provisions of the Assignments Act. The appeal came on to be heard before this Court on the 15th September, 1891.

Moss, Q.C., for the appellant.

J. P. Mabee, for the respondent.

At the conclusion of the argument the Court dismissed the appeal with costs, agreeing with and adopting the reasons for judgment given in the Court below.

IN CHAMBERS.

[MACLENNAN, J.A., 25TH SEPTEMBER, 1891.

In re NORTH BRUCE DOMINION ELECTION.

MUIR v. MCNEILL.

Election petition-Time for filing-After office hours-Solar time.

Motion by the petitioner to disallow the preliminary objection to the petition filed by the respondent. The objection was that the petition was filed after office hours on the last day for filing it.

M. G. Cameron, for the petitioner.

McCarthy, Q.C., for the respondent.

MACLENNAN, J.A.—I am of opinion that the preliminary objection must be disallowed. I think the rule as to keeping the offices of the Court open from ten to three, or from ten to four, as the case may be, is merely directory and for the guidance of the officials, and does not forbid them to keep their offices open to a later hour, if they think fit or if the business requires it. See Rolker v. Fuller, 10 U. C. R. 477. This petition therefore was in time, the office being still open, and the petition having been received by the officer, although it was after three o'clock.

** ** I am moreover of opinion that the petition was in time in any view of the Act and the Rule. It was received by the officer as of that day, and Mr. Cameron, who filed it, swears that it was then not so much as a quarter past three by the public clocks. * The officer's act in receiving and filing the petition on that day and granting a certificate of the fact must be upheld unless displaced by clear and satisfactory

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evidence. It is common knowledge that the time kept by the public clocks in Toronto is standard time, and that standard time is seventeen and a half minutes faster than solar time. * * * That being so, the petition was in reality filed before three o'clock and was in time according to the strictest construction of the Rule. There can be no doubt that upon a question like this, a party has a right to insist, in the absence of legislation or a Rule of Court, that solar time should govern : Curtis v. March, 8 H. & N. 866.

The objection will be disallowed with costs.

In re GLENGARRY DOMINION ELECTION.
CHISHOLM v. MCLENNAN.

Election petition—Preliminary objections—No statement of address or calling of petitioner.

Motion by the petitioner to set aside the preliminary objections filed by the respondent.

McCrimmon, for the petitioner.

McCarthy, Q.C., for the respondent.

MACLENNAN, J.A.-There is only the first objection left to be disposed of. That objection is that the petition does not contain the address, occupation, or calling of the petitioner, nor any means of identifying him, whereby the respondent is prevented from discovering whether there are any objections to his status as a petitioner.

The petition simply states that it is the petition of Angus Chisholm, of the township of Lochiel, in the county of Glengarry, and it is shewn by affidavit that there are two or three other persons of that name on the voters' list for that township. A careful solicitor ought to have described the petitioner by his occupation and his particular place of abode in the township, so that his identity might be apparent, but the question I have to consider is whether the omission to do so is fatal to the petition. It is not suggested that the respondent was misled, or was not perfectly well aware who the petitioner really was, or that the omission of a more particular description was made for any improper purpose, and the objection is therefore purely technical.

(The learned Judge then proceeded to examine the statute and Rules of Court, and referred to secs. 5 and 9 of the Controverted Elections Act; Rules 2, 4, 5, and 9 of the Election Rules; and Con. Rules of Practice 224 et seq.)

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The result is that I find nothing either in the statute or in the Election Rules or in the Consolidated Rules of Practice requiring me to hold that this petition is void for want of a more particular description of the petitioner than is contained therein, and I must therefore overrule the preliminary objections with costs.

High Court of Justice.

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.

[GALT, C.J., 17TH SEPTEMBER, 1891.

In re CRIBBIN AND THE CITY OF TORONTO.

Municipal corporations-By-law prohibiting Sunday preaching in parks— Validity of R. S. O. c. 184, s. 504, 8-8. 10—Violation of constitutional right-Unreasonableness—Uncertainty—“ Sabbath-day."

It is provided by R. S. O. c. 184, s. 504, s-s. 10, that the council of every city and town may pass by-laws for the management of the farm, park, garden, etc.

Held, that the municipal council of a city had power under this enactment to pass a by-law providing that no person should on the Sabbath-day in any public park, square, garden, etc., in the city, publicly preach, lecture, or declaim.

Held, also, that the by-law violated no constitutional right, and was not unreasonable.

Bailey v. Williamson, L. R. 8 Q. B. 118, followed.

Held, also, that the by-law was not bad for uncertainty as to the day of the week intended, by reason of the use of the term "Sabbath-day."

G. B. Gordon, for the applicant.

H. M. Mowat, for the corporation.

[FALCONBRIDGE, J., 2ND SEPTEMBER, 1891.

In re DAVIS AND THE CITY OF TORONTO.

Municipal corporations-By-law-Construction of sewer—Acquiring easement over adjoining lands—K. S. O. c. 184, s. 479, 8-s. 15—“ Using,” meaning of—Quashing by-law--Acting upon by-la‹—Estoppel-Notice to appoint arbitrator-Costs.

A by-law of a municipal corporation authorizing the construction of a sewer provided, inter alia, that for the purpose of the construction the corporation might enter upon and use and occupy with horses, &c., the lands lying within twenty-five feet on either side of the central line of the sewer; also that after construction the corporation might enter upon a strip of land having a width of eight feet on each side of the centre line of the sewer for the purpose of altering, repairing, etc., the sewer; also that owners of land through which the sewer was to be constructed might fill up the land over the sewer, or within eight feet on each side of the centre line, and might build thereon, provided they did not injure or endanger the sewer, but no person might put up, repair, alter, or maintain any buildings thereon without submitting plans to the city engineer and obtaining his approval in writing; also that the construction of the sewer should not be commenced unless and until the aforesaid easement" should have been acquired by and vested in the corporation by conveyance from the owners, at a price to be agreed upon, or, in the case of disagreement, to be determined by arbitration; and also provided for a penalty and for removal of buildings in case of a breach of the by-law.

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Held, that, however liberally the Court ought to construe a statute in favour of the public right of eminent domain, yet, where there is such a complete interference with the right of property as under this by-law, there must be express words authorizing

that interference, and the statute of apparent authorization must be strictly construed; and

Held, that such interference was not authorized by s. 479, s-s. (15), of the Municipal Act, R. S. O. c. 184; the word " using employed therein meaning "holding" or or "occupying," when read with the rest of the section.

The sewer in question was part of a system, but the upper end, and not an outlet for any part already constructed.

Held, that, no money having been spent under the by-law, it had not been so acted upon as to prevent its being quashed.

The applicants for an order quashing the by-law before moving had appeared on a notice to name an arbitrator, before a Judge, who raised the objection to the by-law above referred to, whereupon the applicants gave notice of abandonment.

Held, that the applicants were not estopped, but that they should have no costs.

James Pearson, for the applicants.

Biggar, Q.C., for the corporation.

[STREET, J., 28TH MAY, 1891

In re DWYER AND TOWN OF PORT ARTHUR.

Assessment and taxes-R. S. O. c. 193, s. 52—“May," meaning of.

By s. 52 of the Assessment Act, R. S. O. c. 193, where the assessment in cities, towns, etc., is made, by virtue of a by-law passed under that section, in the latter part of the year, such assessment may be adopted by the council of the following year.

Held, that "may" as used here is permissive only, and that the council of the following year are given the option of having a new assessment.

Overwhelmingly strong reasons of convenience in favour of having one assessment instead of two might justify the Court in giving to "may" the force of "must."

Aylesworth, Q.C., and H. Symons, for the applicant.
Delamere, Q.C., for the corporation.