V. PEARCE 1821. with the secretary of the land office, shall, for two years, enPittsburg. title the applicant to the privileges and benefits, that an oriSKEEN ginal or vacating warrant would; thus affording a strong legislative construction, that a vacating warrant or some substitute therefor was necessary. Jones v. Anderson 4 Yeates, 569. This vacating warrant is not mere matter of form, or thing merely technical, but a matter of serious importance, of grave substance, requiring satisfactory evidence to be exhibited in the land office of the default, before the first warrant is vacated, and a new one issued. The construction given by the Court of Common Pleas, agrees with the text of the Act, the contemporaneous exposition of the Judges of the Court, the interpretation of the Legislature, the analogous principles of the Common law, the reason of the thing and the public peace. I am therefore of opinion that judgment be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. September. An entry by the prothonotary on his docket of a suit, and that a judgment bond was filed of record therein stat HELVETE against Rapp. IN ERROR. ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver county. On a scire facias post annum et diem, in the Court below, at the suit of Frederick Rapp against Francis Helvete, to revive a judgment, William Wilkins, a judgment creditor of Francis Helvete, appeared, and pleaded nultiel record: the plaintiff replied, habetur tale recordum; and rule to bring in good entry of the record. The record when produced was as follows. ing the particulars of it and the date of entry is a a judgment under the Act of 24th Feb ruary, 1806. 1821. Plaintiff files of record a judgment bond, under the hand and seal of defendant for the sum of 5450 dollars, conditioned Pittsburg. for the payment 2725 dollars, 38 cents, on or before November 5th next, dated 5th day of this inst., and entered the 17th May, 1815. Judgment thereupon was rendered on the scire facias, in favour of the plaintiff. Baldwin and Wilkins, for the plaintiff in error, contended, that under the Act of the 24th February, 1806, this was not a good entry of a judgment on a bond and warrant. The mere filing of a bond is not an execution of the warrant of attorney. The word judgment is technical, and cannot be supplied by simply filing the bond. Judgment can only be rendered by the Court: filing the bond constitutes no lien. The Prothonotary, under the Act, must do what the attorney otherwise would do, namely, enter a judgment. The act effects no change but to take away the attorney's fee. Campbell contra, relied on the object of the Legislature, which was to dispense with form, and obtain the substance of the entry, namely notice to creditors and purchasers, and on the constant practice. He cited 2 Binn. 43, Rob. on Frauds, 431. 2. 10 Johns. 467. Str. 585. 2 Ld. Ray, 1350. 4 Bac. Ab. 648. 3 Johns, 586. The opinion of the Court was delivered by DUNCAN J.-The evident and sole intention of the Legislature in conferring the power of entering a judgment on the judgment bond without the intervention of an attorney was, to exempt the obligor from the payment of costs to an attorney. This Act was passed on 24th February, 1806. It provided that the Prothonotary of any Court of record, on the application of the original holder, or his assignee of a note, bond, or other instrument on which judgment is confessed, or containing a warrant for any attorney, to confess a judgment, shall enter judgment against the person or persons who executed the same, for the amount which from the face of the instrument appears to be due, without the agency of any attorney, or declaration filed, particularly entering on his docket, the HELVETE v. RAPP. 1821. date and time of the writing, which shall have the same Pittsburg. force and effect, as if a declaration had been filed, and judgment had been confessed by an attorney, or given in open Court in term time. HELVETE V. RAPP. The Court decided this issue in favour of the plaintiff below, and gave judgment that he had such record as he had made profert of. No set form of words is prescribed, in which the Prothonotary shall enter judgment, as it is to be desired there had been, both for the sake of uniformity and precision. There being no literal form directed, and no precedent to guide the Prothonotaries in the exercise of this new duty, each has adopted his own mode; they are as various as their faces, and many of them scarcely present a feature to inform a purchaser or designate a judgment; but here is a substantial entry of a judgment bond, containing all that is necessary to give information. It is entered on the docket in the form of an action, as a judgment bond, the names of the parties, the amount due, the date and time of the writing. It states the entry of a judgment bond, and seal of the defendant; the judgment bond is filed of record, entered the 17th May, 1815. What is entered? a judgment on the judgment bond filed. No man could be deceived by this mode of entry, for however inartificial it may be, however defective in the technical words of a judgment, none who called for information could be led into error; the docket entry gave full information. It might have been more formal, but still it is the entry of a judgment entered by the Prothonotary, who was authorised to make the entry. The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas of Westmore- The omis land county. Forward and Foster, for the plaintiffs in error. Alexander, contra. sion in a decla perform it, are A receipt indorsed on a The opinion of the Court was delivered by DUNCAN J.-The plaintiff below, Robert Weir, declared diet. in assumpsit. The first count was for 500 dollars, the price for the purof a tract of land, sold by him to Joseph Weigley. The se- chase money, cond, for money had and received. The third, states a spe- deed, is only cial agreement. It recites, that disputes and controversies prima facie evidence, and had arisen between the said Robert, and one Patrick M Cor- may be rebutted by evimick, respecting the title of a tract of land, situated on both dence. sides of the path, leading from Brackins, near M'Candles, in Wheatfield Township, Indiana county, claimed by the said Robert, and the titles and situation of other tracts of land, claimed and held by him in the same township, and the said Joseph being a practising attorney of the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana county, a certain communication was held between them of and concerning the disputes and controversies aforesaid, and of concerning the said Joseph's undertaking the business of the said Robert, in the said several matters, to set right, arrange and adjust for him, the matters in dispute and controversy, touching the title of the tract of land aforesaid, to conduct and manage all suits and prosecutions, which might be necessary for effecting the premises, and to adjust and settle for the said Robert the disputes and difficulties, then subsisting, regarding the titles of his land in Indiana county, upon which communication, it was then and there agreed in writing, between them, as follows; viz. that the said Joseph, in consideration of 105 dollars, secured to be paid by the said Robert to the said Joseph, then and there undertook and promised by the writing atoresaid, faithfully and diligently to manage and conduct the business of the said Robert, in the matters aforesaid, and to rectify and ad 189 346 V. 1821. just the titles of the said Robert, to his lands in the said Pittsburg. county, and to sue, prosecute, and conduct all suits and acWEIGLEY'S tions which might be necessary in and about effecting the administrators said premises. The declaration then states the payment of WEIR. the 105 dollars, and thus assigns the breach, "that the said Joseph hath wholly neglected and refused to perform the said agreement on his part to the aforesaid Robert, accor ding to the form and effect thereof, but the same to keep and perform, altogether hath refused, and hath refused to manage and conduct the suits and actions brought by and against the said Robert, for the purpose of determining and settling the disputes relative to the said lands, whereby the said Robert hath sustained great loss, and hath damage, &c. The errors assigned, are to the declaration and charge of the Court-the last count. Had this been demurred to, the general statement, that the defendant had not performed his agreement or promise, but refused to do so, would have been insufficient for the breach of a special contract should be certain and express. Here the plaintiff ought to have set out the disputes and controversies specially, and that he had given notice of them to the defendant, and that he had refused to attend to them; and as the object of the plaintiff was to go for special damages, for damages not necessarily resulting from the breach of the contract, he ought specially and circumstantially, in order to apprise the defendant of the facts intended to be proved, to have stated them, or he would not be permitted to give such damages in evidence on the trial. But the general verdict may have aided the defective breach; the insufficiency of the breach would be aided by the common law intendment, for it is not to be presumed, that the Judge either would direct, or the jury would have given the verdict, without sufficient evidence of the breach of contract. 1 Chitty Plead, 332. 1 Saund. 228. Note. 10. N. P. Com. Dig. Tit. Plead. C. So of the notice; the omission of the averment of notice, when necessary, will be fatal on demurrer, or judgment by default, but may be aided by a verdict, unless in an action against the drawer of a bill, where the omission of the averment of notice of non payment by the acceptor is fatal, even after verdict. Miles v. O'Hara, 4 Binn. 108. Rushton v. Aspinall, Doug. 679. 1 Chitt. Plead. 322. The opinion of the Court on the second count, for the |