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النشر الإلكتروني

IMPORTANCE OF THIS DOCTRINE.

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general intellectual improvement. This sublime truth, which appears to us so simple, since we have been taught it, was unknown to the ancient philosophers, long after it had been taught by the writers of the neglected Jewish Scriptures; and indeed it is from these that our modern philosophers have derived, however unwillingly, all their better views on this subject. To the sacred writers we owe the doctrine, that God gave existence to what was not. They do not, indeed, dwell so much on the theoretical ground of this truth, as notice its practical consequences; they were, however, the first who established the position itself. Philosophers have only reinvestigated the doctrine which they established, and developed the reasons of the truth which they taught.

But it may be asked, is then the doctrine de creatione ex nihilo, really so important? is it not rather a doctrine interesting only to speculative philosophers? To these questions we must answer, that this doctrine is on the contrary, one of great practical importance; which is the reason, why the Holy Scriptures so frequently and urgently inculcate it. For (a) if matter was created by God from nothing, it follows, that he must fully understand it in all its parts; he must have wisely assigned to every thing its definite position in space, and have preserved it, as he originally created it. But in case he were not the creator, but only the former of the world, according to the opinion of the ancients, it would then be necessary for him to acquaint himself with this matter, which he himself had not produced, and which was foreign to his own nature. But we may confidently affirm, that he never would have become acquainted with matter, if he had not himself made it (as even Malebranche concludes); because he derives all his knowledge from himself alone, and nothing exterior to himself can either add to his information, or in any way exert an influence upon him. (b) A mere builder may leave his building, when it is once completed, and concern himself no farther about it, except perhaps in certain extraordinary cases. And considering that almost all of the philosophers and religious teachers of the heathen world, proceeded upon the notion, that God was the former only, or builder of the world, and not its creator, it is not strange, that their ideas of providence were no more pure and consonant to the divine nature. They generally believed, either that God concerned himself not at all with the world, or, at least, that his providence did not extend to small and minute

affairs. When once Phaeton had misguided the chariot of the sun, Jupiter indeed found it necessary, to see whether the firmament had been shattered. But except in such extraordinary cases, he remained unconcerned with the affairs of the world, and every thing here below was supposed to be left to go on, like a clock, when it has been once wound up.-Thus it appears, that the belief that the world was created from nothing has an important influence on the doctrine concerning providence, and so is of great practical consequence. This belief alone excites in us ideas of providence which do honor to God, and are consonant with his character. If God is the creator of the world, we may be sure that he not only understands and provides for the whole; but that his knowledge and providence extend to every particular part of the universe, though ever so small. The schoolmen, with entire truth, called the preservation of the world a continued creation. And the Bible frequently argues from the fact, that God created all things in the universe, that he must be perfectly acquainted with them, and that they depend for their preservation solely upon his will; vid. Ps. 94: 8— 11. cxxxix.-Cf. Kastner, Ueber die Lehre der Schöpfung aus Nichts, und deren praktische Wichtigkeit, Göttingen, 1770, 4to. Heydenreich, Progr. Num ratio humana sua vi, et sponte contingere possit notionem creationis ex nihilo? Lips. 1790. He shows that this is the only reasonable opinion respecting the origin of the world. [Respecting the practical importance of this doctrine, cf. also, Neander, Allgem. Gesch. der christ. Rel. B. I. Abth. 3. S. 974. Also Hahn, Lehrbuch, S. 271.]

Note. The phrase itself, to create from nothing, does not occur in the canonical books of the Bible; although the idea is scriptural. The phrase is taken from 2 Macc. 7: 28; in the Vulgate, ex nihilo fecit Deus cælum et terram, in the Greek, 15 oυz övtov. The phrase ta un gairóuera, which occurs, Heb. 11: 3, is of the same import. Morus (p. 72), and some others have rejected the phrase, creation from nothing, because it seems to imply that nothing is the material from which the world was made. But this subtilty is unnecessary; since the same language is used in other cases, and is never misunderstood. When we say, for example, there is NOTHING in the chest, there is NOBODY there, we do not mean to imply, that there is in the first case, a material substance, and, in the second, a person, existing in the places intended.

III. The nature of the first material.

The idea of chaos resulted very naturally from the opinion of the ancient Greeks, that matter is eternal and uncreated, and that

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God merely arranged and combined the materials, which he as the great architect, found furnished for his use. The word yάos, is derived by some from zaw, hio, vacuus sum; by others from zew, fundo, because they imagine chaos to be something moveable and fluid. The corresponding Latin word is silva, which denotes what is confused, unarranged, and then, unorganized material from which any thing is made; as, silva rerum, sententiarum, Cicero ; silva medicina, Pliny. The Greek word which is used by Plato and other philosophers is, in, which signifies both silva, and materia. The ancients imagined, that these primordia,--the unorganized elements of things, were of the nature of a thin air, or a subtle ether, fluid and moveable, without order or connexion, rudis indigestaque moles; vid. Ovid. Met. I. 7, sq. But the whole conception of chaos is rather poetical than philosophical,-the progeny of fancy, and not of reason. The philosopher can see no satisfactory reason for believing, that disorder must have preceded the present system. The poet, however, fancies a state before the world was formed, like that which would appear if all the objects of the present world were torn to pieces, dissolved, and thrown together; and this state, he calls chaos, and supposes that there the elements of things conflicted with one another, until the Deity at length interposed, to end the strife. The Greeks now supposed, that the universe proceeded from this state, as from a fluid and fermenting mass; the Hebrews on the contrary represented the origin of the world under the image of a building, of the materials of which, as well as of the structure itself, God was the author. Cf. the essay of Paulus, Das Chaos eine Dichtung, nicht ein Gesetz für physische Kosmologie (Kosmogenie?), in his " Memorabilien," No. III. Stück 4, Leipzig, 1793, 8vo. Some have thought they perceived a description of chaos in the in, of the Mosaic account of the creation, Gen. 1: 2. But Moses says this merely of the earth. After God had created the universe, (the heavens and the earth,) the earth was still waste, empty, and unfinished. There is nothing in the Mosaic account to justify the idea of the Grecian chaos, in which every thing in the universe lay together in a promiscuous and disorderly mass, of which God was no more the creator, than the architect is of the pile of stones, from which he forms his edifice. The history of the opinions of ancient and modern philosophers respecting the nature of the first material of the universe be

longs appropriately to the history of philosophy. The following remarks must suffice for this place.

We cannot form any distinct notion of the elements, and of the primitive, essential, and constituent parts of the bodies which now exist; since our senses are not adapted to take cognizance of them. That such elements actually exist, however, there is no doubt; and that each of these particles has properties which distinguish it from every other, its peculiar use, size, shape, etc., is equally clear. For otherwise there could be no distinction, variety, or alteration in the world. Pythagoras proceeded on this ground, when he taught that the μovas was the origin and ground of all things. For as numbers consist of their units, as constituent parts, so he supposed the world was composed of many such units or monades. This thought led Leibnitz to his theory of monades. According to this theory, these monades are what God originally produced from nothing; and all the variety of things, the world itself, has arisen from their original difference and their various combinations. This theory therefore clearly involves the doctrine of a creation from nothing. But what is the nature, and what are the qualities of these first productions of creative power, we cannot know; because our senses do not reach so far. And when the atomic system, or monadology, is extended to inquiries like these, it becomes, as Kant has well shown, merely hypothetical, and without any practical interest.-The science which has for its object the powers and forces which act in the world, dynamics as it is called, is more important to us, than the science which relates merely to the minute atoms or particles of which bodies are composed, whether they are called monades, or any other name.

In this whole subject, we must guard against the supposition of any successive acts in God; as if he had first created the materials, and then formed them by degrees into the bodies which constitute the universe, proceeding in his work step by step, like a human artist; vid. § 20, respecting the immutability of God. In God, thought and execution are one and the same act. He speaks, and it is done, Ps. 33:9. He says, Let there be light, and there is light, Gen. 1: 3.-Nor is any alteration produced in God by the creation of the world. He designed from eternity that the world should exist at a certain time. Morus expresses this differently, p. 72, § 2. Cf. on this particular point, and on the general subject, Zieg

$47. ETERNITY of matter.

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ler, Kritik über den Artikel von der Schöpfung, nach unserer gewöhnlichen Dogmatik, in Henke's "Magazin für Religionsphilosophie," B. II. St. 1, Abhandl. 1.

47. The doctrine and language of the biblical writers respecting the creation in general; and how they are to be understood.

I. Respecting the eternity of matter.

The Holy Scriptures constantly describe God as the author and creator of the world; not merely of the form which it now has, as the ancient philosophers supposed, but of the materials themselves from which it is formed. With this fundamental principle Moses begins his geogeny, Gen. 1: 1. We find this mentioned as the principal characteristic of the true God, throughout the Bible; Is. 42: 5. Ps. 115: 3, sq. Acts 17: 24; and the other passages cited 14, ad finem, and Morus, p. 72, § 2, Not. 1. It may be considered as an established point, that the eternity of the world is no where affirmed in the Bible; vid. Ps. 90: 2. 102: 26; coll. § 20.

But notwithstanding this, there have always been philosophers and theologians, even among Christians, who have advocated the eternity of the world, or at least of matter. The Platonists among the first Christians very naturally followed Plato, who believed in the eternity of matter, though not of the world; vid. § 46. Thus Justin the Martyr affirmed, that God formed the world from an eternal, misshapen, unorganized material, Apol. I. 39; though in other parts of his writings he appears to derive matter originally from God as its author, and thus to differ from Plato.

The schoolmen, who followed Aristotle, and wished to defend his opinion respecting the eternity of the world (§ 46), taught that we might say, God had CREATED the world from eternity,—a statement in which its dependence upon God would be vindicated, at the same time that its eternity was maintained. This opinion was expressed by Boëthius as early as the fifth and beginning of the sixth century. Others, however, only wished that the possibility of this supposition should be granted. The schoolmen made this distinction: Deus est AETERNUS; mundus est AB AETERNO, sc. pro

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