a cavil about words, if there be no such thing in nature as these philosophers conceived matter to be. At the same time, we may challenge all the experimentalists in Europe, to bring one physical proof, or even phyfical prelumption, that there is. It is indeed a little surprising to us, that a philosopher, who should ever think of accounting for the phenomenon of extension, from unextended atoms, as Leibnitz hath done, should afterwards adopt the Newtonian principles of impenetrable, extended elements. To those, indeed, who concrive the doctrine of the immateriality of the soul intimately connected with that of its immortality, Mr. Locke's supposition will doubtless appear exceptionable. But there is by no means any necesary dependance or connexion between them. Mr. Locke says, the great ends of religion and morality are sufficiently answered by the doctrine of the soul's immortality, without there being any necesiity to suppose its immateriality: and we may reverse the propofition, and say for him, that, could it be proved that the soul was as material as the body really is, it would be no proof that it was not immortal, so that the great ends of religion and morality dependant on that doctrine are equally secured, be the problem determined either way.
. It is to be observed also, that, notwithstanding the apparent difference between the systems of Locke and Leibnitz, with regard to innate ideas, a very little matter of correction may perfeetly reconcile them. For nothing can be plainer than that the latter means, by innate principles of thought, nothing more than an innate capacity of thinking. That the principles or motives of ratiocination, enabling the mind to draw regular conclusions from certain premises, are innate, cannot be doubted; nor did Mr. Locke ever deny it; he only denied that such conclufions existed in the form of axioms already deduced. And thus geometrical truths are no more innate than moral, notwithstanding they are so much more obvious and convincing. It seems as if the great perspicuity and exactitude attending geometrical reasoning had led Mr. Leibnitz into this mistake : but we should reason just as well on any other subject or science, if the premises were equally clear. For we are not to conclude, because the mind reasons geometrically, that therefore it is originally furnished with geoinetrical knowlege. Even the obvious proposition, that two and two make four, is not a notion or idea, originally innate, notwithstanding its universality. It is true we find it impossible to deny it; the mind revolting at so absurd a negation : but this arises from the mode of operation which it necessarily pursues in all kinds of reasoning. This mode must, indeed, be of course innata, because immediately depending on the frame and conftitution of the mind: but a very essential diftin&tion ought to be made between ideas themselves and our capacity for receiving them.
Of the other pieces contained in this volume we shall not trouble our Readers with any extract, they being all short, and little interesting to the generality of readers.
Letire a Monsieur *** relative a Monsieur 7. 7. Rousseau, &c. Anecdotes relative to the Persecution of J. J. Rousseau by the
Clergy in Switzerland; in a Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend; containing the Letters and Declarations of Mr. Roufseau to the Assembly of the Clergy, the Consistory of Elders, the Council of State, and the King's Attorney-general, on
the Occasion. 12mo. 1765. T ITTLE as we are disposed to pity those who seem to
y court persecution, we cannot help thinking poor Rousseau hath had hard measure dealt him by his fellow-countrymen, and (as he even still seems desirous of calling them) fellow-christians.
Neceility, Neceflity, however, seems at length to have determined him to a final expatriation ; in the melancholy search of a more hospic table soil ; where he may be permitted to die in peace. Hard, indeed! to be denied the privilege of breathing his last in that air which he inspired at his birth! but such is the rage of Fanaticism, that the perfecutes with equal fury the child of her womb, and the offspring of the most distant stranger.
Our Readers have, no doubt, been informed in general terms of Mr. Rousseau's late situation, after his having been obliged to retire from Geneva on account of the prosecutions, or rather persecution, carried on against him and his writings. The refuge he fought in the neighbouring principality of Neufchatel, hath, it seems, by no means answered his hopes and expectations. For, notwithstanding he was particularly honoured with the protection of the King of Prussia, to whom that territory belongs, and no less favoured by the friendthip of the Lord Marshall, the governor; neither the influence of the Tovereign, nor of the administration, was found fufficient to prevent his being persecuted by the clergy, and insulted by the people. The government, it is true, appear to have had the power to prevent his being legally excommunicated and burnt at an Auto da fe: but, if we may credit the Author of this letter, he ran no little risk of being torn to pieces by the populace; the most cruel and tyrannical of all human instruments of vengeance!
The Author of the letter before us begins thus :
- You desire of me, Sir, a particular account of the disturb. ance Mr. Rousseau hath received and occasioned, in the new asylum he lately made choice of, in this principality. Indeed, I am not surprised at your curiosity, nor to find you interest yourself so greatly in the situation of a writer, as famous for his misfortunes as celebrated for his merit. It would give too much pain, however, to an ingenuous mind, to enter minutely into the particular causes of this disturbance; or to expose thë mo. tives on which it is too justly to be presumed Mr. Rousseau's enemies have proceeded. I shall leave the recapitulation of these, therefore, to the severe and caustic pen of the satirist; wha may possibly take a cruel pleasure in delineating a picture at once disgraceful to religion and humanity. From me you will receive only a faithful narrative of facis elucidated by a few annotations, and authenticated by copies of the original papers, which have appeared in the course of this extraordinary scene of inquisitorial prosecution.'
The Letter-writer proceeds to inform us, that, about the latter end of the year 1964, Mr. Rouffeau had closed with a proposal, made to him for the publication of a compleat edition of his works : a circumstance which it is faid gave great offence, from different motives, to many. About the same time, also, eame