regulated by various treaties, as, besides the treaty of June 16, 1852, which applies to all of the States of the former North German Union, and also to Hesse, south of the Main, and to Würtemberg, there exist separate treaties with Bavaria and Baden, of September 12, 1853, and January 30, 1857, respectively." Held, that a German subject, charged under the treaty of 1852 with being a fugitive from justice, could not be permitted to call upon the courts of the United States to adjudicate as to the correctness of the conclusions of the Empire concerning its powers and the powers of its members, especially as the executive department of the government of the United States had accepted and acted upon those conclusions; and that the treaty must be considered as still continuing in force. Terlinden . Ames (1902), 184 U. S. 270, 282-286, citing Moore's Report on Extradition with Returns of All Cases, 93, 94, and Laband's Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches (1894), 122, 123, 124, 142. The stipulation in the treaty of cession of Louisiana for the protection of the inhabitants in their property, etc., Admission of Louisi- ceased, by its own limitation, to operate when the State was admitted into the Union. ana. New Orleans v. Armas, 9 Pet. 224. 5. LEGISLATIVE ABROGATION. $ 774. "Whereas the treaties concluded between the United States and France have been repeatedly violated on the part of the French government; and the just claims of the United States for reparation of the injuries so committed have been refused, and their attempts to negotiate an amicable adjustment of all complaints between the two nations have been repelled with indignity: and whereas, under authority of the French Government, there is yet pursued against the United States a system of predatory violence, infracting the said treaties and hostile to the rights of a free and independent nation: “Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States are of right freed and exonerated from the stipulations of the treaties and of the consular convention, heretofore concluded between the United States and France; and that the same shall not henceforth be regarded as legally obligatory on the Government or citizens of the United States. "Approved, July 7, 1798." 1 Stat. 578. "The act of July 7, 1798, annulling the treaties with France, was followed by an act of July 9, 1798, which, without any formal declaration of war, not only authorized the President to instruct the com manders of public armed vessels of the United States to capture any French armed vessel, such captured vessel with her apparel, guns, and appurtenances, with the goods and effects on board the same, being French property, to be brought into the United States, and proceeded against and condemned as forfeited; but the President was authorized to grant special commissions to private armed vessels which shall have the same license and authority. 1 Stat. L. 578." (Lawrence's Wheaton (1863), 507.) See Davis, Notes to the Treaties of the United States; Moore, Int. Arbitrations, V. 4425-4431. After the act of Congress of July 7, 1798, the obligations of France to the United States must be determined by the law of nations. (The Atlantic (1901), 37 Ct. Cl. 17.) It was afterwards held, however, that the decree of the French government abrogating so much of the treaty of 1778 as related to contraband goods did not impair any treaty right of the United States. (The James and William (1902), 37 Ct. Cl. 303.) The French government did not admit that the act of 1798 effected a valid international abrogation of the treaties. During the negotiation of the convention of 1800, the American negotiators presented a draft, in which it was provided that the commissioners, who were to pass upon claims of the citizens of one nation upon the government of the other, should, in determining questions of capture or condemnation, "decide the claims in question according to the original merits of the several cases, and to justice, equity, and the law of nations; and in all cases of complaint existing prior to the 7th of July, 1798, according to the treaties and consular convention then existing between France and the United States." The French plenipotentiaries replied that they were "not aware of any reason" which could “authorize a distinction between the time prior to the 7th of July, 1798, and the time subsequent to that date." The American plenipotentiaries then referred to the act of Congress of that date, declaring the treaties to be at an end. The French plenipotentiaries declined to negotiate on this basis, and the American negotiators in the end found it necessary either to postpone the subject or to abandon the negotiations. They took the former course, and inserted in the convention, which they signed Sept. 30, 1800, an article by which it was agreed that the question of claims should form the subject of a future negotiation, and that the treaties meanwhile should not be operative. The Senate of the United States struck out this article, and Napoleon, on exchanging the ratification, made a declaration to the effect that by the Senate's amendment it was to be understood that "the two states renounce the respective pretensions, which are the object of the said article." This declaration was accepted by the United States; and hence the argument, on which the "French spoliation claims" are founded, that the government of the United States, in spite of the act of 1798, in the end purchased a release from the obligations of the treaties with the relinquishment of the claims of its citizens, for the payment of which it thus became liable. Moore, Int. Arbitrations, V. 4429-4432. By an act of the legislature of Maryland passed in 1780 to define the privileges of French subjects in that State, various rights were conferred upon them, including that of holding lands, subject to certain conditions. A claim being set up under this act, after the "repeal" of the treaties between the United States and France of 1778, it was contended that the act was passed for the sole purpose of enforcing rights under those treaties, and was repealed by implication when they were repealed. Marshall, C. J., delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The court does not think so. The enactment of the law is positive, and in its terms perpetual. Its provisions are not made dependent on the treaty; and, although the peculiar state of things then existing might constitute the principal motive for the law, the act remains in force from its words, however that state of things may change." Chirac v. Chirac (1817), 2 Wheat. 259, 272. A cargo of goods owned by a British subject, but insured by citizens of the United States, was captured as lawful prize, on board of an American ship, by a French vessel, after the passage of the act of July 7, 1798 (1 Stat. 578), abrogating the treaties between the United States and France. Claimant, as assignee, of the owner, sought to recover the value of the goods from the United States out of the indemnity received from France on account of spoliation claims. Held, that after the abrogation of the treaties between the United States and France, the goods of the enemy of France found on board of an American vessel were not entitled to protection; that the owners, having no right to claim indemnity for their seizure, could transfer no greater right to the assignee; and that, the United States having no right to demand indemnity from France on account of such seizure, the claim was not entitled to satisfaction out of the general indemnity funds paid to the United States by France. The William, 23 Ct. Cl. 201; Haskins v. United States, id.; Adams v. Subsequent legislation may municipally abrogate a treaty which may nevertheless continue to bind internationally. Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wali. 616, affirming United States v. Tobacco The decree of the French government abrogating so much of the treaty of 1778 as related to contraband goods on neutral vessels, though it justified French cruisers in seizing and French courts in condemning vessels, did not abrogate any treaty right of the United States. The James and Williams (1902), 37 Ct. Cl. 303. "It has been adjudged that Congress by legislation, and so far as the people and authorities of the United States are concerned, could abrogate a treaty made between this country and another country." La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States (1899), 175 U. S. 423, 460. citing Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, 599; Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190, 194; Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581, 600; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 721. The intention to abrogate a treaty must plainly appear. In re Chin. A. On, 18 Fed. Rep. 506. "I have had the honor to receive your note of the 24th ultimo, in which you inform me that your government, in view of the abrogation of the commercial arrangement between the two countries by the tariff law of the 28th of August last, has directed you to communicate to me the fact that, in virtue of the stipulation contained in the notes exchanged between the negotiators of the said international agreement, and dated January 31, 1891, it (the government of Brazil) deems it necessary' definitely to inform me of its intention and decision to consider at an end said commercial agreement, in accordance with the stipulation therein contained regarding its duration, so that the termination of said agreement shall begin to take effect on the 1st day of January of the year 1895.' "In concluding your note you express the assurance that the cessation of our reciprocity agreement will in no wise affect the commercial relations between our two countries, considering that their mutual interests and spirit of cordial friendship now rest on a firmer basis than a written contract.' "This satisfactory and well-founded assurance, in which the President directs me to say that he fully concurs, would seem to render any comment on your note superfluous, if it were not for your previous statement that your government, notwithstanding the abrogation of the arrangement in question by the act of August 28, deems it necessary, in accordance with the stipulations contained in the notes exchanged on January 31, 1891, to give notice of its intention to consider the arrangement as terminated on and after the 1st of January next. 66 By section 104 of the act of August 28, section 3 of the act of 1890, under which the commercial arrangements with Brazil and certain other countries were negotiated, was repealed; but it was also provided that nothing in the repealing section should be held to abrogate or affect such arrangements, except where they were inconsistent with the provisions of the new law. Notice, therefore, of an intention to terminate those arrangements was not contemplated by the new law; and, so far as they were inconsistent with the provisions of that law, such notice was rendered unnecessary by the fact of their immediate termination. "Your note, however, seems to imply that the United States and Brazil had contracted an obligation not to terminate the arrangement between them in any manner whatsoever except that stipulated in the communications exchanged on January 31, 1891. There is no disposition on the part of this government to avoid the question thus raised. "The circumstances under which the late commercial arrangement between the United States and Brazil was negotiated are disclosed in the official correspondence that preceded its conclusion. It appears that on the 3d of November, 1890, the Secretary of State of the United States notified the minister of Brazil in Washington that, by the third article of the tariff law then recently enacted, provision was made for the admission into the ports of the United States, free of duty, of sugar, not above No. 16 Dutch standard, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides; and that in the same section it was declared that these remissions of duty were made with a view to secure reciprocal trade with the countries producing those articles.' It was also stated that, whenever the President should become satisfied that reciprocal favors' were not granted to the products of the United States in the countries referred to, it was made his duty to impose upon the articles above enumerated the rates of duty set forth in the section above cited. In view of these facts, the government of Brazil was invited to enter into a reciprocal arrangement, and the Secretary of State, in concluding his note, said: "In the happy event of an agreement between the two governments, the same can be notified to each other and to the world by an official announcement simultaneously issued by the executive departinents of the United States of America and the United States of Brazil; and such an agreement can remain in force so long as neither government shall definitely inform the other of its intention and decision to consider it at an end." "The minister of Brazil, in his response of January 31, 1891, enumerated certain articles which the government was prepared to admit either free, or at reduced rates of duty, and announced that he held himself ready to agree upon a time when an official announce |