right to security by not applying till after the original applications of the shareholder had been dismissed, and appeals taken; but that the security should be limited to the costs on the appeals. G. W. Marsh, for James A. Moore. MASTER'S OFFICE. [THE MASTER-IN-ORDINARY, 10TH OCTOBER, 1891. In re BENNETT. Quarantine-Right of widow to. This was an administration proceeding, in which a reference was directed to the Master in Ordinary. The widow of the intestate whose estate was in administration claimed to be relieved from accounting for certain quantities of wheat, potatoes, pork, apples, pickles, preserves, and firewood-all of the value of $31.58-used by her for her maintenance on the farm of the testator for the forty days' period of quarantine succeeding the death of her husband. J. C. Hamilton, for the widow. Baird, for the next of kin. MR. HODGINS, Q.C., MASTER IN ORDINARY.-The right of a widow to quarantine is thus stated in an old authority (Termes de la Ley): "Quarantine is where a man dyeth seized of a manor-place and other lands, whereof the wife ought to be endowed; then the woman may abide in the manor-place and there live of the store and profits thereof the space of forty days, within which time her dower shall be assigned." In Callaghan v. Callaghan, 1 C. P. 348, Sir James Macaulay, C.J., referred to a widow's quarantine as "a right to reside in the dwelling-house concurrently with the heir, and to receive her reasonable maintenance during forty days after her husband's death." See also Lucas v. Knox, 3 O. R. 453. I think therefore that the widow is entitled to be relieved from accounting for the $31.58 claimed by her. NOVA SCOTIA. En the Supreme Court. In re LAKE. Executors and administrators Remedies of creditors Enforcement of distribution-Probate Court-Petition to Court to require administrators to settle estate and pay creditors. Administration of the estate of H. L. was granted in 1870. The personal estate being insufficient to pay the debts, a portion of the real estate was sold and the proceeds placed in a bank to the credit of the estate. In July, 1874, a settlement of the administrator's accounts took place, after all the parties interested had been duly cited, when the claims of creditors were settled and adjusted, as well as the individual accounts of the administrators, and the balance of proceeds of the personal property remaining in their hands was ascertained. A decree was then made, finding, among other things, the amount of the debts adjusted and settled but remaining unpaid. At the time the decree was made the amount of cash in the hands of the administrators was insufficient to pay the debts found to be due, including costs taxed, but there was further real estate available, and all that remained to be done was to pay the creditors, for which it was necessary to obtain a decree for a sale of more of the real estate. On the 20th July, 1889, T. G., a creditor whose account was allowed on the 2nd July, 1874, applied to the Surrogate Judge of Probate for the county of Hants, by petition setting out that his account had never been paid, for an order that the administrators be cited to shew cause why they did not settle the estate and pay the creditors and the costs of the application. No step had been taken by the petitioner in the meantime. On appeal from the decree of the Surrogate Judge dismissing the petition with costs : Held, per RITCHIE and TOWNSHEND, JJ., that the petitioner had mistaken his remedy and could not obtain payment of his debt or compel the administrators to sell real estate by the proceedings adopted. Under the Probate Act, R. S. c. 100, ss. 57, 60, 65, 66, 68, and 70, authority is given to the Judge of Probate to adjust the claims of creditors against the estate, but there is no direct authority to decree payment of debts. The only section which authorizes the distribution of any surplus is 70, under which the Judge may order distribution of surplus among the parties entitled after settlement of the executors' or administrators' accounts. Semble, that the application for a license to sell real estate, where the personal estate is insufficient to pay the debts, is not required to be made by the administrator. The application may be made by any one interested and where the administrator fails to give security within a reasonable time the Judge may appoint another person to act. Quare, whether, there being a fund in the Court of Probate available for the payment of the debt, the Court could order payment out of it. The administrators being the parties entrusted with the settlement of the estate and payment of debts, it is questionable whether the Court of Probate can take the estate out of their hands without revoking the letters of administration, though it would have the right to prevent the withdrawal of any part of the fund unless satisfied that it was to be applied to a legitimate purpose. GRAHAM, E. J., dissented. LOCKHART v. LOCKHART. Undue influence and misrepresentations-Deed set aside as procured by— Delay in commencing proceedings no bar in the absence of prejudiceReturn of consideration ordered-Offer of before action-Costs. In an action brought by the plaintiff to set aside a conveyance of land made by her to the defendant, the deed was impeached as VOL. XI. C.L.T. EE obtained by fraudulent representations, intimidation, and undue influence. It appeared that the defendant, who was the plaintiff's brother-in-law, associated himself with her in the administration of the estate of her deceased husband; that he held himself out to her as being specially skilled in such matters from the fact of his once having been a registrar of probate; that, in order to induce the giving of the deed, he made untrue representations as regarded the validity of the will under which the deceased derived his title to the property, and also made misleading representations as to the liabilities of the deceased. Further, that he advised the plaintiff not to take legal advice. On appeal, the decision of the trial Judge, setting aside the deed with costs, was affirmed with costs. Held, that the delay of a year in adopting the proceedings to set the deed aside, in the absence of anything to show prejudice to the defendant, was not ground enough to justify the Court in refusing the plaintiff the relief to which she had shown herself entitled. Held, also, that the objection that the plaintiff had not offered to return the note forming the consideration for the deed, before action, was sufficiently met by the fact that the note was in the plaintiff's hands, was produced at the trial, and was in a position to be restored. COX v. McKENZIE. Negligence Action for injuries sustained by plaintiff's children by the careless driving of defendant's servant-Allegation of loss of servicesCourt divided as to sufficiency of—Questions of law arising before trial. Two of the plaintiff's children, aged respectively six and four years, were crossing a street in the town of Truro, when the defendant's carriage, driven by his servant, came suddenly around an adjacent corner. The children were knocked down, trampled by the horses, and severely injured. In an action claiming damages for the injuries received by the children by reason of the negligent driving of the defendant's servant, the following words in the statement of claim were relied upon as a sufficient allegation of loss of services to the plaintiff: "By the blows, falls, and tramp lings the children were bruised and injured about their bodies and heads, as well as internally, and in consequence thereof they were for months, and one is still ill, and is suffering, and is unable to move about and perform the acts and duties that children of their age are in the habit of doing and are expected to do, etc." The Court was equally divided. Held, per WEATHERBE, J., and GRAHAM, E.J., that the words used were sufficient. Per RITCHIE and TOWNSHEND, JJ., that, in the absence of an allegation that the children were residing with or in the service of their father, no inference of loss of services by the plaintiff could be drawn from the words used. The issues in law having been heard by the Judge before the trial: Per WEATHERBE, J.-Where objections in law are to be heard before the trial the proper practice is to enter the cause for argument before the full Court. In re WALLACE BAY ABOITEAU. Municipal corporations-Dyke rate-Motion to quash—Dyke commissioners, functions of R. S., 5th Series, c. 109—Disqualification—Estoppel. An application was made to quash a rate imposed upon the proprietors of Wallace Bay Dyked Marsh, on the ground that the commissioners selected to execute the works were themselves proprietors in the marsh, and therefore incompetent to discharge the duties imposed upon commissioners appointed under the R. S. c. 52. The rate was also attacked on the ground that certain expenses incurred by the commissioners for travel, legal services, etc., were improperly included in the amount assessed. It appeared that the expenses were incurred in connection with obtaining a grant from the provincial government in aid of the work; that the expenses were deducted from this grant, and the balance expended. One of the proprietors also complained that he was assessed for a larger acreage than he actually possessed. |