whether it was my purpose to detain them on account of the treaty. My answer was, ‘that it was not: that the treaty containing no provision against the impressment of our seamen, and being accompanied by a kind of protestation of the British ministers, which would leave that Government free to consider it as a treaty or no treaty, according to their own convenience, I should not give them the trouble of deliberating on it.' This was substantially, and almost verbally, what I said whenever spoken to about it, and I never failed, when the occasion would admit of it, to justify yourself and Mr. Pinkney, by expressing my conviction, that it was all that could be obtained from the British Government; that you had told their commissioners that your 'Government could not be pledged to ratify, because it was contrary to their instructions; of course, that it should be considered but as a project; and in this light I stated it publicly in my message to Congress on the opening of the session.” (President Jefferson to Mr. Monroe, Mar. 10, 1808, 5 Jefferson's Works, 254.) "It has been sometimes assumed that the President's rejection of the treaty formed by Monroe and Pinkney was the origin of all the hostile feeling in England against us, and the foundation of the war of 1812. Canning did afterwards complain that the President had no right to approve what he pleased and condemn what he pleased in the treaty, and instruct the American ministers to attempt to procure amendments in the latter points and consider the former settled. He required that the whole subject be reopened from the beginning, if any part of it was reopened. But in glancing through Monroe's correspondence until he asked his audience of leave, we do not observe an intimation that the rejection of the treaty was complained of or treated as an offensive and much less a hostile act.” 3 Randall's Life of Jefferson, 235. 4. TREATY OF GHENT. $829. June 1, 1812, President Madison sent to Congress a confidential message concerning relations with Great Britain. While it did not in terms recommend a declaration of war against Great Britain, it directly pointed to the adoption by Congress of such a measure. The principal grounds of complaint which it specified were the practice of impressment, the violation by British cruisers of the peace of the American coasts, and the enforcement of fictitious blockades under the guise of the orders in council. In concluding his review, President Madison exclaimed: "We behold, in fine, on the side of Great Britain, a state of war against the United States; and on the side of the United States, a state of peace towards Great Britain." With regard to France, he abstained, as he said, from recommending definitive measures, in the expectation that the result of pending.discussions with that country would speedily enable Congress to decide with greater advantage on the course demanded by the rights, interests, and honor of the United States. The message was received and considered in both Houses of Congress with closed doors. On the 3d of June Mr. Calhoun, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, presented to the House of Representatives a report recommending "an immediate appeal to arms." The House adopted a declaration of war, and on the 5th of June communicated it to the Senate, with a request that it be considered confidentially. The Senate passed it, with amendments, on the 17th of June. On the 18th of June the House informed the Senate that the amendments were concurred in, and on the same day the act was signed by the President and became a law. On the 26th of June Mr. Monroe, as Secretary of State, instructed Jonathan Russell, chargé d'affaires ad interim in London, that, although there were "many just and weighty causes of complaint against Great Britain," the orders in council and other illegal measures of blockade and the impressment of American seamen were "considered to be of the highest importance;" that if the orders in council were repealed and no illegal blockade substituted for them, and the practice of impressment discontinued, with the restoration of persons already impressed, there was "no reason why hostilities should not immediately cease," and that he might stipulate for an armistice on that basis. Subsequently the Emperor of Russia offered to mediate between the two countries, and on April 15, 1813, Messrs. James A. Bayard, Albert Gallatin, and John Quincy Adams were authorized and instructed as plenipotentiaries on the part of the United States to enter into negotiations at St. Petersburg, for the purpose of arranging a peace. The Russian mediation was declined by Great Britain, but Lord Castlereagh suggested to the Department of State a direct negotiation. Henry Clay and Jonathan Russell were added to the commission, and arrangements were made for a negotiation at Göttenburg. It was afterwards suggested on behalf of the British Government that the conferences should be held at Ghent. This proposal was accepted. The first conference at Ghent took place on August 8, 1814. The British commissioners brought forward the subjects of (1) impressment, (2) the pacification and definite territorial location of the Indians, and (3) the revision of the boundary line between the United States and Great Britain, including the control of the Great Lakes by the latter power. The American commissioners presented the subjects of (1) blockade, (2) indemnity for illegal captures and seizures, and (3) various other points. On the 4th of October Mr. Monroe, as Secretary of State, sent his last instructions to the American commissioners. By these instructions they were authorized, if they could not make any better arrangement, to agree to the status quo ante bellum as the basis of negotiation. The great change in the European situation, the pros pect of a more durable peace between Great Britain and the continental powers, and the consequent greater security for maritime rights were given as the justification for "this change of our ultimatum." It was added that the right of the United States to the fisheries, as defined in the treaty of 1783, and the right to trade with all other independent nations were not to be relinquished, nor was anything to be done which would sanction the claim of impressment or that of paper blockades. With these explanations, the American commissioners were authorized to make such a treaty as their own judgments should approve, subject to the usual requisite of ratification. A treaty was signed at Ghent on December 24, 1814. The plenipotentiaries on the part of Great Britain were Admiral Lord Gambier, Henry Goulburn, and William Adams. The treaty of Ghent was based upon the status quo ante bellum. All places taken by the one country from the other during the war were to be restored, and provision was made for determining, as far as possible, the international boundary. It was also stipulated that Indian hostilities should cease. The high contracting parties were to use their best endeavors to put an end to the slave trade. Of the subjects of illegal blockades and impressment the treaty made no mention. Neither was the question of the fisheries nor that of the navigation of the Mississippi referred to in that instrument. Indeed, the plenipotentiaries, having failed to reach a decision as to the latter two questions, agreed to postpone them for the further consideration of their governments. In connection with the foregoing, the following references may be noted: Calhoun's report from the Committee on Foreign Relations of the House Mr. Monroe, Sec. of State, to Mr. Russell, chargé, June 26, 1812, Am. Mr. Monroe, Sec. of State, to Messrs. Bayard, Gallatin, and Adams, April Davis's Notes, Treaty Volume (1776-1887), 1325-1328. Proceedings of the commissioners under Art. V. of the treaty of Ghent, Proceedings of the commissioners under Art. VI. of the treaty of Ghent, relating to the boundary through the river St. Lawrence and lakes Ontario, Erie, and Huron, 1 Moore, Int. Arbitrations, 162–170. 66 Proceedings of commissioners under Art. VII. of the treaty of Ghent, in relation to the boundary from Lake Huron to the most northwestern point of the Lake of the Woods, 1 Moore, Int. Arbitrations, 171–195. ‘In a letter marked ‘private,' from Mr. Clay to Mr. Monroe, Secretary of State, dated December 25, 1814, are the following passages: “According to opinions which I have before communicated to you, our negotiation has terminated in a treaty of peace, which was signed yesterday. The terms of this instrument are undoubtedly not such as our country expected at the commencement of the war. Judged of, however, by the actual condition of things, so far as it is known to us, they cannot be pronounced very unfavorable. We lose no territory, I think no honor. If we lose a particular liberty in fisheries, on the one hand (which may be doubted), we gain, on the other, the exemption of the navigation of the Mississippi from British claims. We gain, also, the right of exemption from the British practice of treating with the Indians.' "An exposition by Mr. Gallatin of his views prior to assenting to the treaty of Ghent will be found in a letter to Mr. Monroe, dated at Ghent, October 26, 1814, to be found in the Monroe papers, with pencil notes by Mr. Monroe. "Mr. J. Q. Adams's diary of the period of the Ghent negotiations gives a narrative of those negotiations, which, though of deep interest, is affected by his then strong antagonism to Mr. Clay and to Mr. Russell, two of his colleagues (Wharton, Int. Law Digest, II. 167.) See, also, The Duplicate Letters, by J. Q. Adams: Washington, 1822. "You ask me what I think of the correspondence of our ministers at Ghent. I think well, very well of it. The language, though sometimes heavy, is on the whole as good at least as that of their opponents. Their arguments are better than their language. . . . In argument their superiority is manifest. . . . The British commissioners must be heavy dull men. Their introduction of Pitt's letter to Stanley, and their reliance on it, constituted a terrible faux pas, of which our ministers have properly availed themselves. In the whole correspondence our ministers seem to have been entirely collected and on their guard, and what is equally satisfactory and important, they have firmly maintained the honor and dignity of the country." (Mr. G. W. Hay to Mr. Monroe, Jan. 6, 1815, MS. Monroe Papers, inaccurately quoted in Wharton, Int. Law Digest, II. 167.) “I have no doubt that the British commissioners signed the treaty (if it be signed) under an expectation that Pakenham was in possession of New Orleans, and I am equally confident, from the tenor of the diplomatic correspondence, that New Orleans never would have been restored under the treaty." (Mr. G. W. Hay to Mr. Monroe, Feb. 15, 1815, MS. Monroe Papers, ibid.) As to the negotiation of the treaty the following authorities may be consulted: Adams's Life of Gallatin, 519; 10 John Adams's Works, 97, 106, 129, 131; 3 Am. St. Papers, For. Rel. 695, 730; 4 id. 310; 9 Brit. For. State Papers, 369, 530, 565, 752, 823. For correspondence between Mr. Clay and his colleagues, in respect to the negotiations at Ghent, see Colton's Correspondence of Clay, 28. English criticisms of the treaty are quoted in 2 Ingersoll's Historical Sketch of the Second War between the United States and Great Britain (1st series), 312, chap, xiii, In 37 London Quarterly Review, 286, as noticed in a letter of Mr. Gallatin to Mr. E. Everett, of August 6, 1828 (2 Gallatin's Writings, 400), the treaty of Ghent is spoken of as "That precious treaty of Ghent, which gave to them [the United States] all that they asked, and much more than they had any right to expect." 5. TREATY OF 1815. $ 830. July 3, 1815, a convention to regulate commerce and navigation was concluded between the United States and Great Britain at London. The negotiators on the part of the United States were John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, and Albert Gallatin; on the part of Great Britain, Frederick John Robinson, Henry Goulburn, and William Adams. In this treaty it was for the first time agreed that no higher or other duties or charges should be imposed in any of the ports of the United States on vessels of another power than were payable in the same ports by vessels of the United States, and that the same duties should be paid and the same drawbacks allowed on foreign importations, whether such importations were made in vessels of the United States or of the other contracting party. The convention, however, on the part of Great Britain, applied, with certain exceptions, only to the territories of his Britannic Majesty in Europe. It was to remain in force for four years from the date of its signature. By the convention of October 20, 1818, the term was extended for ten years. By the convention of August 6, 1827, it was extended indefinitely, subject to termination on twelve months' notice. Davis's Notes, Treaty Volume (1776-1887), 1224, 1331; Am. State Papers, In 1821 the British minister complained of an "extra charge" for pilotage required of British vessels, as foreign vessels, at Norfolk, Virginia, under an act of the Virginia legislature. The complaint was sent to the governor of Virginia, with the statement that it had been "the invariable understanding of both parties that by the conventions of 3rd July, 1815, and 20th October, 1818, between the United States and Great Britain, the charge of pilotage is included in the equalization of duties stipulated by that instrument upon the vessels of either party in the ports of the other. It is not doubted," added the Department of State," that the operation of the law of Virginia will by the proper authority be made conformable to this engagement in the conventions; and that measures will be taken for refunding any such sum of extra pilotage duty which may have been levied since the period of those conventions, as well as for guarding against its being again levied in future." Mr. Adams, Sec. of State, to Gov. Randolph, July 2, 1821, 19 MS. Dom. |