in the examination of jurors, as the ordinary practice is for counsel to discuss their objections with each other before the trial. If an objection has substance, it is almost always recognized in the interchange of views, and the name of the person is struck from the panel. The jury in a criminal case simply pass upon the question of guilt or innocence. If a verdict of guilty is returned, the sentence is imposed by the judge after he has been informed by a police officer of the history of the accused, and especially of any previous convictions. The trial of cases is greatly facilitated in England by the fact that few objections are made to the admission of testimony, and when made they are stated with the greatest possible brevity. The judge indeed usually passes upon an objection without hearing from counsel. If a barrister is inclined to be rhetorical, or to wander away from a discussion of the facts of the case, the judge will probably bring him down to earth by informing him that if he has nothing further to say it would be desirable for him to conclude his remarks. The impassioned appeal is seldom heard in an English court, even in the trial of criminal cases. It would have little influence upon the English juror, and would be very apt indeed to prejudice and alienate him.

It is not an exaggeration, I think, to say that cases are tried in England in less time ordinarily than it takes in America to impanel a jury. English newspapers are not permitted to comment upon the evidence during the progress of a trial, or even in advance of the hearing to do more than mention the bare circumstances of the commission of the crime. An atmosphere is not created, therefore, before the trial, either favorable or prejudicial to the plaintiff or the defendant in a civil action, or to the Crown or the accused in a criminal case, and a person who is called to serve upon a jury cannot have formed an opinion of the merits of the case from the perusal of his favorite newspaper. England, with a population according to the last census of over 30,000,000, has only eighteen high court judges. While there is a periodical demand for the creation of more judges, I am satisfied that in no country are cases tried with greater despatch than in England, and that nowhere are the demands of justice more adequately and admirably fulfilled.

In order that legal procedure in America may more closely correspond with that of England, the judges must be appointed to serve during good behavior, or if elected chosen for very long terms;

largely increased salaries must be paid; they must be freed from all political influences; in criminal as well as in civil cases, they alone should interpret and declare the law, and juries should not be permitted to substitute their own interpretation; newspapers must be restricted to a brief recital of the facts connected with the commission of an alleged offense; technicalities must be brushed aside in the trial of a cause, and no case should be reversed unless the appellate court is satisfied that substantial injustice has been done; postponements should only be grudgingly granted, and never merely to suit the convenience or comfort of counsel; arguments of counsel should be limited as to time, and during that time they should be compelled by the judge to confine their remarks to an unemotional and unrhetorical discussion of the facts of the case.

APPENDIX

CAUSES FOR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS1

INTRODUCTORY

I. The causes for dissatisfaction with the administrat on of justice are more numerous and more emphatically apparent in a metropolitan district than anywhere else.

II. The causes group themselves about the following six subjects:

A. Selection, retirement and discipline of judges.

B. Organization of the judges after they are selected.

C. Selection of jurors as judges of the facts, the guidance of the jury and discrimination in its use.

D. Rules of practice and procedure.

E. Efficiency in the offices of clerks of courts.

F. Selection, retirement, discipline and organization of the bar.

1 This statement was prepared by the American Judicature Society and sent out accompanied by the following letter:

AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY

We herewith send you an analytical outline of causes for dissatisfaction with the administration of justice in a metropolitan district, excluding, however, the special causes for dissatisfaction with particular rules of practice and procedure.

This outline was prepared at the instance of the Directors of this Society. It does not necessarily represent the views of the Directors. It simply brings

I. SELECTION, RETIREMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES

I. It has been suggested that in the metropolitan district where the elective system prevails the following is a fair description of the actual mode of selecting and retiring judges and the weaknesses of that system.

A. Judges are usually not really elected, but are designated by the leaders of the party political machine dominant in the district. These leaders appoint the nomination. The electorate only decides which of two or three sets of nominees it prefers. The compulsory primary has but little altered the situation.

B. These leaders have too little responsibility for the due administration of justice. They have the strongest motives for rewarding purely political service to an organization. The occasional instances when the political leaders exercise power to good purpose do not alter the fact that the system is lacking in adequate efficient responsibility.

C. The judges are subject not merely to a recall, but to a progressive series of recalls-first, by the leaders of the party organization refusing nomination; second, by a wing of the party knifing the candidate at the polls; third, by an upheaval in a national election; and fourth, and most rarely, by actual public dissatisfaction with the judge himself. These recalls for the most part retire the judge from office regardless of the character of his service. The

together in concise form many, and we hope, most of the suggestions which have been put forward in the last few years by different persons regarding the causes for dissatisfaction with the administration of justice in the United States (omitting, however, particular proposals regarding practice and procedure).

We desire to promote an expression of views on your part regarding the items of this analysis and to receive any independent and additional suggestions which you can give us. If your experience has not been in practice in a metropolitan district, your views as to how far the suggested causes for dissatisfaction apply outside of such districts will be much appreciated.

In replying please refer to the page and subhead of the enclosed analysis and address your remarks as specifically as possible to each item. At the end add further suggestions not brought out by the comments already given.

It is our plan to classify and arrange all the answers received under each item of the enclosed analysis and to add the many additional suggestions which will be received and in this way secure a complete compilation of all suggested causes for dissatisfaction with the administration of justice.

Please do not attempt at the present time to go into your views concerning the details of practice and procedure, for we shall send out at a later time an analysis regarding the causes for dissatisfaction with the rules of practice and procedure and invite your views especially upon that subject by itself.

Very truly yours,

AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY.

HERBERT HARLEY,
Secretary.

recall at any time by petition will operate to place the judges even more in the power of the political party machine organization than they are now.

D. There is at present no means of disciplining judges at all. There is no chief justice or presiding justices of different divisions of the court to whom the rank and file of judges are responsible for the performance of their duties. E. There are no service test requirements which permit judges to be selected from among those practitioners only who have obtained some success in actual practice before courts.

F. The mode of selecting and retiring judges is so unsatisfactory and the character of the duties of judges is such as to stifle competition for places on the bench by men who have succeeded in practice.

II. It has been suggested that the selection of judges in the sense of the picking out by the electorate of those among the lawyers who it desires above all others is impossible for a metropolitan district having over one hundred thousand population; that such an apparent method of selection results in appointment by the political party leaders; that therefore if by a non-partisan ballot the political party machine influence could be eliminated or so greatly reduced as not to be controlling, nothing but chaos would result: that as a matter of fact the great influence of the political party machine would continue to be the predominant principal force in the election of judges even with the non-partisan ballot.

III. It has been suggested that the bar association should be given power to place upon the official ballot a bar association ticket which could have upon it candidates who had been nominated by any of the other political parties. The question, however, has arisen whether this would result in a greater power in an unbiased bar association to select good judges, or in the lining up of lawyers in political camps controlled by the leaders of the political party machines.

IV. It has been suggested that nothing of great value can be accomplished until the fact is faced that judges in a metropolitan district are practically certain to be appointed and that the only proper appointing power is one which is legal, conspicuous, subject directly to the electorate and interested in and responsible for the due administration of justice; that this principle may be worked out in various ways:

A. Suggested that judges may be appointed by the state executive; that this is better than the present mode, but objectionable because of the governor's interest in promoting a legislative program, the building up of a political machine, and his remote responsibility for the administration of justice; also that he is frequently a stranger to the metropolitan district.

B. Suggested that appointment be by the highest appellate tribunal of the state, the members of which are subject to the electorate; that this is better than the present method and better than appointment by the governor, because such a court is more responsible than the executive for the due admin

Except in the municipal court of Chicago and a few others similarly organized.