isted for telegraph messages to skirmishers, he was ordered to return to his proper station.

On May 4th the enemy again occupied Fredericksburg and was also in force between General Sedgwick and General Hooker practically cut off from all communications except by signals. A line of communication was kept up until General Sedgwick was forced to retire towards Bank's Ford. As he moved on he found another station at Bank's Ford, with which he opened communication over the heads of the enemy, and thus practically was within communication with General Hooker at Chancellorsville.

During the night General Sedgwick re-crossed the river at Bank's Ford. May 5th nearly our whole army was now at or near Bank's Ford or United States Ford. A small force under General Gibbon was in the vicinity of Falmouth. General Alfred Pleasonton with a force of cavalry was patroling the river down' as far as Port Royal. He kept actively moving his command to various points, so as to give a show of force, and asked me for signal officers to assist him, by waving flags on various hills and other places, to keep up the impression that we had a good force on hand to guard the river.

I furnished all I had available.

One of the most furious storms began at 2 p. m. and continued all night. At United States Ford the right wing of the army was preparing to retire to the north side of the river. It had vacated its intrenchments when suddenly the bridge was washed away. No other communication than by signals was available. The heavy rain had so swollen the river that it was impossible to ford it. Lieutenant John S. Holland, signal officer, was in charge of the signal station. The storm was so great that it was found that signals would not answer. Lieutenant Holland volunteered to swim the river with dispatches. A little lull came in the storm, and it was decided to try signals. At 9 p. m. an order was sent by signal torches to suspend the movement until the bridges could be repaired. At 1:20 a. m. an order was again sent to

continue the movement, and by daylight our army was on the north side of the Rappahannock, and the battle of Chancellorsville was over.

Shortly after the battle I was relieved from duty as acting chief signal officer of the Army of the Potomac, and ordered to Washington.

I had been appointed as major and signal officer in the new corps just organized and my duties were to be those of inspector. Little birds had whispered to me that Colonel Myer was not in favor with the Secretary of War, and that his persistency in claiming that the law gave him the charge of all signals, both electric and others, in opposition to Stager, Eckerts, and others, connected with what was termel the "Military Telegraph," was getting him disliked. I had been Myer's principal assistant up to date and knew that if he was disapproved, I would fall under the same blow. I had been examined by the board and had been recommended for the appointment of lieutenant-colonel. I received the appointment of junior major and declined it. This made a chan e in my status and I was not ordered on inspection duty. I lingered about Washington waiting orders and practically shelved. I asked to be relieved and ordered to duty as commissary to no avail.

General Lee commenced his movements towards Maryland. and Pennsylvania. General Early, Mosby, and others made their raids toward Washington, and I spent three days and nights in the dome of the Capitol watching the Virginia shore.

I was finally ordered to West Point, N. Y., as the only graduate who had the knowledge, to introduce at the Military Academy a course of instruction in military signals. I reached there in July and commenced instruction. This course was completed by the last of September. I again aplied for orders and could get none.

On November 10, 1863, Colonel Myer was relieved from the command of the corps and ordered to Cairo, Il. He

was not confirmed in his appointment as colonel and it was decided that he was out of service.

Major Nicodemus was placed in command, and I applied again for orders and could get none. I asked permission to go to Washington and it was declined. I was practically shelved and remained at West Point doing nothing until February, 1864, when I was relieved from duty as acting signal officer and ordered to report to General Thomas, commanding the Department of the Cumberland, at Chattanooga, Tenn., for duty in the Subsistence Department.

The Signal Corps was organized. The various armies all had signal officers and they soon made themselves known and appreciated. None of the first detachments were received. kindly. No one seemed to appreciate them. They were ridiculed and sneered at. Every article of equipage issued to them was done in grudging manner, as if so much robbed from the hard-working soldier who did the fighting. Before the war was over it had gained a firm place in the Army. Commanding generals commenced to appreciate it and made many complimentary reports as to its service. General Sherman has said that its services in transmitting his message to General Corse at Allatoona was worth more to the country than all the money that had been appropriated to support the corps from the day it was founded.

Admiral Farragut has testified his appreciation of its

services.

Generals McClellan, Burnside, Hooker, Meade, and hundreds of others have praised it. Its duties were unambitious. No stirring reports of individual heroism, of magnificent charges, were made by its officers. Its officers simply staid at their stations and did their duty.

In the Ranks at Shiloh.

By Companion Leander Stillwell, First Lieutenant 61st Illinois Volunteer Infantry.

March 2, 1892.

There has been a great deal said and written about the battle of Shiloh, both by Rebel and Union officers and writers. On the part of the first there has been, and probably always will be, angry dispute and criticism about the conduct of General Beauregard in calling off his troops Sunday evening while fully an hour of broad, precious daylight still remained, which, as claimed by some, might have been utilized in destroying the remainder of Grant's army before Buell could have crossed the Tennessee. On the part of Union writers the matters most discussed have been as to wheth r or not our forces were surprised, the condition of Grant's army at the close of the first day, what the result would have been without the aid of the gunboats, or if Buell's army had not come, and kindred subjects. It is not my purpose, in telling my story of the battle of Shiloh, to say anything that shall add to this volume of discussion. My age at the time was but eighteen, and my position that of a common soldier in the ranks. It would therefore be foolish in me to assume the part of a critic. The generals, who, from reasonably safe points of observation, are sweeping the field with their glosse, and noting and directing the movements of the lines of battle, must, in the nature of things, be the ones to furnish the facts that go to make history. The extent of a battlefield seen by the common soldier is that only which comes within the range of the raised sights of his musket. And what little he does see is as "through a glass, darkly." The dense banks of powder smoke obstruct his gaze; he catches but fitful glimpses of his adversaries as the smoke veers or rises.

Then, too, my own experience makes me think that where the common soldier does his duty, all his faculties of mind and body are employed in attending to the details of his own personal part of the work of destruction, and there is but little time left him for taking mental notes to form