[20TH APRIL, 1891. LASBY v. CREWSON. Will-Construction-Direction to divide estate into impossible fractionsCarrying out intention notwithstanding difficulty of particular words used. * * A testator devised as follows:- 'When my youngest son is of the age of 18 years, my estate shall be divided among my children then living, that is to say, to each of my sons I leave two-thirds, and to each of my daughters one-third of all my estate and effects." When the youngest son attained 18 years of age, there were twelve children living, seven daughters and five sons. Held, that, in order to carry out the clear intention, notwithstanding the apparent difficulty caused by the particular words, the above devise should be construed to mean that each son's portion should be double that of a daughter. Guthrie, Q.C., and J. Watt, for the plaintiff. A. MacMurchy, for P. R. Loscombe. Bigelow, Q.C., for Williams and Williams. D. Burke Simpson, G. W. Field, J. P. Coffee, and J. A. Mowat, for other parties. [FERGUSON, J., 9TH MAY, 1891. In re WANSLEY AND BROWN. Religious body-Dispersed congregation-Trust not ended-Trustees-Sale by-Sanction of County Judge-R. S. O. c. 237, s. 14, 8-88. 1, 2, 3—Corporate succession-Vendor and purchaser. Upon an application under the Vendor and Purchaser Act, R. S. O. c. 112, in which the trustee of a congregation which had separated and ceased to exist was making title to lands belonging to the congregation but useless for their original purpose: Held, following Attorney-General v. Jeffrey, 10 Gr. 273, that the trust had not come to an end. Held, also, that the sanction of the sale and the approval of the deed by the County Judge, as provided for by R. S. O. c. 237, s. 14, s-s. 3, is sufficient in lieu of all that is required by s-ss. 1 and 2. Held, also, that the statute 9 Geo. IV. c. 2, s. 1, created in the trustees"the corporate attribute of succession" and so created them a corporation; and that under the deed in question they took an estate in fee simple and had power to sell. Walter Read, for the vendor. Lash, Q.C., for the purchaser. [STREET, J., 11TH MAY, 1891. HAGER v. O'NEILL. Mortgage-Illegal and immoral consideration-Purchase money of a house of ill-fame-Knowledge of-Participation in-Legal title - Payment of amount due. In an action on a mortgage given in part payment of the purchase money of a house of ill-fame, the defendants set up that the consideration was illegal and immoral. Held, that, in order to establish such a defence, the defendants must show more than a knowledge by the plaintiff of the immoral trade carried on on the premises and a belief that it would be continued; they must show something done in furtherance of the immoral purpose or some consent to a participation in it. Held, also, that even if the consideration was tainted with illegality, although the plaintiff could not recover it by action, she, having retained the legal estate as security for the purchase money, was entitled to possession by virtue thereof, and the only way in which the defendants could retain possession was by payment of the balance of the purchase money and costs. R. G. Smyth, for the plaintiff. J. G. Holmes, for the defendants. [MEREDITH, J., 10TH DECEMBER, 1890. CORNELL v. SMITH. Parties Action to establish will-Next of kin of testator-Adjournment of trial-Removal of case from Surrogate Court. The plaintiffs propounded a will in a Surrogate Court, under which they took the whole estate and were named as executors. The defendant, who was one of the next of kin, all having an equal interest if the will was invalid, contested its validity, and the case was removed into the High Court. The others next of kin also disputed the will but were not acting in concert with the defendant. Upon an objection taken by the defendant at the trial, Held, that the other next of kin should be made parties; and the trial was adjourned for that purpose, it appearing that they could conveniently be added. Lount, Q.C., and Heighington, for the plaintiffs. IN CHAMBERS. [THE MASTER IN CHAMBERS, 8TH MAY, 1891. EDMUNDS v. MABEE. Security for costs-Two defendants-Separate orders for security- One bond for $400-Costs. The plaintiff in this case being out of the jurisdiction, the defendant Mabee issued the usual order on præcipe for security for costs, which the plaintiff complied with by filing a bond for $400. The bond was conditioned as security for the costs of both defendants, though the other defendant, Lillico, had not obtained an order for security when it was given. The defendant Lillico afterwards obtained such an order, and the plaintiff then moved for an order declaring that the bond filed should stand as security for both defendants. Masten, for the plaintiff, referred to Bolster v. Cochrane, 2 Ch. Chamb. R, 327. W. M. Douglas, for the defendants, relied on Rule 1242. THE MASTER IN CHAMBERS.-I order, as asked, that the bond already filed stand as security for costs for both the defendants, and that no further security be required. But this is not to prevent an application by defendants upon proper grounds, and upon notice, to increase the amount of security. The costs of this application should be to the plaintiff in the cause. NOVA SCOTIA. En the Supreme Court. CULBURT v. McKEEN. Statute of Frauds-Part payment-Appeal from refusal by County Court Judge to set aside findings. The plaintiff agreed to purchase trees from the defendants, M. and K., which according to the plaintiff's version were to be shipped from Mabou, C. B., to Sussex, N. B., on through bill of lading, defendants to see to their being put on board I.C.R. cars at Pictou. In consequence of this not being attended to, the trees remained at Pictou till they became useless. The plaintiff sued for the price. The jury found in favour of the plaintiff's statement as to the shipment, also that it was agreed at the time of the bargain that M. was to be paid his share from moneys K. was collecting for the plaintiff, and that M's share$140 was accordingly deducted from the amount coming from K. to M. on settlement of partnership accounts, for the balance of which M. gave notes to K., and that when this was done the plaintiff was not aware of the dissolution or of the loss of the trees. Held, per WEATHERBE, J., that the transaction as to the note was a part payment within the Statute of Frauds. Per RITCHIE, J., that when M. accepted the price of the trees he undertook to carry out the agreement. MCDONALD, C.J. (dissenting), considered the verdict for the plaintiff against evidence. Quare, per RITCHIE, J., whether there is an appeal from a refusal of a County Court Judge to set aside findings with which he is not dissatisfied. HUBLEY v. ARCHIBALD. Bill of sale-Affidavit of bona fides-Form of jurat-Omission of date and words "before me"-Writ of execution-Signature of prothonotary. The sheriff seized, under an execution sealed but not signed by the prothonotary, goods which the plaintiff claimed under a bill of sale from the judgment debtor. In the jurat of the affidavit to the bill of sale the words "before me" were omitted, and also the day of the month, but evidence was given that it had been duly sworn before the commissioner. Per MCDONALD, C.J., and RITCHIE, J., that the execution was void, not being signed by the prothonotary. Per RITCHIE, WEATHERBE, and SMITH, JJ., that the bill of sale was of no effect as against the sheriff seizing under execution, the affidavit being defective. Per TOWNSHEND, J., that evidence as to the swearing of the affidavit was admissible and the objections failed. [Reversed in the Supreme Court of Canada: 18 S. C. R. 116; ante 102]. DUGGAN v. DUGGAN. Will-Vested or contingent interest. A testator devised and bequeathed all his real and personal estate to his wife to have and to hold to her, her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns forever. The will then proceeded as follows: "And my will is further, that in case there should be any child or children of my deceased brother Maurice living at |