rate of interest should be allowed in a suit for redemption, but simply on an action brought for breach of covenant to pay the money on a given day." And in Mellersh v. Brown, 45 Ch. D. 225, the case arose directly, and Kay, J., allowed redemption only on payment of the contract rate. He thus puts the case: "Now, in this case, what the mortgagor is really asking is this; he comes here practically saying: 'I admit I never did pay any interest on this debt; I admit that the debt is due and that interest is due in respect of it; I admit that there is a judgment of foreclosure against me; but I say I ought to be allowed to redeem, not on paying the interest due from me which I have not paid, but on payment of only six years' arrears of interest. For what reason?" And then referring to Lord Justice Cotton's dictum above quoted, he proceeds: "An intimation which, if I understand it, means this: 'If the mortgagor were coming here asking for redemption, it is very possible we might say to him that he should not redeem without paying the higher rate; but as it is only a question on the covenant, which does not expressly reserve interest after the day named for payment, we will give as damages a rate of interest lower than that for which the mortgage deed itself stipulates.' In this case there is absolutely no authority for the limitation of the amount of interest which the mortgagor is asking for, and so far as any authority exists, it is exactly the other way. The mortgagor, in fact, wants to have the indulgence of redeeming the property without paying the whole of the interest, or the whole of the damages in lieu of interest, if he prefers so to phrase it, which ought to be paid. I see no reason why I should grant him that indulgence." Though the privilege of redemption is now an absolute right, just as is the right to specific performance, yet like the latter relief it is none the less equitable, and in both cases the Court may say, if you would have equity you must do equity. If you would redeem an estate which has become. absolute but for the exercise of equitable jurisdiction, you must redeem on such terms as we impose. And an equitable term is to pay the contract rate of interest.

REVIEW OF EXCHANGES.

American Law Review.-July-August, 1890.

Expulsion of Members of Corporations and Societies, by SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON. Joint stock companies cannot deprive their members of their property right by expulsion. Voluntary societies may disfranchise a member, or remove an officer. The power must be exercised by the society at large unless constitutionally delegated to a smaller number. By-laws respecting expulsion must be validly enacted and reasonable; and they cannot in general be enforced by forfeiture. The grounds of a motion of an officer are the committing of acts not relating to his office of such an infamous nature as to render him unfit to exercise any public franchise; or such as may be against his oath and the duty of his office as a corporator, or of a mixed nature, both against the duty of his office and indictable at common law. The member must have due notice of the enquiry, and it must proceed fairly so as to enable him to defend himself. The tribunal must be constituted in accordance with the rules of the society, but need not be composed of legales homines as in the case of a jury. The accused must exhaust all remedies in the society before appealing to the Courts. The latter will not interfere as a rule except to restore rights of which the member has been unfairly deprived; they will not act as appellate tribunals.

Boards of Health, by G. W. FIELD. Of the authority of Boards of Health and their relation to municipal bodies.

A Question of Ratification, by FLOYD R. MECHEM. When an unauthorized person makes a contract the principal may or may not ratify it, and in the meantime the other party may retreat. But if he holds the principal to the contract on the latter adopting it, it binds both. Cases are cited and this position defended.

Warning to Workmen of Danger, by JAMES O. PIERCE. After citing and commenting on scme cases the learned writer concludes: "Thus both in England and America, it may be taken as settled law that a workman who becomes accustomed to rely upon a signal from a third party or one not his employer, warning him of the iminence of some danger, may continue to rely upon the giving of such warning, and if he is injured by reason of the third party's failure to give it, he may assign such failure as a breach of legal duty, with all the usual legal consequences. The authorities cited further settle the proper practice to be, that all questions of negligence in such cases are to be subjected to and passed on by the jury as matters of fact, including the question whether the plaintiff was guilty of any contributory negligence in relying as he did upon the usual signal."

The Character and Scope of Analytical Jurisprudence, by CHARLES MALCOLM PLATT.

Citizenship by Naturalization in the United States, by PRENTISS WEBSTER.

Criminal Law Magazine.-March, 1890.

The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Habeas Corpus Cases, by RUSSELL H. CURTIS.

Ibid.-May, 1890.

Cruelty to Animals, by W. W. THORNTON. Cruelty to animals was not a common law offence. It is an offence against statutes. The word "cruelty" does not imply merely the inflicting of pain; it refers to something done for no legitimate purpose. The following phrases amongst others are defined by reference to cases cited:-Needlessly killing or injuring; wilful and unlawful; knowingly; wantonly; and the following phases of the subject treated :-Motive; intent; accident; malice; intoxication as an excuse; overloading and driving, etc. Ibid.-July, 1890.

Grand Jurors as Witnesses Under Statutory Provisions, by M. W. HOPKINS. The construction of certain American statutes, passed to prevent the disclosure of what takes place in the grand jury room, is dealt with, and cases cited.

Law Journal.-9th November, 1889.

The Right to Take and Keep Trade Names. Some remarks on a case of Thomas Turton & Sons (Lim.) v. John Turton & Sons, 58 L. J. Rep. Ch. 677, in which it was held that the defendants, using their own names, were not infringing the plaintiffs' rights, though the customers of the latter might mistake the defendants' name as the trade name of the plaintiffs.

In

Lien for Money Advanced to Keep up Life Policies. Re Leslie, 23 Ch. D. 552, the cases in which a lien will attach are reduced to four: "First, by contract with a beneficial owner of the policy; secondly, by reason of the right of trustees to an indemnity out of their trust property formerly expended by them in its preservation; thirdly, by subrogation to this right of trustees, of some person who may at their request have advanced money for the preservation of the property; fourthly, by reason of the right vested in mortgagees or other persons having a charge upon the policy to add to their charges any moneys which have been paid to them to preserve the property." Although this list possibly does not exhaust the cases in which the lien may attach, there are many cases which deny the right to a lien otherwise. Several of them are cited.

The Effect of a Free Pardon. A discussion of the effect upon the future qualifications of the person pardoned. It was held in a recent case that one who had been convicted of felony and had been pardoned

was not thereby qualified to obtain a liquor license, the statute declaring that a person convicted of felony should be forever after disqualified from selling spirits by retail.

Ibid.-15th March, 1890.

Statute-barred Mortgage Debts. The cases of Sutton v. Sutton and Fearnside v. Flint are referred to; and the learned writer refers to several cases in which the rights of sureties for mortgage debts are dealt with.

Ibid. 22nd March, 1890.

The Law of Building Schemes. The well known cases of Tulk v. Moxkay, 2 Ph. 774, and Duke of Bedford v. Trustees of the British Museum, 2 My. & K. 552, are cited. A case of Mackenzie ▼. Childers, 59 L. J. Ch. 188, is referred to, in which there was no actual covenant, but an intention expressed that future purchasers should bind themselves. The equity of the case was held sufficient to bind the parties affected. The principle applied was this:-"The question is not what the vendor might mean, not whether in his own mind he intended to reserve a power of departing from the bargain, but what the purchaser would understand by the words, what effect they were intended or calculated to produce upon him."

Ibid.-29th March, 1890.

Stockbrokers' Pledges of Other People's

Securities.

Cases in which banks have advanced money to stockbrokers on deposit of securities payable to bearer are dealt with. In several the bonds have been held liable to the owners on the ground that they had constructive notice that the securities were on deposit with the brokers.

Ibid.-5th April, 1890.

Covenants Running with the Land. Comments on a case of Clegg v. Hands, where there was a covenant in a lease against the lessee's buying or selling beer other than that supplied by the lessors. The lessors sold their business to Cain, the benefit of the covenant being expressly assigned. The Court of Appeal held that the covenant ran with the reversion, and that the lessees were bound to buy from Cain.

THE

CANADIAN LAW TIMES.

FEBRUARY, 1891.

A CENTURY OF CONSTITUTION BUILDING.

ONE

NE hundred years ago, in 1791, the Constitutional Act, as it was called, was passed by the British Parliament, whereby a representative assembly was granted to the Province of Upper Canada, which by the same Act was severed from Lower Canada, both being created provinces by the same authority. It seems fitting in this year to take a short retrospect of the progress of constitution building during the century, prefacing our remarks by a glance at the origin of English law in the present Province of Ontario. A collection of constitutional documents, including the Treaties, Acts of Parliament, and Proclamation, with notes thereon, by William Houston, M.A., Librarian of the Legislative Assembly of Ontario, just about to be issued from the press (a), the advance sheets of which have been furnished to us, may be referred to for the text of these important documents.

A discussion arose at an early date between English and French jurists as to whether Canada was acquired by conquest or cession from France. The former maintained that it had been acquired by conquest, the Treaty of

(a) Toronto, Carswell & Co.

VOL. XI. C.L.T.

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