"At the end of the year's notice, should Congress think it proper to make provision for giving that notice, we shall have reached a period when the national rights in Oregon must either be abandoned or firmly maintained. That they can not be abandoned without a sacrifice of both national honor and interest, is too clear to admit of doubt."

The notice recommended by the President was regarded on all sides as the main step in the controversy. It was not, however, the only important one. As early as the 19th day of December, Mr. Douglas, chairman of the Committee on Territories, reported a bill under the unassuming title of "a Bill to Protect the Rights of American Settlers in the Territory of Oregon, until the Termination of the joint Occupancy of the same." This bill, simple enough at first sight, but, on close inspection, one of the most extraordinary and covert, we undertake to say, in its provisions, ever presented to Congress, received a highly eulogistic endorsement from the official organ. Its consideration was postponed to a future day somewhat distant; and, when it was finally brought up, its features were essentially metamorphosed. We trust its history may yet be written.

On the 5th of January, 1846, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom had been referred this particular portion of the message, reported, through their chairman, Mr. C. J. Ingersoll, the following joint resolution:

"Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States forthwith cause notice to be given to the government of Great Britain, that the convention between the United States and Great Britain concerning the Territory of Oregon, of the 6th of August, 1827, signed at London, shall be annulled and abrogated twelve months after the expiration of the said term of notice, conformably to the second article of the said convention of the 6th of August, 1827."

On the 7th of January, Mr. C. J. Ingersoll moved so to amend the doubtful phraseology of this resolution as to strike out all after the words "shall be annulled and abrogated," and insert, in lieu thereof, the words "at the expiration of the term of twelve months from and after said notice shall be given, conformably to the second article of the said convention of the 6th of August, 1827."

On the same day, a minority of the committee, consisting of Messrs. Garrett Davis, Truman Smith, and Caleb B. Smith, made a counter report, which concluded with a resolution in the following words:

"Resolved, That the question whether a notice to terminate the convention between the United States of America and Great Britain, of October, 1818, and continued in force by the convention of August, 1827, ought to be given, is not a matter for the decision of Congress, and upon it this House, at the present, refrains from the expression of any opinion."

The debate, which attracted intense public interest, commenced early in the session, on an indirect issue, but was subsequently transferred to the main proposition, and continued for some weeks. The question of title, in all its. varied aspects, was elaborately argued, some claiming from one source, some from another. The policy of the notice-its probable results of peace or war-the propriety of negotiation and compromise on the one hand, the invitations to stern defiance on the otherthe memories of ancient wrongs, and the duty of avenging them -the necessity of preparation for defense-the future hopes and destinies of the nation-all these things, and many others of minor import, were embraced in the discussion.

Mr. Douglas took strong ground in favor of the notice, as he had done at the last session of the previous Congress. He could not, of course, know whether the giving this notice and the annulment of the treaty might or might not lead to war; but one thing, he declared, he did know, that it afforded no just cause of war. It was important to inquire whether the act would give good ground of offense-just cause of war. If it would, Congress ought to pause and reflect. If it would not, it was no argument to say that Great Britain would choose to make it a cause of war. To give the notice was merely to exercise a peaceful right secured by the treaty itself. No right, no treaty, no law would be violated by it. When the notice should have been given, and the convention terminated, the United States and Great Britain would occupy the same relative position to each other that they occupied before the convention of 1818 was entered into, and that was a position of profound peace. What, then, would be the rights of the United States? The United States would be entitled to the actual

exclusive possession of the valley of the Columbia River, and the right to hold that possession while treating of the title, that right having been secured by the first article of the Treaty of Ghent. It would be found, on reference to the history of this question, that, at the breaking out of the late war, the valley of the Columbia River was in possession of citizens of the United States; that, during that war, it was captured by Great Britain; and that, by the treaty of peace, it was provided that all countries captured by Great Britain (excepting only certain islands in the Bay of Fundy) should be restored to us. As soon as that treaty was ratified and published, the American government, in pursuance of its provisions, had demanded of Great Britain the restoration of the valley of the Columbia River. Great Britain objected, and set up a claim to that country as a part of the British empire. But, notwithstanding all her objections, when Mr. Rush replied to them that we were entitled to the full possession (or repossession, to use his own language), she admitted that right, and acknowledged that, under the Treaty of Ghent, the United States were entitled to the actual, full repossession of the valley of the Columbia, and that we had a right to remain in possession while negotiating as to the title. Not only did Great Britain make this acknowledgment, but she sent her fleet armed into the Pacific Ocean, took on board the United States agent, and then actually surrendered up the country to the United States. Hence, Mr. Douglas contended, if the convention of joint occupation was terminated, the right of the United States to exclusive possession under the Treaty of Ghent was revived, and Great Britain could not, dare not resist the restitution of that valley. This was no cause of war-no war movement. When in pos

session, and not till then, we would be ready to treat upon the title. If the negotiations were carried on, and the treaty of joint occupation was left in force, Great Britain would be the party in possession. If negotiations should commence, and should be terminated because no ground could be found on which the parties could agree, was it a matter of no consequence whether we were in peaceable possession by surrender, or whether Great Britain should be in possession, and we should have to turn her out? In answer to the argument that Great Britain never would acknowledge the exclusive right of the

United States to the possession of the valley of the Columbia before the question of title was settled, he replied that Great Britain had acknowledged that right, not only in words, but by a solemn act, which must stand prominent in the history of that government so long as that history should exist. She had estopped herself from denying our right to the possession. If she did refuse to make that restoration after the notice should have expired, she would have to violate her solemn treaty stipulations; she would become the aggressor-would violate her plighted faith in the eyes of the civilized world, an act of perfidy and bad faith of which she dared not take the responsibility. The notice, therefore, he regarded as the only peaceful means by which we could obtain possession of the valley of the Columbia; and the man who refused to go for it must either avow himself opposed to the possession of that valley, or he must avow himself in favor of war as a substitute for this peaceful measure.

He characterized the policy of those who would continue the treaty of joint occupation, in order that we might finally get possession of the territory, as "stealing possession" of it in violation of that treaty. Was that, he asked, a peaceful remedy? Would not the attempt to carry out that policy lead to war? It would not only do so, but it would put us in the wrong. It would convict our government of an act of duplicity and perfidy. It would array the whole civilized world against us, and would render us amenable to the charge of being faithless and dishonorable.

He expressed the conviction that, after we should have recovered possession of the valley of the Columbia through this, the peaceful medium of the notice, our people and settlements both on the north and south side of the Columbia River would so spread and multiply, that Great Britain would discover that it would be impossible to turn us out, even if she were to try.

"But," he added, "I choose to be frank and candid in this declaration of my sentiments on this question. For one, I never will be satisfied with the valley of the Columbia, nor with 49°, nor with 54° 40'; nor will I be while Great Britain shall hold possession of one acre on the northwest coast of America. And I will never agree to any arrangement that shall recognize her right to one inch of soil upon the northwest coast; and for this

simple reason: Great Britain never did own, she never did have a valid title to, one inch of that country. The question was only one of dispute between Russia, Spain, and the United States. England never had a title to any part of the country. Our government has always held that England had no title to it. In 1826, Mr. Clay, in his dispatches to Mr. Gallatin, said, It is not conceived that the British government can make out even a colorable title to any part of the northwest coast.' Not that she could not make out a title-not that she could not make out an incontrovertible title, but that she could not make out a colorable title-not a shadow of a title-not so much of a shadow as would give coloring to the transaction. That was the doctrine of our government twenty years ago. That title has undergone no changes since; for the joint occupation has been in force, and the treaty of joint occupation provided that the rights of neither party should be affected or impaired thereby. Our government has held ever since that our title is clear and unquestionable.

"The value of the Oregon Territory is not to be measured by the number of miles upon the coast, whether it shall terminate at 49°, or at 54° 40', or reach to 61° and the Arctic Ocean. It does not depend on the character of the country, nor the quality of the soil. It is true, that consideration is not unworthy of attention; but the great point at issue the great struggle between us and Great Britain, is for the freedom of the Pacific Ocean; for the trade of China and of Japan, of the East Indies, and for the maritime ascendency on all these waters. That is the great point at issue between the two countries; and the settlement of this Oregon Question involves all these interests. And in order to maintain these interests, and secure all the benefits resulting from them, we must not only go to 54° 40', but we have got to exclude Great Britain from the coast in toto."

Such were the opinions of Mr. Douglas. That they were as honestly entertained as they were fearlessly expressed, we have no doubt. Nor do we doubt the sincerity of that reliance on the purposes of the President in respect to this question, which is so forcibly avowed in the following extracts from the same speech:

"I was willing to forgive the President from the bottom of